HISTORY OF GREECE ABBOTT HISTORY OF GREECE BY EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A., LL.D. JOWETT LECTURER IN GREEK HISTORY AT BALLIOL COLLEGE PART III. From the Thirty Years Peace to the Fall of the Thirty at Athens, 445-403 B.C. New York: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS London: LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO. 1900 All rights reserved PREFACE In the first five chapters of this volume I have repeated some passages from my Pericles (1891) with corrections and other changes. I am sorry for the delay in the appearance of the hook, but owing to other work I have been unable to finish it sooner, and even now I am conscious that the labour which I have bestowed on it has been inadequate to the subject. Greek History in the Fifth Century B.C. has an interest which is as inexhaustible as it is imperishable. I am greatly indebted to Mr. W. H. Forbes, Tutor of Balliol College, for numerous suggestions and improvements; to Mr. H. W. C. Davis, Fellow of All Souls1 College, and Mr. H. Williamson, of Balliol College, for their kindness in reading over my proof-sheets; and to Mr. F. H. Dale, Fellow of Merton College, for generous help in the Index. E. A. Oxford, December 1899. CONTENTS CHAPTER I. PAGE The History of Athens from the Thirty Years' Peace to the Founding of Amphipolis, 445-437, .... 1 A.—Athens and the West: the Foundation of Thurii, . 15 B.—The Samian Revolt: Athens and the East, . . 28 C.—Athens and the North : the Founding of Amphipolis, 37 CHAPTER II. Athens in 445-432,........49 CHAPTER III. The Causes of the Peloponnesian War, . . > 67 CHAPTER IV. Greece on the Eve of the War,......94 CHAPTER V. The War down to the Death of Pericles, 431-429, . .1ll CHAPTER VI. From the Death of Pericles to the end of 427, . . 155 CHAPTER VII. From the beginning of 426 to the end of 425, . . . 189 CHAPTER VIII. From the beginning of 424 to the Peace of Nicias, 421, . 223 viii CONTENTS. CHAPTER IX. PAGE From the Conclusion of the Peace to the Invasion of Sicily, 421-415,........267 CHAPTER X. Affairs in Sicily, 422-413, . . . . . • . 295 CHAPTER XL From the end of the Sicilian Expedition to the Fall of the Four Hundred, 413-411, . . . . . . . 365 CHAPTER XII. From the Fall of the Four Hundred to the Fall of the Thirty, 411-403,........420 CHAPTER XIII. Events in Sicily from the Destruction of the Athenian Armament to the Peace with Carthage, 413-405, . 476 CHAPTER XIV. Literature, Art, Society, etc.,......490 APPENDIX I. Expenditure on the War,.......530 APPENDIX II. The Revolution of the Four Hundred, .... 532 INDEX, . ........541 LIST OF MAPS-PLAN of the Island of Sphagia (Sphacteria) and the Harbour of Navarino,......206 Syracuse during the Athenian Siege, . . . 327 CORRIGENDUM P. 105,1. 7 from foot:—Fw* " That the cities of the confederacy made some kind of contribution is stated by Thucydides, and the statement is confirmed," etc., read "That the Sicilian allies of the confederacy were expected to make a contribution to the expenses of the war is stated by Thucydides, and the statement is confirmed in regard to other allies," etc. I may add that the Spartans, after the war was ended, demanded from the Eleans their share of the cost, but for this fact we have only the authority of Diodorus (xiv. 17); Xenophon does not mention it. CHAPTER I. THE HISTORY OF ATHENS FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' PEACE TO THE FOUNDING OF AMPHIPOLIS, 445-437. I. By the terms of the peace of 445 Athens was deprived of all the advantages which she had acquired in the preceding fifteen years. She was no longer the Lossof Athens greatest power in Central Greece, with garri- under the Peace sons at Pegae and Nisaea to secure the isthmus of Corinth; she no longer held points of vantage in Achaea and at Troezen, from which she could keep in check the most enterprising of the* allies of Sparta—Sicyon, Corinth, and Epidaurus; she was confined within the limits of her own territory, between two sections of the enemy. It is true that she retained Naupactus, through which she might still hope to exercise some influence in Western Greece; it is true that Aegina, the "eyesore of the Peiraeus," though an independent, was nevertheless a tributary ally,* and without a fleet of her own; but this was a sorry salvage from the wreck of a land empire, which enabled Athens to employ Boeotian hoplites in the field and place her ships in Megarian harbours, which gave- her the command of the Saronic and Corinthian gulfs. The collapse becomes the more remarkable when we compare the present and the previous conduct of the Athenians. In 456, two months after the defeat of Tanagra, they were again in the field, and by the victory of Oenophyta placed the Wantofv-whole of Boeotia at their feet; but no attempt ous policy at had been made to retrieve the disaster of A*hens-Coronea. Thebes gathered the cities of Boeotia round her in a close and hostile confederation; the Phocians and vol. III. A 2 CONDUCT OF SPARTA IN 446. [I. I. Locrians threw off their allegiance, but Athens never called out a single soldier. Since 449 there had been no war— either Hellenic or foreign—to exhaust her resources, and but a small part of her army had been engaged at Coronea. By a vigorous dash at Tanagra, which lay within two days' march of the city, she might have secured captives to hold as hostages for those Athenians who had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and, the balance thus restored, a second contest would have been possible, but she preferred to abandon her position in Central Greece without a struggle. In the peace which Cimon concluded with Sparta in 451 (vol. ii. p. 338), she was allowed to retain her acquisitions in the Peloponnesus and the Megarid; but now, after five years of undisturbed possession, she is called upon to renounce them all, and she obeys the call without any attempt at resistance. The conduct of the'Spartans is hardly less astonishing. The invasion of Attica by Plistoanax was obviously part of a prearranged scheme, in which Euboea was conduct of the deeply concerned. In their revolt the Euboeans Lacedae- must have relied, not only on the Boeotians, " whom they had helped to freedom, but even more on the Lacedaemonians, who invaded Attica in order to divert the Athenians from active operations in the island. For however impregnable the walls of Athens might be, Pericles could not venture to leave the city while the Lacedaemonian army was in Attica. Yet suddenly, at the most critical moment in the fortunes of Euboea, Sparta throws her over, and the invaders return home. It is not difficult to produce instances of Lacedaemonian treachery when the safety of Lacedaemonians was involved {infra, p. 197), but in the present instance the Lacedaemonians were in no danger, and they gained no advantage—at least none to which we can point—by returning home. The Lacedaemonians explained the mystery by the commonplace that Plistoanax had been bribed; but can we suppose that the ephors of Sparta allowed their policy to be so easily thwarted ? I. 2.] A THEN IAN FOLIC Y A FTER CIMON. 3 Archidamus was at Sparta, and he at least was above suspicion. Why was the experienced soldier left at home, and a mere youth placed in command of the expedition? Why was no effort made to persist in the policy by which Plistoanax was sent into Attica ? Why Was Euboea allowed to fall back into the hands of Athens ? 2. If we had fuller information we should no doubt be able to explain the action of Sparta and Athens in this period; but in our present ignorance we cannot go beyond conjecture, and of the causes here suggested it is impossible to say which is the true one. (a) The first symptoms of a decline of vigour, or, at any rate, of a change of policy, at Athens are seen immediately after the death of Cimon. The Athenians were victorious at Salamis; but no attempt poiiCyat was made to gain Cyprus for the Delian Athens after confederacy; the island was abandoned to its fate; war with Persia was dropped. The death of the great soldier, whose life had been dedicated to foreign wars, seems to have brought with it a cessation of warlike enterprise. In the next four years the two commanders who stood next to Cimon in reputation—Tolmides and Myronides — also passed away. The extension of Athenian power on land had been largely due to their victories, and Tolmides fell in endeavouring to maintain what he had helped to win.1 Their places were taken by men of as little capacity as ambition, whom the citizens distrusted and the enemy despised. Pericles himself was by no means a distinguished general; his caution amounted to timidity, and unless in command of an overwhelming force, he shrank from the risk of an engagement. From this period we trace a decline of the Athenian army, of which the last stage was reached on the fatal field of Delium in 424—a decline for which Pericles 1 The date of the death of Myronides is unknown, but we never hear of him after the expedition to Thessaly in 454. Tolmides, of course, fell at Coronea. 4 ATHENS AND HER ALLIES. [1.2. was himself largely to blame. But without an efficient army, carefully trained, and led by able generals, Athens could not hope to maintain her position in Central Hellas. (b) In Gimon Athens also lost the citizen who was most influential at Sparta. It was he who concluded the peace of 451; and though he had been unable to prevent relations*!* * tne breach between Athens and Sparta after Athens and the affair of Ithome, and had shown himself par a* loyal and patriotic in the conflict which followed, his presence at Athens was at least a guarantee that Lacedaemonian interests were not overlooked. After his death there was no one to take his place in this respect, and we may conjecture that in the interval between 449 and 445 a spirit of distrust and suspicion arose among the Lacedaemonians, who might suppose that Athens abandoned war with Persia merely to renew the war in Greece with greater vigour. Under such circumstances they would in 445 insist on severer terms than those which they accepted in 451. (c) Other and more important causes of the change in the spirit and policy of Athens may be sought in the attitude Attitude of the °* ^ie allies and the influence of Pericles. The allies towards calamitous reverse which overtook Athens in Athens. Egypt could not fail to have an effect on the cities of the Anatolian coast • those which were discontented with their position were more inclined to seek aid from Persia; and the Persian satraps began to renew their hopes of collecting the tribute at which the cities were assessed to the Great King. In 450 there had been troubles at Miletus, Erythrae, and Colophon, which could only be composed by the presence of Athenian garrisons and commissioners. In 446 followed the revolt of Euboea, the largest of all the allied islands, the nearest to Athens, and the most important for the supply of the city. In this period also, so far as we can draw conclusions from the quota-lists, the tribute received from the allies was constantly diminishing: in 450 the total amount was reduced from 520 talents to 470 or 480; and by 440 it amounted to 454 talents only, of which I. 2.] WAR WITH PERSIA DISCONTINUED. 5 not more than 400 were paid. In the years 447-445 twelve cities in the Carian district, two in the Ionian, and two in the Thracian, disappear from the list of those paying tribute to Athens.1 Such indications of decline were not lost on Pericles, for even if he did not anticipate so serious an outbreak as he was soon to experience in the revolt of Samos, he could not fail to perceive that if the Athenian empire was to be maintained, Athens must keep her allies well in hand; she must concentrate her power on the sea; she must be invincible in the Aegean, or the cities would rebel and the tribute remain unpaid. With this object in view he allowed the old policy of war with Persia to drop, for experience had shown how fatal was a reverse in the east, and how little could be war with gained by further conquests. A maritime Persia dropped: power could inflict no serious injury on the comes an territory of the king, while the occupation of emPire-Cyprus, which was, perhaps, possible, would involve unceasing conflict with the Phoenician fleet. The revolt in Egypt, if not wholly suppressed, was so far crushed that no reasonable hope of success remained, and it would be the worst folly to waste the resources of Greece in supporting projects so chimerical as the resuscitation of the Pharaohs. On the other hand, the traditional policy of the Delian League— the object for which it had been founded—could not be abandoned without danger. When war with Persia was discontinued, the allies might claim that their contributions should be discontinued also. Their arguments must be met; their irritation soothed, or, if not soothed, suppressed. The change from the Delian confederacy to the Athenian empire was an undertaking which might well absorb the energies of the statesman and the resources of his city. At the time of the defeat of Coronea, Pericles was engaged i Busolt in Philologus, 1882, pp. 714, 710, 701, 684. G. O. iii. 1. 556. 6 THE TWO POWERS IN GREECE. [I. 3. in this difficult undertaking, and in his judgment Athens was unequal to the double task of maintaining her ground in Boeotia and the Aegean. Athens was safer without her possessions on land, which were not so much strongholds of her power, as positions inviting attack and provoking resentment. It was better to send out Athenian citizens to hold the allies in check as " cleruchs," than to waste their lives in garrison duty. And when, owing to the apparent tameness of his policy, Athens was attacked by a general conspiracy, Pericles showed that he was prepared for still Pericles secures the empire of further concessions; he was willing not only Athens by the ^o withdraw from Central Greece, but to abandon the Athenian possessions in the Peloponnesus also, if, by so doing, he could secure his principal object and maintain the power of Athens at sea. In this policy he was entirely successful, owing to the selfish stupidity of the Lacedaemonians, who were content that Euboea should be subject to Athens, if only the Peloponnesus were freed from the presence of Athenians; who, regardless of Corinthian interests, allowed Naupactus to remain in the hands of Athens, and regardless of their own, did not even stipulate that the Messenian garrison should be removed, while Aegina, the great Dorian island, famous alike in legend and history, so far from being rescued for the Peloponnesian confederacy, continued to be a helpless ally of Athens, paying tribute which went to increase the Athenian fleet. In the calculations of Pericles such concessions were not too dearly bought by the evacuation of Troezen and the Megarian ports. 3. From this point of view the peace of 445 becomes intelligible. It marks the end of an old policy, and the Greece now beginning of a new one. Greece is now divided divided into into two sections, each of which takes its own two halves. j.ne - the Athenians on sea, the Peloponnesians on land. The division corresponded roughly with the division of Dorians and lonians, a division which had long been keenly felt in the colonies of the east and west. Such a I. 4-1 DANGER OF COLLISION. 7 partition might seem to offer the fairest prospect of lasting peace. The Athenians, by renouncing their acquisitions in the Peloponnesus, withdrew into the circle of the Deli an confederacy, which they had administered for more than thirty years, with the tacit acquiescence, at any rate, of the Pelopon-nesians. The Lacedaemonians by abandoning Euboea, when she was struggling for independence, made it plain that they were not prepared to look beyond the Peloponnesus, or enter on a war with Athens in the cause of the oppressed allies. The prospect was delusive ; on the one _. * r . . y ., , , The partition hand, complete partition was impossible, and imperfect, and on the other, Pericles still cherished ambitions, hkel,3f.t?lead to i i it • i a collision. which, if realised, made a collision with the Peloponnesians inevitable. Athens still retained Naupactus, which was not only the key of the Corinthian gulf, but an outpost in Western Greece, where Corinth traded through her numerous colonies; and she garrisoned the town with Messenians, who were the deadly enemies of Lacedaemon. Among the cities of the Delian League were some who were bound by a double allegiance to rival sovereigns, such as Potidaea, which was not only a Corinthian colony, governed by officers sent from Corinth, but a subject ally of Athens, engaged to the payment of tribute. Such a situation was delicate, if no more, and nothing but consummate tact could prevent a collision. Worse still, for the hope of lasting peace, was the infatuated passion for Sicily, which haunted the Athenians, and increased in violence when the war with Persia no longer occupied their minds. For conquest in Sicily meant conquest of the Dorians, of the colonies of Corinth, which were closely connected with their mother-city, and formed the foundation of her prosperity. 4# In this new policy Pericles had the support of the poorer classes in the city and Peiraeus, whom he had taught to look on the empire as a convenient source of subsistence (vol. ii. p. 405). And the names of Callias and Andocides, who are mentioned among the plenipotentiaries for conclud- 8 OSTRACISM OF THUCYDIDES. [I. 4. ing the peace, indicate that some of the oldest and richest families in Athens followed his lead. The Cimonian party _ .. , took another view. They were dissatisfied at Parties at J Athens. Os- the cessation of war with Persia, with which *rhC1SId*df ^e name °f tneir great hero was so inseparably connected; and still more dissatisfied at their own position in the city, where Pericles was carrying all before him. The party had been organised by Thucydides as it had never been organised before, but the result was merely a deeper cleft between the aristocrats and the demos. In eloquence Thucydides was no match for Pericles, and among the Athenians eloquence outweighed argument; but the disasters of the last few years, and the strong feeling which many of the citizens entertained about the use made of the contributions of the allies, inspired the oligarchical party with confidence. Was it not possible to throw the blame of the agitation among the allies, and of the shameful peace, which the agitation had made necessary, on the all-powerful Pericles, and by this means to create a reaction 1 On these grounds, in the winter of 445 ostracism was proposed in the city, and the proposal being accepted, the usual arrangements were made for voting in the following spring. But when the day came for decision,, the sentence fell, not on Pericles, but on Thucydides.1 Plato informs us that Thucydides was " of a great family and a man of influence, not at Athens only, but throughout Thucydides: his Hellas." He belonged to that class to whom character and Athens owed so much, and on whom, in the pohcy. (jayg Q£ exfcreme democracy, she looked back as the saviours of the city. To call him an oligarch is unjust, unless we limit the meaning of the word, for he was not an oligarch in the sense in which Antiphon or Pisander were oligarchs. He was an oligarch in the sense in which men 1 Vol. ii. p. 414; Pint. Per. 14, 15. Curtius, and Grote (more doubtfully) support the view that the ostracism was the work of the oligarchical party: Curt. Griech. Gesch. ii. 186 ; Grote, iv. 160 (1862). I-S] SUPREMACY OF PERICLES. 9 are oligarchs who believe that the masses require leaders and that the leading spirits in any community at any one time are few. He was an oligarch in his opposition to Pericles who used the public revenues ,to win the favour of the mob for his own purposes, in his friendly feeling towards Sparta, and in his desire to preserve something of a paternal government at Athens.1 But he was also a sincere friend of the demos, and a patriot, who endeavoured to establish the greatness of Athens on the only basis on which it could endure, by treating the allies with strict and scrupulous justice. 5. With the ostracism of Thucydides the opposition of the oligarchs was silenced. Pericles was now supreme, and could carry out his aims with a free hand. He had cleared the ground on every side. In Hellas he had secured peace and the recognition of Athens as mistress of an empire; war with Persia was at an end, at any rate de facto; and Athens was united under one party as it had never been united before. Pericles occupied a unique position. He wielded an almost absolute authority in a state where every one was an enthusiast for civil and personal freedom. He ruled, but Position and it was by the will and with the support of the aims of people. In the language of Aristotle we might Pencles-say that he was superior to the people, and therefore their natural king, but in the constitution he was merely a magistrate who could be deposed from his position at any moment, dependent on the popular will, and on his own power to control it. He administered resources far greater than those of any other city in Greece, and he administered them as he pleased, if he could persuade the people to support his measures. The city of which he was the head was in some respects the most civilised which the world has ever seen. Pericles could avail himself of the services of Phidias in art, and of Sophocles in tragedy ; Anaxagoras and Herodotus were 1 Arist. Athen. Pol. 28, and Sandys' note; Plato, Meno, 94. 10 PERICLES' VIEWS OF EMPIRE, [I. 6. among his friends. He could appreciate all that was excellent in literature ; his ideal of government was among the highest which have ever heen proposed. Fortunate indeed should we be, if we had before us a full and accurate record of the years during which he ruled Athens; we should then understand what were his aims at home and abroad, and by what means he sought*to realise them. Unhappily we possess nothing more than a record of a few isolated facts, mostly of uncertain date, which rest on indifferent evidence, and stand in doubtful connection with one another. 6. Pericles is often spoken of as a man of wide Panhellenic views, who sought to unite Hellas by welding the various states, Dorian and Ionian, into one nation. This view is only true to a very limited degree. He did indeed attempt, as we shall see, to bring the Hellenes together in various ways, and to break down some of the barriers which divided them, but these attempts, which were a subordinate part of his policy, ended in failure. His chief aims were not Pan-The Athenian hellenic but Panathenian. He wished to create empire as con- an Athenian empire which should embody as p^dcfes3' *ar8e a Part °* Hellas as possible. At first he may have dreamed of an empire by land and sea, but, if he did, he was compelled to abandon the idea as beyond the strength of Athens, and from 445 he confined himself to the sea, as we have shown. He had no intention of going back to a confederacy, or of governing the Athenian empire on the old basis of the Delian League. Athens was not to be the leader of a number of equal states, but an imperial city exacting tribute from subjects, and using the tribute for her own purposes. With the exception of Lesbos, Chios, and Samos, all the cities which had once enjoyed the privilege of an equal vote as allies, were now reduced to the condition of subjects, who paid tribute to the common chest, but had no voice in a common council; their means of defence were taken from them; their walls pulled down. Some were allowed to manage their own affairs; in others there were Athenian garrisons and commissioners, maintaining I. 6.] DIFFICULTY OF THE TASK. 11 institutions which had been established in the interests of Athens; and nearly all were compelled to carry their most important cases at law to Athens to be decided by an Athenian jury. Such a political condition was, from a Greek point of view, little better than slavery \ and, from any point of view, it implied a loss of independence. The Athenian empire was an outrage on Greek political feeling; it was a tyranny, and felt to be a tyranny, though exercised by a city which claimed to be the The Athenian ? most advanced of Greek democracies. Im- empire a perialism, in any form, was inconsistent with tyfanny-the Greek love of autonomy, with the march of Greek politics; and Athens was detested by Greece for the same reason that Pisistratus was detested by the Athenians. When she deprived the subject allies of their means of defence, she acted as the tyrant who deprived his citizens of their arms ; when she thrust her institutions upon them, she acted as the tyrant who made his will the law of the state; in deciding their cases in her courts she acted as the tyrant who constituted himself the judge of his citizens; and the democratical institutions of Athens only made more galling the contrast between her freedom and the subjection of the allies. The problem which lay before Pericles was undoubtedly one of great difficulty—so difficult, indeed, that in the world's history it has not been solved more than three or four times. To combine a number of independent communities into one whole, without destroying, on the one hand, the independence of the several cities, or limiting, on the other, the effective force of the combined body, is perhaps the highest achievement of political wisdom. Our own statesmen, and our own generation, are deeply conscious of the difficulties which attend such a task, and in the Grecian world the difficulties were greatly increased owing to the intense love of autonomy which prevailed in Greek cities, and the jealousies which divided them. Pericles did not even attempt such a combination, but, on the contrary, by suppressing the Delian synod, he removed the means through 12 THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE. [1-7. which the cities might have been brought together on an equal footing, and by dropping the war with Persia he destroyed the motive which made union possible. 7. Politically, then, and as a step in the development of constitutional history, the empire was a blunder on the part of Athens, and it was a blunder which the fmp"re!i°tfthe Greeks neVer f°rg0t' What Can be Said 0n ensured the the other side 1 The empire of Athens is AeCgerany0fthe offcen def ended, even by writers of liberal opinions, on the ground that it brought to a large part of Greece the blessings of security and civilisation. It is argued, and with truth, that under the rule of Athena the Aegean was cleared of Persians and pirates; that the cities prospered, and trade developed; that the mutual quarrels and jealousies of the cities were held in check. All this is true; but the same may be said with equal truth of the despot's rule over his slaves. They also eat and drink and sleep in security—from every danger but one. A despotism is often the best means of attaining material comforts, but it is nevertheless a despotism involving the destruction of civil growth and freedom. It is no support to this line of defence to show that the contributions which Athens demanded from her allies were, as a rule, very light— that Byzantium and Miletus paid sums to the Athenian treasury which would not have sufficed to maintain a dozen ships at sea for a summer's cruise. Slavery may be cheaper than freedom, but few will come forward to defend it on that ground. The amounts paid to Athens were certainly small, but Athens raised or lowered them much as she pleased, and was strict in exacting arrears. It is true, too, that Pericles, while maintaining the empire for the benefit of Athens, sought to give the allies a share of The em ire a tne Sood tnings which the Athenians enjoyed, means of diffus- Athens was to become a centre of light and ing civilisation. leading throughout Hellas; her subjects were to be attracted to her by splendid festivals ; they were to be instructed and amused by her orators and poets; they were I. 8.] A SOURCE OF SECURITY, ETC. 13 to find in the Athenians examples of the highest refinement, to copy Athenian manners, to talk Attic like Athenians, and win the admiration of their countrymen by their metro: politan polish. Athens was to be the school of Greece.1 She was to be the home of art, poetry, and thought; the glorious city to which every eye in Hellas turned with pride. That was the aim of Pericles, and a noble aim it was; but in endeavouring to accomplish it, he fell into the same error which in previous generations had misled the tyrants of Greece and Sicily. They too had filled their courts with poets and artists in the hope that by splendour and refinement they might blind the world to the essential narrowness of their government, forgetting that culture can take no root where it is merely an exotic, a gift and not an acquisition. 8. On the ground then that it was a source of security and civilisation to Hellas, we can only defend the Athenian empire by arguments which may be used in A defence of despotic. rule. Shall we take up by right of another line, paradoxical perhaps, but Hellenic, suPenonty-and claim for Athens the right to rule her allies, because she was their superior, just as on the Aristotelian theory the best man in the city is the natural ruler of his fellow-citizens 1 If there is one lesson of history more valuable than another it is this: that the world owes almost every advantage which it has gained in its onward course to its greatest men. From them, and from no other source, have we derived law and religion, political and social order: the great thoughts which animate mankind, and the great actions which live for ever. Shall we deny to states what we grant to lawgivers and philosophers ? If among a number of communities there exists one community which is supreme in civilisation and advanced beyond the rest in political institutions, has it the right to rule over them ? Not the right surely, unless, perhaps, in cases where the disparity between the ruling 1 Time. ii. 41 j vii. 63. 14 THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE. [1.8. city and the subjects is overwhelming, and the blessings which her rule confers are indisputable. But between Athens and the cities which sank to be her subjects, there was no very great disparity except in power. Down to the Ionian revolt the cities of the Asiatic coast, and the islands of the Aegean, wTere far in advance of Athens, or any other city of the peninsula; and though they never fully recovered from the disasters of the Persian war, they were still active homes of commerce and thought, and they cherished the memory of a glorious past. Nor was Athens chosen by her subject allies to govern them; she often forced her rule upon unwilling cities, and sought her own advantage in doing so. There is yet another plea which may be urged in support of the Athenian empire. It may be said that Athens was Ath form d alwavs ready, to support the cause of the op-a support to pressed against the rich and powerful. There democracy. wag Rot a down-trodden "demos" in any allied city, however insignificant and remote, which did not feel that they were at least within reach of help. In any struggle with the oligarchs they could count on the sympathy and support of Athens. At Mytilene the people were no sooner in power than they placed the city in the hands of the Athenians; and the history of Samos is still more striking in this respect. The tyranny of Athens was, at any rate, a refuge from a tyranny more crushing and immediate, and Athenian ships, even when they came with the tax-gatherer on board, brought to many a message of hope. To ardent democrats the Athenian empire from this point of view will be more than justified. But democracies are sometimes as selfish as they are inconsistent. The support which Athens gave to democracy perpetuated the intestine strife of cities, a strife which she used for her own purposes, and some of the most cruel scenes in the Peloponnesian war arose out of her ill-timed intervention. So we may argue for and against the Athenian empire without coming to a definite conclusion. The empire was raised on an insecure foundation ; and for this reason it was I. 9.] IT FAILED TO SA TISFY GREEK FEELING. 15 foredoomed to perish, not from external attack, but from its own internal want of coherence. "Politics," said Burke, "ought to be adjusted, not to human reasoning, but to human nature," and among the Greeks both reason and nature were opposed to imperialism in any form. Yet the blessings which the empire conferred on Greece were great: security, humanity, sympathy with the oppressed—these were not common qualities in ancient Hellas, but at least they existed at Athens in a larger measure than elsewhere.1 9. In the ten years which followed the peace, of 445 we can distinguish three important events in the history of Athens—the founding of Thurii, the revolt of Samos, and the colonisation of Amphipolis. Of these I will now give an account, including in the story some details of the relation in which Athens stood at this time to the west, the east, and the north. A.—ATHENS AND THE WEST: THE FOUNDATION OF THURIL In the years when Athens was at the height of her power, that is, in the years from 459 to 451, Pericles had striven to acquire the command of the Corinthian gulf. The Messenians from Ithome had been placed secure the at Naupactus, which commanded the entrance ; Corinthian eulf-Achaea had been received into alliance, Athenians had been placed at Pegae, at the head of the gulf; repeated attempts had been made to gain possession of Sicyon, and Pericles had himself led a force against Oeniadae in Acarnania. The object of these acquisitions and attempts is not difficult to discern. Through the Corinthian gulf lay the way to those 1 In Thucydides the Athenians defend the acquisition of their empire by their conduct in the Persian wars ; they maintain it from motives of security and interest: pdXio-ra \i*v vno beovs, etrevra be koi Tiprjs, varrepov kcu aXpeXias . . . irav IA€yiv 2vftapiTp a>*icre rrjv 2vj3apip; in the second, 0€TraXoi crvvcoKicrav. VOL. III. B 18 FOUNDATION OF THURII, 44S. [I. 10. the project was warmly taken up, especially by Lampon, one of the numerous prophets of the day, who at this time was very influential with the people, and in favour with Pericles.1 The god of Delphi, when asked for his sanction, defined the site of the new colony in terms as alluring as they were The foundation ambiguous. It was to be planted where men of Thurii. drank water by measure, but ate their meal unmeasured ! Colonists came forward not from Athens only but from various parts of Peloponnesus; from Elis, Arcadia, and Achaea; from Boeotia and Central Greece, and even from the islands of the Aegean. Ten ships were fitted out at Athens and despatched under the guidance of Lampon and Xenocritus, with whom sailed Dionysius, known as the " Copper" from his desire to introduce copper money at Athens. On arriving in Italy, the emigrants discovered, at a short distance from the site of the ancient town, a spring fitted with a bronze tube which the inhabitants called the bushel. This seemed to indicate the measurement of water, while the well-known fertility of the region promised an inexhaustible supply of grain. The conditions imposed by the oracle being thus fulfilled, a wall was built round the fountain, and a new city arose, called Thurii, from Thuria (gushing), the name of the spring (443).2 The town which thus arose was not a mere collection of houses, each built as the fancy of the owner might The new city suggest; it was carefully laid out under the built by Hippo- supervision of the most famous architect of the amus' day. Among those who went from Athens to Thurii was Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, of Miletus, 1 We first hear of Lampon in the days when Pericles and Thucy-dides were in opposition, i.e, before the ostracism of Thucydides: Plut. Per. 6; infra, p. 56. 2 Diod. xii. 10 ; Plut. Nic. 5. For the fertility of the region see Metagenes, Thuriopersae, in Kock, Com. Att. Frag. i. 706:— 6 fxh iroTajibs 6 Kpa0is rj/juv Kara(j)€p€i fid£as fxeyia-ras avrofidrovs pLCjiayfxivas, 6 §' €T€pOS a>06l KVfia VCKTTCQV Kd\ Kp€(OV icpOcou re ^arlboav elXvofieviav abroad, k.t.A. I. 10.] H1PP0DAMUS OF MILETUS. 19 & man of remarkable powers, speculative and practical; whose eager curiosity no department of knowledge escaped. We may picture him to ourselves as the friend of his countrywoman Aspasia, and brought by her into the Peri-clean circle. In the next century he was remembered as a man, whose abundance of long hair, and warm clothing, worn in summer no less than in winter, had drawn on him the eyes of all; as a student who posed as an authority in eVery department of natural philosophy; as a theorist who wrote about polities without being himself a politician; and as an architect who set a mode in the laying out of a city. The account which Aristotle gives of his political theories has many points of interest. He wished to establish a supreme court of appeal, and to allow juries to give a modified sentence—but the distinctive feature of his speculations was a certain mathematical precision. Hippodamus wished to have triplets everywhere; in his ideal.city the land, the citizens, and even the law-suits fell into three classes. A similar spirit governed his architecture; in all the towns which he planned, he introduced straight streets, running at right angles to each other. Before he left Athens, he had " cut up " the Peiraeus in this manner, and he now applied his principles in the building of Thurii. The town formed a square or oblong; four streets ran from end to end of it— the streets of Heracles, Aphrodite, Olympus, and Dionysus, which were crossed at right angles by the street of Heroes, the Thuria, and the Thurina. The whole was thus composed of twenty blocks of houses, conveniently intersected, and forming a striking contrast to the confusion of the ordinary Greek city.1 1 For Hippodamus, see Aristot. Pol. ii. c. 8, § 5 f.; and for the Hippodamean style, ib. iv. (vii.) c. 11 = 1330 &, 21 f., q 8e tg>v Ibiav olKrja-ecDV didSecris f)dia>v /lev vopifcrai kcu xp-qaifxcarfpa irepl ras aXkas irpaf-eis, av cvropos fj Kara rbv vc&repoy kcu rbv 'imroddficiov rponov. This " mode," however convenient, was thought to render a city less defensible in case of attack. 20 CONSTITUTION qF THURII. [I. II. II. But neither convenience of plan nor fertility of soil could save the new colony from the defects which arose inevitably out of its constitution. In founding their city the descendants of the Sybarites had attracted settlers by lavish offers; but when the town was built, and its existence assured, they showed a less generous spirit. They claimed to be the rightful owners of the soil, the real Internal quar- . , . reis at Thurii; founders of the colony; the rest were a foreign expulsion of the and subordinate class. In the division of the land they took the territory adjacent to the town for themselves, leaving only the most distant parts for others; the most honourable offices were reserved for them, and in offering sacrifice to the gods, their women had precedence. Such intolerable pretensions quickly led to an outbreak, in which the new colonists slew nearly all the Sybarites, and expelled the rest. This new victory left the conquerors in possession of an abundance of fertile land. They immediately invited a number of colonists from Greece to occupy it Fresh colonists J . ,., . . , , invited: con- on terms of equality :—an invitation widely stitutionof accepted. The city now rapidly increased in e C1 y* power: the Crotoniates, after the expulsion of the Sybarites, were, for a time at least, on friendly terms with the settlers, and a popular form of government was devised, in which all the inhabitants had a share. Ten tribes were established as at Athens, in three of which were included the colonists of the Peloponnesus; these were the Arcadian, Elean, and Achaean tribes; three others comprised the settlers from Boeotia and Central Hellas; these were the Boeotian, Amphictyonian, and Dorian tribes. In the remaining four were collected the colonists from Athens, Euboea, and other Ionian cities; these were the Athenian, Euboean, Ionian, and island tribes. Further details are unknown to us, but it is obvious that the city was a Hellenic colony; a settlement designed to prove that the jealousies of race and city could be forgotten; that Dorian and Ionian, Athenian and Boeotian could dwell together I. 12.] DORIANS AT THURII. 21 in unity. And in founding this colony Athens had taken a leading part.1 12. Whatever were the views with whict Pericles encouraged the foundation of Thurii—whether he saw in it the realisation of some Panhellenic scheme, or regarded it chiefly as a centre of Athenian influence in the west—they were doomed to disappointment. In a very few years the colonists were involved in wars, which arose apparently from their own aggressions. With Cleandridas, the exiled Spartan, to lead them, they not only Thurii; growth besieged Terina, a colony of old Sybaris, on the of the Dorian western coast of the peninsula, but endeavoured to acquire the fertile territory of Siris, a step which led to a conflict with Tarentum.2 Each city ravaged the lands of the other without any decisive advantage, but indirectly the war was damaging to Athenian interests, for Cleandridas, as he rose to power, favoured the Dorian element at the expense of the Ionian. In 434 there were seditions in the city, and question was raised:—Who was the true founder of the colony?—a clear proof that the colonists were no longer loyal to the Athenians. An appeal was made to Delphi; 1 Diodorus marks three stages in the foundation of Neo-Sybaris or Thurii: (1) The Sybarites gather together and found a city on the site of the old town ; this is in the archonship of Lysicrates, 453-452. (2) Six years afterwards this city is destroyed, and envoys are sent to Greece to invite colonists, who are established at Thurii. (3) The colonists quarrel; the Sybarites are expelled, and fresh settlers invited. The last two events, are placed in the same year—in the archonship of Callimachus, 446-445. But it is very improbable that the colonists were sent out, the town built, the Sybarites expelled, and additional colonists collected in one year. Nor is 446-445 a year in which the Athenians were likely to give much time to Italian affairs, at any rate till the peace with Sparta was settled. Moreover, we are told in Plut. Vit. Dec. Or. Lysias, that Thurii was founded in the archonship of Praxiteles, 444-443, and this agrees with Dionysius, Lysias, who puts the foundation twelve years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war (431 + 12 = 443). Diodorus, then, has put together in one year a series of events which began in 446, but were not concluded till three years later. See Busolt's exhaustive note, Oriech. Gesch. iii. 1. 523. 2 Diod. xii. 23. 22 THE A THENIANS A T NEAP0L1S. [I. 12. and the god set aside the claims of Athens by declaring himself and no other to be the founder. This was a gain for the Dorians, and a still greater gain was the settlement of the war with Tarentum by a friendly arrangement under which Thurians and Tarentines united in planting the new colony of Heraclea on the site of Siris, which was now for ever lost to the Athenians.1 With the ascendency of the Dorians the democratic government of Thurii was changed into* an oligarchy, and when in 415 Athens sent her fleet to the west, the city was closed against her.2 The last remnant of the unfortunate Sybarites, after their expulsion from Thurii, had settled on the Traeis, a river r already memorable for the defeat of their Advance of J the native ancestors. Here they were attacked and de- tnbes* stroyed by the Lucanians, who, following the example of the Campanians in Central Italy, began from this time forward to molest the cities of Magna Graecia. Thurii only saved herself from a like fate by hard fighting and the skill of Cleandridas.3 Some scanty notices have been preserved of other Athenian connections with Italy besides the colony at Thurii. In 413 ^ u a*u Athens renewed "an old alliance" with the Other Athenian connections king of the Messapians, and as such an alliance with Italy. would be useful to the inhabitants of Thurii in a contest with Tarentum, we may conjecture that it was originally formed when the two cities were at war for the possession of Siris.4 There was also a settlement of Athenians at Neapolis, and coins were issued from the 1 Diod. xii. 35, 36; Strabo, 264. 2 Aria tot. Pol. viii. (v.) 7, 6= 1307 a, 27 ff. Thuc. vi. 44. The anti-Athenian party was subsequently driven out by a revolution (Thuc. vii. 33), and help was given to Eurymedon and Demosthenes, but afterwards Thurian ships joined the Lacedaemonians in Asia. 3 Diodorus places the rise of the Campanians to power in 440 (xii. 31); Cumae fell into their hands in 423 at the latest. For the Sybarites, see Diodorus, xii. 22, who, however, calls the Lucanians Itruttii. For Thurii, see Polyaenus, ii. 10. 4 Duncker, Oesch. Alt. ix. 277; Thuc. vii. 33. I. 13.] SCHEMES OF PERICLES. 23 Neapolitan mint, bearing the head of Pallas with a helmet crowned with olive. The coins and the colony may be due to commerce; it is more difficult to account for the presence of Diotimus, an Athenian admiral, who is said to have sacrificed to Parthenope, the guardian, goddess of Neapolis, and to have established a torch race which the Neapolitans afterwards maintained as a yearly festival.1 13. We have spoken of the colonisation of Thurii as due, at least in part, to the wish of Pericles to bring the Greeks together under the lead of Athens, and perhaps Panhellenic we may follow the unity of subject so far as to schemes of mention here two other attempts of a similar Pencles-nature, "Panhellenic schemes," they are sometimes called, which owed their origin directly in the one case, and indirectly in the other, to Pericles. In these he not only endeavoured, as in the foundation of Thurii, to break through the division into Dorians and Ionians, which would range the Dorians on the side of Sparta in any contest with that city, but he also sought to regain for Athens the position which she was losing by abandoning the war with Persia, and to attract to Attica the same religious veneration which gathered rouijd Olympia and Delphi. Our knowledge of the first of these schemes is derived from Plutarch, who tells us that at the time when the Lacedaemonians were beginning to be greatly distressed at the rise of Athens,; Pericles en- gressofthe couraged the people to aim at a still higher Greeks-position. With this object he brought forward a decree that all the Greeks, whether in Europe or in Asia, should be invited to send envoys to a conference at Athens for the purpose of discussing some questions of national interest. The temples which the Persians had destroyed were still un-restored; the offerings vowed in the great war had not been fully rendered; no definite arrangement had been made for 1 Strabo, p. 246 ; Head, Historia Num. p 32; Timaeus, Frag. 99 M. The date is uncertain: Aiorifios 5e els NediroXiv rjXOev, ore (TTpaTrjyos kv rap 'ABrjvaiav cVoXcftct rots SiKeXots, Tim. loc. tit. 24 THE CONGRESS. [I. 13- th e control of the sea or the preservation of peace. These were matters in which every Greek had an interest, and they could only be discussed in a Panhellenic conference. Twenty Athenians, men of more than fifty years of age, were chosen as envoys, of whom five visited the Ionians and Dorians in Asia, and the islands as far as Lesbos and Rhodes; five more were sent to the Greeks in the Hellespont, and in Thrace as far as Byzantium. Other five went to Boeotia, Phocis, and the Peloponnesus, whence they passed through Locris to Acarnania and Ambracia; the remainder visited the Oeteans of the Maliac gulf, the Achaeans of Phthiotis, and the Thessalians. But the scheme fell to the ground; nowhere was there any response to the invitation; not a single envoy appeared at Athens, and the attempt to make the city a centre of Hellas completely failed. We cannot satisfactorily explain the collapse, because we do not know at what date the proposal was made; but if it is rightly placed after the peace of 445, the Lacedaemonians must have received with some amusement a project in which Athens claimed to take a leading part in Hellenic affairs, and to resuscitate for her own interests that national antipathy to the barbarians, which, when her own interests seemed to demand it, she had so readily allowed to subside. The Thebans also, who, after many years of decline, were again becoming a power in Greece, were very unlikely to support a scheme which would place their past conduct in an unfavourable light, while the allies of Athens were aware, from their experience, that no project of national unity would lighten their subjection to the imperial city. If the Athenians were in earnest in asking their advice, why had they allowed the Delian synod to perish %x 1 Plutarch, Per. 17, is our only authority for this scheme, which he represents as a decree proposed by Pericles. He explains the failure of it by the opposition of the Lacedaemonians, AaKebaifiopiav V7T€PaVTLOi>6€VT(OV, CHS XeyCTCU, KCU TO 7Tp£>TOP €P TLikoiTOVVT)(rGi Tfjs neipas iXcyxOeLa-rjs. Duncker, on general grounds, puts the date at 444-443. I. 14.] THE ELEUS1NIAN MYSTERIES. 25 14. The second scheme was a project for associating the Greeks more closely with the sanctuary at Eleusis. In spite of traditions which spoke of it as an alien, or even a hostile community, Eleusis had long been cherished by the Athenians as a sacred place, the home of those holy goddesses whose mysteries were revered throughout Hellas. In the sixth century the Athenians seem to have fallen peculiarly under the influence of mysticism (vol. i. p. 463); Musaeus, Orpheus, and other soothsayers became at that time equal authorities with Homer on religious doctrines, of even superior authorities, because they dealt with subjects which do not find a place in the Homeric poems, and they also claimed to be of greater antiquity. The interest in mystical lore, the curiosity about a future life, and the desire for purification from this " muddy vesture of decay," were still further developed by the Pythagorean doctrines, which began to spread in Greece during the first half of the fifth century (vol. ii. p. 488). Legends also glorified the part which the deities of Eleusis had taken in the struggle against Persia; and it was in the precinct of Demeter, both at Plataea and Mycale, that the barbarians were finally defeated.1 In the years which followed the Persian war, the popularity of the mysteries seems to have greatly increased. In an inscription which is certainly anterior to the Popularity of Thirty Years' peace, we find traces of elaborate the mystenes-arrangements for the reception of foreigners at Athens during the mysteries. From the full moon of Metageitnion to the 10th of Pyanepsion (August - October) a sacred truce prevailed, of which any city might avail herself whose citizens wished to share in the holy rites; and while the truce lasted, the benefits extended equally to aliens at Athens and Athenians dwelling in alien cities. To receive the visitors a great temple was planned at Eleusis, which, though unfinished in the lifetime of Pericles, 1 Vol. ii. pp. 192, 233, and Herod, ix. 65, 101. 26 OFFERINGS OF CORN AT ELEUSIS. [I. 14. ranks next to the Parthenon among the buildings with which he adorned Attica. Hence the poet Sophocles in his Antigone could speak of the vale of Eleusinian Deo as a place where all found a welcome.1 But the mysteries were not the sole attraction of Eleusis; not through them only had blessings been conferred upon Eleusis the Greece by the holy goddesses. It was in the home of adjacent Eharian plain that corn had first agncu ure. been sown; it was from Eleusis that Demeter sent forth Triptolemus to till the earth, and teach mankind the art of agriculture. This legend was treated by Sophocles in the Triptolemus, one of the three plays with which in 469 he had obtained a victory over the veteran Aeschylus, and it was a subject peculiarly gratifying to Athenian pride. The Greeks with instinctive wisdom saw in agriculture the foundation of law and civilisation; Demeter, the earth-mother, was to them Demeter Thesmo-phoros, Demeter the founder of ordinances, the protector of house and home, married life and society. All the Hellenes, therefore, owed a debt to Eleusis, and Pericles was not slow to remind them of their obligation.2 The scheme was supported by the Delphian god, who commanded the Athenians to bring thankofferings from their harvests to the goddesses at Eleusis—a request which was afterwards extended to all the Greeks. Such oracles could not, of course, be neglected, and a commission was issued to report on the best means of giving effect to them. This report and the proposals which followed the publication of it have been preserved in the following inscription3:— 1 Hicks, Inscript. British Mus. i. 2; O. I. A. i. 1; iv. 1. 1; and iv. 3. I. Kirchhoff puts the inscription before 456. For the temple, see Baumeister, Denkmdler, Eleusis; Duncker, G. A. ix. 254 j Busolt, G. G. iii. 1. 473. Soph. Ant. 1120. 2 Cp. Isocrates, Paueyyr. § 29 f.; Dionys. Halicarn. i. 12. 8 For the oracles, see Isocr, I.e. ; Aristides, i. 167, Schol. 3. 65. I. 14.] REPORT ON THE OFFERINGS. 27 " The Athenians are to make offerings of their fruits to the two goddesses as their fathers have done, and as the response from Delphi commands : not less than one-sixth of a bushel from every hundred bushels of barley, and ^2™^ e not less than half a sixth from every hundred Eleusis. bushels of wheat—and this proportion is to be kept throughout, whatever the yearly produce may be, whether less or more. These offerings the demarchs must collect in the demes, and deposit them with the ministers at Eleusis. Three pits must be built at Eleusis in the manner of our fathers, wherever the ministers and the architect think fit, out of the funds belonging to the goddesses ; and in these pits the corn received from the demarchs is to be placed. The allies must also bring offerings in the same manner, and the cities must choose collectors of the corn in whatever manner will, in their opinion, help the collection of it; and when collected they must send it to Athens, and those who bring it must deposit it with the ministers at Eleusis. . . . The Council must elect heralds and send them to the cities to announce the resolutions. ... At these mysteries the Hierophant and the Torchbearer must call on the Hellenes to make offerings of their fruits as their fathers have done, and as the oracle from Delphi commands. . . . With all the rest of the cities of Greece the Council must communicate as it finds opportunity, telling them how the Athenians and their allies are making offerings of their fruits, and inviting them to bring offerings in the manner of their fathers, and according to the oracle from Delphi—but inviting only and not commanding. The contributions from these cities, if any are brought, are to be collected by the minister in the same manner as the rest." x This report was adopted on the motion of Lampon, and written on two stone pillars, of which one was placed in the temple at Eleusis, the other at Athens in the acropolis.2 To what extent the Greeks who were not allies of Athens responded to this invitation we cannot say. In the next century Isocrates asserts that the majority of the cities of Greece sent yearly to Athens some memorial of the benefits received in ancient days by the gift of agriculture; those 1 The remainder of the inscription refers to the use which is to be made of the offerings. 2 Dittenberger, Sylloge, 13. The date is after 446 (? 439). 28 SAMOS. CI. IS cities which neglected to do so were often commanded by the oracle at Delphi to send fruits as their fathers had done in old days. Yet Eleusis seems to have became a suffered much in the Peloponnesian war, for sacred place for ft jav on ^he high road of invasion, and the in- all the Greeks. .J .b, , , . ... vaders were not debarred by any sense of piety or obligation from laying waste the harvests from which the resources of the temple were drawn. For the eight or nine years during which Agis was encamped at Decelea (413-404) the procession from Athens to Eleusis, which was a conspicuous part of the celebration of the mysteries, was entirely suspended, with the exception of one year, when it was conducted under the protection of an armed force. We may conclude, therefore, that the sacred associations which the Athenians connected with Eleusis were but slightly felt by the rest of the Greeks, and the attempt to create in Attica a holy place, which might rank with Olympia and Delphi, met with little success. B.—THE SAMIAN REVOLT: ATHENS AND THE EAST. 15. In the midst of his schemes for consolidating the power of Athens, and raising the city to a higher position, Pericles found himself engaged in a conflict which threatened the existence of the Athenian empire. During the years which followed the expulsion of the Persians from Samos, an oligarchical government was in internal fac- power, but their rule was not acceptable to all tions at Samos. tne Samians; there was a strong democratical party in the state, who were only waiting for a favourable opportunity to overthrow the government with the help of the democracy of Athens. Such an opportunity came in the Quarrel with spring of 440. In the sixth year pf the peace, Miletus. Thucydides tells us, the Samians and Milesians went to war about Priene, and the Milesians were defeated. The cities were not on good terms; they were rivals in trade, and such near neighbours that each seemed to I. 15.] QUARREL WITH MILETUS, 29 prosper at the expense of the other. What gave rise to the quarrel about Priene, or what object each city had in view, is not recorded ; we do not even know which of the two was the aggressor in the contest. Priene, though a comparatively unimportant city, was charged with the maintenance of the Panionian festival, which was held on the northern slopes of Mycale, and it is possible that Samos wished to attain this privilege for herself. Or the Samians may have sought to plant a firmer foot on the mainland, and in fact they had already gone to war with Priene for the possession of some towns in the neighbourhood. Whatever the cause, it is surprising to find two cities of the Delian League going to war about a third, without consulting the wishes of the imperial city ; and as Samos still retained her independence, while Miletus was a subject city, we must suppose that Samos was the aggressor. Her action threatened the liberty of Priene, which Miletus strove to protect.1 The Milesians repaired to Athens, where their complaints were listened to with eagerness. The cities were on excellent terms, and we know of two Milesians at least who were members of the Periclean circle—Aspasia and Hippodamus. And with the Milesian envoys came a number The Milesians of the Samian party, who wished to get rid of apply to the oligarchical government in their city. Such Athens-overtures would be received with the greater readiness because the Athenians were not satisfied with the position of affairs in Samos and the neighbouring continent. Ever since the defeat of the Egyptian expedition Athenian power had been declining in the east, especially in Caria. Between 454 and 441 the Carian tribute, so far as it can be calculated from the lists, fell from about 75 talents to 53 talents; and the number of cities which paid it, from 60 or more to 43— " a certain proof how varying even before the Samian revolt 1 In 450 Miletus was occupied by an Athenian garrison, and Athenian interests were represented by an iTria-Konos* This may have been the case in 440 also, 30 REVOLT OF SAM OS, 440. [I. iS was the dominion of the Athenians in a large part of the Carian district." 1 The Athenians at once despatched forty ships to Samos, under the command of Pericles. What steps were taken Pericles at w*^ re§ar^ to Priene and the quarrel with Samos: a Miletus we are not told; these were matters of established ^le ™Portance '> *n sending a fleet across the Aegean the Athenians had other objects in view than the settlement of a local dispute. The oligarchy at Samos was suppressed, and the obedience of the party was secured by a hundred hostages, fifty men and fifty boys, who were placed in Lemnos; a democratical form of government was established and protected by a garrison of Athenian soldiers; after which the fleet returned to Athens.2 Samos was not inclined to submit. She could not forget that she had once ruled the eastern Aegean, and that her fleet was still a great power; her walls were Samos: the strong, and help might be expected from Persia, democracy Of thedeposed oligarchs, some had sought refuge on the continent, others remained in the city. The fugitives communicated with their friends in the island, and with Pissuthnes, the satrap of Sardis. Collecting a body of 700 mercenaries, they crossed over to Samos in the night, and attacked the demos, most of whom fell into their power. They also captured the Athenian garrison and 1 Busolt, Philol. xli. 683, who enumerates twelve cities which paid for the last time in 447-445. Diodorus, xii. 27, goes so far as to say of the Samians : op&vTes tovs 'AOrjvaiovs rais evvoiais diatfiepovras npos Mikrjcriovs, i.e. the Athenians preferred the subject to the independent city. That they watched Samos seems implied by the words of Aristoph. Vesp. 282, Xeycov as ? ivos ovtov tov ttclvtos eVe^e/p^o-fl/ a7ro$€i£€is €VpL(TK€iv. Plut., Per. 26 :—MeXicraos o 'iBayevovs, avi)p <^KA6cro<£oy, (rrpaTrjycov rore rrjs 2apov. 2 Byzantium paid tribute in 438. 3 Busolt, Philol. xli. 685; Q. O, in. 1. 5545 O, I. A, I 239, 24*, For Thrace, infra, p. 41. 36 WALLS OF THE ALLIES DESTROYED. [I. 17. Pericles, on his return to Athens, was at the height of his reputation as a general. For the second time he had Return of saved Athens at a dangerous crisis. Agamem- Pericies; his non, he saidj had spent ten years in reducing unera speec . «pro.^ ^ut jn ten m0nths he had brought the greatest of Ionian cities to submission. When the last rites were paid to the dead who had fallen in their country's cause, he was chosen to pronounce the funeral oration over them. He dwelt on the immortality of the illustrious dead; on the fair promise of the lives that were ended: "The loss of the young was as the loss of the springtime of the year." But they had fallen in a noble cause, and their glory was great. When he descended from the tribune, widows and orphans crowded round him with flowers and garlands; but Elpinice, the now aged sister of Cimon, turned away, saying bitterly, " Why these flowers and crowns 1 Not in war against Medes and Phoenicians, as my brother, but in conflict against a friendly and allied state, has Pericles led our citizens to death." 1 The long resistance which Samos had offered to the whole force of Athens, the great danger into which that resistance had brought the empire, were lessons not to be forgotten. The resistance was chiefly due to the fortifications of the . . city, which defied the skill and bravery of the on the destruc- besiegers. Similar difficulties had been ex-tion of the wails perienced in the reduction of Thasos and Aegina, and so long as the allied cities retained their walls, Athens would find it necessary, in case of revolt, to employ her ships and men in the slow process of reducing them by famine. She resolved to prevent this evil, and, by a single stroke of tyrannical power, to bring the cities, or at least those of Ionia and the adjacent islands, to her feet. She decreed the destruction of their walls, and 1 Plut. Per. 28 ; Pericles retorted with a quotation from Archi-lochus (ovk av fivpoio-i ypavs eova' ^X€iv cbv km cvepyerrjs €< iravraiv hv p.€jivr)fi€6a irpoyovwv. It often occurs in inscriptions. See Dittenb. SylL 33. I. 19.] THE MACEDONIAN KINGDOM. 39 If he did not aid in the destruction of the Athenians at Drabescus (464) Alexander made no effort to save them, and on their part the Athenians expected Cimon to crown his victory over Thasos by acquiring a portion of Macedonia.1 From 464 onwards'the Athenians and their "benefactor" must have regarded each other with suspicion; on the one hand Alexander might tamper with the allies of Athens; on the other it was certain that Athens intended to plant a foot on the lower Strymon, and control the passage from Macedonia into Thrace. 1 19, Alexander died in 454, leaving four sons—Perdiccas, Philip, Menelaus, and Alcetas. Which of the four was the eldest is uncertain, and we do not know what partition of his kingdom Alexander made Alexander: among them, if indeed he made any. When partition of , .. . 1 1 n j his kingdom. we begin to see our way clearly, we find a triple division of the Macedonian dominions. Derdas, the nephew of Alexander, is sovereign of the Elimiotae; the land east of the Axius, adjacent to the Strymon and the Greek cities of Chalcidice, is governed by Philip; and Perdiccas is ruler of Macedonia in the narrower sense, of the territory between the Haliacmon and the Axius.2 1 Plut. Oim. 14. 2 In a matter so obscure we must expect a difference of opinion. Abel, Makedonien, p. 166, confesses that his account is merely conjectural, and Duncker, G. A. ix. 225, note, is not convincing. The dates given for the reign of Perdiccas vary from 23 to 41 years; and Abel considers that this is best explained by supposing that in one calculation the whole period from the death of Alexander to the death of Perdiccas is reckoned; in the other, the time during which Perdiccas was actually king of the whole country. Perdiccas died in 413 ; but 413 + 41 =454, the date of the death of Alexander ; and 413 + 23 = 436, a probable date for the expulsion of Philip by Perdiccas. Theopompus puts the reign of Perdiccas at 35 years, i.e. it began in 413 + 35=448, which may have been the date of a division ¦of the kingdom between Philip and Perdiccas. But what happened in 454-448 ? Abel thinks that in this period Alcetas may have been king of all Macedonia, for in Plato, Gorg. 471 A, Perdiccas is said to have taken the kingdom from Alcetas. By promising him a share in the kingdom, Perdiccas induced Philip to join him in deposing Alcetas, and having obtained his object, set about depriving Philip 40 THE ODRYSIANS. [I. 19. By this division of the Macedonian monarchy the position <>i affairs was greatly altered. For the moment the Mace-Macedonia and Ionian power was paralysed; the Greek cities the Chaicidic had nothing to fear from their neighbour. If cities. Philip attempted to extend his borders, the aid of Perdiccas could be invoked against him. On the other hand, the Greeks, freed from the fear of attack by Macedon, were less subservient to the Athenians, and their position became more independent. The situation was complicated by the growth of the Odrysian empire in Thrace. The Thracians, no less than the Macedonians, had regained their liberty on of the0 odrysian tne retreat of the Persians, and in Thrace, as empire. jn Macedonia, the invasion made it easier for an ambitious prince to extend his power. Teres, the king of the Odrysians, who lay in the valley of the Artiscus, seized the opportunity. He began with subjugating the Thracian tribes as far as the Haemus, from which, by the conquest of the Getae, he pushed his borders to the right bank of the Danube. Beyond the river lay the vast territory of the Scythians, which extended to the Cimmerian Bosphorus, the mouth of the Sea of Azov. Teres secured himself from attack in this direction by marrying his daughter to Aria-pithes, the king of Scythia, and, recrossing the Haemus, advanced his kingdom towards the east, till he almost touched the gates of Byzantium.1 At the death of Teres in 440 this great empire seems to have been divided between his two sons, Sitalces and Sparadocus, and though Sitalces in a short time united the whole power in his own hands, there was a period during which Thrace, no less than Macedon, was distracted by the claims of rival monarchs. of his share, in which he was at length successful. Duncker thinks that Alexander divided his kingdom between two of his sons, Perdiccas and Philip, bub cannot give any reason why the others were passed over. Alcetas and Menelaus are mentioned in C. I. A. i. 42, 43 as sons of Alexander. Abel, however, regards Amyntas as the fourth son, but only on the authority of Syncellus (p. 262). 1 See Thuc. ii. 29, 96, 97 ; infra, p. 148. I. 20.] THE " THRACIAN DISTRICT." 41 20. Thus the cities of Chalcidice and Thrace were relieved from any danger on the side of the tribes of the interior, at the very time when Athens was Difficulties in engaged in suppressing the revolt of Samos. V?e Thracian A spirit of rebellion arose among them. By- Athenian zantium, as we know, joined Samos (though emPire-she does not seem to have taken any active part in assisting her); and from an examination of the Quota-lists of 440-436 it appears that a number of cities in the Thracian district refused to pay tribute in those years.1 Athens endeavoured to meet the resistance by various changes. From the year 437 onwards we find in the lists a number of cities which, with one or two exceptions, appear there for the first time, ranged separately as cities "which tax themselves," and "which private citizens have enrolled to pay tribute"; and of the twenty-four cities in these lists, seventeen are situated in the Thracian district. The inference has been drawn from this, and with probability, that a number of small towns which had hitherto paid as tributaries to larger cities, such as Aenus, Potidaea, and others, were now detached, and not only allowed to pay tribute independently, but to fix their own tribute in the one case, or, in the other, to be enrolled at the wish of some of their citizens in the Athenian empire.2 What was far more important than these changes and 1 The number of cities which paid tribute in 454-442 is about 45; but in 441 we have spaces for 35 only, and in 440 for 37 only. In 438 the cities of Aenus, Argilus, Galepsus, Scapsa, and Stolus do not appear; in 436 eight cities are missing. Between the years 439-436 the tribute was raised at Spartolus, Potidaea, Scabala, Mecyperna, Sane, Mende, Scione, Aegae, Aphytis, cities lying close together on the west coast of Chalcidice, and in Pallene. 2 See Busolt, Philol. xli. 667, etc. ; C. I. A. i. 239-244. The new headings in 437 are : (1) Ilo^eis avrai Tagdfievat, (2) xroXeis as ol ibimrat iveypdyfravTo secure the territory between Lake Cercinitis colonise the and the sea, the valley of the Angites, and the region. inland slopes of Mount Pangaeus, had ended in failure. The story of Athenian hopes and disappointments has been preserved by the Scholiast on Aeschines,3 who enumerates nine disasters which had befallen the Athenians in this region; and there are few calamities in Athenian 1 When Alexander conquered the Bisaltians he took over their coinage. See Head, Hist. Num. Introd. xlv., and pp. 178, 180. 2 Thuc. i. 101. 8 Aesch. 2. 31. I. 20.] FOUNDING OF AMPHIPOIIS, 43f. 43 history more disastrous than the slaughter of 10,000 colonists at Drabescus in 464 (vol. ii. p. 314).1 In 464 Alexander and Teres were still alive, and their kingdoms were undivided; by 437 the situation was changed. Athens had also brought her struggle in the east to an end, though at the cost of resigning a number of Carian cities, and the action of the Greeks in Thraee made it clear that a strong centre was needed from which to control them. Philip of Macedon could not offer serious opposition from beyond the Strymon, owing to his relations with his brother Perdiccas, who would readily join the Athenians against him; and the Odrysians were too much occupied with the contentions of their rival monarchs to render him assistance, even if they wished. In 437 a new colony was sent out under Hagnon, the son of Nicias, who had held command in the war against Samos.2 Of the constitution of the city nothing is re- Foundin of corded, beyond the statement that the colonists Amphipoiis in were partly Athenian citizens, and partly col- 437, lected from the neighbouring towns.3 The new city was called Amphipoiis, a name apparently derived from the situation. It lay on the slope of a hill, visible from the sea, on the left bank of the river, which is diverted from its course so as to circle round three sides of the hill. Where the river ran no fortifications were needed, but a wall was built from bank to bank across the slope. At some distance from the city lay the bridge over the Strymon.4 1 The region was known as Phyllis, a name derived in legend from Phyllis, the wife of Demophon, the son of Theseus, with whom, it was believed, the country came as a dower to her husband. Phyllis is said to have visited the Strymon nine times, hence the name "Nine Ways," to meet her lover, who failed to come, and in her anger she pronounced upon the Athenians the curse that they should suffer disaster nine times in that region. 2 Diodorus, xii. 32, who gives the date 435, but cp. Thuc. iv. 102. 3 Thuc. iv. 106 ; Diod. I.e. 4 For Hagnon, whose father was Nicias of Steiria, not to be confounded with Nicias, the statesman and general, see Thuc. v. 11. The district is described in Leake, Northern Greece, iii. 181 ff. It 44 SCYLES OF SCYTHIA, [I. 21. 21. With a view of securing their position, the Athenians entered into an alliance with Perdiccas, from whom they had Athens and for the time nothing to fear,1 but in a few years Macedon. Perdiccas succeeded in expelling Philip and uniting Macedonia; the territory east of the Axius, as far as the Strymon, was added to his own dominions, and he became the neighbour of Athens on the Strymon, at hand to help the Chalcidian cities ! His brother was driven to seek refuge with Derdas the prince of the Elimiotae. In Thrace also the kingdom of the Odrysians was by this time united in the hands of Sitalces. The king of Scythia, Ariapithes, had been treacherously murdered by Sparga-pithes, king of the Agathyrsi,2 probably in the attempt to annex, by force or by fraud, the territory of his neighbour towards the Danube. He left three sons: Oricus, by his native wife Opaea; Octamasades, by the daughter of Teres; and Scyles, by a Greek woman of Istros. Scyles Scyles, King of . . . . . , . . . . . . Scythia: his succeeded his father, and with the throne he love of Greek aiso received his father's Scythian wife. He was half a Greek by birth, and this natural bent had been strengthened by education. From his mother he learned the Greek language and letters, thus imbibing a love of Greek manners and life which proved his ruin. When he ascended the throne, he found the barbarous Scythian customs intolerable; his Scythian wife was odious to him; and whenever he could, he stole away to indulge his Hellenic inclinations. As often as he visited Olbia, the Milesian colony on the Borysthenes, he left his Scythian retinue in the suburbs, and entered the city, attended by seems to be doubtful whether the bridge lay above or below the wall which Hagnon built; that it did not lie within it, is clear from Thucydides, iv. 103. Leake, l.c. p. 196, considers that the ancient bridge was probably in the same situation as the modern one, i.e. just below the lake, and above the city, but Grote places it below, vol. iv. p. 547. The present bridge is 300 yards long. For the device by which Hagnon was supposed to have driven away the Edonians, see Polyaen. Strateg. vi. 53. 1 Thuc. i. 57 says of Perdiccas : a-vfifiaxos irporcpov kcu u 6 \vp07r016s, qs koi ttjv dicojSeXiav eVopixi)p ovb* apdyicrjp 8iaKoTO£ o-cK^cVrtrrdV tc iravT&v kcu dappa\^rarov Tifpl a-cXr/j^s Karavyaarp.aiV nai (tklcls \6yov els ypac^rjy KuTa0€fX€J>os }Ai>a£uy6pas ovr* avros rjv naXaios ovt' 6 \6yos evbo^os aXX' dnopprjTOS crt ku\ 6V oXlywv teal per* eiXafielasTivos rj wiarecos ftablfav. 58 THE "SOPHISTS." [II. 6. tribes, but more especially on the expulsion of the tyrants and the restoration of the old inhabitants to their homes and possessions, numerous questions arose which could only be settled in the law-courts. It was by the art of speech that men hoped to regain their lost position, Often, no doubt, the claims put forward were of a very uncertain kind, and there was a great temptation to "make the worse the better cause." This had not been the attitude of the older inquirers, Philosophers but now philosophy and sophistry parted eom-and sophists. pany; they stood as far asunder as the student of jurisprudence and the successful pleader. While Anaxa-goras was in danger of starvation, had not Pericles com© to his help, and Socrates lived on less than the laziest citizen could earn, the new teachers, such as Protagoras of Abdera and Gorgias of Leontini, were well paid for their instruction. The wandering life of these sophists, who went from city to city as lecturers, emancipated them from civic traditions, and thus a prejudice was raised against them in cities where morality came to men through the state and was bound up with state institutions. Among them were men of great ability and knowledge, who played a useful part in stimulating the minds of their pupils, and imparting to them knowledge which was new and valuable; but even the best of them hardly perceived the true effect of his teaching, and the second-rate were mere intellectual gladiators, ready to maintain any thesis for the sake of display and profit. 6. The appearance of the "sophists" and the spread of " sophistical " teaching seems for a time to have revolutionised education at Athens. In more than one play the comic poet Aristophanes contrasts the old and new, the young man as he was when moulded by the best traditions of Athens, and as he became in the hands of sophists. In mind teaching. and body the change was for the worse; digni- Scenefrom fiec[ obedience and decorous self-control were Aristophanes. , , , . , k. succeeded by a noisy argumentative conceit, which claimed to be infallible on every subject. "I will tell you how our quarrel began/' says Strepsiades in the Clouds, II. 6.] EFFECT OF " SOPHISTRY:' 59 speaking of his son; " we were at dinner, and I asked him to take his lyre and sing me Simonides' song about the combing of the ram. He at once replied that it was not the fashion now to play the lyre and sing over one's wine, * like an old wife grinding parched barley.' * Yes !' rejoins Phidippides; ' and did you not deserve to be kicked and beaten for asking your guest to sing, as if you were entertaining grasshoppers 1' Just so," Strepsiades continues, -"that is the language he used, and he said that Simonides was a bad poet. With much ado I kept my temper, and asked him to take a branch of myrtle and repeat some lines of Aeschylus. He replied : * Aeschylus is bombastic, harsh, immature, and rugged.' How my heart went pit-a-pat; still I curbed myself and said: ' Well!" well! sing me one of these smart songs which are in fashion/ Forthwith he chanted a lay from Euripides, God help us all! about the incest of a brother and sister. 1 broke out at this and roundly abused him. He retorted, and word brought up word, till at last he sprang upon me and beat me." 1 This scene is of course intended to be a caricature of the effect of "sophistic" teaching, but of the hold which that teaching obtained on the minds of the younger citizens there is no doubt. We have no reason to suspect exaggeration in the description given in the Protagoras of Plato of the excitement caused by the visit of an eminent sophist to Athens. "Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, gave a tremendous thump with his staff at my door " ;—it is Socrates who is speaking— " some one opened to him, and he came rushing in and bawled out, * Socrates, are you awake or asleep 1' " I knew his voice, and said, ' Hippocrates, is that you ? and do you bring any news 1' " * Good news,5 he said ; * nothing but good.' '"Delightful/ 1 said ; 'but what is the news ? and why have you come nither at this unearthly hour ?' 1 Aristoph. Clouds, 1354 ff. Cp. also the well-known passage 950 ff. 60 PROTAGORAS AT ATHENS. [II. 7. " He drew nearer 'o me and said, * Protagoras is come/ "'Yes,5 I replied : 'he came two days ago ; have you only just heard of his arrival ?' "' Yes, by the gods,' he said ; ' but not till yesterday evening.' At the same time, he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet, and then he said : * Yesterday, quite late in the evening, on my return from Oenoe, whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave, Satyrus, as I meant to have told you, if some other matter had not come in the way, when we had done supper and were about to retire to rest, my brother said to me, " Protagoras is come." 1 was going to you at once, and then I thought that the night was far spent. But the moment sfleep left me after my fatigue, I got up and came hither direct.' " I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said, 4 What is the matter ? Has Protagoras robbed you of anything 1' " He replied, laughing, ' Yes, indeed, he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which he keeps from me.' " i But surely,' I said, ' if you give him money, and make friends with him, he will make you as wise as he is himself.' "'Would to heaven,' he replied, 'that this were the case. He might take all that I have, and all that my friends have, if he pleased. But that is why I have come to you now, in order that you may speak to him on my behalf; for I am young, and also I have never seen nor heard him (when he visited Athens before I was but a child); and all men praise him, Socrates; he is reputed to be the most accomplished of speakers. There is no reason why we should not go to him at once, and then we shall find him at home. He lodges, as I hear, with Callias, the son of Hipponicus; let us start.'"l 7. The older men at Athens watched this movement with anxious eyes. More especially were the young orators regarded with suspicion—striplings who came forward with the new equipment of logic and dialectic. They were thought to be entirely without moral principles; and an Pericles and the orator of the new school was at once assumed new movement, to be a man of bad character. With Pericles and his friends the sophists and their doctrines found a welcome. Aspasia herself was known as a composer of 1 Plato, Protag. p. 310, Jowett's translation. II. 7-] PERICLES BECOMES UNPOPULAR. 61 clever speeches; and Pericles is said to have spent a whole day in arguing with Protagoras the case of a competitor in the Pentathlum, who was accidentally killed by a spear. Who was really to blame—the thrower of the spear, or the spear, or those who arranged the contest? In the new enthusiasm for discussion such absurdities may have occurred ; at any rate they were believed, and Pericles brought on himself a part of the dislike which the plain Athenian felt for intellectual hair-splitting.1 Even in his conduct of the city, he inevitably became the object of a good deal of criticism. By taking the management of everything into his own hands, he made himself the common mark for discontent. If any interest was harassed, or any scheme went wrong, Pericles was to blame. We have seen that his expenditure on public works brought upon him the severe reproaches of his political opponents, who considered, not without reason, that Athens was thereby placed in a false relation to the allies, and though Pericles knew how to deal with such criticism, his position was slowly shaken. The change was inevitable. Pericles himself no longer showed the same conciliatory temper towards the people. In his conception of democracy there was always the reservation that it must be under control, attitude of Peri-He meant to rule, not to be ruled. He refused cles towards to accede to the wishes of the people when their wishes did not coincide with his own. A man of aristocratic birth and temperament, when he attempts to lead a mob, is always in a difficult position. He has broken from his natural supports, and yet he is not wholly in sympathy with his new clientele* At first he can make concessions without endangering those restrictions which he knows to be necessary for the maintenance of the state, but in time the democratic spirit, evoked by him in his own interests, as well 1 Cp. Plut. Per. 36 ; Ari&toph. Clouds, 1073 ff. Compare the procedure at the Prytaneum desciibed in Demosthenes, 23. 76. At the Buphonia the Athenians solemnly passed sentence on the axe by which the px was slain ; Paus. i. 24. 4. 62 CHARGES AGAINST PHIDIAS, [II. 8. as in those of the state, demands more than he can give. So it was with Pericles; he was willing that the money of the allies should be spent on Athens and on Athenian institutions, but, as we have said, he had ulterior aims in view in this expenditure; he allowed the rich to be heavily fined for public purposes, and took his part in such payments; but he did not wish the finance of Athens to pass into the control of demagogues, who would use the funds, as he had done, to win the people, but without those aims by which he justified his own course. The demagogues could not be expected to make such fine distinctions; they sought to gain for themselves the authority which seemed to be slipping from the hands of Pericles. They wished to lead the people against him if they could, and cared little about the means which they employed in attaining their object. Foremost among them was Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus, a man of low birth and vulgar manners, but of great energy and ability, whose appearance and occupation (he was a tanner) made him the favourite butt of Aristophanes. 8. In this manner a combination was formed against Pericles, and parties which usually stood far apart were united, not indeed in a common policy, but in the attempt to put an The attack on en(^ to the domination of their rival. The first Phidias. attack seems to have been made through Phidias. He was the chief adviser of Pericles in the adornment of Athens, and he was therefore peculiarly obnoxious to those who were opposed to expenditure on such objects. That Phidias had failed in the charge entrusted to him could not be maintained. Nothing existed in Greece more beautiful than the temples which rose under his direction, and the statues executed by him and his school. But it was easy to insinuate that all the sums which had passed into his hands had not been spent honestly. Some years previously he had constructed the great statue of Athena in ivory and gold for the Parthenon, and he was now charged with keeping back part of the money. Fortunately he was able to II. 8.] ANAXAGORAS. 63 repel this accusation. On the advice of Pericles, the statue had been so constructed that the gold could be removed without injury to the work. It was now taken off and weighed, and no deficiency was found. The charge of dishonesty was thus conclusively disproved, but the accusers were not to be shaken off. The public mind was already disquieted on the subject of religion, and a charge of impiety might succeed where a charge of peculation had failed. In the figures which he had depicted on the shield of Athena, it was found that Phidias had introduced portraits of himself and Pericles. This was declared to be an offence against the majesty of the goddess. Phidias was at once thrown into prison, and all the efforts of Pericles to procure his release were in vain. Before the day of trial arrived he was found dead in his cell.1 The next attack was directed against Anaxagoras. A proposal was made by Diopithes, a friend of Nicias, who was the most orthodox and religious of Athenians, that Attack on those who disbelieved in divinities, and passed Anaxagoras. their time in discussing the nature of the heavenly bodies, should be impeached before the Assembly. The proposition was accepted, but whether Diopithes carried the matter farther, and personally attacked Anaxagoras, is not known. A late writer informs us that Cleon brought a charge of impiety against him; others said that Thucydides, who had now returned from ostracism, accused him of treason. Whatever may have been the precise nature of the charge, it seems certain that Anaxagoras was condemned, and was thrown into prison. In a short time he escaped, or was allowed to go free, and a few years later he died at Lampsacus.2 Protagoras was also banished from the city about this time; and Damon, who was the chief political 1 Plut. Per. 31 : © peu ovv Qeibias eis to BccrpcarripLov dira^dcls €T€\evTr)(T€ vo(rf)(ras} ojff Se (j)a(riv evioi, (pappaKois, eVi §ta(3o\rj iov Il€piKk€Ovs rap ixOpiov TrapacrKevao-dvTajv. Ap. Schol. Aristoph. Pax, 588. According to Philochorus, Phidias was exiled, and retired to Elis, where he was subsequently executed. 2 Plut. Per. 32. 04 A CCUSA TIONS A GAItfST PERICLES. [II. Q. adviser of Pericles, was ostracised, but neither the date nor the cause of his ostracism can be fixed with certainty. For some years the comedians had amused themselves at the expense of Aspasia. She was the " new Omphale," the "concubine of the Olympian Pericles," the "child of Lewdness." And now Hermippus, a comedian whose power lay in the coarseness of his satire, weary, perhaps, of his own abuse, or believing that the ground had been well prepared, ventured to bring a public charge against her. She also was accused of impiety, a subject on which the Athenians were easily roused, but in her case impiety was only the cover for a still more odious imputation. She was brought before the court as an atheist and procuress. As an alien she could not appear at the trial; her cause was left in the hands of Pericles, and the Athenians looked on with delight, while their great statesman, overcome with emotion, pleaded for his mistress with the entreaties am,d tears which Athenian custom permitted in a court of law. Aspasia was acquitted.1 9. The enemies of Pericles were baffled, but his victory did not strengthen his position. The acquittal of Aspasia was merely a concession to his personal influence. It was Charges brought clear that he had felt the attack; and his op-against Pericles. p0nents now ventured on a direct accusation. Dracontides proposed in the Assembly that Pericles should give before the fifty Prytaneis an account of his expenditure of the public money, and that, in this case, the judges should give their votes before the altar in the Acropolis. The proposal was subsequently altered on the motion of Hagnon, a friend of Pericles, and the case was to be brought before a court of 1500 jurors, voting in the usual way, by dropping pebbles into an urn, as a charge of bribery or maladministration.2 Nothing came of the proposal; the case appears never to have been brought into court, unless indeed it was subsequently revived in the year 430. The 1 Pint. Per. 32. 2 Pint. Per. 32: e'lre Kkoirqi kcu Ba>pcov, eiV dbiKiov ftovXoiro tis OPOfld^€LV TT)V SlG)£ll>. II. 9-] PERICLES PREPARES FOR WAR. 65 attention of the Athenians was drawn away by the impending war with the Peloponnesians, which also created a new division of parties in the city. The iniquities The approach of Phidias, Anaxagoras, and Aspasia were for- of war-gotten in the question whether Athens should go to war, and what were her chances of success. To Pericles war was certainly an advantage; in war a leader is needed, and he was undoubtedly the leader of Athens. By some, indeed, he was thought to have forced the points at issue between Sparta and Athens to a climax in order to recover his lost position, and we may at least allow that, convinced that war must come, he wished it to come while he was still able to direct the Athenian state. He was well aware that his monopoly of power had been such that he would leave no successor. And for years he had been looking forward to a great struggle, which should place the empire on a still firmer foundation. With war in view he had so organised the empire that all the resources of it lay at the disposal of Athens; by the law-courts, before whom the cases of the allies were tried, by the sixty ships which year by year he put in commission, by garrisons and wardens established in every city where there were signs of disloyalty, by destroying the walls of the cities, by accumulating an enormous treasure, he had secured Athens against the greatest danger which could overtake her — the revolt of her allies. On land she was not a match for the forces which could be brought against her, but this difficulty Pericles was prepared to meet by allowing the enemy to do their worst; the loss of the crops and cattle of Attica could easily be replaced so long as Athens was mistress of the sea. So Pericles u watched war coming from the Pelopon nesus." Parties were divided on the question. There were still many who wished that their city should Party opposed be on good terms with Sparta, and were op- towar-posed to any action which rendered this impossible. Such were Nicias and his following, men absolutely loyal to Athens and democracy, but also friendly to Sparta, partly VOL. III. £ 66 PARTIES AT ATHENS. [II. 9. as the inheritor of great traditions, partly as a pattern of military organisation. Such, too, were those Athenians who lived in the country—rich men who owned fine houses and large estates; poor men who cultivated a few ancestral acres, on which they lived in comfort, holding in much contempt the city and the ways of the city. They remembered that in 445 Plistoanax had marched without opposition as far as Eleusis. They knew that war meant invasion. The pleasant houses, the orchards, olive-groves, and highly cultivated farms, the growth of two generations of peaceful possession, would then be destroyed, and they would have to find such shelter as they could within the city walls. In Aristophanes we have pictures—instructive if exaggerated—of these country folks in Dicaeopolis, Strepsiades, and Trygaeus. They are rough yeomen, gross in their tastes and enjoyments, yet not without a homely goodness, a love of simplicity, and an inborn appreciation of what is beautiful in art and literature. They are men of sound sense, cherishing a lively hatred of the new culture and its special product, the youthful orator, who always had them at an advantage, and took a peculiar delight in exhibiting his smartness at their expense. On the other hand, the inhabitants of the city, with Cleon to lead them, were eager for war. They were not moved by Party favour- the prospect of the disasters which would fall able to war. on Attica— they would not share in them. They were pleased with the excitement of war, and confidently expected a solid result in additions to the empire. There would be more land to occupy as colonists, more tribute to spend on amusements. In any case, there would be a large outlay from the public funds, which would go into the pockets of those who served the city. The risks they disregarded; and indeed there was little risk at sea, and on land Athenian generals were careful not to expose their fellow-citizens, to whom they were responsible, to unnecessary danger. On this question, therefore, the influence of Cleon was thrown on the side of Pericles, who, with this support was able to turn the scale in favour of war. CHAPTER III. THE CAUSES OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. I. Thucydides, who, as a contemporary writer, is most competent to judge of the motives which guided his own generation, informs us that the real cause of Thucydides' the Peloponnesian war was the growing fear of viewofthe the Athenian power. "The real reason," he Peloponnesian says, "which led to this great conflict, though war-it was rarely mentioned, was, I believe, that the power of the Athenians alarmed the Peloponnesians, and forced them to go to war; but the causes commonly put forward on either side were two ": the part which the Athenians took in the Corinthian war, and their treatment of Potidaea. The same view is repeated in other passages. "In deciding to go to war, the Lacedaemonians were influenced not so much by the arguments of their allies, as by the fear of the Athenians, and of their increasing power."—"The Athenians were growing too great to be ignored, and though the Lacedaemonians were unwilling by nature to go to war if they could help it, they could remain inactive no longer. Their allies were suffering from the aggression of the Athenians, and therefore they had no other course but to do their best to destroy the Athenian power."x The Creek mind was not satisfied with this general predisposing cause. Careful as the Greeks always were to assign to the right author the guilt of the first other causes-step in wrongdoing, they naturally asked, not the Megarian what was the general or the remote cause of ecree" the war, but what was the immediate and particular cause— JThuc. i. 23,88,118. 68 ATHENS AND MEGARA. [III. I. what was the precise act which brought about hostilities, and who was guilty of it 1 To this question various answers were given. A quarrel, of which the exact nature is obscure, had broken out between Athens and Megara. The Athenians charged the Megarians with tilling the sacred land, which, as forming the boundary between the two states, was no man's land, and might not be cultivated. They sent a herald, by name Anthemocritus, to complain, but the Megarians slew him, in defiance of the sacred and universal law of nations. The anger of the Athenians knew no bounds. Charinus proposed in the Assembly that there should be "truceless and unproclaimed" hostility between the two cities; that any Megarian found on Attic soil should be put to death; and that the generals, when taking the customary oath on their admission to office, should further pledge themselves to invade the Megarian territory twice a year.1 Whether these details, which come to us on late authority, are true in every particular, we cannot say, but in some important points they are confirmed by Thucydides. He tells us that the Athenians had passed a decree —supported, certainly, by Pericles, if not proposed by him—by which the Megarians were excluded from the market of Athens and the ports of the Athenian empire; and when the Pelopon-nesians demanded the cancelling of this decree under a threat of war, the Athenians replied that the Megarians had tilled the border land, and received fugitive slaves. And after the outbreak of the war the Athenians invaded the Megarid every year till the capture of Nisaea. Thus, even on the evidence of Thucydides, the "Megarian decree" was the immediate pretext of the war. The demand that it should be cancelled was put forward in such a manner that if the Athenians had yielded, the outbreak of the war would have been deferred. But what was the real cause of the decree and of the attitude of Pericles towards it %2 A Plut. Per. 30. 2 Thuc. i. 139; ii. 31. III. I.] OTHER CAUSES OF THE WAR. 69 The contemporary comedians dwell on neither of the two reasons given by Thucydides, though the motive which they ascribe to Pericles may rest on a perversion of The Megarian the incident of the "fugitive slaves." In their decree•. account view, the real grievance was the theft by ofArist°Phanes-the Megarians of two women belonging to Aspasia. This insult Pericles felt himself compelled to punish ; hence his refusal to make any concession. "In his fury the Olympian thundered and lightened, turned Hellas upside down, and passed laws after the style of catches, that the Megarians must not in the land abide, nor on the sea, nor in the markets, nor the continent."* In the Pax, a play written four years after the Acharnians, Aristophanes gives another reason for the attitude of Pericles towards the Megarian decree. " The mischief The war due to began .vith the ruin of Phidias, for Pericles, ^p^^1008 fearing to be involved in that disaster, set the Aristophanes, city in a blaze with the tiny spark of the EPhorus-Megarian decree; and blew up such a war that the eyes of all the Greeks were filled with tears owing to the smoke." This account of the true cause of the Peloponnesian war is regarded as a revelation from Hermes, and it comes as a surprise to the Chorus and Trygaeus, who had never heard that Phidias was in any way connected with it. In the next century it was regarded as historical. Ephorus tells us that Alcibiades, who was brought up in the house of Pericles, once found his uncle in great distress; and on inquiring the cause, was informed that he had been asked for an account of the money which he had spent, and was at a loss how to give it. " Would it not be better," observed Alcibiades, "to invent some reason for giving no account 1 Aristoph. Acharn. 504 ff. In the words *'in the style of catches," there seems to be an allusion to the "catch" or scolion of Timocreon:— (ocfteXev tr', & TV(f>)<£ nXoCrc, /Lt7Jr' iv yfj, fxr}T' iv daXaTTtj jut^t' iv T}7r€tpco (pavrjficv, k.t.X. 70 PERICLES AND THE MEGARIAN DECREE. [III. 2. at all %" Pericles took the hint, and being at the time greatly harassed by the prosecutions of his friends Phidias and Anaxagoras, he decided to give the Athenians something to occupy their minds; they would be less critical in time of war. For this reason he insisted that the Megarian decree should not be cancelled.1 That Aristophanes was serious in attributing the Megarian decree to the theft of Aspasia's women, or to Pericles'object , .... <• -r» • i . i • i i • in supporting the dishonesty of Pericles, is highly lmpro-the Megarian kMe, To the comedian all is grist that decree. comes to the mill, and why should he be more just to Pericles than to Socrates 1 In the Acharnians he may have merely parodied the cause which was supposed to have brought about the great war of Grecian legend,2 and in the Pax, as we have seen, he hints that he is giving a new and paradoxical account of the conduct of Pericles. Yet the historians of the next century, though they had Thucydides before them, accept these grotesque stories, and make history out of them. It was to their minds unintelligible that Pericles should havo insisted on such a trifling point as the Megarian decree at the cost of a great war; and we may share in their astonishment while disregarding their explanations. We need not suppose that Pericles was guilty of peculation, or the obsequious slave of Aspasia; we know that he was over-logical, and would not listen to a compromise, when a principle was involved. He believed that the demand for the cancelling of the Megarian decree was merely intended to test the tenacity of the Athenian purpose—that if any concession were made, other demands would follow, and in that belief he resolved to make a firm stand at the very outset. 2. If the immediate cause of hostilities was the refusal 1 Aristoph. Pax, 588 ff. Plut. Ale, 7. Diodorus, xii. 38-40; cp. ibid. 41: curiai p.ev ovv rov UcXoTrovvrjmaKOV noXepov roiavrai rives vjrrjp^av, cos vEv £vfxpdx<*>v leal el tis n aXAo € an(j now ac£ j^e r0gueSj they deserve a double punishment; they have lost a good character and got a bad one. We at least have made no such change; and if we are true to ourselves, we shall not allow our allies to be injured, or delay to help them, for there is no delay on the other side. Other nations may have ships and money, but we have brave allies, and we must not abandon them. Why discuss outrages, of which no one disputes the reality 1 We must put forth our strength at once. It is not for us who suffer to deliberate, but those who plot iniquity may well take time about it. I call on you, Lacedaemonians, to vote for war— for immediate war—the only vote worthy of you. Do not allow the Athenian power to increase; do not abandon your allies; let us help the injured, and God will help us." The question was now put to the Assembly, whether the Athenians had broken the treaty or not. It was the custom Decision of the at Lacedaemon to decide by acclamation, but Spartan on this occasion, under the pretence that he ssem y. could not distinguish which was the louder cry, Stheneiaidas divided the Assembly, directing those who said " Aye " to go to one side, and those who said " No " to go to the other. The result was thus placed beyond doubt. A large majority voted that the treaty had been broken. The decision was at once communicated to the allies, who were then dismissed to their cities.1 II. After passing this vote, the Lacedaemonians consulted the oracle at Delphi, where they received a favourable response : " If they did their best in the war, they would gain the day; and the deity would himself take their part, invited or uninvited." They now formally summoned all the members of the confederacy to Sparta, and put the question of peace and war before them. On this occasion, as before, the 1 Thuc. L 79-87. III. II.] FORMAL MEETING OF THE ALLIES, ItfZ. 91 Corinthians were most energetic; they did their utmost to excite their allies, and, when all the rest had spoken, they came forward themselves, insisting that im- General mediate war was necessary to put an end to meeting of the i "Trii allies at Sparta: the growing power of Athens. Those who had speech of the been brought into contact with the Athenians Corinthians, need not be warned against them, and those who supposed that their inland position placed them beyond the reach of danger must remember that on the control of the seaboard rested the free export and import of commodities; if they were negligent now, their own turn would soon come. True, they were now at peace, but war was to be preferred to peace if it secured permanent freedom; better war with the prospect of victory and peace, than peace with the risk of war and subjection. The present was a favourable opportunity for taking up arms, and the grounds were adequate. There was a good chance of success. On land the Pelopon-nesian confederacy had greater numbers, superior skill and organisation; and, though the Athenians had money and ships in abundance, the Peloponnesians could contribute to the expense of the war, or borrow funds from Olympia or Delphi. When they had money, it would be easy to build ships, and buy up the foreign sailors who rowed in the Athenian fleet. Or the allies of Athens might be induced to revolt. At any rate, the risk must be run, for submission simply meant slavery. The Lacedaemonians, having heard what their allies had to say, called on each of those present to give his The allies vote, and the majority were in favour of war. decide for war-But so ill prepared was the confederacy, so unwilling, we may perhaps add, were the Spartans themselves, or at least a considerable party among them, to take any active measures —for no wrong had been done to them by the Athenians— that nearly a year elapsed before they invaded Attica.1 1 Thuc. i. 119-125. o/xa>s §€ Kadicrrafievocs hv e5si eviavros fitv ov bierpipTjj Tkaacrov Se, irpiv eafiakt'iv is rfjv 'Attiktjv kol tov 7roXc/xoy apaaBai (pavcp&s. This second Assembly at Sparta must have taken 92 DEMANDS OF SPARTA [III. 12. 12. In the interval, embassies went to and fro between Sparta and Athens in the hope that war might be averted, or, if this were impossible, that the Athenians might be ^ „ m clearly put in the wrong. The Lacedaemonians Demands of J \ . i a i • , • i i theLacedae- first called on the Athenians to banish the monians on « accursed," by whom were meant the Alcmae-onidae, who had been guilty of sacrilege in the matter of Cylon (vol. i. p. 296). Had the Athenians agreed to this demand, Pericles must have gone into exile, and the greatest obstacle to peace would have been removed. But so far from yielding, the Athenians retorted by bidding the Lacedaemonians expel the "curse of Taenarus," and the "curse of Athena of the Brazen House" (vol. ii. p. 261). In a second embassy the Athenians were requested to raise the siege of Potidaea, and restore Aegina to independence. They could reply that the allied states of Sparta had already agreed to the principle that each confederacy should deal as it chose with its own subject allies; and in the position of Aegina there had been no change whatever since the peace of 445 was concluded. Once more, the Lacedaemonians insisted that the decree which excluded the Megarians from trading in the markets of Athens and the Athenian empire should be cancelled; if this were done, there would be no war. To this the Athenians answered: first, that the Megarians had tilled the border land between the two countries and sheltered fugitive slaves; and secondly, that the Lacedaemonians were in the habit of expelling strangers from their own city. If they would admit strangers to Lacedaemon, the Athenians would admit the Megarians to their markets; but in the truce there was no stipulation on these matters. A final embassy came with a demand which swept away all these minor differences in one general request. The Lacedaemonians, they said, desire peace, and peace there will be if place soon after the previous meeting, not later than October 432, and if the invasion took place about the beginning of June 431, infra, p. 117, the "somewhat less than a year" is equivalent to only eight or nine months. See Forbes, ad loc. III. 12.] REFUSED BY ATHENS, $2. 93 you will restore the Hellenes to independence; if not, there will be war—a broad condition, which commanded universal sympathy. It was one thing to go to war for the interests of Aegina and Megara, or for the deliverance of Potidaea, and quite another to come forward as the champion of freedom throughout Greece. The Athenians replied, on the advice of Pericles, that they were willing to settle the matters in dispute by arbitration, as was provided in the terms of the treaty, but they would do nothing upon compulsion.1 i Thuc. i. 126, 139, 144, 145. CHAPTER IV, GREECE ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. I. In the Peloponnesian war two states were brought into collision, which stood in sharp contrast to each other at every point. Ionian was matched with Dorian, a maritime power with a land power, the mistress of an empire with an ill-organised confederacy; Athens was a democracy, Sparta was an oligarchy; Athens was progressive, Sparta held to the past and resisted innovation in every form; Athens trusted to the free impulses of her citizens for the fulfilment of civic duty, Sparta never allowed her citizens to be out of training; Athens is the pattern of development, Sparta of "regimentation." What was implied in the contrast of Dorian and Ionian we cannot fully appreciate. Dorian differed from Dorian, and Ionian from Ionian. The Dorians of Sparta and Crete, trained in peculiar institutions, and to a great extent Contrast of snut on° ^rom intercourse with other nations, Dorian and were very unlike the Dorians of Corinth or Ionian. Megara, who were maritime nations, living by commerce and trading in every port of Greece. The Ionians of Athens, though they acknowledged kindred with the Ionic cities of Asia Minor, occupied a unique position, and attracted an admiration which was not granted to the citizens of Miletus or Samos. Yet in spite of these differences the contrast between the two tribes was so deeply felt throughout Greece that they were regarded as natural enemies.1 Each had distinct customs (vo/xi/m) by which they ordered their 1 Time. vi. 82. 94 IV. 2.] DORIANS AND IONIANS. 95 lives. The Dorians were the harder race, and the more capable of discipline; their ordinary habits were severe, and they were thought to make better soldiers, because they did not shrink from laborious training. The lonians were less solid, and less sombre. Theirs was a pleasure-loving nature ; they delighted in festivals ; their habits tended to be luxurious, as their clothing was delicate.1 Even at Athens, in spite of the development of democratic sentiment, the luxurious style and dress of the old lonians continued to be in use long after the time when Sparta had adopted simpler habits; and of the Athenians of his own time Pericles proudly says: "We have not forgotten to provide ourselves with many relaxations from toil: we have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year; at home the style of our life is refined, and the delight which we daily feel in all these things helps to banish melancholy."2 For these reasons the lonians were regarded as unwarlike, without any real force of character, and incapable of supporting toil or privation.3 Yet such judgments must have been founded on partial evidence. The Ionian sailors, when on duty, at any rate in the Athenian fleet, submitted to severe training, and the Corinthians describe the Athenians as the most energetic of men, who made the performance of duty a kind of festival, Pericles, also, when comparing the Spartans with the Athenians, claims for his countrymen that they discharge the duties of citizenship as fully as the Spartans, though they do not oppress themselves with the same laborious training. 4 2. A contrast more easily realised is that between Athens, as the mistress of an empire, a single city with ail her forces 1 Thuc. i. 6. * Thuc. ii. 38. 3 Cp. Hdt. vi. 12. 4 The common Greek opinion of the Spartans is given in Thuc. iii. 57 ; cp. vi. 80; in v. 105 the Athenians criticise this view ; cp. Aristoph. Acharn. 289, olfx6s ovt€ tv'kttis ovd1 op an^ at times conflicting, interests, empire; its Before war could be declared, the Lacedae-e,?lent,a monians must be persuaded to summon the difficulty. L . allies, and the allies, or a majority of them, must be persuaded to agree. At Athens, a vote in the Assembly was enough to set all the forces of the empire in motion. Here Athens would seem to have had greatly the advantage of Sparta; yet many circumstances concurred to diminish her superiority. The great extent of her empire made it difficult to concentrate her forces at any one point, and in the Peloponnesian war this difficulty was increased by the revolt of Potidaea, by which the forces of Athens were divided at the very beginning of the war. The danger of revolt in the Asiatic cities could never be left out of sight; the entrance to the Corinthian Gulf must be kept in Athenian hands, and the Euripus carefully watched; other ships were required to collect the tribute, and keep piracy in check. But the resources of Athens were ample, and, if they had been at the disposal of one man, they would have been more than sufficient for the demands made upon them. This, however, was not the case, even in the days of Pericles. The Athenian The great administrative power at Athens was Assembly. fcne Assembly, and not even Pericles could always carry the Assembly with him. He had opponents who attacked him from all sides, and when he had carried his measures about the war, and the plan of campaign, he was still liable to be outvoted in matters of detail. After his death the evil increased tenfold; no clear and consistent plan of operations was ever formed ; at one moment there was an inclination to peace ; at another, to recover power in central Hellas; at another, ships were sent to Sicily. Worse still was the publicity which attended discussions in the Assembly; unless large powers were delegated to the generals, who could then form and carry out some scheme of their own, the plans of the Athenians were known to their enemies IV. 2.] THE GENERALS AND THE ASSEMBLY, 97 almost as soon as they were formed. If, on the other hand, large powers were granted to one man, however capable, the people became suspicious that he might use them for his own purposes, and the cry of " tyranny" was at once raised. Even in the Assembly itself a patriotic Athenian had to encounter the greatest difficulties. If the picture drawn by Thucydides in the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus is to be accepted (infra, p. 170), it was almost impossible for a man to come forward honestly. His motives in speaking were always suspected, and a sound proposal could only be carried by deception. At the same time the Athenians were strict in their ideas of responsibility; though the whole meeting was unanimous in supporting a proposal, the mover of it was held responsible, and if by any accident the result was unfortunate, the Assembly were ready to visit the failure on the head of the adviser, who, if he had opposed their wishes, would have been suspected of treachery to the state.1 Worse still was the relation of the general to the Assembly. In the days of Cimon, the general and the "orator" were one and the same. The general came before The position of the Assembly and explained his views; if the the Generals at Assembly voted in his favour, he carried out At ens' what he had proposed. But as time went on, the general was rarely a leader in the Assembly. Younger men, without experience of war, and men of the people, who neither wished to be generals nor were qualified for the post, became prominent in the Assembly, while the generals were more and more confined to their official duties. Hence they were often employed to carry out plans of which they were not the authors, and which, perhaps, were not even practicable. More especially was a general in danger when, like Demosthenes, he had sacrificed Athenian lives in vain. The office 1 See Thuc. iii. 43, vvv fie npos opyrjv fjvrivu rv^iyre earrtv ore (T^aAeVres, rrjv tov TTfiaavros fiiav yvcov kol to. Ttpayp.ara, &o"7T€p kcu avrol, opcovras ko\ ovk oKXcop eniTLprjo-ci aKovovras ypa>o'€0'6aiJ dXX* e£ hv av tls cv Xeya)^ 5ta/3aXX7/, ck tovtcdv avrovs 7T€ia€cr0ai. IV. 3-] SPARTAN KINGS AND ADMIRALS, 99 to be rid; the remainder were collected from the rest of Peloponnesus, but none were Spartans.1—The conduct of war, when once war had been declared by a vote of the Spartan people and the allied cities, rested chiefly with the ephors, who could call out the forces and send them whither they chose, under the command of the Lacedaemonian kings. This was a gain in the direction of rapidity and concentration of movement, but though at Sparta there was no discussion of details in the Assembly, and certainly no public discussion in the Gerousia, there were parties jeahmsies and there as well as at Athens; jealousies and enmities at enmities often fettered the action of success- Sparta-ful generals. The energetic policy of Brasidas was not acceptable to those in authority. " They would not second his efforts because their leading men were jealous of him."2 The same feeling is shown in the treatment of the admirals. The kings were not allowed to command the fleet, and therefore precautions were taken to prevent an admiral from obtaining too much power. His office was annual, and the same man could not be sent out twice; and though in the case of Lysander this difficulty was overcome by appointing him second in command to an admiral of no ability, even Lysander was taught that he must not enter into rivalry with the kings. The Spartan commanders, whether admirals or kings, were allowed great freedom of action in the field. The king, at any rate, could lead the army whither he chose, per- spartan haps in secret understanding with the ephors; commanders, he could make peace without reference to the authorities at home; and when Agis was stationed at Decelea, he acted almost as an independent power. Unlike the Athenians, the Spartans were very unwilling to condemn their officers for incompetence. Of the admirals in office during the early years of the war, Cnemus failed disgracefully on sea and land in the west of Greece; and Alcidas not only failed to aid the Mytilenaeans, but behaved with such cowardice and cruelty » Thuc. iv. 78, 80. 2 Thuc. iv. 108. 100 THE ALLIES ON EITHER SIDE. [IV. 4. that there was no further attempt at revolt among the Athenian allies till Brasidas had produced a different impression. Yet both were retained in their command, commissioners being sent out to advise and support them. At Athens such failures would have been punished by death or banishment, but in the mind of the Spartans a soldier was a carefully prepared instrument, which was not to be destroyed or thrown aside.1 4. The allies on either side at the beginning of the war were as follows:—The Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the nations within the Isthmus except the Argives and Achaeans. These were friendly but neutral; and from the first the Achaeans of Pellene took part with the Lacedaemonians; afterwards their example was followed by the rest of the nation. Beyond the limits of the Peloponnese, the Megarians, Phocians, Opuntian Locrians, Boeotians, the Acarnanians of Oeniadae, Leucadians, and Ambraciots were on their side. Of these allies the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyon-ians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians provided a navy; the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians furnished cavalry; the other states infantry only. The allies of Athens were Chios and Lesbos, members of the old Delian League, who still retained their independence, Plataea, the Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania, Corcyra, Zacynthus. Besides these were the subject cities in the following regions :—The seaboard of Caria, the adjacent Dorian peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian coast, and the islands which lay north-east of a line drawn from Peloponnese to Crete, except Melos and Thera.2 Chios,Lesbos, and Corcyra furnished ships, the rest soldiers and money.3 1 See Thuc. v. 54, 60, 63, for the position of Agis as commander- of the army, and for Agis at Decelea, viii. 5. '' While he was with his army at Decelea, Agis had the right to send troops whithersoever he pleased, to raise levies, and to exact money." There must have been far ahler and more experienced naval officers at Corinth and other maritime cities than could be found at Sparta, but owing to old tradition the command of the fleet was retained by Sparta. 2 Thera paid tribute in 427 or 426. 3 Thuc ii. 9. IV. 4] THE FLEETS. 101 Unfortunately Thucydides has not followed up this list of the allies on either side with a comparative statement of their respective armaments. He tells us what were Forces on the resources of Athens as estimated by Pericles, either side-and what expectations the Peloponnesians, or, at any rate, the Corinthians, formed of success, but he never gives any clear account of the forces which Sparta and her allies could brine into the field. In regard to ships, A t . _ ° , Athenian fleet. the Athenian fleet is put at 300 vessels, a number wThich can be reached by the total sum of the ships in service in the first year of the war, and is never exceeded.1 The Peloponnesians amused themselves with the fancy that they would be able, with the assistance of the Dorian cities in the west, to put on the sea a fleet of 500 ships.2 But they never reached anything near this amount; the Peioponnesian Corinthians in their great struggle with Coreyra fleet* were able to get together 150 ships, of which 90 were their own; but the united fleet of the Peloponnesians amounts to 100 ships only in 430. No more than 42 ships are sent to Lesbos; and 60 is the largest number sent to Corcyra, and also the number surrendered at Pylus in 425, after which the Lacedaemonians built no more ships till 413. Even with the assistance of the Persians they found it difficult to match the numbers of the Athenians.3 In the army, of course, the preponderance was very largely in favour of Sparta. Athens is credited with 29,000 heavy-armed, of whom, perhaps, 3000 were resident aliens. Of the number of troops furnished by the allies we have no statement. When he went to Pylus, Cleon took with him no citizens from Athens at all, 1 In Thuc. ii. 23, 100 ships are sent round Peloponnesus; in c. 24, 100 are set apart with their trierarchs ; in c. 26, 30 are sent to Locris, and 70 are at Potidaea (i. 61) = 300. In iii. 17 the distribution is different, and the total only 250. The Lesbians and Chians, who send 50 ships in 430, send none in 431, and Pericles does not mention their contingents. (Xenophon) Rep. Ath. iii. 1 speaks of 400 trierarchs as appointed each year at Athens. 2 Thuc. ii. 7. 3 Thuc. i. 46 ; ii. 66; iii. 26; iv. 2. 102 THE ARMIES. [IV. 5- but only "the Lemnian and Inibrian forces who were at Athens at the time, the auxiliaries from Aenus, and 400 archers from other places"; and of the total of 5100 hoplites who went to Syracuse in 415 only 2200 were Athenians.1 Whatever the number was at the beginning of the war, it was greatly diminished towards the close. At the siege of Potidaea there were 7000 Athenians under arms at one time; but 3400 is the number sent out in both the expeditions to Sicily; and we know from Thucydides that 4400 perished in the plague.2 The number of the Peloponnesian army which invaded Attica is given by Plutarch 3 at 60,000. But, even if the Peloponnesian light-armed are included, this number is exces-army* sive. At the battle of Tanagra the allies had furnished a force of 10,000 men; Sparta could furnish about 5000 in round numbers, and Boeotia about 8000. This amounts to 23,000, and if we add 15,000 for the light-armecf Boeotians, and the helot who accompanied every Spartan, we get 38,000 only. This is perhaps too low an estimate, and we may suppose that Sparta could count on the support of about 45,000 troops.4 5. The Athenians availed themselves of the services of bowmen and cavalry to support their infantry, but they had 1 Thuc. ii. 13, 31 ; iv. 28 ; vi. 43. The Lemnians and Imbrians were however Athenians who had settled as Kkt)pov^oi in those islands. 2 Though Alcibiades asserts that " Hellas has been singularly mistaken about her heavy-armed infantry," we may presume that Thucydides could obtain an accurate account of the number of heavy-armed at Athens. Yet his statements are hardly credible. The military age extended from 20 to 60, but the numbers given are 13,000 for those of military age, and 16,000 for those over or below military age (and the resident aliens). If from this sum we deduct 3000 for resident aliens, we have as many men from the two years 19, 20 and the years over 60 as for the years 21-60 ! 3 Per. 33. 4 At the battle of Delium (424) the entire Athenian force of heavy-armed is put at 7000—a striking contrast to the estimate of Pericles. See Delbruck, Die Strategie des Pericles, p. 82. Buncker, Gexch. Alt. ix. 405. Beloch, Griech. Gesch. i. 524, puts the invading army of the Peloponnesians at 20,000-25,000 heavy-armed. This was two-thirds of the whole force. (See also his Bev6lkerungi p. 151.) IV. 5] STRATEGY, MERCENARIES, ETC. 103 no organised light-arif*ed force. The Spartans, on the other hand, had a force of light-armed ready to hand in their helots, but they had no cavalry. For these they trusted to the Boeotians, until the year 425, when they organised a body of 400 horse for the protection of Laconia.1 In their mode of warfare the two armies differed greatly. The Spartans, trusting to their admirable skill and organisation, sought a fair field in which to fight the Mode of struggle out, and were able at Mantinea to warfare-retrieve even so great a disaster as a breach of their line. The Athenians displayed more versatility. Demosthenes, for instance, won the battle of Olpae by an ambuscade, and the battle of Idomene by a surprise, marching through the night, and attacking the enemy while still asleep. The greatest confusion often prevailed; at Delium the Athenians slew one another by mistake, and it frequently happened that one part of an army drove the enemy cff the field, only to find on their return that the rest of their forces had been irretrievably defeated. The combination of different nationalities in the same army also gave rise to difficulties. In the night attack on Epipolae the Athenians were in terror of their own Dorian allies, whose war-cry, given in Doric, resembled that of the enemy. At Argos we find the nucleus of a standing army in the select thousand uwhom the city had long trained at the public expense in military exercises"2; and in the course of the war the use of mercenaries became more common ; even the Athenians, when they found out by experience the value of light-armed troops, did not hesitate to take into their pay the "most bloodthirsty of barbarians."8 When addressing the allies at Sparta before the beginning of the war, the Corinthians claimed for the Peloponnesians a superiority over the Athenians in courage, but acknowledged their inferiority in seamanship. This inferiority, i Time. iv. 94, 55. 2 Thuc. v. 67. 3 Thuc. vii. 29. For liglit-armed troops, cp. ii. 79 ; iii. 98; iv. 33 f. 104 THE WEALTH OF ATHENS. [IV. 6. they predict, will be removed by practice.1 If we compare the position of the Athenian navy at the beginning and the Decline of close of the war, we find that the Corinthians Athenian skill were right. In the sea fights of 429 the skill atsea* of Phormio was irresistible, and the arrange- ments which Cnemus made to defeat the dreaded manoeuvres of the Athenian ships were rendered entirely useless. With the progress of the war the balance passes over to the other side. The Corinthians show far greater genius in adapting themselves to the new conditions of naval warfare than the Athenians, who did not perceive when they entered the harbour of Syracuse that they were throwing away all opportunities of displaying their seamanship. Still, even after the destruction of her best ships and her best sailors, Athens held her own; the victories of Cyzicus and Arginusae were greater than any previously gained in the war, and it was owing to treachery or to the foolish self-confidence of his enemy that Lysander was able to seize the entire Athenian fleet at Aegospotami. 6. In financial resources the Athenians had greatly the advantage of their opponents. We cannot, indeed, say that Finance Athens was the only city in which there was Athenian any systematic finance, for we do not know resources. j1QW ^e navies of Corinth were supported, but from the time that the management of the Delian League passed into her hands, and still more from the time when the League became the Athenian empire, her position was quite different from that of any other city in Greece. In the year 435, before the outlay on the Propylaea and the siege of Potidaea, a sum of 9700 talents had been accumulated in the Acropolis, and at the beginning of the war 6000 t. were still at the disposal of the city. The income from the allies is* put by Thucydides at 600 t.,2 and if Xenophon is right in 1 Thuc. i. 121. 2 This perhaps includes more than the mere cj)6pos; cp. Thuc. iv, 108, who says that Amphipolis was useful to the Athenians xpiHidroav 7r/30(jd5o), but Amphipolis paid no tribute. IV. 6 ] FINANCE IN THE PELOPONNESE. 105 placing the total income of Athens at the beginning of the war at 1000 t., there was a further sum of 400 t. coming in from tolls, dues, mines, and other sources.1 Considerable sums could also be obtained by borrowing from the temples, which had incomes of their own, distinct from the public revenues. When necessary, a property-tax could be levied, and though the Athenians were averse to taxing themselves directly, this particular burden, as it fell mainly on the rich, was regarded as tolerable by the sovereign Many.2 A good deal of the cost of war was met by private expenditure. To every ship was attached a trierarch, whose business it was to keep the vessel in repair, and pay a large part of the maintenance when in service. The knights also spent money on their horses in addition to the allowance made by the state. There was an honourable and even extravagant spirit of emulation among the richer Athenians in these matters, which was stimulated by the reflection that a wise expenditure was the best means of winning popular favour. The Athenian was taught in a severe school that property has its duties as well as its rights and pleasures. Against these large resources the Spartans and their allies had little to set—at least in public funds. That the cities of the confederacy made some kind of contri- peioponnesian bution is stated by Thucydides, and the state- finances-ment is confirmed by an inscription, but no details have been preserved.3 The amount was probably inconsiderable. Pericles says distinctly that ? the Peloponnesians had no money, either in private fortunes or in public treasuries* 1 See Xen. Anab. vii. 1. 27. Aristoph. Wasps, 657 ff. enumerates the sources of Athenian income. He puts the total at 2000 t., but this is probably exaggerated, and in any case the Wasps was written after 425 when the tribute was raised. 2 The rich suffered most in a war; Thuc. viii. 48. 3 Thuc. ii. 7. Hicks, Historical Inscriptions, 43. Plut. Reg. et Imperial. Apophth., 'Apx&apos ev tg> HeXoTrovvrjcriaKCd 7roXep.(af ra>v i-vpudxcov d£iovvTv\d^€ip. In iii. 17 we are told tt)v T€ yap ^Attlkyjv koi Euj3otav kol 2a\ap'iva ckcitov (vrjes) €(f)v\a(rcrov. Previously the Peiraeus was d(j)v\a.KTos kol a/cA^o-ros, etKora)?, bia to iiriKpajtiv ttoXv r<» vclvtikm (ii. 93), and again, ibid. ovt€ vavriKov i)v irpoien, p. 97. 2 Thuc. ii. 69. 3 Time. ii. 69. 134 S1TALCES : POTIDAEA, 430. [V. i% court of the Odrysian king, Sitalces, thinking that he might be brought to abandon the Athenians, or at least to convey Northern the envoys across the Hellespont. The visit Greece: proved a fatal mistake. Two Athenians who seizure of * . . Peioponnesian happened to be with Sitalces at the time per-envoys. suaded his son Sadocus to seize the envoys as they were about to cross the straits, and deliver them into their hands. The captives were at once carried to Athens, where they were put to death on the very day of their arrival, without any trial, and their bodies thrown down precipices. This savage act was justified as a retaliation on the Lacedaemonians, who, at the beginning of the war, slaughtered all their captives at sea, whether allies of the Athenians or neutrals. And at this time Athenian feeling was much excited against Persia. The "Medising" party in Colophon, with the aid of the satrap of Sardis, had recently seized the city for the King, compelling the patriots to take refuge in the harbour of Notium. A bad act cannot justify a, worse, but it was certainly a gain to the Athenians to have got rid of Aristeus, and to have given a check to Spartan negotiations with Persia. The alliance with Sitalces was beginning to bear fruit.1 More important was the surrender of Potidaea, which took place towards the end of the year. For more than two years Surrender the heroic defenders had successfully defied the of Potidaea. utmost efforts of Athenian skill and energy. But the invasions of Attica, from which so much had been expected, had brought no relief, and at last supplies ran short. Still the city held out, and it was not till the extremity of famine, " even to the eating of human flesh," had been endured, that the final overtures were made. The besiegers had suffered much, and they had before them the prospect of a third winter in their exposed situation, while the expenses of the siege had run up to about ,£400,000 of our money. On both sides there was an eagerness to bring 1 Thuc. ii. 67 ; iii- 34. The seizure of Colophon took place about the time of the second invasion of Attica. V. 13.] ARCHIDAMUS A T PLA TAEA, 429. 135 the long conflict to an end, and the terms proposed were accepted by the Athenian generals. The Potidaeans, with their wives and children and even the foreign troops, came out of the city, the men with one garment, the women with two; besides which they received a certain sum of money for their journey. They dispersed among the cities of Chal-cidice, or wherever they could find a home, and Potidaea was occupied by Athenian colonists.1 13. The Peloponnesian army had twice invaded Attica in the hope of saving a Corinthian colony; the Peloponnesian fleet had been sent into the Ionian sea to support Corinthian interests, but for Boeotia nothing had been done. The war began with an attempt on the part of Thebes to seize Plataea, an attempt which failed, and after two years of war the Thebans were as far from attaining their object as ever. They would wait no longer, and at their request, in the spring of the following year (429), Archidamus, instead of invading Attica, led his forces into the Plataean territory. He was about to ravage the country, when he was met by envoys from the city, who reminded him that after the great battle which finally broke the neslans invade power of the Persians in Greece, Pausanias, the territory of Plataea. the Lacedaemonian, had offered sacrifice in the market-place of Plataea to Zeus, the god of Freedom, and had solemnly declared Plataea an independent city and territory ; no one was to make war on the Plataeans unless injured, or to attempt to enslave them, and all the Greeks then present pledged themselves to resist any attack upon their liberties (vol. ii. p. 232). Eegardless of these oaths Archidamus was now invading their territory, to aid the Thebans, the worst enemies of the city, in bringing about her enslavement. Archidamus acknowledged the justice of the Plataean 1 Thuc. ii*. 70; Diod. xii 46. In Aristoph. Knights, 436, the sausage-seller declares that Cleon has received 10 talents from Potidaea,— but what is meant it is difficult to say. The Athenians were displeased with their generals for accepting such easy terms. 136 PLATAEA FAITHFUL TO ATHENS, 429. [V. 13. claim, but professed to believe that their actions did not correspond to their words. Their independence had indeed been guaranteed to them, and he was willing, as he was bound, to respect it; but the Plataeans had put themselves in a false position. While claiming the help of all the Hellenes in securing their own independence and freedom, they had deserted their former allies, and joined the Athenians in enslaving Hellas. It was to emancipate the enslaved Greeks that the war had been undertaken; let them join in it, or at least remain neutral, aiding neither side but receiving both as friends—a course already once proposed to them. The Plataeans replied that they could do nothing without the Athenians; their wives and children were now at Athens, and under the proposed terms the Athenians might come as friends and compel them to remain in their alliance; so, too, the Thebans might come, taking advantage of the peace as before, and renew their attack. Archidamus offered to be surety for Plataea and everything in the city, or in the territory: let the Plataeans go where they chose, and on the return of peace they should receive their own; meanwhile the Lacedaemonians would till the ground and pay rent for it. These proposals the Plataeans were willing to put before the Athenians, and with their permission they would do as Archidamus wished. Archidamus then granted a truce for the negotiations. The envoy returned from Athens with a message calling on the Plataeans to stand firm; the Athenians never had abandoned them in the past, and they would aid them now to the utmost of their power. Upon this the Plataeans resolved to remain true to their alliance, and let the Lacedaemonians do their worst: answer was made from the walls to this effect. Archidamus, after a solemn appeal to the gods to favour his enterprise, which was justified because the Plataeans had not only deserted the Hellenic alliance for that of Athens, but had refused to accept his overtures, began the siege.1 All the 1 Thuc. ii. 71-74. Diodor. xii. 47 merely says: pcWovrctv tfavTtov byovv tt)v x^Pavi Ka* wapaKakovvTwv tovs nXaraieis a7roo-n}j/at ra>v V. I3-] PLATAEA BESIEGED, 4#9. 137 resources of engineering skill were brought to bear upon the city, but in vain; when a huge mound—the work of seventy days—had been raised against the siege of wall, in order to capture the town by this plataea-primitive method (xw/xa),1 the Plataeans rendered it useless, partly by raising the wall, partly by removing the earth through a mine, but most of all by building a second, crescent-shaped wall within that part against which the mound was raised, so that if this were captured, the besiegers would still have another wall to surmount, and at the same time be exposed to a cross fire. Engines of assault were also brought up, among them battering-rams, but the Plataeans broke off the heads of these by dropping heavy beams upon them.2 The Peloponnesians then attempted to set the town on fire, but the plan failed of success owing to the stillness of the weather and an opportune storm of rain. Finding his efforts useless, Archidamus was driven to invest the city; a double wall was built round it, and garrisoned partly with Peloponnesian, partly with Boeotian, soldiers.3 These operations occupied the Peloponnesians .from May to October. During the whole of this time Athens took no steps whatever to deliver those who had shut themselves up in their city and allowed their country to be ravaged in reliance on promises of Athenian help. For these promises Pericles, if it is right to assume that he was not now in office, was not himself responsible, but those who gave them must have been aware that they could not now assist the Plataeans without meeting the Boeotians, at least, in the open 'AOrjvaicov, o)s ov irpoail^ov avrols, enopOrjae ttjv x&pav. Duncker, G. A. ix. 474 n., thinks it impossible that Archidamus, as the ally of Thebes, can have offered neutrality to the Plataeans, or security for their possessions. This part of the story he regards as an invention of the Spartans, who wished to justify their action as far as possible. 1 See Herod, i. 162 : atpec tcls noXias ^a>/iao"t. 2 This is said to be the first occasion on which engines were used ; see supra, p. 33 and note: Droysen, Die Griechischen Kriegsalterthiimer, pp. 208, 209, and notes. 3 Thuc. ii. 75-78. For the difficulties connected with the siege, see below. 138 SPARTOLUS: PERICLES RESTORED, J^29. [V. 14. field, a policy which had been renounced at the very beginning of the war. The abandonment of Plataea to her fate was the inevitable result of the line taken by Pericles since the peace of 445. Nothing but an effective army could have saved the town, and the Athenian army in the hands of Pericles became eminently ineffective. Some years later, the Athenians tried their strength against Boeotia in the battle of Delium, but only to meet with a most disastrous defeat. 14. About the time of the attack on Plataea, the Athenians sent out an expedition of 2000 heavy-armed and 200 cavalry Defeat of the to Thrace. They were anxious to follow up Athenians at their successes there, and put an end to the Spartoius. reVolt of the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans. From Potidaea, where they disembarked, the troops marched to Spartoius, hopii j that the town would be given up to them. In this they were deceived; aid arrived at Spartoius from Olynthus, and an engagement took place under the walls, in which, though the Chalcidian heavy-armed were defeated, their cavalry and light-armed gained some advantage over those of the Athenians, who had been joined by a small body of targeteers from the neighbourhood. Further reinforcements having arrived, the light-armed troops of Spartoius were encouraged to renew the attack on the Athenians. They drove them back to their baggage, and finally, aided by their cavalry, routed them with severe loss. All three generals perished and a fifth of the force; the rest escaped to Potidaea, and returned home.1 The news of this defeat seems to have caused a reaction at Athens in favour of Pericles. At the next election of generals, Reaction in ^ay 429, he was replaced in his old position, favour of "and everything was put into his hands." Pencies. rj-^ reaction came too late. At the time when he returned to office (July) he was already, perhaps, stricken 1 Thuc. ii. 79. Cp. Diod. xii. 47, who reduces the Athenian forces to 1000. The generals were Xenophon and Phanomachus, who had been in command in the previous year, and Calliades (Diod. I.e. ', Plut. Nic. 6). V. i5.] ATTACK ON ACARNANIA, #9. 139 with the disease which in three or four months brought him to the grave. Under such circumstances, he can hardly have taken any very active part in public affairs, but his last days were cheered by reports of the most brilliant exploits ever achieved by the Athenian fleet. 15. Though the Ambraciots had failed to capture Amphi lochian Argos in the preceding summer, they had not abandoned their designs on the city. They Attack on Acar-now came forward with a plan for subjugating nania, which is the whole country of Acarnania, and detaching de eate * it from the Athenian alliance. A combined attack was to be made by land and sea, so that the Acarnanians might be unable to unite their whole forces for resistance. With this view, the Ambraciots requested the Lacedaemonians to send a fleet, with a thousand hoplites on board. On their own part they would bring into the field their army, and also obtain the help of the barbarian tribes of Epirus, with whom they had a large and extensive connection. If the plot succeeded, and Acarnania were conquered, Zacynthus and Cephallenia, and perhaps even Naupactus, would fall into the hands of Sparta, and it would no longer be easy for the Athenians to cruise round the Peloponnesus. This scheme, attractive in itself, and warmly supported by the Corinthians, was readily taken up at Sparta. Cnemus, the admiral who had conducted the attack upon Zacynthus in the previous year, was at once despatched with a thousand hoplites in a few vessels, and the fleet was ordered to assemble at Leucas. Cnemus succeeded in crossing to Leucas unobserved by Phormio, the Athenian officer stationed at Naupactus, and was there joined by the ships from Leucas, Ambracia, and Anactorium. With these he sailed to Am-bracia, expecting that the contingents of ships which were coming from Sicyon and Corinth would overtake him there. On his arrival, he found a large force of Chaonians and other Epirotes ready to obey his orders; even Perdiccas, the king of Macedonia, though ostensibly at peace with Athens, secretly sent a thousand soldiers (who arrived too late to be 140 BATTLE OF STRATUS, 429. [V. 16. of service), and an equal number came from Antiochus, the king of the Orestae. Feeling himself sufficiently strong to open the game without waiting for the ships from Corinth and Sicyon, Cnemus at once began his march to the south. The route lay along the eastern edge of the Ambracian gulf, through the territory of Argos to Stratus, on the Achelous, which was the largest city of Acarnania. The Acarnanians, on hearing of the threatened invasion, had at once sent to Phormio for help; but as he was daily expecting to see the Corinthian ships sail down the gulf, he could not leave Naupactus. Meanwhile the combined forces were approaching Stratus. They advanced in three divisions, of which the barbarians formed the centre. The Hellenic soldiers marched in good order as they had been trained to do, but the barbarians rushed on at full speed, thinking that they had only to be first on the scene to capture the town. The Stratians saw their opportunity; if they could destroy the barbarians before the Greeks came up, the whole expedition would receive a very sensible check. They placed some of their forces in ambuscades outside the city, and when the assailants were close to the walls, a combined onset was made from the city and from the ambuscades. The Chaonians were at once seized with a panic; many were slaughtered; the rest, carrying the other barbarians with them, rushed back to the Greeks, who received their first news of the disaster from the defeated fugitives. Here a stand was made for the remainder of the day, but when night came on Cnemus withdrew to the Anapus, and from thence to Ocniadae, where he disbanded his army.1 l6. This was not the worst. Almost on the very day of the engagement at Stratus, the fleet from Corinth, which should have co-operated with Cnemus and the land army, was utterly defeated by Phormio at the mouth of the gulf. From his station at Naupactus the Athenian commander saw 1 Thuc. ii. 80-82 ; Diod. xii. 47. V. i6.] PHORMIO'S VICTORY, 429. 141 the ships moving along the Peloponnesian shore. They had no intention of attacking him, and no fear that he would attack their forty-seven vessels with his twenty, when they suddenly saw the Athenian ships peloponnesian off the opposite coast of Aetolia, and when in fleet by the dim light of morning they attempted to cross over from Patrae in Achaea towards Acarnania, they were met by Pbormio, who bore down upon them from the mouth of the Evenus. It was impossible to avoid an engagement. The Corinthian commanders knew that their seamen were not a match for the Athenians in point of skill. To be forced into battle was bad enough ; to be attacked outside the strait, where there was room for every manoeuvre, was still worse. They resolved to arrange their fleet in such a manner that the ordinary tactics of sailing through the line of vessels and then charging from the rear would be impossible. With this object they drew up their ships in a circle, turning the prows outward, and keeping them sufficiently close to avoid any inlet. The smaller craft were collected in the central space, where also were placed five of their swiftest triremes, ready to run out at any point where the enemy attacked. On seeing this formation, Phormio at once arranged his plan. Placing his vessels in a single line, he bade them pass round the enemy's fleet in ever narrowing circles. By this means he brought their ships into the smallest possible compass, and kept them in constant expectation of an attack. He continued this movement till the time at which the morning breeze from the Corinthian gulf made it impossible for the Peloponnesian ships to remain steadily in their position. Ship began to dash against ship; the attention of the sailors was occupied in keeping them clear of each other, the more so as the rough water made it difficult for unpractised rowers to manage their oars. Then Phormio gave the signal for direct attack. The first vessel sunk was one of the admirals', but the havoc soon became universal; no resistance could be made • in wild disorder the whole fleet ran for the Achaean 142 CNEMUS AND BRASIDAS, J&9. [V. 17. coast, hotly pursued by Phormio, who captured twelve vessels with most of their crews. The rest escaped to Cyllene in Elis, where they were joined by Cnemus and the ships from Leucas.1 17. At the news of this disaster, the Lacedaemonians were highly indignant. They could not understand how a few Commissioners ships could defeat so many, or recognise that sent to Cnemus. their own fleet was so vastly inferior to the Athenian as it had been proved to be. They did not indeed recall their admiral and fine or banish him, as the Athenians would have done under similar circumstances, but, while sending him orders to fight again, they also sent three commissioners, one of whom was Brasidas, to advise with him. Supported by their help, Cnemus sent round to the Pelopon-nesian allies for more vessels, and refitted those which had been damaged in the engagement. Intelligence of these preparations was brought to Phormio, who at once sent to Athens for reinforcements; a battle Reinforcements might take place any day, and he would have sent to Phormio. to meet the whole Peloponnesian fleet with no more than twenty vessels. From Corcyra, whose fleet was to be of such advantage to Athens in her operations in Western Greece, not a single ship had been sent to aid Acarnania or Phormio, who was thus left entirely to his own resources or help from Athens. The greater is our astonishment to find that the reinforcement voted at Athens amounted to twenty vessels only, and that even these, though every day was of the greatest importance, were bidden to sail to Crete before they joined Phormio! Who was responsible for this extraordinary order we do not know; the Athenians could have gained nothing by the most brilliant success in Crete—which, so far as we know, they never revisited in the course of the war; while, on the other hand, the position of Athens in Western Greece was in peril. It 1 Time. ii. 83, 84; Diod, xii. 48, For details, see Grote, iv. 313, notes. V. I7-] SECOND ENGAGEMENT, 4^9. 143 was a grave blunder, and nothing but the skill and bravery of Phormio saved Athens from irretrievable disaster.1 When all was ready, the Peloponnesian fleet left Cyllene for Panormus in Achaea, where the land forces were assembled to support it. Phormio, meanwhile, who ^ rr % ' ' Engagement in was resolved not to fight in the narrow channel, the Corinthian sailed from Naupactus to the promontory of gulf* Antirrhium, anchoring outside it. The Peloponnesians, who were as anxious to fight in the gulf as Phormio was to fight outside it, met him by moving to a point exactly opposite, but just inside the gulf, where the distance from shore to shore was not more than a mile. The number of their vessels had been raised to seventy-seven, while Phormio had no more than his original twenty. For six or seven days the two fleets lay opposite each other, until at length Cnemus and Brasidas, finding that Phormio would not enter the strait, determined to draw him into it. Before going into action they thought it necessary to raise the courage of their sailors, — who, in spite of the disparity of The Pelo on_ numbers, were far from confident of success, nesians encour-—partly by dwelling on the increased chances aeetheirsailors of victory, and partly by hinting that any want of courage would be noticed and punished.2 Phormio also, though he had hitherto trained his sailors to the belief that no superiority of forces on the enemy's side could justify a retreat on theirs, on seeing them dispirited by the odds which they had now to face, gathered them together and encouraged them in a brief address. He pointed out that the enemy had assembled in such force because they were 1 Thuc. ii. 85. The force was sent to Crete at the request of Nicias, a citizen of Gortys and proxenus of the Athenians, ostensibly to conquer the hostile city of Cydonia, but really to interfere in some neighbourly quarrel between Polichna and Cydonia. It did nothing beyond ravaging the territory of Cydonia, and was delayed by contrary winds on its return. Nicias was a friend of the Polichnitae, and Arnold, ad loc, suggests that the Athenians would naturally be ill-disposed towards the Cydonians, who were, in part, colonists from Aegina. 2 Thuc. ii. 87. i44 PHORMlO AGAIN VICTORIOUS, 429. [V. 18. afraid of defeat, and their courage was due, not to experience at sea, but to experience on land. It would fail them when they saw that the Athenians were ready to attack in spite of the disparity of numbers.1 l8. Forming their vessels four abreast, the Peloponnesians now fronted north-east or east, and sailed along the shore of Achaea into the gulf, twenty of their fastest vessels leading the way. Phormio at once saw the danger; he had left Naupactus unprotected, for even the Messenians of the town had followed him on shore to support his vessels, and if the Peloponnesian fleet got ahead, they would reach the place before he could save it. He embarked at once, and bidding the Messenians follow, sailed in single file along the coast with all speed for Naupactus. This was exactly what Brasidas wished; the Athenian ships had now no room for any exhibition of their dreaded skill. Changing front, he suddenly brought his whole line four deep upon the flank of Phormio's vessels. It was an excellent manoeuvre, and well carried The engage- . . . mentoffNau- out; but owing to the superiority of the pactus: Phor- Athenians in rowing, it was only partially successful. Eleven of Phormio's vessels escaped the swiftest Peloponnesian ships; the remaining nine were forced aground ; one ship was taken with its crew, others were being towed away, when the Messenians dashed into the water and saved them. So far the victory was on the side of the Lacedaemonians, who might reasonably have thought that they had redeemed their previous failure. But half the Athenian fleet remained. Of the eleven ships which escaped the attack, ten reached Naupactus, and ranged themselves in a position of defence, should the enemy attempt to force them ashore. One remained behind the rest, unable to keep up in the race. In their wake came the twenty Peloponnesian vessels, of which one, a Leucadian, far in advance of the rest, was chasing the Athenian laggard. In the line of pursuit lay a merchantman, 1 Time. ii. 89. V. I9-] PHORMICPS SECOND VICTORY, I$§. 145 anchored in the det,p water off Naupactus. The Athenians saw their opportunity. At full speed they rowed round the anchored vessel, and, hearing down on the ship, by which they were themselves pursued, struck her amidships, and so injured her that in a short time she sank. Timocrates, one of the Peloponnesian admirals, who was on board, seeing that his ship was sinking, drew his sword and slew himself. The Peloponnesians were dismayed; they had come on in loose order, singing the paean of victory, but their temper changed in a moment, and checking their pursuit, they waited for the body of the fleet to come up. The delay was fatal; the Athenians, cheered by the brilliant success of their ship, and seeing the disorder of the enemy, sailed out and fell upon the Peloponnesians, who were without any settled plan of battle. After a short resistance they fled to Panormus, whence they had started, pursued by the Athenians, who captured six of the enemy's vessels, and recovered the eight of their own which had been driven on shore. On the following night the Peloponnesians stole away to Corinth.1 19. The attempt to acquire control of the Corinthian gulf had entirely failed, but before the ships dispersed from Corinth, the Peloponnesian commanders re- Proposed attack solved, at the suggestion of the Megarians, to on the Peiraeus. make an attack in another direction. The harbour of Peiraeus was neither closed nor guarded, and, though forty ships of war lay in the port of Nisaea, the Athenians, secure in the mastery of all the adjacent seas, considered that three ships of war stationed at Budorum on the promontory of Salamis which looks toward Megara, were sufficient to keep them in check. Here was an opportunity for a sudden surprise, an attack on the very centre of the Athenian power. Preparations were at once begun; the sailors were bidden to take the rowing tackle out of their own ships, and march by 1 Thuc. ii. 90. How the fifty-seven ships of the Peloponnesian fleet which had forced Phormio'snine ships aground were put to flight is not clear. VOL. HI. K 146 THE PEL0P0NNES1ANS IN SALAMIS, 429. [V. 19. night across the isthmus from Corinth to Nisaea. On their arrival, they at once launched the forty vessels, as had been arranged, but at this point their courage failed them; the risk seemed too great, and changing their course, they sailed to Salamis, where they captured the three ships before the Athenians had time to man them, and ravaged the island, of which for nearly a hundred and fifty years the Athenians had been in secure possession. Fire signals at once conveyed information of the attack to Athens. The excitement was intense. The inhabitants of the upper city thought that the enemy had already sailed into the harbour; the inhabitants of Peiraeus feared that Salamis was captured, and an attack on the harbour imminent. At daybreak the Athenians rushed to the shore, manned their vessels in all haste, and crossed to Salamis, while others remained on guard in the Peiraeus. The Peloponnesians had no intention of risking an engagement; the memory of their defeat was too recent, and the ships in which they put out from Nisaea were old and unseaworthy. With their captives and spoil, including the three ships from Budorum, they returned to Megara and dispersed. The Athenians also returned home, but the lesson was not lost on them; from this time onwards the mouth of the harbour was closed and a strict watch kept.1 In defence of their conduct, the Peloponnesians asserted that they were prevented by adverse winds from entering Peiraeus;2 but in the judgment of Thucydides, this was a mere excuse, and there was nothing in the weather to prevent resolute men from entering the harbour. It is, however, doubtful whether an unsupported attack in forty unseaworthy ships on the harbour of Athens, even if successful at first, could have ended in anything but disaster; and as Brasidas was one of the commanders of the Peloponnesian 1 Thuc. ii. 93, 94. 2 " Phalerum, they say, is the right harbour, because it is so hard to tack into Peiraeus.*'—Clough, Life and Letters, p. 248. V. 20.] LAST DAYS OF PHORMIO, 409-4*8. 147 fleet, we must suppose that other reasons, and not a want of courage, determined the abandonment of the plan. A few weeks later, Phormio sailed with a considerable force from Naupactus to Astacus, which, in spite of the restoration of Evarchus in 431,1 seems now to have Phormioin been favourable to Athens, and marching into Acarnania* .... n i r aj. i His return to the interior, he expelled from fetratus and Athens and Coronta and other towns any citizens who death, were likely to oppose Athenian interests. Oeniadae was unapproachable owing to the floods of the Achelous, and Phormio returned to Naupactus for the winter. In the following spring (428) he sailed to Athens, taking with him his ships and captives; but such is the vexatious reticence of Grecian historians, that, in spite of his brilliant services to his country, we never hear of this officer again; we conclude that he died soon after his return home, or he would certainly have been sent out in the following summer to take the command at Naupactus, a post which was given to his son Asopius.2 20. Meanwhile the whole of Northern Greece had been terrified by a gathering of the tribes of Thrace. Two years previously, in the summer of 431 (supra, M p. 123), Sitalces, the king of the Odrysians, in Thrace: had become an ally of the Athenians, who Sltalces-wished to obtain his assistance in reducing the revolted cities in Chalcidice. About the same time Perdiccas had prevailed upon him to bring about a reconciliation between himself and the Athenians, and to abandon the idea of restoring Philip to his kingdom. In the interval, Perdiccas, having obtained his object, forgot his promises, while Sitalces took no steps towards assisting the Athenians. This neglect was now brought to his notice by some envoys sent from Athens for the purpose, who also would not fail to remind him that Perdiccas had treacherously sent 1000 Macedonians to operate against i Thuc. ii. 33. 2 Thuc. ii. 102, 103. Phormio was one of the heroes of Athenian gtory ; cp, Aristoph. Knights, 560; Lysistr, 804. 148 THE POWER OF SITALCES, I>29. [V. 20. Athens in Acarnania. Sitalces resolved to put forth his whole strength. Perdiccas was to be deposed from the throne of Macedon, and in concert with Hagnon, the Athenian general, whose name was well known in Thrace as the founder of Amphipolis, a combined attack on Chalcidice was planned, in which the Athenians, according to their agreement, were to take part with as large a force as possible.1 The empire of Sitalces has been described (supra, p. 46). It was the greatest power between the Ionian Sea and the Euxine. The levy of The tribes included in it were numerous and sitalces. warlike, and only required competent leaders to make them a formidable army. These tribes Sitalces now called out. He first summoned those adjacent to his own territory—the Thracians who dwelt between Mount Haemus and Mount Ehodope, extending to the shores of the Euxine and Hellespont; then the Getae from beyond the Haemus, and other tribes as far as the Danube—nations which, like their Scythian neighbours, fought in battle as mounted archers. He paid or persuaded a number of Dii from the heights of Rhodope, the most warlike of all the Thracians, and armed with their native dirks,2 to join his ranks, though they did not acknowledge his supremacy. From the banks of the Strymon he summoned the Agrianes and Laeaei, and other Paeonians; from the northern slopes of Mount Scombrus the Treres and Tilataei. This mighty host was still increased by many independent tribes who joined it in the hope of plunder, until it reached a total of 150,000 men, of whom one-third were mounted soldiers.3 In a previous expedition against the Paeonians, Sitalces had cut a road over Mount Cercine, and by this he now invasion of advanced to Doberus, from which he could Macedonia. descend the valley of the Axius, into Macedonia.4 As he carried with him Amyntas, the son of Philip, who was now dead, intending to make him king of Macedonia Thuc. ii. 95, 96. 2 Tbuc. vii. 27. 3 Time. ii. 96, 98. For the geography, see esp. Abel's Mahdonien, p. 60 f. V. 20.] SITALCES IN MACEDONIA, 4%9. 149 in the room of Perdiccas, he purposely led his forces into the district on the left of the Axius, the part of the kingdom over which Philip had previously ruled. The banks of the river were defended by a number of walled cities, founded by the races which had held the country before the Macedonian conquest. Of these Eidomene was taken by storm, but others opened their gates to Amyntas, whom they regarded as their legitimate king, and it was not till they reached Europus that the invaders met with a resistance which they could not overcome. Even this did not put an end to their depredations; they ravaged Mygdonia, Crestonaea, Anthemus, and all Macedonia to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus.1 The resources of Macedonia were unequal to repelling such a host. The country had not yet been provided with the numerous strongholds and excellent roads by which Archelaus subsequently strengthened his kingdom—doing more for Macedonia in his single reign than all the kings before him. The people made the best of their position, retiring into their castles, and keeping up a series of attacks on the Thracians with thejr excellent and well-armed cavalry. Their best hope lay in the numbers of the invaders; it was impossible for such a horde to remain long in one place, or risk the dangers of a winter campaign; and when on reaching Chalcidice, Sitalces found that the Athenians did not appear according to their agreement, he decided to return home. He had already The Athenians entered into negotiations with Perdiccas, who fail to meet had won over Seuthes, the nephew of Sitalces ^t^l^andi110 and next in power to the king himself, by the makes terms promise of the hand of his sister Stratonice. with Perdiccas-The cause of Amyntas was abandoned, and after a raid into Chalcidice and Bottice the Thracian withdrew his army. Nothing important had been achieved. The Chalcidic cities 1 "Left," that is, of the Axius; they did not enter Pieria and Bottiaea. For Bottiaea and Bo'tice, see Forbes, Thvc. i. f>] 150 DEA TH OF PERICLES, 429. [V. 21 had not been reduced, and Perdiccas was in a better position than ever.1 The movement of so great a host filled the neighbouring nations with alarm. The Thessalians, on the south, prepared to meet invasion, and on the north the Thracian tribes who were still independent feared that they would have to fight for their freedom. All the enemies of Athens, aware of the alliance between that city and the Thracian king, expected to see the hosts of the north launched upon their territory. The alarm was not unnatural. Had the Athenians kept their promise, the skill and energy necessary to conduct so great an undertaking might have been supplied; and a larger army would have been brought against the rebellious cities in Thrace than had been seen since the Persian invasion. In their absence the invasion of Macedonia was conducted without any definite aim or fixed purpose, and though the hosts of Sitalces seemed powerful by their numbers, it was their numbers which formed the chief difficulty in the way of success.2 21. At the time when these events were taking place in the west and north of Greece, Athens was mourning the The death of loss of her great leader. In September 429, Pericles. two years and a half after the outbreak of the war, Pericles died.3 He sank under a lingering disease, which Plutarch regards as an insidious form of the plague, unaccompanied by the violent symptoms. The mind sympathised with the body; and so low was he brought that to a friend who visited him in his sickness, he showed the 1 Thuc. ii. 100, 101. See also Abel, Makedonien, p. 179. The Macedonian cavalry were TeOcopaicuTfievoi. 2 See Aristoph. Acharn. 148 if. (425): 6 6° «/xoo-€ (Sitalces) airevbcov fiorjdrjo-eLV, e^oov GTpaTiav Toaravrrjp wcrr' *AOrjvaiovs ipflv, ocov to XPVt10- irapvoirav irpoaep^Tai. 3 Thuc. ii. 65 : end re 6 7r6Xe/xoy KarecrTT} . . . ene^Lco dvo err) kcii e£ prfva$. The date is, however, uncertain, because We do not know whether Thucydides reckons from the affair of Plataea, or the invasion of Attica—in the latter case the death of Pericles must be put in November. V. 21.] INFLUENCE OF PERICLES. 151 amulet which he had allowed the women of his household to hang about his neck. Yet something of the old Pericles remained: a few days before his death, when the friends who gathered round him praised his greatness and his victories—the nine trophies which he had erected over the enemies of the city—believing him to be quite unconscious of their presence, Pericles, who had followed their words, found voice to express his wonder why they selected for praise what was partly due to fortune, and had fallen to the lot of many other generals, while they left unrecorded his best and greatest claim to renown. " No action of mine," he said, " has ever caused an Athenian to wear the garb of a mourner."x To the sickness and death of Pericles we may, without hesitation, ascribe the unsteadiness of plan and weakness in execution which marks Athenian policy during The death the second half of the year 429. Had he ofPericies: retained his old vigour, the ships sent to aid ^Athenian Phormio would not have been allowed to visit policy. Crete, when their presence was so urgently needed at Naupactus. Nor would the Athenians have failed to perform their part of the compact with Sitalces, and appear on the coast of Chalcidice, with an adequate fleet, when the Thracians were ravaging the interior. And we cannot but hope, for the honour of Athens and her leader, that in spite of his disinclination to take the field, Pericles would have made some attempt to relieve Plataea, whose condition, in the summer of the year, was as great a proof of Athenian incompetence and ingratitude as it was of the devotion of her allies. His death was a calamity to Athens. From the first his influence had been personal. He had not built up a structure, social and political, which would continue to exist when the creating spirit had passed away ; he had not launched Athens on a new line in which she could move forward without his 1 Plut. Per. 38. The first story is taken from Theophrastus, the scholar of Aristotle, circ. 300 ; for the second no authority is given. 152 POLICY OF PERICLES. [V. 21. guiding care; he had not even left a party behind him. He ruled alone, and when the reins dropped from his hand, no one else could take them up. A democracy ruled by a great man is an admirable form of government; but a democracy with rulers absorbed in maintaining their own position is incapable of governing itself or others: at home it is distracted by parties; abroad it is inconsistent or tyrannical. The Athenian empire was an outrage on the autonomous rights of the allies, and the plan of campaign with which Pericles entered into the war was not likely, under any circumstances, to lead to a final settlement between Athens and Sparta; but, however true this may be, in his views on the position of Athens towards her allies, and in the conduct of the war, Pericles displays the great quality of moderation. He did not oppress the subject cities as they were oppressed after his death; he did not seek to aggrandise Athens in the war. He dreamed, not of an empire stretching from Crete to Carthage, but of an impregnable Athens, a city so strong that her enemies would desist for very weariness from attacking her. To this policy he would have clung, and neither defeat nor success would have drawn him from it. Those who came after him were of another temper; they used every success as a basis for new demands, and when defeated they were in despair. There were times when the war was carried on better after his death than during his life, but it was carried out without a settled plan. Nicias hoped for one result, Cleon for another; and the policy of Athens varied as one or other was in the ascendant. The mischief which showed itself in the last two years of Pericles' life became fixed and constant. In the internal politics of the city we see a rapid decline. Cleon, if an unworthy successor of Pericles, was at least a man of energy, with a clear eye to the point at issue. When he died, the influence of Nicias became paramount till he met with a rival in Alcibiades, and the management of the state fell into the hands of the two men, who in opposite ways were equally a source of disaster to Athens. V. 2ii] IDEALS OF PERICLES. 153 Pericles died, and the glory pf Athens died with him; in part, through him. He has no claim to be counted amonj; the statesmen who have put new life into their nation. He was neither a legislator like Solon, nor a constitutional reformer like Clisthenes. Yet we feel that by universal consent of friend and enemy, he was the foremost man of his day, to whom all turned in the hour of distress. Persuasion sat on his lips, not merely because he was a great orator, but because he was as wise as he was eloquent, and as honest as he was wise. We must also allow that he cherished nobler ideals than any other Greek before or after him. In the State of Plato the higher life is confined to a few of the citizens; little or nothing is done for the "working classes" as we should call them. Even in Aristotle's State, this class, though more clearly recognised than in Plato, is shut out from the true life of the citizen. Pericles sought to bring all within the influence of the state; all were to share in the blessings which it had to bestow; all were to be inspired and ennobled by its influence. If we ask what the state can do for the individual, hardly any other answer can be given but the answer of Pericles. A state cannot equalise property, or efface personal distinction, and the attempt to do so is fatal. It can secure to every one, at least in a large measure, the power to shape a life and character, and the sense of this power is the best possession of a man. The practical result formed a melancholy contrast to this noble ideal. When Pericles died, a large part of the citizens were pauperised by the means which he had taken to provide them with leisure. Their hereditary interest in their fields and farms was broken, and it was not replaced by anything better. Their thoughts were absorbed in a struggle which was anything but ennobling; a struggle which embittered existing hostilities, destroyed the hope of any national union, and fixed the interest of Athens on the maintenance of her empire. The Persian war had been the highest impulse of the fifth century in Greece; it sent a thrill through the nation, and in the years which follow we reap 154 EFFECT OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. [V. 21. a harvest of the best which Greece could give. The Peloponnesian war destroyed Hellenism. The delicate bloom faded; it became more and more clear that Hellenic politics were a failure, and that new forms of union must be devised. With these new arrangements and altered conditions of life, the old Hellenic feeling, so intimately bound up with the city-state, could not co-exist. CHAPTER VI. FROM THE DEATH OF PERICLES TO THE END OF 427. I. In the next summer, immediately after the Pelopon-nesians had made their usual invasion of Attica, Athens was startled by the news of the revolt of Lesbos revolts Lesbos (428). The island had been one of the from Athens-first to join the alliance after the battle of Mycale in 479; it had remained faithful to Athens when Samos broke into revolt, and amid the general subjugation of the cities of the league, it still retained, like Chios, an independent position. Since the outbreak of the war it had furnished a contingent to the Athenian fleet; and, indeed, at the moment of revolt, ten Mytilenaean ships were lying in the harbour of Athens. But a secret discontent had long been spreading through the island. Before the war, overtures had been made to Lacedae-mon, and though these were rejected, owing no doubt to the inadequacy of the Peloponnesian fleet, the design was not abandoned. The Mytilenaeans, who led the movement, set about filling up the mouths of the harbours of their city, strengthening or restoring the walls, and building ships; vessels were despatched to the Euxine for supplies of corn; and a force of Scythian bowmen was hired. In the island they attempted to centralise the administration of the island at Mytilene, hoping by this means to put an end to internal dissension. Negotiations were opened with the Boeotians, who, as Aeolians, were akin to the Lesbians, and a second appeal was made to Lacedaemon. The Athenians were at once informed of these movements. The inhabitants of the adjacent island of Tenedos, owing to 15/) 156 REVOLT OF MYTILENE, W8. [VI. 2. a quarrel with the Lesbians, were only too ready to betray them; the city of Methymna, which ranked next to Mytilene in Lesbos, was opposed to the policy of consolidation, and retained her loyalty to Athens ; and even in Mytilene itself domestic strife had arisen, which rendered united action impossible.1 The Athenians were at first incredulous. They were unwilling to believe that a new disaster, calling for prompt The Athenians acti°n m a distant part of the empire, was send an expedi- added to their domestic calamities — to the tion to Lesbos. p]ague and the desolation of Attica. Envoys were sent in the hope of persuading the Mytilenaeans to abandon their plans and preparations, but in vain; Mytilene would yield to force, and force only. Nothing remained but immediate action. Forty ships, which had been equipped to sail round Peloponnesus, were despatched to Lesbos. It was known that a festival would shortly be held at Mytilene, at the temple of Apollo Maloeis, outside the walls of the city, and this appeared to offer a favourable opportunity for seizing the place in the absence of the citizens. If this plan failed, the Athenian commander was instructed to call on the Mytilenaeans, under a threat of war, to surrender their fleet and dismantle their walls. Meanwhile the ten Mytilenaean ships which were at Athens were detained, and the crews thrown into prison.2 2. Had the Athenians arrived unexpectedly at Mytilene, they might have succeeded in surprising the town, but in little more than two days their plans were made known to the Lesbians. The festival was, of course, abandoned; the Mytilenaeans began to barricade and guard the unfinished parts of their harbour-defences and walls, and when the Athenians appeared their demands were refused. But the Mytilenaeans were not in a condition to resist an Athenian fleet; " a show of fighting" which they made in front of the harbour was 1 Thuc. iii. 2; cp. Arist. Pol. v. 4=1304 a4ff. 2 Thuc. iii. 3. VI. 2.] THE MYTILENAEANS HARD PRESSED, 428. 157 at once repulsed, and without waiting for a second defeat, they made proposals to the Athenian generals, in the hope of procuring the recall of the fleet for a time. The Athenians The Athenians were conscious that their force at Mytiiene. was too small to reduce the island if driven to extremities, and a cessation of arms was agreed upon, during which the Mytilenaeans were allowed to send one of the informers, who had repented of his action, and other envoys to Athens. They offered to abandon their revolutionary designs if the Athenians would withdraw their ships, but their hopes of success were slight; and while these negotiations were going on, they thought it prudent to send envoys secretly to Lacedaemon for assistance. As the Athenian fleet lay at Malea, to the south of the city, the envoys slipped out to the north, and after a difficult voyage across the open sea, they reached their destination.1 As was expected, the Mytilenaeans' envoys failed to persuade the Athenians to withdraw their forces, and on their return hostilities were resumed, Mytiiene being supported by the whole of Lesbos except Methymna, which aided Athens. The Mytilenaeans were still without any real confidence in their enterprise; and after a general attack on the Athenian camp, in which they were certainly not defeated, they retired into the city to wait for the assist- ^ i.ii it it r The Mytilen- ance which they hoped would come from aeans appeal Peloponnesus. In this attitude they were to Sparta for confirmed by Meleas of Lacedaemon and Hermaeondas of Thebes, who had just succeeded in entering the city, and on their advice a second trireme with envoys was sent to Sparta.2 Such inaction naturally encouraged the Athenians, and many of the allies, who may have been watching the event, when they saw the weakness of the Lesbian resistance, came readily to their help. They now brought up their ships from Malea and anchored round the 1 Thuc. iii. 3, 4. The words npos ftopeav rrjs iroXccos are to be taken with cnrooTeAXovo-i. 2 Thuc. iii. 5. 158 THEIR ENVOYS AT OLYMP/A, 4%8- [VI. 3. south side of the city, establishing two camps, one on either side, and blockading both the harbours.1 3. Meanwhile the envoys who had left Mytilene in the first ship arrived at Lacedaemon. It was close on the time of the The Olympic games and they were bidden to repair Mytiienaeans to Olympia, in order that they might the more ympia. easily make their case known to all the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy. When the games were over, a meeting was arranged, at which they came forward. Like the Corcyraeans at Athens in 432, they had to defend their conduct, and clear it from the stain of unprovoked rebellion. They insisted that in deserting Athens they had not forsaken an equal in the hour of danger; they had risen against a tyrant at a favourable moment. The blame rested with the Athenians, who had been false to their principles in the management of the Delian League. That League was founded to preserve the freedom of Hellas, but it had been perverted to the destruction of it, and no member could continue faithful to the dominant city without betraying the liberty of their allies. It was true that the Lesbians occupied a favoured position in the alliance; they were still, as they had been at the first, free and independent, supplying ships by agreement, and paying no tribute ; but this position was better in appearance than in reality. By allowing one or two allies to remain independent, the Athenians gave a colour of justice to 1 Thuc. iii. 6. Mytilene was originally built on an island, and, therefore, like Syracuse, the city possessed two harbour? one on the north, the other on the south. The northern harbour, which was probably MaXoei9, was the harbour for ships of war, of which it would contain tifty ; it could be closed if necessary. The southern harbour was larger and deeper, and defended by a mole (Strabo, p. 617). The strait which divided the island and city is called Euripus by Pausanias, iii. 30 (Smith, Diet. Geog. s.v. Mytilene). The promontory of Malea is seventy stades distant from the city to the south, and if by it is meant the Malea at which the Athenians had their " docks and market," we must suppose that they retired there while negotiations were going on, See Jowett, Thucydides, ad Iog, VI. 4-1 REASONS FOR THE REVOLT, 428. 159 their conduct, of which it was greatly in need, and they wisely left the strongest allies to the last, when there would be no one to help them. Even this favoured position was retained by a subservience almost slavish to the Athenian people and their leaders. All real equality was gone; the alliance rested on fear, and fear only; the Lesbians were afraid of the Athenian power; the Athenians were afraid that Lesbos might combine her fleet with another and become a centre of disaffection. On these grounds the city resolved to meet the danger, and secure whatever advantages might be gained by those who made the first move.1 In revolting from Athens, Mytilene had followed the advice of the Boeotians, and if the revolt was premature, there was the more reason that assistance should be sent. No better opportunity would occur. The Athenians were prostrate with the plague; their ships were occupied; their funds were exhausted. A second invasion of Attica could not fail to create a diversion of their forces. Let no man think that in fighting for Lesbos he was risking his life in another man's quarrel. The interests of Lesbos and the Peloponnesians were the same, and Athens could be injured more deeply in Lesbos than elsewhere. Not Attica, which had been harried over and over again, but the countries from which Attica drew her resources, were the real support of the war. Strip Athens of her allies, and her power was ruined. Pro* vide Peloponnesus with ships, and her efficiency was doubled. "Think," they concluded, "think of the hopes which the Hellenes repose in you; think of Zeus Olympius, in whose temple we appear, not otherwise than suppliants, and receive us into your alliance. We are risking our lives in a great struggle; if we win, all will share in the gain; if we lose, the loss will be felt by all."2 4. The appeal was not without effect. The Lesbians were received into alliance by the Lacedaemonians, and to divert the Athenian fleet from Mytilene, the Lacedaemonians requested 1 Thuc. iii. 8-12. * Thuc. iii. 13, 14. 160 EN ERG Y OE A TBENS, 428. [VI. 4. their allies to assemble at the Isthmus for a second invasion of Attica. They were themselves most energetic, and The Lesbians arrived first at the rendezvous, where they received into began preparations for the transport of ships alliance: pro- £ . « . , . \ n • t <• 1 posed invasion *rom the Corinthian to the Saroruc gulf; but of Attica. the allies were less forward, being busy with their ingathering. Meanwhile the Athenians, by a display of their force, made it clear that they could meet the danger at home without recalling a single ship from service.1 Manning a hundred vessels, with sailors taken from every class of citizens except the two highest, and even from the resident aliens, they stood out to sea along the Isthmus and made descents upon the coast. The Lacedaemonians, finding that the Lesbians were mistaken in their estimate of the _.. . Athenian strength, and that their own allies The invasion © > of Attica did not assemble, returned home, where their abandoned. presence was needed to protect their own territory against the depredations of an Athenian fleet, which had been sent out earlier in the year. Yet they did not wholly foro-et their pledges to the Lesbians, for they called upon their allies to furnish forty vessels for service at Mytilene. When the Athenians saw that the invasion was abandoned, they also recalled their ships.2 Meanwhile the Mytilenaeans made an attack upon Me-thymna, the only city in Lesbos which had not joined them. Movements The attack was unsuccessful, but the Myti-in Lesbos. lenaeans were able to strengthen their position in the other cities of Lesbos, and it was clear that the Athenian blockade was ineffective; a larger force was Paches sent necessary to prevent the rebels from marching to Mytilene. to and fro in the island as they pleased. At the beginning of autumn the Athenians despatched Paches with 1000 Athenian hoplites. He at once surrounded the 1 Thuc. iii 15. The Kapnov £vyKOfiibr} cannot have been the corn harvest, which had long been over, but refers to the vintage, fruits, etc., or possibly millet, and other grain of that kind; see Leake, Northern Greece, iv. 158. 2 Thuc. iii. 16. VI. 5-] THE GARRISON A T PLA TAB A, #8. 161 city with a wall, thus cutting off all communication by land as well as sea.1 5. The revolt of Lesbos carried the centre of operations to eastern Greece. In the west little was done. Early in the summer Asopius, the son of Phormio, was sent out, at the request of the Acarnanians, with a small fleet, Aso ius. but the greater part of his ships returned home western after 'ravaging the coast of Laconia. With the Greece-remainder he sailed to Naupactus, and resumed the plans of Phormio by an expedition against Oeniadae. He was supported by the whole force of the Acarnanians, who attacked the city by land and devastated the country round, while he brought his ships up the Acheloiis. But Oeniadae could neither be seduced nor coerced, and Asopius was compelled to retire. A subsequent attack on Leucas cost him his life and the loss of a large part of his force. The remainder seem to have returned to Naupactus. A memorable incident marked the close of the year. Since September 429 the garrison at Plataea had been closely shut up, and nothing had been done by Athens to Plataea. art relieve the distress of her brave allies. When of the garrison supplies began to fail, the besieged resolved to escape-force their way if possible over the wall; and though about half the number withdrew from the enterprise, 220 men were found willing to risk the danger. The first necessity was to provide scaling ladders of a sufficient length to reach the top of the wall. By counting the layers of bricks in a part which had not been plastered over, a tolerably correct calculation of the height was made (the bricks being, no doubt, of a standard and familiar size). When the preparations were complete, the garrison waited for the advantage of a dark and stormy night; for it was the custom of the besiegers to pass the night when fine on the battlements, and when wet, to retire for shelter into the towers, of which there was one at every tenth battlement extending to the inner and outer face of the double wall, but with a passage through it, 1 Thuc. iii. 18. VOL. III. L 162 THE ESCAPE FROM PLA1AEA, 428. [VI. 5. the intervening spaces being then unprotected. In darkness, wind, and rain the gallant band set out on their forlorn hope. They successfully crossed the ditch round the town, and arrived at the wall. Their armour had been lightened in order to impede their movements as little as possible, while the right foot was left unshod to gain a firmer hold on the slippery mud of the ditches. The ladders were no sooner planted in a space between two towers than they were mounted by soldiers armed with dirks and corslets, who immediately parted right and left to the towers at either end. After these came others armed with javelins only, their shields being carried by their comrades behind. A considerable number had ascended when the noise of a falling tile aroused the enemy. The alarm was at once raised, and the besieging army rushed out on the wall. They did not know what had happened, and their attention was distracted by an attack which the Plataeans in the city made from the opposite side. No one moved from his post lest he should abandon the place where he was most needed; only the body of Three Hundred, who had been set apart for emergencies, ventured to march along outside the wall to the place where the alarm had been given. Fire signals were at once raised to give information to the Thebans, but they wrere rendered useless by the beacons which the Plataeans lighted on the wall.1 Meanwhile the Plataeans had slain the guards of the towers at either end of the space where they had mounted the wall, and not content with occupying the passages through the towers, they planted their ladders against these and sent a body of men to the top. From the towers and from the wall they kept up a constant discharge of missiles, while their comrades planted more ladders against the intervening space, cleared off the battlements, and passed over the wall to the outer ditch. Each man, as he reached the further side, halted and shot arrows or javelins against any of 1 Thuc. iii. 20-22. It has been urged that signals from Plataea could not be visible at Thebes, but they might be very well seen at some place where the Thebans were watching. VI. 5-] THE ESCAPE FROM PLATAEA, 428. 163 the enemy who came in sight. When all had crossed, those in the towers descended and advanced to the ditch. They were at once attacked by the Three Hundred who had provided themselves with torches, a precaution of doubtful advantage, for the Plataeans, standing on the further edge of the ditch, saw the enemy by the lights which they carried, and could discharge their missiles with effect, while they themselves were in darkness. But the crossing of the outer ditch was a difficult task; for owing to the rain it was filled with water, and the frost had spread a film of ice on the surface, thick enough to be an impediment without affording a safe pathway. The difficulties were successfully overcome, and out of the whole number one archer alone was captured by the enemy. After crossing the ditch, the fugitives took the road to Thebes, on which pursuit was least likely to be made—and in fact they could see. the enemy hurrying along the road up Cithaeron to the pass which led to Athens. When they had gone about a mile, they turned sharply round and made for the hills, and so escaped to Athens. Of the 220, 212 had made good their escape, seven had abandoned the attempt, and one was captured. The Plataeans in the city, hearing from those who turned back that their comrades had been cut down to a man, sent a herald in the morning to ask for the bodies of the alain.1 In the autumn of 428 the war had gone on for three 1 Thuc. iii. 23, 24. Those who doubt the veracity of Thucydides' account of the siege of Plataea point to the fact, among others, that while the historian dwells on the difficulties created by tLe water in the ditch outside the wall, he says nothing of any water in the ditch round the town. If there was water in the one, there would be water in the other. Under certain conditions of soil and situation, the objection would, no doubt, be serious; but as we know nothing of the situation of the ditches at the point where the wall was crossed, we cannot ascribe much weight to the objection. In any case the area of rainfall inside the Wall would be less than the area outside, and it is easy to imagine conditions in which there would be a good deal of water in the outer ditch and little or none in the inner. On the position of Plataea, see Forbes, Thuc, I. xcvii, f, j G, B, Grundy, The Battle of Plataea. 164 A PROPERTY-TAX AT ATHENS, 428. [VI. 6. years and a half, and already the pressure of the expense began to be felt heavily at Athens. For the first time a tax Financial was imposed on the property of the citizens, difficulties which realised 200 talents (about £40,000), a at Athens. gum eqUaj to one_third of the annual receipts from the Delian confederacy. At the same time twelve ships were sent out under Lysicles, a demagogue who had obtained some transient power after the death of Pericles, to collect money from the cities in Caria and the adjacent region, cities of whose loyalty the Athenians were at no time very secure. The expedition ended in disaster. Lysicles fell in battle against the Carians, aided by the Samians of Anaea, and a large number of his soldiers with him.1 In the course of the winter a Lacedaemonian envoy, Salaethus by name, who had been despatched, after the meeting at Olympia, with intelligence that Attica was to be invaded and a fleet sent to the relief of Lesbos, succeeded in making his way into Mytilene. He encouraged the Myti-lenaeans to persevere in their plans, and any thoughts which they had entertained of coming to terms with the Athenians were now entirely abandoned.2 6. With the spring of 427 began a year which was the most terrible of the whole ten years of the war which preceded the peace of Nicias—a year marked on both, sides by excesses of savage cruelty, indicating too truly the passions which the war had let loose. After despatching the forty vessels, under the command of Alcidas, to Lesbos, the Peloponnesians made their usual Proi n ed invasion of Attica. They were no longer led invasion of by Archidamus, who was either dead or in his Attica. jast i]inesSj but by Cleomenes, who was regent for his nephew, king Pausanias. Expecting to hear of some success gained by their fleet at Mytilene, and with the hope 1 Thuc. iii. 19. For Lysicles see Aristoph. Knights, 132, 762; Plut. Per. 24. After the death of Pericles he married Aspasia, and became a successful orator 2 Thuc. iii. 25. For the Samians, infra, p. 166. VI. 6.] PELOPONNESIANS IN THE AEGEAN, 4S7. 165 of preventing the Athenians from sending any additional force to Lesbos, the Peloponnesians remained in Attica as long as they could, carrying their devastations into the remote districts which had escaped in former invasions, and destroying all that had grown up since the previous spring. But the expected news did not arrive, and when their supplies were exhausted, they returned home.1 Meanwhile the Peloponnesian ships, instead of sailing directly to Lesbos, wasted time off the coast of Peloponnesus, and then slowly passed across the Aegean to Aicidas in the Delos, which they reached before the Athenians Aegean, in the city were aware of their movements. From Delos they put in at the islands of Icarus and Myconus, where, to their astonishment, they were informed that Mytilene had fallen. At first they were incredulous, but on reaching Embatum, in the territory of Erythrae, they found the news confirmed. Mytilene surrendered a week before their arrival on the Asiatic coast.2 Supplies had run short in the unhappy city, and when all hope of the ships promised from Peloponnesus died away, it became necessary to have recourse to desperate measures. With the intention of making an attack on the Athenian lines, Salaethus gave shields and spears to the populace, who hitherto had served as light-armed soldiers only.3 They were no sooner in possession of arms than they refused to obey their officers, and gathering together in knots, demanded that all the corn in the city should be brought out and divided equally; if the demand were refused, they would give surrender of up the city to the enemy. Reflecting that they Mytilene-were quite unable to prevent the action of the people, and that their own position would be one of great danger if they were excluded from any agreement made with the Athenians, the magistrates of the city joined with the people in coming to 1 Time. in. 26. Thucydides here speaks of forty-two ships in the fleet of Aicidas, though previously, c. 16 and 25, he has mentioned forty only, and so in c. 29. 2 Thuc. iii. 29. 3 Thuc. iii. 27. 166 MYTILENE SURRENDERS, J&7. [VI. 7. terms with Paches. They placed themselves unconditionally at the mercy of Athens, and agreed to receive the army into the city; merely stipulating that they should be allowed to send envoys to Athens to plead their cause, and that till they returned Paches should not imprison, nor enslave, nor put to death any of the citizens. Those who had taken a leading part in the negotiations with Lacedaemon sought the protection of the altars, but on receiving an assurance that they should suffer no injury, they also put themselves into the hands of Paches, who placed them in Tenedos.1 7. When the Peloponnesians found that Lesbos was indeed taken, a council of war was held to decide on their move-Aicidasoffthe ments. Teutiaplus of Elis urged an immediate coast of Asia. attack on Mytilene ; the enemy were not aware of their presence, and by a sudden descent they might take them off their guard in the careless confidence of their recent victory. Such vigorous action was quite beyond Alcidas. Nor would he listen to the advice of the Ionian exiles and the Lesbians in his fleet, who suggested that he should seize some city of Ionia, or Cyme in Aeolis, as a base of operations from which to excite a revolt in Ionia, an attempt in which he could rely not only on the feeling of the Asiatic Greeks, but on the help of Pissuthnes, the satrap of Sardis. His only wish, now that Mytilene had fallen, was to return whence he came. Sailing from Embatum he put in at Myonnesus, where he slaughtered most of the captives taken on the voyage, a barbarous and foolish act, which could only alienate those whom he was sent to assist, and damage the Spartan cause. As he lay off Ephesus, the Samian oligarchs, who had established themselves at Anaea, on the mainland, after their expulsion from the island {supra, p. 33),2 protested against his conduct, declaring that he had an ill way of liberating Hellas, if he put to death men who made no resistance and were not even enemies, but allies of Athens 1 Thuc. iii. 28. 2 Thuc. iv. 75. VI. 70 ALCIDAS AND PACHES, 4%7. 167 under compulsion. Alcidas then set at liberty all the surviving Chians in his hands, and some others.1 Before arriving at Ephesus, he had been sighted by the Salaminia and Paralus, the two state galleys of the Athenians. Pursuit was now inevitable, and, indeed, information of his presence had already been conveyed to Paches. Alcidas had no intention of being caught; from Ephesus he struck across the open sea, " not wishing to touch on any land till he reached Peloponnesus, if he could help it." Paches followed as far as Patmos, without coming in sight of the fleet; upon which he returned to Notium near Colophon, while Alcidas, fleeing far to the south, was carried by a storm to Crete, whence his vessels straggled home.2 If Alcidas was cowardly, Paches was treacherous. In the spring of 430 there had been a revolution at Colophon, in which the oligarchical party, aided by Itamenes Paches at and a number of Persians, drove out their Notium-opponents, and seized the upper city for themselves. The exiles settled in Notium, which was the port of Colophon, where, in a short time, a second faction broke out. A new Persian party was formed, which, of course, had the support of the similar party in Colophon, and a number of Arcadian and barbarian mercenaries were sent to their aid by Pissuthnes. They were now able to drive their opponents out of Notium, and, to secure their position, the mercenaries were placed under the command of one Hippias, in a part of the town which was walled off into a fortress. The Athenian party summoned Paches to their assistance, who induced Hippias to visit him, on the assurance that, if terms were not arranged, he should be sent back uninjured. But no sooner had Paches got him in his power than he made an unexpected attack on the fortress and slew all who were in 1 Thuc. iii. 30-32. His captives were the more numerous because the lonians, far from attempting to escape, came to his ships under the impression that they were Athenian. No one in the eastern Aegean expected to see Peloponnesian vessels in those waters, so long as the Athenian empire lasted. 2 Thuc. iii. 33, 69. 168 PACHES AT MYTILENE, 421. [VI. 8. it. He then took Hippias back into the fortress, as he had promised, and caused him to be slain. The Persian party were of course expelled from Notium, and not long afterwards the Athenians sent out a number of commissioners to establish the town as a colony under Athenian laws. Any Colophonian who might be in exile among the neighbouring cities was recalled, if he were of the democratic party, and enrolled in the new settlement. Owing to its situation on the shore, Notium was in the range of Athenian protection; Colophon, on the other hand, which lay on a hill at some little distance inland, remained in the hands of the Persians.1 8. From Notium Paches returned to Mytilene. He lost no time in acquiring the two cities of the island, Pyrrha and m tiien- Eresus, which were still independent, and then aeanssentto he despatched to Athens the Mytilenaeans Athens. whom he had placed in Tenedos, and any others who seemed specially implicated in the revolt, including Salaethus. The disturbance was now so utterly crushed that he was able to dismiss the larger part of his forces.2 When the captives arrived at Athens, Salaethus was at once put to death.3 The fate of the Mytilenaeans was then cieon's brought before the Athenian Assembly. Cleon, proposal. wh0 by this time had completely won the ear of the people, pressed for an extreme penalty. He proposed to execute, not only the prisoners who had been brought to Athens—who were, in fact, the ringleaders in the revolt— but all the grown-up citizens of Mytilene, and to sell the women and children into slavery. To this atrocious sentence he brought the people to consent by dwelling on the unprovoked nature of the revolt—for Lesbos was not a subject state, but an equal ally—and pointing out the unexpected and unparalleled circumstance that a Peloponnesian fleet 1 Thuc. iii. 34; Xen. Hell. i. 2. 4. 2 Thuc. iii. 35. 3 He endeavoured to save himself by offering to get the Pelopon-nesians withdrawn from Plataea, but the offer was rejected. VI. 8.] CLEON'S PROPOSAL, 4$7. 169 had crossed the Aegean to support the revolt. Such audacity was thought to imply an extensive plan for the alienation of the Asiatic cities—a plan which must be repressed by the most vigorous measures. At the close of the „ . . e ° Cruel decree of meeting a trireme was sent to Paches, an- the Athenians: nouncing the resolution, and bidding him a second meet-execute it without delay. But when the citizens had retired to their homes, and the excitement of a public meeting had subsided, a change came over their feelings. The decree which had seemed just and politic a few hours before was now regarded as cruel and monstrous. A review of the whole circumstances of the revolt showed that there were different degrees of guilt; and the populace of Mytilene, who were involved in one sentence with the oligarchs, had practically been the cause of the surrender of the city to the Athenians. The Mytilenaean envoys present in Athens, and those of the citizens who sympathised with them, were not slow to notice the change of sentiment. They appealed to the magistrates to call a second Assembly, and bring the matter before it once more. It is doubtful whether it was strictly legal to reopen a question which had been decided by a former vote in the Assembly. But, as the Assembly was itself the sovereign power, an act which received its approval could not be called in question by any other body, and there was no standing ordinance which forbade the sovereign power to cancel its own decrees. On the next morning notice was given of a second Assembly, and the people were once more gathered in the Pnyx.1 Cleon was furious. It was his motion which was being rediscussed; his policy was being challenged; his authority shaken. In the speech which Thucydides has put into his mouth on this occasion, we have a sketch of the attitude of the demagogue to the Athenian allies abroad and to his own opponents at home. It was useless, he said, to apply the principles which prevailed in the democracy 1 Thuc. iii. 36. 170 CLEON'S SPEECH, 427. [VI. 8- of Athens to the government of her empire. That was a tyranny, and must be maintained as such. As for these changes of purpose—they were odious and ruinous too. Let the law be maintained; innovations were clever, no doubt, but there was something better for a state than cleverness, and that was consistency. " Can any one show that the revolt of the Mytilenaeans is a benefit to the state 1 Of course he can not; the mere attempt to do so means that the speaker has been bribed to persuade you out of your senses. And when can we punish with a truer sense of the injury than when the injury is fresh in our minds 1 The love of fine speeches is the ruin of you Athenians, for when straightforward action on recognised principles is needed, you are always listening to the last argument. Nothing can be worse than the conduct of the Mytilenaeans. They were safe from the enemy; they had a fleet of their own, and enjoyed a favoured position; yet this did not prevent them from taking sides with our bitterest enemies. The truth is, we have been too lenient with them. We ought to have reduced them to subjection long ago, and treated them like the rest. It is not too late to let them feel the weight of your arm, and the opportunity must not be allowed to pass. And we must make no difference between nobles and people. They were all of one mind about attacking us. If you give way to foolish considerations of mercy, all your allies will revolt. Eemember that your empire is involved in the sentence; for if you spare the Mytilenaeans, you confess that your rule is unjust; you cannot take up an ideal line about virtue and retain that. Think, too, how they would deal with you, if they had the opportunity, and deal so with them. Eemember the feelings which came over you when first you heard of the revolt, and punish them as they deserve." That his opponents are bribed—that argument is sophistical when opposed to his own views—that the Athenian power is a despotism which can only be supported by despotic measures—that justice is revenge—that mercy and equity VI. p.] THE SPEECH OF DIODOTUS, J&7. 171 are out of the question in dealing with the allies—that tory stupidity is better than liberal discussion—these are the principles on which Cleon wishes to lead the Athenians of his day. Such ideas were clear and intelligible, and likely to commend themselves to the meanest citizen. 9, The leader of the opposite party was Diodotus, of whom, unfortunately, we know nothing. He began with some allusions to Cleon. The two greatest The speech of impediments to wise counsel were haste and Dlodotus-passion, of which the first was a sign of folly, and the second implied a vulgar and narrow mind. A man who wished to prevent discussion was either one who had not the sense to see that in no other way could light be thrown on the future, or he had a discreditable proposal to make, and knowing that it would not bear examination, he endeavoured to silence opposition by the virulence of his abuse, or by hints of corruption. But discussion was quite a different thing from slander, or invective, and those who demanded it ought not to be suspected of dishonesty and corruption; there was no better citizen than the man who tried to convince his fellows of what was right by fair argument. If a speaker could not venture to come forward openly with his opinion, he was compelled to deceive his audience; and thus the patriot and the traitor were on the same level. This was a great evil and a great mistake too, for those who came forward to advise the people were men who had taken unusual pains to form a sound opinion, and moreover they were responsible for what they said. "The present question is merely one of policy. Is the severe sentence likely to do us harm or good 1 Cleon's proposal may be just in the abstract sense of justice—but is it politic1? I say it is not. The fear of death does not deter men from crime; men have gone on increasing the severity of sentences—for in earlier times they would naturally be milder—but crimes are still committed. The present outweighs the future; and hope suggests escape. It is impossible, and simply absurd to suppose, that human 172 THE SPEECH OF DIODOTUS, 427. [VI. 9. nature when bent upon some favourite project can be restrained either by the power of law or by any other terror. Such a sentence as that which we are met to discuss will only drive our enemies to despair. They will resist to the last man, for there is no hope* if they yield. Our wars will be fought to the bitter end, and when we are victorious there will be nothing left for us to gain. Let us be as cautious and vigilant as you will; but avoid extremity in punishment. In the present case we must make a distinction. The popular party are our friends everywhere; the people of Mytilene took no part in the revolt. If you destroy them equally with the guilty, you will alienate your friends; besides, if guilty and innocent share the same fate, no one will care to be innocent. Cleon may insist that his proposal is just, but justice and expediency cannot always be combined. I do not speak to you of lenity or mercy, words which are out of place in a discussion of this kind. I only advise what is most politic. You have the guilty men in your hands: pass sentence on them as you will; but leave the rest of the inhabitants untouched."1 In this remarkable speech we observe that hardly a word is said in condemnation of the cruelty of the decree, though many of the audience were painfully conscious of this. Diodotus accepts the sentiment of his audience, and endeavours to show how far it can be rightly indulged. The proposal of Cleon is even allowed to be just, i.e. it corresponds fairly to the degree of resentment which the Athenians might be expected to feel towards the Lesbians. The only point in question is the expediency of such a wholesale execution. And here it is interesting to notice that Diodotus uses arguments of which the world has been very slow to recognise the value. That severity of punishment, far from preventing, tends to aggravate crime is now a commonplace; but it has only become so after a long series of judicial atrocities. Another feature of these speeches, less striking, but 1 Thuc. iii. 42-48. See Jowett's translation. VI. io.] PUBLIC SPEAKING AT ATHENS. 173 perhaps even more significant as an indication of Athenian feeling, is the view taken of the political adviser or speaker. We see an audience delighting in displays of rhetoric, who can be influenced and carried away by a clever speech; and as a natural consequence we find a class of orators growing up who make it their sole business to lead or mislead the Assembly. They were masters of argument and disputation; men with whom subtlety was far above sincerity. They drew upon themselves the hatred of both the sections of conservative feeling at Athens; we find them denounced as bitterly by Aristophanes as they are by Cleon. Both alike warned the people against unprincipled leaders, who were either bribed to play their part, or spoke as "sophists" from a mere love of discussion. There was, no doubt, some truth in this point of view, but the means taken to destroy the influence of these " orators " were not without evils. It was unfair to charge every speaker who happened to oppose the popular feeling with corruption and dishonesty. As Diodotus points out, the suspicion thus created stood in the way of those who honestly wished to give good advice to their citizens. At the best, the politician had enough responsibility, for often he alone was made to suffer, when the people had eagerly supported him, or even when the failure of his plan was due to others.1 10. The excitement in the Assembly was great, and no one knew on which side the decision would fall. The show of hands appeared to be nearly equal in favour Mytiiene of either proposal, but the amendment of issaved-Diodotus was carried by a small majority. A trireme was immediately despatched to overtake the ship which had been sent out twenty-four hours previously. The envoys 1 It is remarkable that Aristophanes, though opposed to the war, and to any severe treatment of the allies, never directly alludes to the atrocities which made the Athenian name odious in Greece, but cp. Knights, 1025, Kepfiepov avbp(mofa(TTr)v; and indeed the massacre of the Mytilenaeans "is alluded to among the crimes of the Athenian people but two or three times in the whole of ancient literature." —Forbes, Thuc. i. ci 174 CLEOJSTS DECREE RESCINDED, 4%7. [VI. 10. from Mytilene provided the crew with wine and meal, and promised a large reward if they arrived at Lesbos in time to prevent the execution of the decree. The sailors rowed without stopping, eating meal kneaded with wine and oil as they sat at the oar, and giving up their places to a fresh relay of men when they required sleep. As there was happily no opposing wind, and the first trireme did not hasten on its dismal errand, the race was won, and Mytilene was saved. Paches had already read the decree of the Athenians, and was preparing to carry it into execution, when the second vessel arrived to countermand the orders.1 Even now the sentence was severe enough. All the Mytilenaeans who had been sent to Athens, more than a Massacres and thousand in number, were put to death; the confiscations. walls 0f the city were pulled down; the ships carried away. The whole of the island, with the exception of the territory of Methymna, was then divided into three thousand lots, of which three hundred were set aside for the temples, and the rest assigned to Athenian citizens. The new owners, though sent out to the island, did not permanently reside on their property, but leased it at an annual rent of two minae a lot to Lesbian tenants. Such an income would be welcome to many who had lost all their property in the repeated invasions of Attica, and enabled many more to qualify for the hoplite class who had hitherto fallen below it. The total sum brought each year into Athens was 5400 minae, or about ,£18,000. On his return to Athens, Paches was brought to trial by Cleon, and so shameful was his conduct proved to be that he slew himself in open court.2 1 Thuc. iii. 49. There could not, of course, be two sets of rowers in one ship, for the space would not admit of this. But we may-suppose that the room ordinarily occupied by the officers of the sbip, or assigned to hoplites, was on this occasion given up to men who rowed. 2 For the death of Paches see Plutarch, Nic. 6, who says that it occurred when he was being tried for his conduct in office. Another account attributes it to his treatment of two Lesbian women; see the VI. ii.] PLATAEA SURRENDERS, J$1. 175 II. From the punishment of Mytilene at the hands of the Athenians we pask to the punishment of Plataea at the hands of the Peloponnesians, a punishment The surrender more severe, more indefensible, and more dis- of plataea-graceful to those who inflicted it. Soon after the recovery of Lesbos the supplies of the besieged Plataeans were utt'erly exhausted, and they had to choose between starvation and submission. The city was, indeed, reduced to such weakness that resistance to a vigorous attack from the besiegers would have been impossible, but such an attack was strictly forbidden by the Lacedaemonians, who, looking forward to peace with Athens, did not wish Plataea to come under the category of towns taken by force—which it might be necessary to restore—but under that of towns yielded by agreement, which either side would claim to keep. For this reason the general in command of the siege was instructed to send a herald to Plataea, which was now in the last stage of exhaustion, and inquire whether the garrison would submit themselves to the judgment of the Lacedaemonians; " the guilty would be punished, but no injustice would be done." In the belief that they would receive a fair trial, and would be, at any rate, in the hands of the Lacedaemonians, not of their bitter enemies the Thebans, the garrison gave up their city. Food was immediately supplied to them until the commissioners who were to decide their fate should arrive from Sparta. On the arrival of the judges the hopes of the Plataeans were dashed to the ground. No accusation was brought against them; they were merely asked, one after the other, epigram of Agathias (a.d. 570, Anthol. vii. 614). Paches slew their husbands, but the women escaped him and made their way to Athens, where they denounced his conduct. Cleon probably had a grudge against Paches for his want of promptness in executing the first decree. See Beloch, Die Attische Politik, pp. 30, 33. Cp. Plut. Aristid. 26. For some difficulties connected with the revolt, see Forbes, Time. i. ci., f. When Thucydides says that the somewhat more than 1000 who were put to death were atrtwrarot tt}$ a7rooTao-fa)s, one is inclined to doubt the numeral. 176 THE TRIAL OF THE PLATA LANS, 427. [VI. il. the short and simple question, whether they had rendered any assistance to the Lacedaemonians or their allies in the Trial of the present war. Of course, as they were allies of Piataeans. tne Athenians, there was but one answer; an answer which implied* immediate condemnation. In the hope -that they might move their judges to take a more favourable view, they requested leave to address them through two of their number, Astymachus, and Lacon, who was the proxenus of the Lacedaemonians at Plataea. The head and front of the offence of the Piataeans was their alliance with Athens. Originally a member of the Boeotian Speech of the League, the city had broken away from the con-piataeans. federacy, to which, both by race and territory, she naturally belonged, and associated with the Athenians (supra, p. 111). But the Piataeans were able to prove that they had taken this step on the advice of the Spartan king, Cleomenes, and therefore—whether they were right or wrong in abandoning their Boeotian friends—the Spartans could not justly condemn them. And though they had joined in the general alliance formed in 481 to resist the Persians, this did not cancel the alliance with Athens already existing. In taking the Athenian side they were only fulfilling obligations which every city was bound to fulfil. In the present war their city had been attacked by Thebes without notice or provocation, even at a holy season, a proof that without the support of the Athenians they would have lost their independence. Instead of reproaching them for their fidelity to allies who had aided them in a time of trouble, the Spartans should remember their services to the cause of Hellas. In the great invasion they alone among the cities of Boeotia had fought for liberty. They had even gone on board ship as seamen, leaving their city to destruction. How different was the conduct of the Thebans, who had done their best to enslave Hellas to the barbarians. At Plataea the decisive battle had been fought; in their country were the memorials of victory, the tombs of the slain, and the temples in which the conquerors offered prayer and thanksgiving; it was they VI. 12.] THE APPEAL OF THE PLATAEANS, ffl. 177 who, year by year, made offerings to the dead who had fallen in the glorious struggle; their land was sacred, pledged by the oath of Pausanias to be inviolate and independent. And were they then to be rooted out from the soil of Greece to satisfy the revenge of their most bitter enemies % That would be a stain on the honour of Lacedae-mon, which now stood first in Greece; a denial of the protection due to them as to all suppliants. But if the Spartans were indeed obdurate, let them at least put the garrison back in the city and leave them, if perish they must, to perish of hunger. Terrible as such a fate would be, they would rather die so than fall into the hands of the Thebans.1 The language in which Thucydides has clothed these thoughts is touching and pathetic. We cannot read it without realising what terrible dangers beset a small city in Greece at the hands of powerful neighbours; what sacrifices were made in the passionate desire for "independence." We are also deeply impressed with the honourable attachment of Plataea to Athens—an attachment ill repaid by the selfish policy which, while urging resistance, abandoned the city to the enemy. On the other hand, we cannot but lament the presence in this brave and faithful people of that spirit of division which caused it to break away from a union in which alone it would have found protection. Odious as was the conduct of Thebes, we cannot say that her efforts to create a united Boeotia were unjust or impolitic, and to these efforts Plataea was the greatest obstacle. There was also the danger that Plataea might become, as happened in other cities of Boeotia, a centre for democratic intrigues in the interest of Athens. 12. The Thebans thought it necessary to make a reply to this appeal. There were points in their own past which required excuse, and they wished to put Reply of the their case against Plataea as strongly as they Thebans-could. It was true that in the Persian invasion they had 1 Thuc. iii. F3 f. VOL. IT. M 178 MASSACRE OF THE PLATAEANS, 487. [VI. 12. joined the invader, but Thebes was not her own mistress at the time; she was in the hands of a few leading families, who managed everything in their own interests, and when she got back her constitution, she acted very differently. By the victory of Coronea Hellas was freed from the dominion of Athens. It was true, too, that they had seized Plataea at a time of peace and in a holy season; but they were not the first to move in the matter; they merely accepted an invitation sent by the leading citizens in the town. The Plataeans, on the other hand, had acted with the greatest perfidy in attacking the Thebans who came with peaceful intentions, an while the regt made a truce and laid aside their enmity, but the ten selected for trial immediately fled, and when Nicostratus was about to quit the island, the popular leaders requested him to leave behind five of his ships for their protection, their place in 1 Thuc. iii. 74. VI. IS-] NICOSTRATUS AT CORCYRA, 4#7. 183 the fleet being taken by five Corcyraean vessels. Nicostratus agreed, and the people began to man the ships with crews selected from the oligarchs. The oligarchs took alarm. Why were they selected to serve under Athenians 1 Were they not being sent to Athens for punishment 1 In their terror they took refuge in the temple of the Dioscuri, where they remained in spite of the assurances of Nicostratus. In the eyes of the people, this dread of serving in the Athenian fleet was a proof of treasonable designs. They Distress of disarmed them by removing their weapons the oligarchs, from their houses, and would even have killed those whom they met—for in the meanwhile most of the refugees had left their sanctuary—had not Nicostratus interfered. In their distress the unfortunate oligarchs, to the number of 400, took refuge in the temple of Hera; but the people, believing themselves to be insecure bo long as their enemies remained in the city, persuaded them to leave the temple, and they were conveyed to the island opposite, to which provisions were regularly sent.1 15. For three or four days affairs continued in this position, Nicostratus still remaining at Corcyra. A new scene in the drama opened with the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet. After the failure at Lesbos, the Lacedaemonians had determined to increase their navy; and hearing of the troubles in Corcyra, they instructed Alcidas, who was still in command, to sail to the island. Accompanied by Brasidas, who had been chosen as his adviser, he set sail from Cyllene in Elis, with a fleet of fifty-three ships, and anchored for the night at Sybota, a harbour on the mainland. The next morning he sailed upon the city.2 His arrival created the greatest confusion. The popular party were now between two enemies—those in the city and those in the fleet. They hastily manned sixty vessels which lay in the harbour and sent them out in detachments, without waiting till the whole force was ready. Two of the 1 Thuc. iii. 75. 2 Thuc. iii. 76. 184 ALCIDAS AT CORCYRA, 427. [VI. 15. Corcyraean ships, on reaching the enemy, at once deserted to them; in others the crews began to fight with each other. A Arrival of the l>attle followed, which, owing to the skill and Peioponnesian coolness of the Athenians, was protracted till fleet# sunset, when the Peloponnesians returned to their station at Sybota with thirteen Corcyraean vessels. No attempt was made, either on that or the succeeding day, to capture the town, for in spite of the remonstrances of Brasidas, Alcidas refused to take the opportunity offered by the panic which prevailed. So great was the alarm in the city that the Corcyraeans removed the refugees from the island, and even persuaded some to go on board the thirty triremes, which they were able to man in expectation of a second battle. Alcidas, however, contented himself with ravaging the south of the island for half the day, and when at nightfall signals from Leucas announced the arrival of sixty Athenian ships, he at once sailed homewards, creeping along the shore, and transporting his ships over the low isthmus which united Leucas with the mainland, to escape detection by the Athenians. The popular party were now absolute masters of the city. The fleet which arrived from Athens, under the command of Eurymedon, joined that of Nicostratus, making a total of seventy-two vessels, besides the thirty Corcyraean ships, which, though partly manned by oligarchs, were commanded Massacre of by captains of the other party. Thus supported, the oligarchs. the Corcyraean demos went to work with a will. The five hundred Messenians, who had hitherto remained outside the city, were brought within the walls, and all the ships were united in the Hyllaic harbour. The massacre then began. Every oligarch found in the city was at once cut down; and when the Corcyraean ships approached the shore, those refugees who had been placed on board were taken out and slaughtered. Of the suppliants who still remained in the temple of Hera, about fifty were persuaded to come out and stand their trial. These were at once condemned. A much larger number refused to leave the temple, preferring VI. i6.] MASSACRE OF THE OLIGARCHS, 427. 185 to be their own executioners ; many put an end to their lives in the shrine; others went into the precincts and hanged themselves on the trees, or destroyed themselves in any manner they could. The massacre went on for the seven days during which the Athenian fleet remained at Corcyra. It was ostensibly a political execution, an extermination of the oligarchs, but in reality many other motives were at work; personal enmity, and even the desire to get rid of a creditor, were as active here as in the proscriptions of Eome. Whatever crimes a man committed there was no risk of condemnation, for all were alike implicated in the slaughter. " Every form of death was seen, and everything, and more than everything, that commonly happens in revolutions happened then. The father slew the son, and the suppliants were torn from the temples and slain near them; some of them were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and there perished."1 Even a week of butchery did not suffice for the demos to exterminate their opponents. About 500 of the oligarchs survived the massacre, and passed over Escapeofthe —we do not know how—to the mainland, survivors to whence they issued forth in plundering raids the mainland-to the island, raids so successful, that Corcyra was reduced to famine. But in spite of their successes they were unable to bear the separation from their city. They sent envoys to Lacedaemon and Corinth asking to be restored, and when this hope failed, they returned to Corcyra in boats, which they burnt, that they might have no resource except in the conquest of the island. They established themselves in a fort on Mount Istone, from which they plundered the country and the city.2 l6. We may anticipate the progress of events and tell out this wretched story to the end. For a year and a half the exiles continued their depredations, but in the spring of 425 the Athenians, when despatching a fleet of forty vessels to 1 Thuc. iii. 81 (Jowett). » Thuc. iii. 85, 186 THE OLIGARCHS AT CORCYRA, 425. [VI. 16. Sicily under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles, gave them orders to call at Corcyra on their way and put End of the an en(^ ^° ^e disorder. During the last year Corcyraean the inhabitants of the city had been greatly dis-sedition. tressed, and they were now suffering severely from famine, while their enemies were supported by the presence of a Peloponnesian fleet of sixty vessels. On its way, as we shall see, the Athenian fleet occupied Pylus, an event which, though it delayed the Athenians, compelled the Peloponnesians to withdraw their fleet from the island. On their arrival, Eurymedon and Sophocles joined the citizens in an attack upon the fortress of Istone. The attack was successful; the exiles were driven out, and after fleeing for refuge to an elevated part of the mountain, surrendered at discretion to the Athenians. The generals carried their captives to the island of Ptychia, till they could be sent to Athens, guaranteeing their safety on condition that no attempt at escape should be made. But the leaders of the Corcyraean demos, fearing that the Athenians would not put their captives to death, persuaded a few to run the risk, and promised to find a boat for the purpose. The fugitives were of course captured, and the whole number were now given up to the Corcyraeans. For this treachery the Athenian generals themselves were partly to blame ; at any rate, they were not unwilling to insist with the utmost precision on the terms of the capitulation, without any regard to the means by which the fugitives had been brought to break them; and as they were themselves engaged to sail to Sicily, they had no wish that captives whom they had taken should be carried to Athens by others, who would reap the honour of their success.1 The Corcyraeans placed the prisoners in a large chamber, from which, having arranged a number of hoplites.in two The final rows, they led them out, twenty at a time, massacre. chained to one another. As they passed along the rows they were beaten and stabbed by the hoplites on i Thuc. iv. 46, 47. VI. 17.] THE FINAL MASSACRE, #5. 187 either side, each of whom seized the opportunity to avenge himself on an enemy, while others with scourges lashed those who lingered on their way. In this manner about sixty were taken out and destroyed before their fate was discovered. When this was known, those who remained in the chamber called on the Athenians to put them to death with their own hands if they pleased, but they refused to go out or to allow any one to enter. The Corcyraeans made no attempt to force a passage through the doors; they climbed on the roof, and, breaking through it, pelted the prisoners with the tiles, or shot arrows upon them. The wretched men defended themselves for a time, but at length most of them in despair put an end to their lives in any way that they could. The massacre went on through the day and the greater part of the following night, till all were destroyed. The women who had been captured in the fortress were sold as slaves. " This," says Thucydides, " was the end of the great Coreyraean sedition, at any rate for the period of the Peloponnesian war, for, in fact, little or nothing was left of the oligarchical party."l 17. We now return to the year 427. The Athenians did not forget the threatened attack on the Peiraeus in 429. Soon after the recovery of Lesbos Nicias seized Nicias captures the island of Minoa, lying in front of Megara, Minoa« which the Megarians had fortified and used as a military-station. It was nearer Megara than Budorum or Salamis, and if the Athenians held it they would have complete control of Nisaea. Nicias directed his attack to the side nearest the mainland, and after destroying two towers which commanded the connection with the shore, gained the whole island, in which he built a fort and left a garrison.2 At the close of the summer Athens took a step which was attended with momentous results—a step more opposed than 1 Thuc. iv. 47, 48. For a criticism on Thucydides' account of the Corcyraean sedition, see Muller-Strubing in N. Jahrbiich. fur Phil. vol. 133, p. 585 ff. ; and for a criticism on this, Holm, Greek Uisl. ii. p. 392. See also Macan, Transactions of the Oxford Phil. Soc. 1886-1887, pp. 30-31. 2 Thuc. iii. 51. 188 THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY, 427. [VI. 17. any which she had hitherto taken to the policy of Pericles. Envoys arrived from the Chalcidians of Sicily, among whom was Gorgias, the sophist, of Leontini, asking for assistance against Syracuse and the Dorians. Since the final suppression of the rising of the Sicels, Syracuse had greatly extended her power (vol. ii. p. 472). She was now at war with the Leontines, who, finding themselves shut up by land and sea, and relying on the alliance which had been made in 433, came to Athens for assistance. With them were envoys from Ehegium, a city which, like their own, was in alliance with Athens. The envoys were well received. At the beginning of the war the Dorians of Sicily had been ranged among the allies of Sparta, in the confident hope that they would send to the Peloponnese a fleet far more numerous than that of Athens, and though no ships had ever crossed the sea, the alarm had not passed away. There were other reasons also which weighed with the Athenians; in the petition of the Leontines they saw an opportunity of realising the long-cherished hope of extending their dominion -. A' . over the most prosperous of Greek settlements. The Athenians r r send ships to A pretext for war was not far to seek. As Sicily. Ionians, as allies, they were bound to succour their allies and kinsmen. A small fleet was despatched to Sicily under Laches, who seems, however, to have done nothing till the winter, when an abortive attack was made on the inhabitants of the Liparaean Islands.1 Meanwhile Athens was once more a city of the dead and dying. The plague, which since the summer of 428 had greatly „u , diminished in severity, though it had never The plague i . S • j reappears at entirely ceased, returned in all its terrors, and Athens. continued to rage for a whole year (427-426). In this dreadful scourge no fewer than 4400 of the heavy-armed citizens perished, and 300 of the knights; the mortality among the common people could not even be estimated.2 1 Thuc. iii. 86, 88. 2 Thuc. iii. 87. The plague raged from early summer 430 to early summer 428, and again from winter 427 to winter 426. CHAPTER VII. FROM THE BEGINNING OF 426 TO THE END OF 425. I. There was no invasion of Attica by the Lacedaemonians in the spring of 426. The allies had collected at the Isthmus as usual, but their advance was prevented by no invasion of a series of earthquakes, and they returned Attica-home. The season was indeed remarkable for physical disturbances, which could not fail to impress the superstitious minds of the Greeks. The elements seemed to be taking a part in the terrible conflict which was spreading desolation and bloodshed throughout Hellas. But though the Lacedaemonians allowed the year to pass without an invasion of Attica, they fell upon another project, which promised far greater results, and is a c . . proof that their plans of warfare were being Heraciea by the conceived on a larger and more effective scale. sPartans-The Trachinians, a Melian tribe, dwelling near the pass of Thermopylae, had suffered greatly at the hands of their neighbours the Oetaeans. Their first intention was to put themselves in the hands of the Athenians, but on second thoughts they sent an envoy to the Lacedaemonians, as the more trustworthy allies (infra, p. 199). Their envoy was joined by others from the Dorians, the mountain state which claimed to be the metropolis of Lacedaemon, for they, like Trachis, had been ravaged by the Oetaeans, and were in urgent need of help. The Lacedaemonians resolved to send out a colony, not merely to assist the suppliants, but because a city of their own in that region would be of service in the war. Could a fleet be maintained at Thermopylae, it might cross to Euboea, or control the passage to Thrace. They consulted 189 190 THE FOUNDATION OF HER AC LEA, J&6. [VII. 2. the oracle of Delphi, and on receiving a favourable answer sent out colonists from Sparta and the Perioecic cities, inviting any of the Greeks who chose to join, except the Ionians and Achaeans and some other nations. The leaders of the colony were three in number, and all from Lacedae-mon: Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. The name Heraclea was given to the new city. The Athenians were at first greatly alarmed for the safety of Euboea, but their fears proved to be groundless. The Thessalians, who ruled the neighbouring districts, and all whose territory was threatened, were bitterly hostile to the new city, and carried on ceaseless war against it; and when the governors who were sent out from Sparta, by their harsh and tyrannical conduct, frightened away the greater part of the settlers, it was easy for the neighbouring nations to complete their conquest.1 The foundation of Heraclea was an attempt to carry out the plan of kirtrux^^os^ which the Corinthians mentioned in 432 as one of the means by which Athens might be attacked. To whom the attempt was due we do not know, but in the winter of 427-426 the aged king Archidamus was succeeded by his son Agis, who, as a younger man and more warlike in his views, would be likely to venture on new methods. About this time also Plistoanax was brought back to Sparta after nineteen years of exile. This for a time may have encouraged the Spartans to new plans, though Plistoanax was subsequently desirous of peace.2 2. The Athenians also ventured on new projects. They began the operations of the year by sending out fleets to the Nicias at Meios east and west. Nicias was despatched with a and Tanagra. large force to the island of Melos, a colony of the Lacedaemonians, which had hitherto refused to become 1 Thuc. iii. 92, 23. Strabo, p. 428. Leake, Northern Greece, ii. 26 f. 2 Thuc. v. 16. Can we accept Aristoph. Ach. 652 f., bia ravB'ifias AcuccBai/JLOVioi ttjv clprjvrjv irpoKakovvrai kcl\ tt)v Alyivav dnaiTovo-iv, as evidence that the Spartans were willing to make peace in 426 ? VII. 3-] DEMOSTHENES AT LEUCAS, 4%6. 191 a member of the Delian confederacy. The recent events in Lesbos may have warned the Athenians that it was necessary to make their power felt in the Aegean, and above all to deprive the Lacedaemonians of any stations where a Dorian fleet might find shelter. Whatever the cause, they now determined to force the island into the confederacy.1 The attempt failed, and after devastating the island, Nicias returned to Oropus, on the northern border of Attica. Here the hoplites disembarked under cover of night, and marched along the Asopus to Tanagra. At the same time, on a preconcerted signal, the whole force of Athens advanced over the border to join the invading army. They devastated the country round Tanagra, and defeated the Tanagraeans in battle, after which, without attempting to make use of the victory, they retired, some to the city, and others to the ships. Nicias continued his voyage to eastern Locris, where he ravaged the sea-coast; and then returned home.2 3, The second fleet sailed westwards under the command of Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes, of whom we now hear for the first time. Nothing is said of ^ & Demosthenes any attempt to land on the Peloponnesus; in western Demosthenes opened the campaign by destroy- Greece-ing the garrison at Ellomenus in Leucadia, and followed up his success by devastating the territory of Leucas. He laid waste the territory on both sides of the isthmus on which the town lay, and reduced the enemy to inaction, but when the Acarnanians in his army urged him to cut the city off with a wall and help them to rid themselves of an old enemy, they found that he had other plans in view.3 The Messenians at Naupactus were on bad terms with their neighbours the Aetolians, and they wished to avail 1 About this time, or a little earlier, Thera must have been compelled to join the Athenian alliance, and pay a tribute of three talents (supra, p. 100). 2 Thuc. iii. 91. The attack on Melos was renewed ten years later with terrible success: the battle of Tanagra was an anticipation of the battle of Delium two years later. 3 Thuc. iii. 91, 94. 192 INVASION OF AETOLIA, 426. [VII. 3. themselves of the large army collected under the command of Demosthenes, to subdue their opponents. They pointed out that the Aetolians, though numerous and warlike, dwelt in villages distant from each other, and unprotected by walls. Their warriors were only light-armed soldiers, who, if they were attacked before they had time to assemble, could be reduced without difficulty. Of the three tribes which composed the nation, the Apodoti were to be taken first, then the Ophioneis, and after these the Eurytanes, the largest and most barbarous portion of the whole.1 If these were conquered, the rest could be brought over without difficulty. Demosthenes was inclined to gratify the Messenians, but his plans went far beyond their proposals. He hoped, by winning over the nations of Aetolia and the neighbouring Demosthenes in districts, to march through western Locris, Aetolia. unassisted by any power from Athens, to Cytinium in Doris, and so make his way round Parnassus into Phocis. The Phocians, though nominally allies of the Spartans, were friendly to the Athenians, and would probably join the Athenian leader, or could be compelled to do so. When in Phocis, Demosthenes would be on the borders of Boeotia, the ultimate object of his expedition.2 He led his forces away from Leucas, much against the will of the Acarnanians, to Sollium, a town on the opposite coast, where he laid his new plans before the army. The Acarnanians, finding that Leucas was not to be besieged, at once withdrew, and with them fifteen ships which had come from Corcyra, but with th,e rest of his army, to which he now added 300 Epibatae (marines) from the Athenian ships, Demosthenes marched against the Aetolians. The western 1 Time. iii. 94. Of the Eurytanes, Thucydides tells us that their dialect was unintelligible, and that they ate their meat uncooked. 2 It is interesting to observe that both Demosthenes and Nicias have in view an attack on Boeotia in this year; the one from the south, the other from the north. It is obvious that the plan of 424 was already in the air. VII. 3.] DEMOSTHENES DEFEATED, 4$6. 193 Locrians, unlike their kinsmen on the east, were allies of the Athenians, and being neighbours of the Aetolians, armed like them, and acquainted with their mode of fighting, their co-operation was eagerly sought by the general, who persuaded them to join him at some point in the interior and serve as his guides through the country. The territory which Demosthenes was about to invade forms roughly the apex of an angle, of which the two sides are the river Hylaethus and the Corinthian gulf. It is a mountainous region, difficult of access. The Apodoti appear to have occupied the left bank of the river and the hills which border it; the Ophioneis lay beyond them on the right bank; the Eurytanes further to the north and northeast.1 Marching from Oeneon, whither he sailed from Sollium, Demosthenes halted his troops for the night in the temple of Nemean Zeus, a place well known as the scene of the death of the poet Hesiod. In the next three days he captured three Aetolian villages, the last of which was Teichium on the confines of the Ophioneis. He did not intend to push his conquests beyond the Apodoti till he had reduced the whole of their territory. When this was accomplished he would return to Naupactus, and thence, begin a new expedition against the Ophioneis. But the Messenians, impatient of the caution of their leader, urged him to press on at once, and unfortunately Demosthenes adopted their advice. Without waiting for the Locrians, of whose light-armed javelin men he was greatly in need, he marched upon Aegitium, a town lying among . high hills, about ten miles from the coast. Demosthenes at The inhabitants, who had already been joined Ae<lum-by the combined forces of the Aetolians, even from the distant tribes bordering on the Meliac gulf, abandoned the town and encamped upon the surrounding heights, from which they threw their missiles at the Athenians, running 1 See Woodhouse, Aetolia, p. 16 if. The dividing lines of the tribes cannot be drawn very precisely. The Apodoti may have been settled on both banks of the river Hvlaethus. VOL. III. N 194 A TTA CK ON NA UP A CTUS, 4#6. [VI1. 3. down from the summits in all directions, retiring whenever the Athenians advanced, and attacking when they retired. This desultory mode of battle continued for a long time, greatly to the disadvantage of the Athenians. So long as their archers had a supply of arrows and could use them, they held their ground, the Aetolian light-armed being compelled to retire before the shots of the bowmen; but when the archers lost their commander, and were themselves exhausted by the long conflict, they turned and fled. Ignorant of the locality, for their guide was slain, they found themselves entangled in impassable ravines, in which their light-armed and active enemies caught them at every step. A large number fled into a wood, to which the Aetolians at once set fire; others wandered about till death overtook them, and but a small remnant escaped to Oeneon. Of the three hundred Athenians, one hundred and twenty had been slain, men in the very flower of their youth, whom Thucy-dides describes as the finest soldiers who fell in the war. When the dead had been recovered from the Aetolians, the ships returned to Naupactus and thence to Athens; Demosthenes, however, fearing to return home after his failure, remained in the neighbourhood of Naupactus.1 After this success the Aetolians were eager to revenge themselves on Naupactus for the invasion of their country. In the late summer the Lacedaemonians, at pactus, which their request, sent a large force over the gulf, is saved by When he reached Delphi, the Spartan general, Eurylochus, sent envoys to the Locrians, through whose territory the route to Naupactus lay, to detach them from the Athenians; and the Locrian towns, far from making any resistance, not only gave hostages for a safe conduct, but even joined in the expedition, with one or two exceptions. The army entered the territory of Naupactus, where they were joined by the Aetolians, and laid 1 Thuc. iii. 95-98. For the locality, see Leake, Northern Greece, ii. 612 ff., and especially Woodhouse, Aetolia, p. 57 ff., 340 ff. VII. 4.] AMBRACIA AND ARGOS, 4^6. 195 waste the country as far as the suburbs of the city; but here their successes came to an end. Demosthenes, when he heard of the intended expedition, knowing the defenceless state of Naupactus, which was both weakly garrisoned and weakly fortified, persuaded the Acarnanians to send 1000 hoplites, with whom he sailed to the city, just in time to save it. Eurylochus felt that it was now impossible to take the place by storm, and withdrew into the neighbouring territory of Calydon and Pleuron. He had already entered into negotiations with the Ambraciots for a combined attack upon Argos Amphilochicum and Acarnania, by which, if successful, the inhabitants of those regions could be brought over to the Lacedaemonian alliance.1 4. In the autumn the Ambraciots, as they had promised, sent a large force against Argos. Traversing the pass between the mountains and the sea, which commands invasion of the northern entrance into the Argive territory, Arg°s. they seized Olpae, a strong fortress on a hill by the sea, about three miles distant from the city. The Argives were aided by the Acarnanians, who, with part of their forces, marched to the city, and with others occupied Crenae (wells), a place in the adjacent plain, to prevent the Peloponnesians under Eurylochus from joining the Ambraciots at Olpae. They also sent a messenger to Demosthenes begging him to take command of their army, and to twenty Athenian vessels which happened at the time to be cruising off the coast of the Peloponnese. The Ambraciots at Olpae, fearing that Eurylochus might be unable to make his way through Acarnania, when they would have to fight without his assistance or return home as best they could, sent to Ambracia and requested the citizens to join them in full force. When he heard that the Ambraciots were at Olpae, Eurylochus set out out in haste from Proschium (west of Pleuron), and crossing the Achelous, advanced through Acarnania, where, owing to the absence of the inhabitants 1 Thuc, iii. 100-102. 196 DEMOSTHENES AT OLPAE, 1$6. [VII. 4. at Argos, he met with no resistance. Leaving Stratus on his right, and taking to the range of Mount Thyamus, a wild uncultivated district, he descended into the Argive plain by night, and passed between Argos and Crenae to Olpae. At daybreak the united forces pitched their camp at a place called the "metropolis," in the immediate neighbourhood. Not long afterwards the Athenians sailed into the Ambracian gulf, and with them Demosthenes at the head of 200 Messenian heavy-armed a-nd sixty Athenian bowmen. The battle of The ships lay at anchor off the hill of Olpae, oipae. while the Acarnanians and Amphilochians, who had already assembled at Argos, prepared for battle. Demosthenes, who was commander-in-chief, at once led out his army to Olpae, and encamped in a position separated from the enemy by a deep ravine. For five days the two armies remained inactive, but on the sixth they drew out for battle. Finding that the Peloponnesian forces were numerous enough to overlap his own, Demosthenes placed a force of hoplites and light-armed soldiers in a deep lane overgrown with brushwood, in order that they might attack in the rear the extreme wing of the enemy should it attempt to encircle him. The armies then joined battle. The stratagem of Demosthenes was entirely successful. The Peloponnesians had begun to encircle his right, when the Acarnanians appeared from their ambush and drove them back in such haste that they carried with them the greater part of the army. On the other wing the Ambraciots succeeded in defeating their opponents and driving them to the city, but on their return they were attacked by the victorious Acarnanians, and forced to seek refuge in Olpae, with much difficulty and loss. The Mantineans alone among the invading forces preserved an orderly retreat. On the next day Menedaeus, who was now general of the Peloponnesians, as both Eurylochus and Macarius, the second in command, had fallen, proposed a truce to cover the retreat of his soldiers. Demosthenes was unwilling to enter into open negotiations for the retreat of the whole army, and proposed a separate VII. 5-] PELOPONNESIAN TREACHERY, 426. 197 treaty with the Mantineans and the Peloponnesians, hoping thereby not only to isolate the Ambraciots and their mercenaries, but also to bring the Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesians into ill repute for their selfish treachery in saving their own lives at the cost of their allies. The Retreat of the terms were no sooner fixed than the Pelopon- Peloponnesians. nesians buried their dead and prepared for their own escape. Under pretence of gathering wood and fodder, the Mantineans and others included in the truce began to steal away in small companies, till they were at some distance from Olpae, when they abandoned all disguise and ran off at full speed. The Ambraciots and others who had gone out with them, seeing their movements, quickened their pace in order to overtake them, while the Acarnanians, who thought that all alike were retiring without permission, started in pursuit. When their generals announced that the Peloponnesians were retreating under a truce, there was for a moment an alarm that the whole army had been treacherously allowed to escape, and one of the soldiers in his rage and disappointment threw a javelin at his commanders. Afterwards they let the Mantineans and Peloponnesians go, but the Ambraciots were cut down on every hand. The survivors escaped into the territory of the Agraeans, whose king, Salynthius, afforded them a friendly shelter.1 5. Immediately after the battle of Olpae, news had been brought to Demosthenes that the Ambraciots were advancing in full force from the city to join their allies, of whose defeat they knew nothing. He at once sent a portion of his army to occupy the roads and take up a strong position on the 1 Thuc. iii. 105-111. For the topography, see Leake, Northern Greece, iv. p. 242 ff. ; Oberhummer, Aharnanien, p. 107 f.; Heuzey, Le Mont Olympe et VAcarnanie, p. 293 f. The possible changes of the coast render it difficult to be precise, but on the whole I am inclined to agree with Heuzey about the situation of Olpae, which he places at Hellenokuli, and not as Leake and Oberhummer at Agrilo-vuni. The ravine which separated the two armies will then be the stream flowing from Lutro to Arapi. The position of Argos and Crenae is certain. 198 BATTLE OF IDOMENE, 426. [VII. 5. enemy's route, intending to follow with the remainder as soon as possible. On their way into the Argive plain the Ambraciots had to pass through a narrow and difficult defile, which forms the only entrance in this direction, and it was of the utmost importance to Demosthenes that he should secure this pass. His advanced force succeeded during the night in seizing, unknown to the enemy, the larger of two hills, which Thucydides calls Idomene; the smaller had already been occupied by the Ambraciots. After the evening meal, Demosthenes advanced with half his force to the pass, while the other half was sent further to the east, through the Amphilochian hills. Marching all night, he came upon Battle of the Ambraciots at daybreak, while they were idomene. vet [n their beds and quite ignorant of his approach. Their confusion was the greater because he had purposely placed his Messenians in the van, that the Ambraciots, hearing their Doric dialect, might receive them as friends. The army thus surprised was immediately put to flight with prodigious slaughter; they fled down the hill, but only to find the roads secured,1 and driven back on every side they wandered in unknewn ravines or fell into the ambuscades prepared for them. In despair some rushed to the sea-shore and swam to the Attic ships, thinking, in the extremity of their terror, that if die they must, it was better that they should be slain by the sailors than fall into the hands of the detested and barbarian Amphilochians. The few survivors found their way back to Ambracia. Thucydides illustrates the severity of this defeat by the following incident. When the herald came from the Am-Numberofthe hraciots at Olpae to ask for the corpses of slain; the Am- the slain, knowing nothing of the battle of raciot era . i(iomenej an(j seeing the arms of the dead, he expressed his astonishment at their number. A bystander, who believed him to be the herald from Idomene, asked how many he thought had fallen. "About two 1 Were they secured, in part, by the forces sent through the hills ? VII. 6.] SLAUGHTER OF THE AMBRACIOTS, J$6. 199 hundred," was the reply. " Then these are not their arms, for here are those of more than a thousand." The herald answered, "They cannot then be the arms of those who fought with us." "Indeed they are," said the other, "if you were fighting yesterday at Idomene." "Yesterday we fought with no one; it was the day before, in the retreat." The other replied, "All I know is that these are the arms of those with whom we fought yesterday, the men who marched from the city of Ambracia." When the herald heard this, he understood that the army from the city had perished, and overcome by the disaster, he broke into a loud cry and departed as he came, without even asking for the dead. For this, adds the historian, was the greatest calamity that overtook any one city in an equal number of days throughout the whole war, and so great was the number of the slain, compared with the population of the city, that he does not venture to state it. Had the Amphilochians and the Acarnanians been willing to take the advice of Demosthenes and march upon Ambracia, they would easily have captured the city, but this they refused to do lest they should find the Athenians, if settled there, more troublesome neighbours than their old enemies.1 Ambracia was subsequently reinforced by a garrison from Corinth. 6. In Sicily (supra, p. 187) nothing of importance was achieved beyond the capture of Messene* by which the Athenians became masters of both sides of the strait and planted a firm foot on Sicilian ground. The desultory wa/' fleet seems to have been distracted between the fare: ,new Pre-claims of Italy and Sicily; too weak to take an independent line, it made desultory attacks as the Ehegians, the Sicilian allies, or the Sicels called for its 1 Time. iii. 112-113; Oberhummer, I.e., p. 110; Heuzey, I.e. 293 ff. He places the greater Idomene at Liapochori, the smaller at Paleokoulia (p. 304), but the locality cannot be determined with precision. It is, however, certain that the smaller Idomene was near the sea, and apparently it was not far from the co"j3oXi) or pass leading from Ambracia into the plain of Argos. 200 THE A THENIANS IN S1CIL Y, ^26. [VI1. 7. assistance. In one of these, Laches captured a fortress on the river Halex, the boundary separating the territory of Locri from that of Rhegium. In another, he made an unsuccessful attempt on Inessa, a Sicel town, but held by the Syracusans. In a third, the Athenians landed in the territory of Himera, while their Sicel allies ravaged the interior border.1 At the close of the year, when Laches returned to Rhegium, he found himself superseded by Pythodorus. The alli.es of Athene in Sicily had become weary of the useless war. On land they had lost ground, and though an insignificant fleet was as yet sufficient to keep the Syracusans off the sea, the enemy were preparing a larger force. They called on the Athenians to increase the number of their ships, and the Athenians, "partly because they wished to bring the war in Sicily to an end, and partly to keep their sailors in practice," equipped a fleet of forty vessels. As it was now too late for naval operations, they sent Pythodorus, with a few ships only, intending to despatch a larger number in the following spring. The change brought no better fortune. On his arrival Pythodorus sailed to the Locrian fortress, which Laches had captured, but he was defeated and forced to retire.2 7. Towards the close of the year the Athenians, warned by an oracle, as was said, resolved to purify the sacred island of Delos, and restore the old festival ofDeios- and which once made it the centre of the Ionic restoration of race (vol. i. 519). A similar purification had been made, more than a century before, by Pisistratus, but to a limited extent, so much only of the island being cleansed as could be seen from the temple. On the present occasion the purification was thorough and complete: all the dead who had been buried in Delos were 1 Thuc. iii. 90, 99, 103. Perhaps it was at this time that Laches renewed the fatal alliance with Segesta, which is recorded as his work. Thuc. vi. 6. For the previous alliance see vol. ii. 468. 2 Thuc. iii. 115; Freeman, Sicily, iii. 31 ff. Laches was put on his trial on his return : see Aristoph. Wasps, 240, 836 ff. VII. 8.] PURIFICATION OF DELOS, m* 201 removed, and for the future neither death nor birth was allowed to take place in the island. The Athenians then restored the Delia as a " five-yearly " festival. Though the old games had fallen into disuse, the islanders had kept up their choral dances, and the Athenians had sent choruses and sacrificed. The gymnastic exercises were now renewed, and horse-races were added—a contest unknown in the old festival. We can hardly doubt that tke Athenians, in thus renewing the sanctity and importance of Delos, wished to bind together the Ionic race as closely as possible. The events of the previous year had shown how necessary it was to preserve by every means the allegiance of their allies in the east, and they had recently launched on a new career as the champion of Ionic influence in the west. It was important to show that the championship was something more than imperial domination. The head of Ionic cities must treat the colonies of her race, not merely as allies or subjects, but as fellow-worshippers of the great Ionic deity, and linked together by the enjoyment of a common festival.1 8. In the following spring (425) the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, but they had barely been in the country a fortnight before they returned home. The invasion had short invasi0n been made so early in the year that they could of A«ica. not support their forces on the harvest, and the weather was unusually severe, but what chiefly hastened their return was the alarming news from Sparta.2 The fleet destined for Sicily set out from Athens about the same time that the Peloponnesians invaded Attica. The generals in command were Eurymedon and Sophocles, but Demosthenes, who had returned home from Acarnania, 1 Thuc. iii. 104. The celebration of the festival took place in the spring. The final disappearance of the plague in this year may also, as Curtius thinks, have influenced the Athenians in this matter. 2 Thuc. iv. 2: tov rjpos irp\v tov vXtov iv rfj dic/ifi rival, ib. 6, Trpw i€pov(ra rfj 7r6Xet k.Lcug) ^ ^ A {i e. thirty talents), where the omission of the words /ecu 229 Athenians captured the Long Walls by a stratagem in the night, and shut up the Peloponnesians in Nisaea. When the day dawned, the conspirators in Megara, who were aware that a large Athenian force had come up from Eleusis during the night, proposed to open the gates and go out to attack the enemy, hoping by this means to gain admittance for the Athenians. But one of their number betrayed the secret, upon which the oligarchs gathered together and refused to meet the enemy or risk the safety of the city. When they saw that the conspiracy had failed, the Athenians advanced upon Nisaea, and began to invest it with a wall. By the evening of the second day the work was almost completed, and the garrison, who were without provisions, in despair of any assistance, surrendered to the Athenians on condition that each man should give up his arms and pay a fixed ransom.1 The Athenians then established themselves in Nisaea, and threw down part of the Long Walls towards Megara. The fate of Megara hung in the balance. Would the oligarchical faction save the city for Sparta, or would the democrats bring it over to Athens 1 The Brasidas in question was decided by the presence of Brasidas, the Megarid. who was now collecting troops for his Thracian expedition at Sicyon and Corinth. On hearing of the capture of the walls, he at once sent to Boeotia for reinforcements, and meanwhile, with a force of more than 3000 men, furnished from the neighbouring towns, advanced to Tripodiscus, in the hope of saving Nisaea. When he found that he was too late, he marched rapidly to Megara with a select body of troops, and begged to be received into the city. There was still a hope, he thought, of recovering Nisaea, and in any case his presence would strengthen the Megarians. But they refused to open their gates; the democrats fearing that by the restoration of the exiles he would bring about their own expulsion; the oligarchs lest the demos in alarm for their 1 These terms did not, however, extend to the Lacedaemonians in the garrison, who were to be dealt with as the Athenians pleased. 230 BRASIDAS SA VES MEGARA, 4%. [VIII. 2. safety should attack them, while the Athenians lay at hand to take advantage of the faction. It was better to wait and let Brasidas and the Athenians fight it out; the issue of the battle might determine the fate of the city, which could safely pronounce for oligarchy if Brasidas were victorious, or for democracy with the Athenians. Brasidas retired to his camp, where at daybreak he was joined by the Boeotians. The arrival of this force was quite unexpected by the Athenians, whose hoplites watches the were drawn up in Nisaea or on the coast, while Athenians at their light-armed ranged freely in the plain between Megara and the sea. The Boeotian horse had no difficulty in driving these stragglers down to the coast, but when the Athenian cavalry came out to protect them, an engagement took place which was hotly contested and ended without decisive advantage to either side. Brasidas now ventured to advance nearer the sea and the city, where he awaited the action of the Athenians in a convenient position, from which his movements could be seen by the Megarians. If the enemy were willing to fight, he had no reason to fear the event, for his forces were now superior to theirs; if they thought it prudent to remain in their encampment, he would attain his object at Megara without striking a blow. And in this he was not mistaken. The Athenians went so far as to draw up in order of battle under the Long Walls,1 but they did not venture into the open field; they had achieved a considerable success in the capture of Nisaea, Brasidas at an(^ ^ would be f oolish to run the risk of an length secures engagement with superior numbers; they would Megara. indeed gain Megara if successful, but if de- feated the entire loss would fall upon the flower of the Athenian troops. After a time they retired to Nisaea, upon which the oligarchs at Megara received Brasidas into the city to the great dismay of the conspirators. 1 Of these they had destroyed part {supra); the rest were destroyed by the Megarians later in the year; see Thuc. iv. 109. VIII. 3-1 THE CONGRESS AT GELA, 4U- 231 The allies from Boeotia and Peloponnesus now dispersed and Brasidas returned to Corinth. The Athenians also returned home. The conspirators at Megara The oligarchs retired from the city, but those of the popular are restored party who were not implicated agreed to recall a e£ara-the exiles from Pegae, binding them by solemn pledges to forget the past and promote the good of the city. No sooner were the exiles elected to public office than they seized the opportunity of an inspection of arms to arrest about a hundred of their opponents, whom the}' put to death after a mock trial; a strict oligarchy was established in the city, and Thucydides observes that it remained in power for a longer time than any other government which owed its origin to a revolution carried out by so small a number of men.1 3. In the west also the tide turned against the Athenians. Since the winter a new policy had been gaining ground among the Sicilians. The cities resolved to forego their mutual quarrels, and by uniting together to Sicily: change preserve Sicily from foreign intervention. The of policy, first to combine were Gela and Camarina, neighbouring towns, which the war had brought into a peculiar relation to each other. Both were Dorian; and Camarina had been re-colonised by Geloans, after the destruction of the old city by Syracuse; but the memory of the ancient enmity remained, and though Dorian, Camarina was the ally of Leontini and Athens. In this policy the citizens were by no means united, and as there were some who wished to betray Camarina to Syracuse {supra, p. 221), so there were others who wished to be on friendly terms with Gela. Through these negotiations were opened, which ended in an armistice between the cities. This example was quickly followed. Envoys from all the cities met at Gela and discussed the question of a general reconciliation. There were great difficulties in the way: the cities were sensitive and jealous; each suspected her neighbour 1 Thtic. iv. 66-74. 232 SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES, 424. [VIII. 3. of some selfish design; each had her own claims to maintain. The congress was a scene of animated discussion, but of the The congress speeches one only is recorded, which Thucy-ofGeia. dides selects as being in his judgment most influential in determining the result—the speech of Hermo-crates of Syracuse, the great Sicilian patriot, of whom we now hear for the first time. Hermocrates was a citizen of no mean city. It was not from any fear for Syracuse, or owing to any loss which she had sustained, that he came forward to advocate Hermocrates. . peace—he spoke in the interests of all Sicily. He had no wish to control the free action of the cities; he was no supporter of peace at any price; but the war, so far as it had gone, had brought no advantage to any one. Let them try peace, therefore, and if that failed, let them go to war again. The danger at the moment was not from within but from without. While they were wearing each other out in factions and conflicts, the Athenians were at hand to take advantage of the result. "The question which we have met to discuss," he said, "is not the settlement of our private quarrels but the preservation of Sicily. The Athenians are here with a few ships as yet, and under the pretence of an alliance—but they aim at the conquest of the whole island, and when they have secured a firm footing they will come again with a larger fleet to carry out their design. In all our wars and our appeals to them for help, we are but preparing the way for our own subjugation. Their presence, far more than any arguments of mine, should incline you to reconciliation. In union lies our strength. Let us hear no more of Dorian and Ionian— the Athenians care nothing about either; it is Sicily and her wealth that they desire. Let every man and every city unite against the common foe. It is human nature to take what we can get, and I am far from blaming the Athenians; but it is not less human to resist attack and defend what is our own. Of all ways of getting rid of them this is the speediest. For it is not from Athens, but from those cities VIII. 3-] SICILY FOR THE SICILIANS, 4U- 233 which have invited their assistance, that they carry on war against us. Deprived of these, they will go back whence they came; and we shall be at peace. " Let me remind you also that the end of war is uncertain. It is not determined by the justice or injustice of a cause. Fortune is capricious, and fortune is supreme. The best lesson which she teaches is distrust. Let us take this lesson to heart, and in our distrust of the future and alarm at the presence of the Athenians, make up our quarrels, at least till we have got rid of the common enemy. In this way we shall preserve our independence; we shall go to war how and when we please, and not at the bidding of another. "I will end as I began. I am not speaking solely in the interest of Syracuse, but in the interests of all. Do not, I entreat you, in your eagerness to damage your opponents, inflict far worse damage on yourselves; or think that you can govern fortune according to your own moods. Be willing to make mutual concessions; cast aside all jealousies of tribe or city; be good neighbours and good Siceliots, resolute in the determination to manage your own affairs, and resist the interference of foreigners whether they come as allies or as mediators."* The speech of Hermocrates was decisive. The cities agreed to unite; and no change was made in their mutual relations, with the exception of Camarina, which agreed to purchase Morgantina from Syracuse for a fixed sum. Those who were allies of the Athenians sent for the officers in command of the fleet and requested them to join in the pacification. They accepted the proposal without any remonstrance, and after a brief interval withdrew their forces from the island. Thus the Athenians saw themselves shut out from any hope of planting a foot in Sicily, or taking advantage of local quarrels to further their own interests. They were at 1 Thuc. iv. 58-64. Notice that Hermocrates, in this speech, while appealing to the common feeling of the Greeks in Sicily, and urging them to act as inhabitants of one island home, entirely ignores the natives of the island. 234 THE A THENIANS LEA VE SIC1L Y, 424. [VIII. 4. liberty to visit the western waters in a single ship of war— that was allowed by the common custom of Greece—but The Athenians their presence with any greater number would retire from be the signal for hostilities. So far as we can 1C1 y* see, Eurymedon and his fellow-generals were quite unable to make or mar in the pacification; they could neither prevent the meeting of the congress nor influence its decision, nor refuse to accept the result. On their return to Athens they were at once put on their trial. Pythodorus and Sophocles were driven into exile, and we do not hear of them again. Eurymedon was merely fined; he was destined to return and fall in Sicily. From the language of Thucydides we infer that the accusations were frivolous. "In the enthusiasm of their success the Athenians were impatient of every check; they looked on all things as possible, and any armament as sufficient, so extravagant were the hopes aroused in them by their unexpected prosperity."1 4. The Lesbians who had escaped from the island in 428-427 had settled on the mainland opposite. With the help of some Peloponnesian mercenaries they captured Rhoeteum, but afterwards they restored the town to the rightful owners —for a large sum of money—and acquired Antandrus, which they intended to make their headquarters. Timber was abundant there, and with the help of a fleet they could harass Lesbos. But two Athenian generals, who were collecting tribute in the neighbourhood, seeing their designs, gathered together a force and recovered the town. They feared that it would become to Lesbos what Anaea was to Samos, a constant source of danger and alarm.2 The successes of Athens had kindled new hopes in the heart of every democrat throughout Greece. Hippocrates and Demosthenes had no sooner returned to Athens from Nisaea than negotiations were opened with them by a number of Boeotians, who desired to see a popular form of government established in their cities. A plot was formed 1 Thuc. iv. 65. 2 Thuc. iv. 52, 75. VIII. 4-] MO VEMENT IN BOEOTIA, m. 235 by which the conspirators undertook to raise a revolt at different points in Boeotia: at Siphae, a seaport on the Corinthian gulf in the territory of Thespiae, and at Chaeronea, a dependency of Orchomenus, movement in in the extreme north, while the Athenians were Boeotia: plan to seize the temple of Apollo at Delium, near Tanagra, in the south. To prevent the Boeotians from bringing their whole force to bear on any single point, these movements were to take place simultaneously, on a fixed day. If successful, the conspirators would have at least three places of vantage, and by maintaining these and devastating the country, they hoped in time to effect a general revolution. Demosthenes was at once sent to Naupactus to collect an army of Acarnanians and other allies for the attack on Siphae, while Hippocrates remained in the city, ready to march on Delium at the time appointed. Some Orchomenian exiles had already engaged a body of mercenaries from Peloponnesus, and a number of the neighbouring Phocians were associated in the project.1 On his arrival at Naupactus Demosthenes found that the Acarnanians had already brought Oeniadae into the Athenian alliance. He immediately began to collect Demosthenes forces for the attack on Siphae, and while ^t Naupactus. waiting for the time appointed, employed them in subduing the Agraeans. But the plan of invasion miscarried. By some mistake Demosthenes sailed for Siphae before Hippocrates had reached Delium, and the Boeotians, who had been forewarned of the danger, occupied Siphae and Chaeronea in force. The revolt was suppressed before it had broken out; the conspirators, seeing their mistake, made no sign, and Demosthenes returned to Naupactus.2 Hippocrates was not deterred from executing his part of the plot. Marching to Delium with the entire force of Athens, both light and heavy-armed, including all the available metic and allied troops, he set about fortifying the 1 Time, iv. 76, 77. 2 Thuc. iv. 89. 236 THE ATHENIANS IN B0E0T1A, 4H- [VIII. 4. temple. In three days and a half the work was nearly finished, and the array set out on its return. When they Hippocrates had marched about a mile, the hoplites halted, at Deiium. awaiting their general, who had remained at the temple to superintend the completion of the defensive works, but the light-armed went their way homewards. Meanwhile the Boeotians had gathered together from forces assemble every part of the country, under the command and attack the 0f the Boeotarchs. When they saw that the enianarmy. Athenians were returning home, most of the generals were unwilling to attack them, on the ground that the enemy were no longer in Boeotian territory; they had, in fact, halted on the borders of Oropia; but Pagondas, one of the two Boeotarchs from Thebes, was eager for battle, and summoning the soldiers in detachments, lest they should all leave their arms at once, urged them to engage, without caring where the battle was fought, whether on Athenian soil or on Boeotian. The Athenian was an invader whom they must repel; and it was folly to talk of boundaries when dealing with a neighbour who sought to advance his frontier to the utmost limit of Boeotia. Let them remember Coronea, and show themselves worthy of that glorious day.1 The soldiers responded to this appeal, and as it was now late in the day, Pagondas at once led them forward to a position where they were separated from the enemy by a hill. When he had drawn up his forces, he ascended to the summit, ready to sweep down on the foe. He had under his command 7000 heavy-armed, 500 targeteers, and 1000 horse, besides an organised force of 10,000 light-armed. On the right he placed the Thebans and the Boeotians from the neighbouring districts; on the left the Thespians, Tana-graeans, and Orchomenians; in the centre the troops from Haliartus, Coronea, and Copae, and the region round Lake Copais. The cavalry and light-armed troops were placed, as usual, on the wings. The formation of the ranks varied in 1 Thuc. iv. 90-92. VIII. 4-] THE BATTLE OF DELIUM, m. 237 the different contingents, but the Thebans were drawn up twenty-five deep. While at Delium Hippocrates had been informed of the approach of the Boeotians. He at once sent orders to the army to form for battle, and soon afterwards joined them in person, leaving three hundred horse at Delium, partly to protect the temple, and also in the hope that they might have an opportunity of attacking the Boeotians during the battle, a danger which the Boeotians provided against by detaching a separate body of troops to meet them. In heavy-armed and cavalry the Athenians were about equal to the Boeotians, but they were almost entirely without light-armed troops. No organised force of the kind existed in the Athenian service, and of the irregular multitude which had followed the expedition from Athens, the greater part were by this time far on their way to the city. The army was drawn up at a uniform depth of eight shields; the cavalry took their place on the wings. Before advancing Hippocrates made a short address to the troops, in which he reminded his soldiers that a victory over the Boeotian cavalry would not only give them possession of Boeotia, but relieve Attica from invasion, for without the protection of this force the Peloponnesians would never venture into their land. "Meet your enemy," he cried, "as those ought to meet him who call Athens their home—as sons of the men whom Myronides led to victory at Oenophyta !"1 He had only gone over half the line when the Boeotians rushed down the hill with a shout, and the Athenian heavy-armed met them at the double. Those on the extreme right and left of either army could ^De^m-not engage, owing to the watercourses which defeat of the prevented their advance, but the rest at once Athemans-joined in close conflict, shield upon shield. On their own right the Athenians were victorious; part of the enemy were put to flight, and the Thespians, who stood their ground, i Thuc. iv. 93-95. 238 DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS, 4U- [VIII. 4. though attacked on all sides, were at length driven to seek the protection of the centre. So furious was the fighting, so confused the ranks, that some of the Athenians fell by the hands of their own countrymen, who mistook them for the enemy. On the left the extraordinary weight of the Theban column, aided by the ground, was found irresistible; slowly, and step by step, the Athenians were driven back, though as yet the line was unbroken. But now Pagondas, seeing that he had nothing to fear in this part of the battle, secretly detached two companies of horse to assist his broken left, and when they appeared over the ridge, the victorious Athenians, believing themselves attacked by a new army, were panic-stricken and fled; after this the wavering left could no longer keep their ground, and the whole army was put to flight, every man seeking safety where he could find it. The Boeotian cavalry, who were now joined by a troop of Locrians, followed in pursuit, but the approach of night aided the fugitives. Some reached Mount Parnes, on the direct route to Athens, others Oropus and Delium, whence, on the next day, they were conveyed home by sea.1 The battle of Delium presents many features of interest. It is the first battle in Greek history of which the details Remarks on are c^ear enou&n to enable us to form an idea the battle of the engagement. We know the numbers of Deiium. on ^^ gj^es, an(j their disposition; the mode of attack, and the cause of defeat. The absence of light-armed troops was a defect in the Athenian army, which their defeat at Spartolus should have taught them to remedy; which Demosthenes, had he been in command, would probably have remedied. The enormous depth of the Theban line was an anticipation of the tactics which proved successful fifty years later on the field of Leuctra, and on this occasion it seems to have taken the Athenians by surprise, or they were unable to perceive its importance. While the Boeotians 1 The Boeotians lost about 500 in the battle, the Athenians 1000, including the general Hippocrates, besides light-armed and baggage bearers. See Thuc. iv. 96 : cf. ib. 101. VIII. 4-] CAPTURE OF THE TEMPLE, 4#4- 239 have the advantage in the composition of their army, their strategy is also superior to that of the Athenians. Not only do they secure a position, which added immensely to the force of their charge, but when his left is broken Pagondas at once sees that his cavalry can be employed to restore it, though unable to advance on the troops ranged opposite; on the other hand, the Athenian cavalry is useless Decline of the from first to last, failing even to cover with effect Athenian army-the retreat of the army. If it be said that the Athenians were now departing from the policy of Pericles, and that their defeat is a proof of his wisdom in forbidding them to meet the enemy in the field, the observation is true, but it seems to be not less true that the policy which Pericles pursued in regard to the Athenian army had been fatal to strategic skill.1 The Athenian garrison was still in possession of the temple at Delium. The Boeotians attempted to dislodge them by refusing to give up the bodies of those who capture of had fallen in the battle, but after some time Delium-had been wasted in fruitless negotiations, they resolved to carry the place by assault. They had already been joined by large reinforcements, and the number of the heavy-armed infantry must have amounted to nearly 10,000—an overwhelming force to bring upon a temple surrounded by an earthwork thrown up in three days, and held by a few hundred men. But so helpless was a Greek army before a fortress of any kind, that the besiegers found it necessary to send for slingers and javelin-men from the Melian gulf to clear the walls, and even then the fort was not captured till an ingenious engine had been devised by which they set fire to the woodwork of the palisade and material from the neighbouring vineyard, with which the ramparts had been hastily constructed. The greater part of the garrison escaped to the sea, but about two hundred were captured 1 Cp. Aristoph. Frogs, 1021 ff.: AIO. Grjfiaiovs yap TTiiroirjKas avbp€ioTepovs eis rbv n6\€p.ov ... AI. dXX' vjuv avT} i^rjv clvkciv, dXX' ovk enl tovt irpaTrecBe. 240 BRASIDAS MARCHES TO THRACE, 404. [VIII. 5. and a few were slain. The Athenians now sent a second herald to recover their dead, who were at once given up to them. They had remained unburied seventeen days.1 5. The defeat of Delium was a heavy blow to Athens, but a heavier still was now to fall upon her. Brasidas had returned Brasidas from Megara to his task of collecting forces marches to for the expedition to Chalcidice. In addition to the 700 Helots provided by the Spartan government, he got together by persuasion and promises a force of a thousand heavy-armed, and with these he set out to the north. He had, of course, no difficulty in reaching the Lacedaemonian colony at Heraclea; but to pass through Thessaly was not an easy task, for the Thessalian people were friendly to Athens, and Greek custom did not allow an armed force to cross a neighbour's territory without formal consent. But the governing class in Thessaly was oligarchical, and Brasidas had friends, who, at his request, acted as his guides. With their help and his own tact and energy, he succeeded in making his way to Pharsalus, whence he passed through Perrhaebia to Dium, a city in the territory of Perdiccas. The Macedonian king lost no time in uniting the Greek force with his own army, for the purpose of attacking Brasidas and Arrhibaeus, the king of the Lyncestians, but Perdiccas. when they were on the point of entering Lyncestis, Brasidas expressed a wish for a personal interview with Arrhibaeus, whom he hoped to make an ally of the Peloponnesians. Perdiccas was greatly enraged, and reminded him that he was paid to obey Macedonian orders, not to "act as a peacemaker." Brasidas, nevertheless, opened negotiations with Arrhibaeus, and at his persuasion withdrew his army, upon which Perdiccas, who had hitherto paid half the expenses of the Peloponnesian forces, now refused to pay more than a third. His position was even worse than it had been before the arrival of the Peloponnesians ; he had less hope of subduing Arrhibaeus; and the 1 Thuc. iv. 97-101. VIII. 50 BRASIDAS RECEIVED AT ACANTHUS, 4H- 241 Athenians, suspecting that he had brought Brasidas into Macedonia, declared him an enemy. Brasidas was now free to pursue his own plans in regard to the Chalcidic cities. On the eastern shore of Chalcidice, where the isthmus connects the promontory of Acte Brasidas at and Mount Athos with the mainland, a few Acanthus, miles from the mouth of the canal of Xerxes, lay Acanthus, a colony of Andros, and a subject city of the Athenians. Hither he marched in response to an invitation from the oligarchical party in the town. He found the inhabitants by no means agreed on the question of admitting him with his forces, for here, as almost everywhere, the people were attached to the Athenians. But as it was now the vintage time, and the crop, still ungathered, was at the mercy of the army, they consented to receive him alone, and hear what he had to say. Brasidas, who was "not a bad orator for a Lacedaemonian," made the most of the permission. He declared that he had come to liberate Hellas, and to make good the promises with which Sparta had begun the war. He had come at great risk, and it was a bitter disappointment to find opposition in the first city to which he appealed. What was it that they feared ? Was his power inadequate ? At Nisaea the Athenians, though superior in numbers, refused to fight with his unassisted forces, and would they be able to send as large an army across the sea to Acanthus ri1 Or was his honesty questionable 1 He brought the most solemn pledges from the Spartans, that every city which joined them at his invitation should be an independent ally. Or did they suspect that he had come to help one party in the city against the other 1 Nothing was further from his intention; neither the many nor the few had reason to fear him; he had no thought of substituting a domestic for a foreign tyranny. The Spartans were known to be men 1 This statement of Brasidas is not true, see Thuc. iv. 108. His army at Nisaea included a lar^e number of Corinthians, who were not with him at Acanthus, and was superior in number to the enemy (iv. 73). VOL. III. Q 242 ARGILUS AND AMPHIPOLIS, 424. [VIII. 5. of their word; they would not damage their reputation by actions which would be disgraceful even in an Athenian. But the Acanthians must not suppose that they could remain neutral and continue friends while refusing to admit him into the city. If they would not listen to persuasion, he would try force, for he could not allow them to help the Athenians by their contributions, or to stand in the way of the liberation of Hellas. They had it in their power to save their property, and win a name for their city; but he would maintain his cause against all opposition. Let them choose the better part.1 The Acanthians were in favour of admitting Brasidas, as might be expected when an army was at the city gates awaiting the signal to devastate the fruit-laden Brasidas gains *? *? . Acanthus, and vineyards—and, as they gave their votes marches on secretly, every one could follow his own judgment. Their example was followed by the neighbouring city of Stagirus. It was now October, but Brasidas had no intention of throwing away the advantages which he might gain before the Athenian fleet could arrest his progress. He was already in communication with Argilus, and had hopes of winning no less a prize than Amphipolis itself. The foundation of that city appears to have caused the greatest discontent at Argilus, and, as we find Argilians settled in Amphipolis, it is probable that the territory and population of the new town had been increased at the expense of the older settlement. Whatever the cause, the Argilians and Athenians were on bad terms, and Amphipolis was the bone of contention. The Argilians wished for nothing better than to expel the Athenians, who were but a small minority in the mixed population of the city, and their efforts were aided by a party which had the support of Perdiccas and the Chalcidic cities. Of these discontents Brasidas was fully informed, and he resolved to make use of them. Starting from Arnae, a town a few miles distant from Acanthus, on the evening of a stormy day, he l Tfcuc. iv. 84-88. VIII. 5 ] BR AS I DAS A T AMPHIPOLIS, 4U- 243 advanced rapidly to Argilus, where his arrival was the signal for revolt, but he would not allow himself to be detained; he rushed on through the storm and darkness, and by early morning reached the bridge which crossed the Strymon, at a little distance from Amphipolis. A small body of soldiers were in charge; these he quickly dispersed, and crossing the river, entered the territory of Amphipolis, which he allowed his army to ravage. The citizens, who woke in the gloom of a wintry morning to find themselves the prey of an unexpected enemy, were filled with alarm; of those who dwelt outside the walls, some fled to the city, others were taken captive. They felt that they were betrayed, but the extent of the conspiracy was unknown, and every man suspected his neighbour. So great was the panic that Brasidas might have secured the city; but he preferred to wait for the action of his confederates, and, when they failed to carry out their part of the plot, he remained in his position. The Athenians, on hearing of the arrival of Brasidas in Chalcidice, had kept a close watch on the district;1 and of the two generals who had been appointed to this service, Eucles and Thucydides the historian, the first was now in Amphipolis, the second at Thasos, half a day's voyage distant. In concert with Eucles, the Athenian party kept the gates of the city closed, and sent to Thucydides for help, who immediately set sail with seven vessels, in the hope off saving Amphipolis, or at least occupying Eion, at the mouth of the Strymon. As owning a right over the working of goldmines in Thrace, he was a man of much influence in the district; and could he reach Amphipolis, he would be able to bring in reinforcements by land and sea. Brasidas no sooner heard of his approach than he issued a proclamation offering the most moderate terms. Any citizen of Amphipolis, even if an Athenian, might either remain in the city undisturbed, or, if he chose, leave it in five days, taking his property with him. The proclamation had the * Thwcr iv, 82, 244 EXILE OF THUCYDIDES, 404. [VIII. 6. desired effect; the Amphipolitans were relieved for themselves and their relatives who had fallen into the hands of Brasidas; the Athenians, who were but a small proportion of the inhabitants, were glad to escape from danger. Capture of Brasidas took possession of Amphipolis, and Amphipolis. on ^he eVening of the same day, Thucydides occupied Eion. With the help of the fugitives from Amphipolis, he put the place into a state of defence, and when Brasidas suddenly attacked it by land and water, his attempt was defeated. The Athenians were still able to watch the lower course of the Strymon with their triremes.1 6. But Amphipolis had fallen, and with it the bridge over the river had passed out of Athenian control. The prize so Condemnation long coveted, so hardly won, was lost; and the of Thucydides. wav t0 their allies was open to the enemy. In their vexation the Athenians turned upon Thucydides, whom they chose to consider responsible for the disaster. He was brought to trial and banished, or perhaps, after his failure, went into voluntary exile. If we may trust his own narrative, he was certainly not remiss in reply to the appeal for help, and but for his rapidity of movement Eion would have been lost no less than Amphipolis. It is not so clear that proper measures had been taken to secure the safety of the Strymon. The importance of the bridge over the river was well known to the Athenians, and above all to Thucydides, as his own words prove to us.2 Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that this position was allotted to him among the generals, owing to his intimate acquaintance with the region and his great influence in it. Yet the bridge over the Strymon, though at some distance from Amphipolis, and apparently within easy reach of Argilus, a city long suspected by Athens Negligence of disloyalty, is held by a small guard only; at of the Amphipolis the general is unsupported by any Athenians. garrison, and is therefore compelled to accept the decision of the people, while Eion is the prize of the 1 Thuc. iv. 102-107. 2 Thuc. iv. 108. VIII. 6.] BRASIDAS IN THRACE, m. 245 first comer. Even at Thasos no regular force seems to have been maintained, for the ships which Thucydides brought to Eion are said to "have been accidentally at hand." Such negligence was certainly culpable, but we hardly know enough of the facts to decide who was to blame. The Athenians may have sent out the generals with orders to go to Amphipolis and Thasos; they may have supplied them with insufficient forces, trusting to "moral influence," and believing that the period of the year had begun in which active operations were impossible. We are told that when they heard of the arrival of Brasidas in Chalcidice they declared Perdiccas an enemy, and kept a watch on their colonies in that district, but we do not hear of any forces being sent out, and it was not till Amphipolis had fallen that they placed garrisons in the towns. One point is very clear. The Athenians were quite incapable of dealing with so great a soldier, so acute a diplomatist as Brasidas. While they slept, he marched, regardless of the weather and the season. While they collected revenues, he offered emancipation. The power of Sparta, which hitherto had been a mere name to the subjects of Athens in northern Greece, he brought in visible presence to the gates of their cities: the hopes of years were at last realised; the liberator was come. And he came, not in the interests of party, to give oligarch the advantage over democrat, or democrat over oligarch, but offering freedom to all, without respect to their political creed. The Sparta which he represented was not the narrow and selfish community by the Eurotas, but a large and liberal state, which, far from seeking to establish oligarchy in every allied city, was bound, not in honour only, but by solemn oaths, to respect the independence of all who joined her. He encouraged the timid, reassured the suspicious, and convinced the wavering; in his description Sparta was the ideal deliverer of whom the oppressed had dreamed so long, and the impression thus created continued for years to increase the reputation of the city. When persuasion failed, he struck, and struck hard. He saw 246 TORONE CAPTURED, m* [VIII. 7. that the real weakness of the Athenian empire was its great extent. If an active spirit of revolt were excited through the various districts, even Athenian resources were inadequate to keep her power from crumbling to decay. Athens never recovered from the blow dealt her by Brasidas in Chalcidice, and when the same policy was repeated by Alcibiades in Ionia, the empire was doomed. Fortunately for Athens, the plans of Brasidas received little support from the Spartans, who were quite unable to sympathise with them. The liberation of Greece was in Spartan eyes a small matter compared with the recovery of the prisoners captured at Sphacteria ; and, blinded by the miserable jealousy which is so painful a feature in the Greek character, their leading men were more anxious to check the success of their great general than to promote it. 7. After the capture of Amphipolis, Perdiccas forgot his resentment and came to support the conqueror in settling „ mjt the cities. Eager to extend his operations, Brasidas o jt > acquires Brasidas sent to Sparta for reinforcements, and Acte, etc. began building ships of war on the Strymon. With his allies he marched into Acte* the most eastern of the three promontories of Chalcidice, and brought over the cities there, with one or two exceptions.1 From Acte he crossed to Torone, which he captured with the aid of a party in the city. Marching through the night Brasidas as before, ne encamped before daylight at a captures temple less than half a mile from the city—his Torone. approach being unperceived by all but those who were in the plot. Of these a few met him at the temple, and by them seven of his light-armed soldiers—for out of twenty selected for the purpose only seven had the courage to go— were introduced into the city and obtained possession of the gates. When the signal was given, Brasidas rushed forward and secured the town without difficulty. Most of the inhabitants were entirely ignorant of the plot by which they 1 Time, iv. 107, 108, 109. VIII. 8.] WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENCE, #4. 247 had been betrayed to the enemy. The Athenian garrison, who though apparently charged with the care of the great gates had been asleep in the market-place at the time of the attack, escaped with some slight loss—partly on foot, partly with the assistance of two vessels which lay off the shore— to Lecythus, a fortified promontory separated from Torone by a narrow isthmus, where they were joined by their adherents in the town. After an interval of two days, during which he had granted a truce to the Athenians for the burial of their dead, Brasidas attacked and carried Lecythus. His success was greatly due to the fall of a tower, which spread consternation among the besieged. Eegarding this accident as a proof of divine aid, he piously devoted a sum of thirty minae, which he had promised as a reward to the soldier who should first climb the walls, to the temple of Athena, and consecrated the whole of Lecythus as a precinct to the goddess. The capture of Torone was the last event of the campaign. For the rest of the winter Brasidas occupied himself with securing his conquests and forming future plans. So far he had been entirely successful, and his last enterprise taught him that he had little to fear from an Athenian garrison. Nothing could be more inefficient than the defence of Torone; the walls are out of repair, and in parts without a guard; a conspiracy is formed in the city, without any suspicion either on the part of the Athenians or their supporters; the garrison are asleep; the gates are insufficiently watched. If this were all the opposition which Athens had to offer, another campaign would decide the fate of the Athenian possessions in Thrace.1 8. Such was the war in Chalcidice, where, by his energy and enthusiasm, one man was carrying all before him. At home matters wore a very different aspect. Each of the combatants had suffered severely in the last year, and each was apprehensive of new calamities. The fall of Torone roused the Athenians to their danger, and the insufficiency J For Torone, Thuc. iv, 110-116, 248 A TRUCE CONCLUDED, J&8. [VIII. 8.^ of their own measures. If their empire was to be kept together a larger force must be sent out to Chalcidice, and a truce in the meantime Brasidas must be restrained concluded. from further aggression. The Lacedaemonians, though regarding the successes of Brasidas as a poor compensation for their losses at home, were aware of the impression which they made at Athens, and sought to take advantage of it. Both parties hoped to gain by a cessation of hostilities, and at the very beginning of the spring of 423 a truce was concluded for a year. In this instance, as so often, the Spartan policy was shortsighted and selfish to a degree almost incredible. We can understand why the Athenians should desire a truce which would prevent Brasidas from making new conquests, and enable them to send out reinforcements; but why should Sparta consent to it % Why should she wish Brasidas to be stopped in his career, when, as she very well knew, he was inflicting the severest blows upon the enemy % Thucydides explains the situation, but in language so obscure that it is almost unintelligible. The dominant feeling of the Spartans was a wish to recover the prisoners now lying at Athens, and this they might hope to do by offering in exchange their conquests in Thrace, conquests which they could surrender without injury to their allies in Peloponnesus. If, however, the war continued, Brasidas might be defeated, and they would then no longer have these conquests to offer, and if he were victorious, he might indeed restore the balance of the war, but even so they would not have gained their point. Their prisoners would be prisoners still; their recovery would be subject to the chances of war. It was better to sacrifice Chalcidice at once, in spite of all that Brasidas had said about liberation, and make use of his success for the object which they had most at heart.1 1 Thuc. iv. 117. The words Kai cjieXKov eVt pfi^ov xcoPV(TaVTOs clvtov Kai avTiiraka Karaa-TrjaavTos todv \jXv crrepeo-Oai, tols 5' ck tov taov dfj.vv6p.evoL Kivdvp€V€iv Kai KparrjiTCLv, are very obscure. See BartoD and Chavasse, ad loc. VIII. 9-] TERMS OF THE TRUCE, 423. 249 We observe with some surprise that the first two clauses of the truce refer to the temple at Delphi. All Greeks are to be allowed to consult the oracle according Terms of the to hereditary custom, and steps are to be taken truce-for the detection of those who misappropriate the funds of the temple—provisions which imply that there had been some difficulty in obtaining access to the sacred shrine and some improper use of the sacred treasure.1 With regard to their conquests each side was to keep what it possessed on the day when the truce was signed. The Lacedaemonians might sail along their own coasts and the coasts of the confederacy in rowing vessels of not more than 500 talents burden, but not in ships of war. A safe-conduct was assured during the truce to envoys from both cities, in the hope that a lasting peace might be arranged; deserters were not to be received; and any disputes which might arise were to be settled by arbitration. The terms having been agreed upon by Sparta and her allies, were carried by envoys, with plenary powers, to Athens for acceptance, and if any change was desired, the Athenians were requested to send plenipotentiaries to Sparta. On the motion of Laches the Athenians accepted the terms, and on the 14th of Elaphebolion, i.e. about the end of March 423, hostilities were suspended. 9. The truce had hardly been signed before new difficulties arose. While Athens and Sparta were negotiating peace, the city of Scione, on the promontory of Pallene, went over to Brasidas. He at once crossed from scione revolts Torone, and publicly commended the Scionaeans from Athens-for their courage and good sense. Though almost as defenceless as islanders, owing to the Athenian occupation of 1 The oracle cannot be said to have been quite impartial in the war. Apollo promised his assistance to the Peloponnesians. He also authorised the foundation of Heraclea. Whether the Peloponnesians carried out their intention of borrowing money from Delphi we do not kno w; but the funds seem to have been open to them and not to th#* Athenians. 250 SCI ONE RE VOL TS, #3. [VIII. 9. Potidaea, they had by their own act joined the side of liberty: such bravery was a good omen of their future conduct, and the Lacedaemonians would honour it as it deserved. The Scionaeans were filled with delight; even those who had opposed the revolt now supported it, and were prepared to go to war with Athens. One spirit animated all. Brasidas received the greatest honours which the city could bestow: as the deliverer of Greece he was crowned with a crown of gold; while the citizens crowded round him with salutations and placed garlands on his head as though he had been a victorious athlete returning from the games. Brasidas left a small garrison in the city and returned to Torone, but soon afterwards he appeared again with a larger force; he was already in negotiation with Mende and Potidaea, and hoped to acquire those cities, with the help of Scione, before the Athenians could arrive.1 At this moment came the envoys from home announcing the truce. The allies of Lacedaemon in Chalcidice all agreed to the terms, but the Athenian envoy refused to admit the Scionaeans when it was found that they had Difficulties revolted after the truce had been signed, about Scione. while Brasidas, though he sent back his army to Torone, would not surrender the town. The Athenians, when they heard the report of the envoy, prepared to sail to Scione, but the Lacedaemonians announced that they should regard the expedition' as a breach of the truce, and asked to have the matter settled by arbitration. To this the Athenians would not agree: they were exasperated at the thought that even islanders were revolting in reliance upon the power of Lacedaemon—a power useless at sea—and instantly passed a resolution, on the proposal of Cleon, that Scione should be destroyed and all the inhabitants put to death. In the main question they were right, for the revolt of Scione took place two days after the signing of. the truce, I Thuc. iv, 120, 121, VIII. p.] INVASION OF LYNCESTIS, J&3. 251 and confining their operations to this one point, they avoided any further hostilities.1 Meanwhile Mende went over, and Brasidas, though the truce had been proclaimed, did not hesitate to receive the city, excusing his conduct on the ground that Revolt of the Athenians had themselves violated the Mende-terms. His action at Scione inspired the Mendaeans with confidence, but the movement was due to a small party who, fearing for their own safety, compelled the populace to go with them. The Athenians were now more enraged than ever, and directed their expedition against Mende as well as Scione. Brasidas made arrangements for the defence of both, but he was unable to be present in person. At this crisis in the fortunes of two Greek cities, which trusted in him to save them from destruction, he was called away to support Perdiccas in a new invasion of Lyncestis. perdiccas irTan At the cause of this sudden change in his plans invasion of we can only guess; in the previous summer he reasonTfor this, had offended Perdiccas by coming to terms with Arrhibaeus, and his subsequent career had been one of unbroken success; he was not now seeking admission into the Chalcidic cities; he was the hero, the deliverer, to whom all turned with longing eyes. After the conquest of Amphipolis he was visited by Perdiccas, who may have induced him to reconsider his position towards Arrhibaeus; or he may have been driven by the need of larger forces for protecting his conquests to secure the help of the Macedonian army at any price. He knew that the Athenians would come, and come quickly ; that he must meet them unaided by any troops from Lacedaemon; that Perdiccas would not render him assistance till he had helped to carry out the object for which he and his forces had been invited to Macedonia. On some such grounds he may have been brought to join Perdiccas, as he now did, with the Thuc. iv. 122. kcll raXXa r)(Tv\a^ovT€S is tovto nap€(TK€vd£opTO. 252 RETREAT OF PERDICCAS, J$3> [VIII. 10. bulk of his Peloponnesian forces, and as many Chalcidian troops as could be supplied by Acanthus and other towns. That he did so with a heavy heart and divided purpose is clear from his conduct—and indeed the step was fatal; no fewer than 3000 heavy-armed Hellenic troops and a large force of cavalry were withdrawn from Chalcidice at a time when the presence of the Athenians was daily expected. 10. The combined armies entered the Lyncestian territory and defeated the troops of Arrhibaeus, after which they Defeat of the remained inactive, awaiting the arrival of some Lyncestians. Ulyrian auxiliaries. When the Illyrians did not appear, Perdiccas wished to push on and destroy the villages round, while Brasidas was anxious to return to Mende, and refused to go further without the Illyrians. The dispute was ended by the news that the Illyrians had thrown Perdiccas over and joined Arrhibaeus. Perdiccas and Brasidas now resolved to retreat. The two armies lay at some distance from each other, and in the night the Mace-Retreat of donians, seized with a sudden panic, rushed Perdiccas. homewards, carrying Perdiccas with them before he had time to acquaint Brasidas with his movements. When the morning broke, Brasidas found himself face to face with the Illyrians, and without the support of his allies. Nothing remained but retreat, and was retreat possible ? Could his army be kept together in the presence of a multitude of dancing and yelling Difficult posi- _ . _ & .. ,& tion of Brasidas; savages, who threatened an immediate attack, his orderly ^he Greeks rarely marched far beyond their own borders, and expected to find in the enemy armour, tactics, and organisation resembling their own; conflict with savages was new to them. Brasidas saw the danger and met it. He arranged his army in a hollow square, within which he collected the light-armed forces; the most active of the soldiers were placed in readiness for a sally, should the enemy attack; while the general himself, with 300 picked men, took up his position in the rear, to receive VIII. io.] BRASIDAS AND THE ILLYRIANS, 4&3. 253 the first onset. He briefly addressed his men. What if they had been abandoned by their allies 1 It was their duty to conquer by their own valour without the assistance of others. What if they were attacked by greater numbers ? They came from cities where the few held the many in subjection. The sight of a barbarian foe was new to them, and what was unknown was feared; but the terror was for the eye only. Barbarians were not trained to fight in ranks; they felt no shame in deserting their post; they were under no controlling authority. " Your safety lies in despising these attempts to frighten you, which are but a proof that the enemy shrinks from a battle. By resisting their onset, and retiring in perfect order, you will soon reach a place of security; and you will find that hordes such as these, if you receive their first attack, are careful for the future to display their valour at a distance. But if you yield to them they will dog your steps, being men of infinite courage where there is nothing to fear." The orders of Brasidas were obeyed; the barbarians were successfully resisted. After a time they ceased to attack him, and hastened forward, partly to overtake the retreating Macedonians, some of whom they slew, partly to occupy the heights commanding the gorge through which Brasidas must pass on his way to Macedonia. When he was about to enter the defile he perceived their intention, and bade his three hundred run at full speed, without thought of line or order, to the summit of the hill, which he thought that they would occupy, and dislodge the enemy. This was done, and the rest of the army ascended without difficulty, for the barbarians, being greatly discouraged, desisted from further pursuit. The soldiers of Brasidas were greatly enraged at the conduct of their allies, and on entering Macedonia they revenged themselves by slaughtering the oxen Breach between of the waggons, and appropriating the baggage Brasidas and thrown away in the retreat. Perdiccas now Perdlccas-regarded Brasidas as an enemy, and, forgetting the old hatred 254 MENDE AND SCI ONE, 423. [VIII. ix. in the new, forgetting too his own natural interests, he sought an opportunity of joining the Athenians.1 II. When Brasidas returned to Torone his worst fears were realised. Mende had been captured by the Athenians, and the position of Scione was desperate. On their arrival in Chalcidice, under the command of Nicias and Nicostratus, the Athenian fleet found the Mendaeans and their garrison, a body of 700 Peloponnesian hoplites, encamped under the command of Polydamidas, a Lacedaemonian, on a steep hill outside the town. An attempt was made to dislodge them, but without success; Nicias was driven back wounded, and the whole army narrowly escaped a severe defeat. Next day the Athenians sailed round to the other side of the city, where, without even a brush with the enemy, they took the suburb and ravaged the country round. Nicostratus encamped near the Potidaean gate of the town, where Nicias joined him after completing the devastation of the country as far as the borders of Scione. Within the city all was confusion. Faction had broken out, three hundred Scionaeans, who had come to the help of the city, had gone home, and when Polydamidas began to draw up his soldiers in the marketplace for an attack on the enemy, one of the popular party declared that he had no wish to fight, and would not go out. Polydamidas answered him sharply, and from words proceeded to blows, upon which the populace at once seized their arms and rushed upon the Peloponnesians. They fled in terror at this unexpected attack, and their alarm was increased when they saw the gates opened to receive the Athenians; they believed themselves to be the victims of a preconcerted plot, and sought refuge in the Acropolis, with some loss. Meanwhile the Athenian army poured into the town, pillaging and destroying, and it was only by the personal intervention of the generals that the lives of the inhabitants were spared. The Mendaeans were bidden to return to their old form of constitution, and it was left to them to put on their trial any * Thuc. iv. 124-128. VIII. 12.] PERDICCAS JOINS THE ATHENIANS, 42S. 255 citizen whom they thought guilty, a concession which could safely be made after the recent outburst of popular fury. The Athenians then cut off the fugitives in the Acropolis by a wall, extending at either end to the sea, and, leaving a detachment to guard it, went on to Scion e.1 Here the same tactics were pursued. To save the city from being surrounded, the inhabitants, with their Pelopon-nesian auxiliaries, encamped on a hill outside Blockade the walls; the Athenians by a vigorous effort of Scione. dislodged them, and at once set about building a siege-wall. Before the work was finished, the Peloponnesians who had taken refuge in the Acropolis of Mende broke out by the shore, and joined their friends in Scione.2 In the meantime Perdiccas came to terms with the Athenian generals, and in order to prove the sincerity of his conversion, which Nicias thought was much in need Perdiccas joins of proof, he prevailed on his friends in Thessaly the Athenians ; r ' . r ¦ J and stops the to stop the passage of some reinforcements Lacedaemonian which were marching to the aid of Brasidas.3 reinforcements. The three commissioners who had been sent to Chalcidice to report on the state of affairs were, however, able to make their way through, and brought with them a number of the younger citizens, whom, contrary to the custom of their state, the Spartans intended to make governors of their cities in Thrace. Of these, Clearidas was established in Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas in Torone.4 12. In Greece the truce was strictly maintained, so far as operations between the belligerents were concerned; but for those who had old scores to pay off, the opportunity was too good to be lost. Taking advantage of the heavy losses which 1 Thuc. iv. 129, 130. 2 Thuc. iv. 131. 3 This agreement was confirmed by a formal alliance: cp. G. I .A. i. 42 ; Thuc. v. 6, 83 ; Forbes, Thuc. i. xcv. 4 Thuc iv. 132. On the inscription which, as Boeckh and Hicks suppose, contains the names of Athenians who fell in Chalcidice in 423, see Jowett, Thuc. t. xcviii. The blockade of Scione is alluded to in Aristoph. Wasp*, 209 (Feb. 422) : vr} At' rjplv Kpeirrov r\v ri\pCw 2kl(X)VT]v clvtX tovtov tov 7rarp6s» 256 EXPULSION OF THE DELIANS, 422. [VIII. 13. the Thespians had suffered in the battle of Delium, the Thebans marched to the town and destroyed the walls. They charged the Thespians with "Atticism," an absurd accusation against men who had fought by their side in defence of Boeotia at Delium, and, under the circumstances, as hypocritical as it was absurd. Later in Tegea and the year the Mantineans and Tegeans renewed Mantinea. their long-standing feud, but, after a hotly con- tested battle, the victory was undecided; both sides set up trophies, both sent spoils to Delphi, but the Tegeans could claim the slight advantage of encamping on the field of battle.1 When the winter of 423 was drawing to a close, Brasidas endeavoured to retrieve his fortunes in Chalcidice by an attack on Potidaea. Arriving in the night, he attempts succeeded in planting a ladder against the wall, Potidaea, but a£ ^e moment when the watchman had passed by; but before he could ascend it, the attack was discovered, and he withdrew his army in haste to Torone.2 The year had seen a disastrous change in his position; of the cities which had come over to him in the spring, when his star was in the ascendant, Mende was lost, and Scione was closely besieged. No assistance could be expected from Macedonia, and the way was blocked against reinforcements from home. As yet the Athenians were present with but a small number of ships; in the coming summer he might be called upon to meet their whole force unaided. 13. The truce expired in March, but hostilities were not resumed till the summer, after the Pythian games. During Expulsion of the interval the Athenians, thinking that the theDeiians. purification of Delos was still incomplete, expelled the entire population from the island, on the ground that they were defiled by some ancient stain, and unfit to 1 Thuc. iv. 133, 134. The battle took place iv AaobiKicp rrjs 'OpeaOibos, "in the valley of the Alpheus, near the spot where Megalopolis was afterwards built" (Arnold). 2 Thuc. iv. 135 : rov yap Kcohcovos irapeve^devros ovrcaf es to hiaKCVQV) 7rp\p iiravikdciv rbv irapabihovTa avrbv, r\ irpo&deo-LS iyevero. VIII. 13.] CLEON AT TOXONE, 422. 257 dwell in the holy land. The exiles found a home at Adra-myttium, under the protection of Pharnaces, the Persian satrap Y (infra, p. 270). When the Pythian games were over, Cleon persuaded his citizens to send him out with an army to Chalcidice. The success of the previous year had fallen to his cleon saiis opponent Nicias, whose reputation as a general to chalcidice. had steadily advanced since the miserable scene of 425. In the interval Cleon had been busy squeezing the allies 2 and filling the law-courts, to the great satisfaction of his followers and the increase of his own power. His military ambition had been kindled by his achievement at Pylus, and when in 422 he was once more chosen general he wished for an opportunity of displaying his genius. He flattered himself that he had only to appear in Chalcidice and all that had been lost would be recovered. He set sail with thirty ships, having on board twelve hundred Athenian hoplites and three hundred horsemen, besides a number of allies. At Scione, which was still blockaded, he added to his forces any soldiers who could be spared from the siege. Landing near Tbrone, and finding that Brasidas had left the city in charge of Pasitelidas with a diminished garrison, he at once despatched ten of his ships into the harbour, and marched his infantry on the town. In order to increase the size of Torone and protect the inhabitants, Brasidas had enclosed and fortified a suburb, which he incorporated with the city by breaking down the old wall. On this new fortification Cleon directed his attack. Pasitelidas was preparing to repel him when the Athenian ships sailed into the harbour. His forces being inadequate to hold both the He captures suburb and the town, he rushed back to the Torone. city, leaving the way clear for Cleon. But he was too late. The ships had taken the city before he could reach it, 1 Time. v. 1. What led the Athenians to this step we do not know ; hut it indicates an unusual degree of religious excitement in the city. 2 For the ra|is 6pov of 425 (C. 2. A, i. 37) and the raising of the tribute, supra, p. 222. VOL. III. r 258 CLEON AT EION, 422- [VIII. 14. and meanwhile the army entered from the suburb. Some of his men were cut down at once, the rest were captured, himself among them. Brasidas, who hastened to the rescue, was within five miles of the city when he heard of its fall. Cleon had reason to be proud of his success. At his first attempt, without even a serious conflict, he had recovered the headquarters of the enemy, and could send seven hundred prisoners to Athens. He had stolen a march on Brasidas, and proved himself more energetic than the greatest of Spartan generals. It cannot be said on this occasion that he reaped the glory which was another's due; he sailed out, so far as we know, in sole command, taking the whole responsibility upon himself. His success was owing to the rapidity of his movements, his skill in dividing his force, and attacking the town simultaneously at two points. On the other hand, the conduct of Brasidas is inexplicable. What induced him to leave Torone with an insufficient garrison at the moment when a large Athenian force was expected? Was he misled by false intelligence, or was he still collecting reinforcements at the time when Cleon arrived % Whatever the cause, the result was disastrous, and the Spartan power in which he had persuaded the Chalcidic cities to put their trust was shown to be unequal to the task which it had undertaken. 14. From Torone Cleon sailed to Eion at the mouth of the Strymon. The recovery of Amphipolis was the chief object cieon arrives of his expedition, but, before entering on so at Eion. difficult a task, he wished to collect reinforce- ments from Macedonia and Thrace. While waiting for their arrival, he attacked and took the neighbouring town of Galepsus. Brasidas was informed of his movements, and at once marched up from Argilus to Cerdylium, a hill on the right . bank of the Strymon, commanding a view of marches to Amphipolis and the country round. From this cerdyhum. point he could keep a watch on Cleon, should he attempt the town without waiting for his reinforcements. VIII. I4-] HE ADVANCES TO AMPHIPOLIS, &9. 259 He divided his army into two portions, one of which he kept near him on the hill; the other was placed in Amphipolis, under the command of Clearidas.1 Cleon was unable to carry out his plans. His soldiers grew weary of inaction; their spirits drooped; they murmured loudly against the strategy which kept cleon ad_ them idle in the sight of their enemy; and vanceson contrasted in no flattering terms the conduct AmPhlP°hs-and abilities of their own general with those of Brasidas. It was with the utmost unwillingness that they had taken service under such a leader.2 Cleon gave way to the discontent so far as to advance upon Amphipolis, not with the intention of risking a battle, but merely to reconnoitre. He posted his army on the hill above the city, which commanded a view of the lake on the Strymon, and the country towards Thrace, as well as the interior of Amphipolis. He did not anticipate an engagement, and felt confident that he could without difficulty retire to Eion whenever he pleased. The opportunity which Brasidas desired had come ; Cleon, unsupported by his Thracian and Macedonian auxiliaries, was within striking distance. As soon as he saw the Athenians on the opposite hill, he prep^resfto hastened from Cerdylium, and entering Amphi- attack the polis, joined his forces to those of Clearidas. He did not venture to offer battle in the open, for though his army was about as numerous as that of the enemy, it was far inferior in quality. He selected 150 of his best hoplites with whom to make a sudden attack on the Athenian centre, while the rest were stationed under the command of Clearidas at the Thracian gate of the city, with orders to rush out and 1 Thuc. v. 6. 2 Thucydides says that their reluctance was more than justified, and such was the feeling of the knights or cavalry who served under Cleon ; cp. Aristoph. Clouds, 572 f.; but so far as Cleon's conduct went, they had no reason to be dissatisfied. When rapidity was required, he moved rapidly, and it was in the confidence arising from success that his soldiers became so impatient. Cleon knew wlien to wait, and they did not. 260 DEFEAT AND DEATH OF CLEON, 428. [VIII. 14. support him. In a short address to the soldiers he explained his plans: they were not to be dismayed by the disparity of numbers; the enemy would be taken unawares and thrown into disorder by his attack, and the reinforcement under Clearidas would come upon them as a new army and fill them with alarm. The advance of Brasidas into the town was observed by the Athenians, and Cleon was informed that the enemy's forces were collected near the gate, under which the feet of men and horses could be seen. He went himself to look, and finding that an attack was intended, he gave orders to his army to retire by the left wing, which, as he lay along the ridge facing the town, was the part of his army nearest Eion. He hoped to get away before the enemy sallied out, and when the troops seemed to delay, he ordered his right to wheel round and march forward to the coast, thus presenting the unshielded side of his soldiers to Amphipolis. Brasidas detected the mistake. He rushed out of the city with his followers at the first ga,te in the Long Wall, and hastening up the steepest part of the hill, fell upon the Athenian centre as it was preparing to retire to Eion. The Athenians were terrified at the Amphipolis: sudden attack, and thrown into disorder. Death of cieon Clearidas then sallied out and attacked the and Brasidas. . . , . , - right wing; upon which the army was panic-stricken and fell to pieces. The left, which was completely severed from the rest, hastened to Eion, the right retired up the hill. At this moment both the commanders fell: Brasidas, while advancing to attack the Athenian right, was wounded and carried off the field; Cleon was overtaken in his flight by a Myrcinian targeteer and cut down on the spot. On the top of the hill the Athenian right continued for some time to repulse the attacks of Clearidas, but at length, hemmed in by cavalry and targeteers, with whom they could not come to close quarters, they were put to flight. The whole army was now routed, and the survivors fled as they could to Eion, whence they sailed back to Athens. VIII. I5-] DEATH OF BRASIDAS, J&2. 261 About six hundred Athenians were slain, of their enemies seven only, but of these seven one was Brasidas. He lived long enough to be assured of his victory. He was buried with public honours in the city, followed to his grave by all the army. And as his devotion Honours paid in saving the city seemed more than human, to Brasldas-the grateful citizens made his tomb a shrine, and sacrificed to him with yearly games and offerings as a Hero. Regarding him as their deliverer, they also made him the Founder of Amphipolis, transferring to him the honours hitherto assigned to Hagnon, whose shrine they destroyed, as well as any other building which commemorated their connection with Athens. They were an Athenian colony no longer.1 15. By saving Amphipolis, Brasidas rendered a great service to Sparta, who had now an important post to offer in return for the captives at Athens. And we , . , , , t .,, , , . Brasidas. cannot praise too highly the skill and devotion by which the city was saved. The attack on the Athenian line was admirably planned and executed. Every detail of the action was carefully arranged: every arrangement efficiently carried out. Brasidas anticipated every movement of Cleon, and fell upon him at the very moment when resistance was almost impossible. His own onset at the head of 150 men upon the centre of the Athenian army—a force of picked men^over most unfavourable ground, was a feat without parallel in the war, and impossible for any general but Brasidas, who alone possessed the genius to plan such a charge, and the power to inspire his men and keep them together. Confidence in their leader's judgment, devotion to his person, and admiration of his courage, these were the feelings which animated every soldier in his army, and by these the audacious enterprise, which in other hands might have proved a disastrous failure, if it could have been executed 1 Thuc. v. 6-12. For the topography of Amphipolis, see Leake, Northern Greece, iii. 190 f.; Grote, Hist, of Greece, iv. 546. Diodorus, xii. 14, gives a different account of the battle; Cleon falls fighting bravely in the ranks. 262 CLEON AND BRASIDAS, 422. [VIII. 15. at all, proved a brilliant victory. When we turn from this rapid, definite, and energetic movement, this devoted confidence and admiration, to consider the action of the Conduct of Athenians, the contrast is great indeed. Cleon cieonat is compelled by the clamours of his army to Amphipois. march upon Amphipolis without waiting for his reinforcements; the leader allows his wishes to be forced by his soldiers, and the soldiers claim to direct their general. Such insubordination is fatal to the discipline which alone makes an army efficient, and such weakness marks a general as unfit for his post. Yet we must in this point make large allowance for Cleon. He appears to have had some difficulty in persuading the Athenians to send an expedition against Amphipolis at all; they did not see the imperative necessity of recovering the town by arms, when they still had the Spartan prisoners in their hands, and they were disinclined to renew the war after the year of truce. Thus the expedition was unpopular from the first, and only sent out under His command the pressure of Cleon's personal influence. It unpopular. became more unpopular still when it was known that Cleon was to have the command. The soldiers, who were knights and hoplites of the best class, took service with the greatest unwillingness: they had, or professed to have, no confidence in their leader. With such relations existing between general and soldiers, there was little hope of successful action, but the conduct of Cleon on reaching Amphipolis goes far to cancel any excuse which we can make for his __ . 4. , march thither. He at once fell into the trap He is entirely r outwitted by which Brasidas had prepared for him; and Brasidas. when he saw the gates closed, and no evidence of an intended sally, he assumed that the enemy was overawed at his mere approach. In his extravagant self-confidence he thought that he could come and go as he pleased, and allowed his soldiers to wander from their ranks. " Had he brought up his siege-engines," he said, "he could have assaulted the city at once." When he became aware of his danger, he at once lost all courage, threw his army into confusion by VIII. 16.] DESIRE FOR PEACE, &%. 263 giving orders for retreat, and fled for his life. The Athenians, abandoned and demoralised, were cut down almost without resistance, till six hundred of the best soldiers in the city were left upon the field, at a loss to the enemy of seven men only. 16. The battle of Amphipolis was the last event of the Archidamian war,1 for in Greece neither side had moved since the expiration of the truce. The scene in Chalcidice was indeed little more than a personal duel, in which both principals were but moderately supported by the government at home. Influence now passed Desire for peace; into the hands of those who heartily desired Nicias and peace—Nicias at Athens and Plistoanax at Sparta. The fall of Cleon after a career of such unexpected prosperity must have made a deep impression on the sensitive and even superstitious mind of Nicias. He was afraid that a similar reverse might overtake himself. He desired to preserve the good fortune which had attended him hitherto; "he would have liked to rest from toil and to give the people rest; and he hoped to leave behind him to other ages the name of a man who in all his life had never brought disaster on the city."2 Plistoanax had other reasons, and they were even more personal. Banished from Sparta after the events of 446-445, in which he was suspected of receiving bribes to induce him to quit Attica, he had retired to Mount Lycaeus, where he dwelt in a house, half of which lay within the sacred precinct of Zeus—so great was his fear of the Lacedaemonians. He remained in exile nineteen years, when, owing to the repeated commands of the Oracle of Delphi, he was brought back and restored to the throne with all the ceremonies customary at a coronation. Nevertheless he was suspected of influencing the Delphic priestess in some dishonest manner, and the calamities which the Spartans suffered after 426 were by some attributed to his return. For this reason he was anxious to put an end 1 The name given to the war from 431 to 421. 2 Thuc. v. 16. 264 FEELING A T SPAR TA, m-m* [ VI11. 16. to the war, and preclude any further chance of disaster from this source; above all by recovering the Spartan captives from Athens to rescue the city from her helpless position. Nor were the cities less inclined to peace than their leaders. Since their success at Pylus, the Athenians had suffered Feeling at severely at Delium and Amphipolis, and they Athens and now perceived that war was not the one-sided Sparta. game which in the flush of their success they had imagined it to be; the Lacedaemonians, so far from reducing the Athenians by a few invasions of Attica, found themselves at the end of a ten years' struggle with their own territory ravaged from Pylus and Cythera, and a number of their best citizens in chains at Athens. The Helots were constantly deserting, and the ev«r-present fear of a revolt was more keenly felt than ever. Another reason of great weight with them was the approaching close of the Thirty Years' Peace which had been concluded between Argos and Sparta in 451. If Argos were free from her obligations, she might join Athens, or she might form a second centre in Peloponnese, to which any dissatisfied city could repair. She was demanding the restoration of Cynuria as a condition of renewing the peace, and if pressed by the war to secure her help Sparta would be compelled to give way. On these grounds negotiations for peace were opened in the winter of 422-421, and towards the spring the Spartans, in order to force the hand of the Athenians, Negotiations . J for peace— announced to their allies that they would be 422-421, winter. reqUired to assist in invading Attica and building a fort to command the country. The announcement had the desired effect; and after a good deal of negotiation and many journeys to and fro, a peace was finally arranged. The Lacedaemonians then summoned their allies to a conference at Sparta, and in spite of the opposition of the Boeotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleans, the majority accepted the terms. 17, These were as follows: Both parties were to give up VIII. 17.] PEACE CONCLUDED, m* 265 what they had acquired by force of arms. The Athenians were to restore Pylus, Cythera, Methana, Pteleum, and Atalanta; the Lacedaemonians Amphipolis and Panactum The terms (a fortress on the frontier of Attica which had of Peace-been betrayed to the Boeotians just after the renewal of the war). The Boeotians refused to surrender Plataea, on the ground that it had been won not by force but by agreement, and Athens replied by retaining Nisaea for the same reasons. With regard to the Chalcidic cities, Scione, Torone, and Sermyle were left, without any conditions, to the mercy of the Athenians. Others were to be independent on condition that they paid the tribute as assessed by Aristides; they were to be allies of neither party unless they joined the Athenians of their own free will-—these were Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. If the inhabitants were dissatisfied, they were free to change their abode and take their property with them. All prisoners on either side were to be restored. Free access to the " common temples " was guaranteed to all Hellenes. The temple at Delphi was declared independent, and the Delphians were to be an independent state, enjoying their own revenues, laws, and customs. Neither party was to take up arms to the injury of the other in any way or manner; and controversies were to be decided by arbitration. The peace was to continue for fifty years.1 In these terms the Spartans paid but little attention to the interests of their allies. No mention is made of Potidaea, the relief of which was one of the chief causes of the war. The Megarian decree was so far from being rescinded, that the port of the city was now given up to Athens; the desolation of Aegina and the slaughter of the inhabitants were condoned; and from her action in Chalcidice it was plain that Sparta was wholly careless what befel the towns if she could save her own citizens:—the tribute was guaranteed to i Thuc. v. 18. 266 TERMS OF THE PEACE, 421. [VIII. 17. Athens from cities from which she had not now the power to collect it without an armed force. There was no doubt a party at Athens which had looked for more than this. Those who had hoped, with Cleon, to break up the Pelopon-nesian confederacy, and recover the full extent of empire which Athens had possessed in 447 or gain more, were bitterly disappointed. In the Peloponnesus Sparta had lost nothing; she was still the head of the confederacy, if the confederacy would follow her. The treasury of Athens had been emptied; the utmost pressure had been put upon the allies to provide money and men, yet both by sea and land Athens had since 424 failed to achieve any success. Even those who acquiesced in the plan of "wearing Sparta out " must have felt that the war had been useless. And the peace was useless too. All the causes which led to hostilities in 431 were-still at work: was it likely that an agreement for fifty years, which settled nothing, would prevent them from taking effect ? CHAPTER IX. FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE TO THE INVASION OF SICILY, 421-415. I. The peace had barely been concluded before it became clear what peace meant. The question who should begin the work of restitution was decided by lot, The terms of and the lot fell on Sparta. Sha found herself the peace not unable to carry out her undertaking. All the carned out* prisoners in her hands were at once set at liberty ; but when Clearidas, who commanded in Thrace after the death of Brasidas, received orders to give up Amphipolis, he declared himself unable to do so against the wishes of the Chalcidians, and he was eventually recalled home with all the Pelopon-nesian forces under his command ;1 Athens continued to be deprived of her most coveted possession. She retaliated by refusing to give up Pylus and Cythera, or the prisoners taken at Sphacteria : and thus the Spartans also failed to secure the objects for which they had sacrificed all their gains in the war. Still greater were the difficulties which arose out of the attitude of the allies. The Corinthians, exasperated at the neglect of their claims, refused to accept the peace; and the Boeotians contented themselves with securing their own interests by a truce with Athens terminable at ten days' notice.2 Sparta was in difficulties. In spite of her recent successes her reputation in the Peloponnese had fallen so low, that the Argives ventured to reject the terms which she had offered for a renewal of the truce. On the other hand, there 1 Time, v. 21. * Thuc. v. 32. 267 268 ALLIANCE OF SPARTA AND ATHENS, 421. [IX. 2. was nothing under the terms of the existing peace to prevent the members of the confederacy from joining Athens if they chose to do so. To obviate these dangers, Sparta proposed Alliance be- to enter into a separate alliance with Athens; tween Sparta and after some negotiations the offer was and Athens. accepted. The alliance was primarily defensive : each city was to assist the other in case of invasion, and Athens was to help Lacedaemon against any revolt of the Helots. But the invader, in each case, was regarded as an enemy of both cities, to be punished by them conjointly, and neither city was to cease from war before the other.1 Immediately after the conclusion of the alliance, the Athenians restored the captives taken at Sphacteria, but as Sparta was unable to give back Amphipolis, they refused to withdraw their troops from Pylus or Cythera. By this alliance the Spartans were greatly the gainers. They could count on the help of Athens in case of an invasion by Argos; Pylus could not be used as a centre from which to spread revolt among the Helots ; and above all, they had attained the object which they had most at heart—the recovery of their countrymen. 2. The Argives were confirmed in their contempt of their ancient enemy. For ten years past the Grecian cities had been oppressed by military service and contributions ; they had seen their cities pillaged, their fields wasted, their commerce destroyed, while Argos had enjoyed the blessings of peace and prosperity. The city has indeed no history during the thirty years since she concluded peace with Sparta, but Thucydides significantly remarks that she had made " a harvest of both sides "; she had also become a centre of democracy in the Peloponnese; and so far as we can form an opinion, she had been improving her army by the creation of what may be called a " standing force " of a thousand picked soldiers, supported and trained at the expense of the city, a body with which no doubt she intended to meet the trained soldiers of Sparta. Once more 1 Thuc. v. 22-24, and the note in Poppo-Stahl on 22. 2. IX. 3-] ARGOS COMES TO THE FRONT, 421. 269 she might hope to resume the position which her rival could no longer retain, and become, as in heroic days, the leader of Greece. The allies of Sparta were more exasperated than ever by the alliance between Sparta and Athens, and persisted in their refusal to accept the terms of the peace. As at the beginning of the war, the Corinthians Corinthians were the most energetic in expressing their at Argos. displeasure. On leaving the conference at Sparta, after the conclusion of the peace and alliance, their envoys turned aside to Argos, and urged the authorities there not to lose the opportunity which now offered of drawing over the confederacy, and protecting the Peloponnese from the Spartans and Athenians, who were conspiring against the liberties of Greece. If it were known that Argos would receive any city into a defensive alliance, many would flock to her, through hatred of the Lacedaemonians. To prevent any public repulse, they advised that negotiations should be carried on by a select body of men, and not through the general Assembly. The Argives took the matter up, and appointed twelve men with whom the cities could treat. Only in the case of Athens or Sparta wishing to join were the proposals to be laid before the people.1 3. The Mantineans were the first to join. For some time past they had acted in a manner of which they could hardly expect that Sparta would approve. During the The Argive truce of 423 they had been at war with Tegea, confederacy, and though they failed in this direction, they had succeeded in reducing a considerable part of Arcadia. These conquests they knew that the Lacedaemonians, now that their hands were free from the war, would not allow them to retain. Moreover they were a democracy like Argos, and had always been in sympathy with that city.2 Their defection was the signal for a general agitation among the cities of the confederacy, which the Lacedaemonians vainly endeavoured 1 Thuc. v. 27, 28. See Aristoph. Pax, 468, 9, the Argives Kare-yeX&v ra>v ra\avrra>pov^€va>v kcu ravra 8i^d0«/ fiur&ocfropovvTcs eSfXdura. 2 Tfouc, iv, J34, and v. 28, 29, 33, 81. 270 ALLIES OF ARGOS, 421. [IX. 3. to check by sending envoys to Corinth to remonstrate. The Corinthians, who had summoned the recalcitrant cities, replied in their presence that they were justified in breaking away from the confederacy. Of the real but private grounds of offence—that neither Sollium nor Anactorium had been restored to them—they said nothing, but pretended that they were bound by their oaths to their allies in Thrace, for in the ordinances of the confederacy such separate oaths were allowed to be a valid reason for refusing to accept Mantinea tne decision of the majority. The Eleans andEHs. were the next to conclude an alliance with Argos. They also had their quarrel with Sparta, who had decided against them in a contention with Lepreum, and restored this city to its former independence {infra, 275). They were followed by the Corinthians, who, however, would only consent to a defensive alliance, and the Chalci-dians. The Megarians and Boeotians agreed to stand aloof. They were well aware that the Lacedaemonian constitution was more congenial to their own oligarchical form of government than the Argive democracy.1 While these negotiations were taking place in the Peloponnesus, Athens was asserting her imperial power. The blockade of Scione was brought to an end, and the unfortunate city treated with the utmost severity. All the grown up men were put to the sword, and the women and children sold into slavery. The Athenians also brought back the Delians from Adramyttium to Delos, "moved partly by the defeats which they had sustained, partly by an oracle of the Delphic God." 2 When the Argives and Corinthians appeared at Tegea with proposals that the city should join them, they met Tegea and with a repulse. In Boeotia they fared little Boeotia. better. The Boeotians still hesitated about joining the Argives. They had concluded a truce, terminable at ten days' notice, with Athens soon after the peace 1 Thuc. v. 29-34. 2 Thuc, v. 32. IX. 4-] ACTION OF SPARTA, 421* 271 was settled, and the Corinthians were anxious that they also should be on a similar footing. They persuaded the Boeotians to go with them to Athens and support their request, but the Athenians merely answered that if the Corinthians were allies of Sparta they were included in the terms of the general truce.1 4. Meanwhile Sparta endeavoured to recover her position. King Plistoanax marched with the whole force of the city into Arcadia, rescued the Parrhasians from their subjection to the Mantineans, and destroyed a fort which had been built by the Mantineans in the Par-rhasian town of Cypsela, to command the Sciritis. The Helots who had served with Brasidas, on their return to Laconia, had received their freedom and permission to dwell where they pleased, but now they were settled with the Neodamodes2 at Lepreum to defend it against Elis. The prisoners from Sphacteria, who hitherto had enjoyed the privileges of citizens, and in some cases had been elected to public office, were disfranchised: they could neither hold office, nor buy nor sell—a severe sentence considering that the government had thrown upon them the responsibility of their surrender {supra, p. 215), but one which after a time was cancelled. Negotiations went on with Athens about the terms of the peace which were still unfulfilled, and though no result was attained, the Athenians agreed to withdraw the Messenians and Helots from Pylus,3 and settled them in Cephallenia. Such a state of affairs satisfied no one. When the ephors of the year came into office at Sparta in the autumn of 421, a new line of policy was taken up. After an abortive discussion at Sparta, in which the Athenians, Boeotians, Corin- 1 Time. v. 32. 2 The Neodamodes were emancipated Helots (Thuc. vii. 58), but there was some difference between them and the soldiers of Brasidas which we cannot explain. 3 Thuc. v. 34, 35. The reasons of the Spartans for the disfranchisement are noticeable: beiaavrcs firj tl dia ttjv ^vfi(j)opav vofiiaravrts *\a av yeXatracrai, tl f3e(3ov\€VTai n€p\ T&v anrovhav iv ttj (TrrjKrj irapaypatyai iv tg> brjfico TTjfjLcpov vfjuv ; tl 8i vol tuvt ; r\ 5' 6? av dvrjpy ov (TLyr)(T€L ; Kayw 'aiycov. A passage which shows with what interest these negotiations and changes were watched in Athenian homes. 2 Thuc. v. 56. IX. 9] AGIS IN ARGOLIS, 418. 279 armed, 500 cavalry and an equal number of "runners"1) collected at Phlius. Before the forces could combine, the Argives met the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium, supported by the Mantineans and 3000 Eleans. They were eager to attack, but in the night Agis broke up his camp and joined the allies at Phlius. The Argives followed, and took up a position on the road from Nemea to Argos, expecting by this means to prevent Agis from reaching the city. Agis outmanoeuvred them by dividing his forces. With his Arcadian and Epidaurian allies, he descended by a difficult path into the plain; the Corinthians and Phliasians entered it at another point by an equally difficult route; the Boeotians, who were well supplied with cavalry, the Megarians, and Sicyonians descended by the Nemean road, on which the Argives lay. On hearing that Agis was in the plain, laying waste their territory, the Argives returned from their position near Nemea, and after a slight brush with the Corinthians and Phliasians, drew up for battle. They were surrounded on all sides. Agis cut them off from the city; the Corinthians and their allies held the higher ground to the west; and on the Nemean road lay the Boeotians. Their Athenian allies had not yet come up, and they were without cavalry. When the armies were on the point of engaging, two Argives, Thrasyllus, one of the five generals, and Alciphron, the proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, came to terms with Agis, undertaking that Argos A . ° -i-iTi A&1S comes to should satisfy any complaints which the terms with Lacedaemonians had to bring against her, and Ar£°s- enter into a lasting peace. Agis, after conferring with one of the Lacedaemonian magistrates who were in the camp, agreed to a truce for four months, to allow time for the Argives to fulfil their promises. In these transactions neither party was supported by public authority; four persons only—two on each side—acting entirely upon their own responsibility, 1 Thuc. v. 57. For the apnr7roi who are mentioned in this passage only in Thucydides, see Arnold's note, ad. loc. Xenophon mentions them among the Boeotian forces at Mantinea (362). 280 THE ALLIES IN ARCADIA, m> [IX. 10. decided the issue of the campaign. When drawing off his forces, Agis did not even inform his allies what had taken place, but such was the discipline of the Peloponnesian army that, though indignant at his action, they obeyed his commands. Never before had so fine an army been collected; all the allies were present except the Mantineans and Eleans, who were fighting for Argos, and the soldiers were picked men. " In numbers and quality they were a match for the force opposed to them and for another as large," and they had caught the Argives in a trap. More undaunted still were the Argives, who had not at all realised how perilous was their position. They blamed their generals for allowing the Lacedaemonians to escape them. It was their custom to decide any disputes which arose in a campaign at the Charadrus, a ravine outside the city walls, and when the army reached this place on the march home, the soldiers began to stone Thrasyllus. He saved his life by fleeing to an altar for protection, but his property was confiscated.1 10. After the truce had been concluded, the Athenian contingent arrived at Argos, 1000 foot and 300 horse, under The Argives Laches and Nicostratus. The Argives were renew the for sencling them back, as the war was at an instigation of end, but the Eleans and Mantineans compelled Aicibiades. them t0 listen to Alcibiades, who, though not one of the generals for the year,* was present as an envoy. He urged that the truce which had been concluded in the absence of some of the allies had no validity. They must disregard it, and make the best of the present opportunity. Alcibiades prevailed. The allies at once marched upon Orchomenus in Arcadia, where, after some delay, they were joined by the Argives, in open violation of their engagement with Sparta. Orchomenus, unable to resist the united forces, agreed to join them. These were now uncertain what step to take : the Eleans called on them to march upon Lepreum; the Mantineans proposed an attack upon Tegea \ and when 1 Thuc. v. 57-60. IX. 10.] THE LACEDAEMONIANS AT MANTINEA, 418. 281 the proposal of the Mantineans was preferred, the Eleans withdrew their forces, thus depriving the army which they had insisted on calling into the field of the support of three thousand men.1 The conduct of Agis had- been severely condemned at Lacedaemon, and when it was known that Argos had promptly broken the truce, and that Orchomenus had surrendered, it was proposed to punish him, contrary to all tradition, by razing his house to the ground and imposing a heavy fine. Agis prevailed on the authorities to remit these severe penalties, but the Lacedaemonians passed a new law, by which the king was forbidden to lead out an army from the city without the leave of ten commissioners, who were chosen to be his advisers. They were now informed by their friends in Tegea that the city was all but lost; nothing could save it but immediate help. They were roused to action as they had never been roused before: without a moment's delay they marched with their Helots to Orestheum, and called on their Arcadian w. , . The Lacedae- allies to follow them to Tegea. The allies in monians again Corinth and Boeotia were summoned, and the take the field-war-cry was sent even to Phocis and Locris; but it was difficult for the contingents to assemble at such short notice, and unless united they could not make their way through territory which was occupied by the enemy. With the Arcadians to support them, the Lacedaemonians, who had put five-sixths of their force in the field, took up a position near the temple of Heracles, in the territory of the Mantineans. The allies then ranged themselves in a strong position over against them. The light-armed were already throwing their stones and javelins, when one of the elders called to Agis that he was curing one mistake by committing another, for the enemy were in too strong a position to be attacked with success. Upon this Agis withdrew his troops to a position on the low watershed between Tegea and Mantinea, 1 Time. v. 61, 62. 282 SPARTAN DISCIPLINE, 418. [IX. II. and directed the water, which, as it did much damage, was a constant source of contention between the two cities, upon the fields of the Mantineans. By this means he succeeded in drawing the allies into the plain. The generals were The armies at unwilling to leave their strong position, but Mantinea. j^e soldiers, who were already dissatisfied with the campaign in Argolis, declared that they were again betrayed. The enemy was escaping once more, without attack or pursuit. They descended into the plain; and the Lacedaemonians, on returning to their old camp by the Heracleum, suddenly found themselves face to face with an army drawn up for battle. It was a moment in which Spartan discipline was invaluable; never before had they been so taken by surprise. Under the commands of Agis, passed down through a succession of officers to the smallest divisions of the army, the troops fell into order. On the left were the Sciritae, next to whom were the Helots who had served under Brasidas, and the Neodamodes; beside these were ranged the Lacedaemonians in their companies; then came the Arcadian allies, and on the right the Tegeatae and a few Lacedaemonians: the cavalry were placed on both wings. The right wing of the allies was held by the Mantineans, in whose territory the engagement took place; next to them were the allies from Arcadia; beside these were the "Thousand" of the Argives, a select body of troops trained at the public expense; then the rest of the Argives, who were arranged in five battalions, and their allies the Cleonaeans and Orneatae. On the left were the Athenians, flanked by their cavalry.1 II. Before joining battle, the commanders spoke a few words of encouragement to their soldiers. The Mantineans 1 In numbers the Lacedaemonians appeared to have the advantage; but beyond a computation which gives 3584 as the number of the Lacedaemonians, Thucydides will not venture on any precise statement. It is worth attention that Thucydides describes the Cleonaeans and Orneatae as allies of the Argives : this would lead us to suppose that they stood in the same relation to Argos as, e.g., the Tegeatae to Sparta. The words /ueifov tyavr) of the Lacedaemonian army may imply that he was present at the battle.—Thuc. v. 67-68. IX. II.] THE BATTLE OF MANTJNEA, 418. 283 were reminded that if defeated they would again be slaves of the Lacedaemonians, but if victorious they could maintain the dominant position which they had recently gained in Arcadia; the Argives that they had at last an opportunity of revenging themselves on their ancient The battle of enemies, and recovering their supremacy in the Mantinea-Peloponnese. The Athenians were told that a defeat of the Lacedaemonians in Peloponnese would be a blow to their supremacy from which they would not recover; they would never again interfere with the expansion of Athenian power or invade Attica. "But the Lacedaemonians, both in their war-songs and in the words which a man spoke to his comrade, did but remind one another of what their brave spirits knew already. For they had learned that true safety was to be found in long previous training, and not in eloquent exhortations uttered when they were going into action."1 When the signal was given for battle, the Argives and their allies rushed eagerly forward, while the Lacedaemonians advanced slowly to the music of flute-players, who were placed in their ranks, not from motives of religion, as Thucydides remarks, but that by their music the steps of the soldiers might be steadied, and their time preserved unbroken. The weak point in a Greek army was the right or unshielded flank, and for this reason every army tended, even unconsciously, to overlap the opposing line by moving to the right, each soldier seeking to cover his spear arm by the shield of his comrade. Owing to this movement, the two armies, even before joining battle, began to overlap each other on the right—the Lacedaemonians passing beyond the Athenians, and the Mantineans beyond the Sciritae. Agis had sufficient forces at command to extend his line beyond both wings of the enemy without unduly diminishing its depth; and seeing the danger to which the Sciritae and Brasideans were exposed, he gave instructions for them to move to the left and cover the Mantineans, and at 1 Thuc. v. 69, Jowett. 284 DEFEAT OF THE ALLIES, 418. [IX. 11. the same time ordered two of the Lacedaemonian polemarchs to march their divisions from the right into the vacant space which the movement of the Sciritae necessarily caused in the centre of his line. The polemarchs refused to obey orders: the Sciritae were unable to close up, and the Lacedaemonian army was broken into two divisions. To any other forces such a failure in tactics would have been ruinous, but the Spartans were either too stupid to understand the full extent of their danger, or too courageous to be discouraged by it. Their left wing was defeated and driven back to the waggons by the Mantineans and the select Ar-gives, who outflanked them on the one hand, and on the other dashed through the broken line upon the unshielded arm of their opponents; but in the centre, where Agis was posted with the three hundred Spartan "knights," the allies fled at the first approach of the enemy without striking a blow. The allied line was now in a worse plight than that of the Peloponnesians. The right had rushed forward in pursuit of the enemy; the centre, including some of the Athenians, was driven back by the Spartan charge. Only the Athenians on the extreme left remained in their position. They were in great danger of being surrounded on one side and defeated on the other, but they were saved from destruction partly by the excellent service of their own cavalry, and partly by a change in the plans of Agis, who ordered the whole army to go to the support of his defeated left. The Athenians and Argives of the centre seized the opportunity to leave the field, and this was the end of the conflict. For when the Mantineans and select Argives saw the rest of their army defeated, and the whole Spartan force advancing on themselves, they abandoned any further pursuit of the Sciritae, and fled. Of the allies, about eleven hundred fell, including both the Athenian generals; and of the Lacedaemonians about three hundred. The loss of the allies on their side was inconsiderable.1 1 Time. v. 70-74. IX. 12.] EFFECT OF THE BA TTLE} 418. 285 Thucydides describes the battle of Mantinea as " by far the greatest of Hellenic battles which had taken place for a long time, and fought by the most famous cities." It is also so described that we can form a clear conception of it. We can follow the progress of the conflict step by step. One point only is not easily explained—the insubordination of the Spartan polemarchs. No doubt the movement which Agis ordered was one involving difficulty and danger; but danger and difficulty are not reasons for disobeying orders in the battlefield; and such a movement, difficult as it was, could not have been beyond the capacity of the Spartan army— the most perfect instrument of war in the Grecian world. The polemarchs were afterwards sent into exile " for their cowardice," a light punishment for their offence. They had imperilled the safety of the Spartan army on a day when Sparta's power and position were at stake. After the battle, the Spartans collected the arms of the enemies slain, and erected a trophy; the dead they gave back, according to custom, and, retiring to Tegea with their own dead, buried them there. They then dismissed their allies, and returned to Sparta to celebrate the Carnea. The second king, Plistoanax, who had marched out just before the battle with reinforcements, had reached Tegea, but returned on hearing of the victory. The contingents from the more distant allies were countermanded.1 12. The battle of Mantinea* placed Sparta in a higher position than she had occupied since the outbreak of war in 431. The reputation of her army, which had suffered from the disaster at Pylus, was fully restored; her soldiers "were thought to have been hardly used by fortune, but in character to be the same as ever."2 Her policy was now clear, and she began to carry it out in an effective manner. When the festival of the Carnea was over, an army was led out to Tegea, and with these warlike movements to support them, proposals of peace were sent to Argos. In that city there 1 Thuc. v. 73-75. * Thuc. v, 75, Jowett 286 SPARTA AND ARGOS, 418. [IX. 12. had always been a party which sympathised with Sparta, and were willing to overlook the jealousies and enmities of the past, if they might have her assistance in establishing H their own power on the ruins of the democracy, between Sparta The proxenus of the Argives at Sparta, Lichas andArgos. ^j name, appeared at Argos offering war or peace, as they were pleased to accept it. It happened that Alcibiades was in the city .at the time, supporting the democratic interest, but, in spite of his influence, after a heated discussion, the Spartan party carried the day; terms were agreed upon between Argos and Sparta. The army then retired from Tegea, and not long afterwards Argos, renouncing her alliance with Mantinea, Athens, and Elis, entered into an alliance with Sparta.1 The alliance between Argos and the discontented members of the Peloponnesian League is now finally at an end, and the Peloponnesus is again united round Sparta, with Argos as her ally. The alliance between Sparta and Athens is still in force; but Athens and Argos are allies no more.2 In the strength of this new combination, the two cities displayed an energy hitherto unknown in the Peloponnesus. 1 By the terms of the first treaty, the Argives were to evacuate Epidauria and destroy their fortifications. And if the Athenians refused to do the same, they were to be regarded as enemies. No pretext was to be left for their interference in the affairs of the Peloponnese. The cities in the Peloponnesus, both small and great, were to be independent; a provision which put an end to any ambitious schemes of dominion cherished by the Mantineans. One clause seems directly aimed at the Athenians : " If any one from without Peloponnesus comes against Peloponnesus with evil intent, the Peloponnesians shall take counsel together, and shall repel the enemy." The terms of the treaty might be shown by either party to their allies, who, however, were allowed to accept or refuse them as they pleased. In the second treaty, the alliance between Argos and Sparta is extended to the rest of the Peloponnesus, and even to the allies outside the Peloponnesus. All were to be independent, and in undisturbed possession of their own territory ; all were to submit to arbitration on fair terms; and if a quarrel broke out between any two of them, it was to be settled by some impartial state, * Thuc. v. 77, 79. IX. I3-] EXTENSION OF OLIGARCHY, 418. 287 Envoys were sent to Perdiccas, whom they persuaded to join them, when it suited his convenience to do so, and to the Chalcidian cities, with which "they renewed their former oaths and swore new ones." No communications were to be entered into with Athens unless she withdrew entirely from the Peloponnesus, and no alliance was to be made, no war declared, by the cities, except in concert.1 The action of Argos made it impossible for the Mantineans to hold out. The claim to supremacy over neighbouring cities of Arcadia, which they had endeavoured . A. J J Action of to set up in the general confusion of the war,2 Sparta towards was abandoned, and they came to terms with heralhes-Lacedaemon, concluding a peace for thirty years.3 At Sicyon, also, where the government was unsatisfactory, the Lacedaemonians appeared in force, and established a more oligarchical constitution. Similar changes were soon afterwards carried out through the whole of Achaea, in which hitherto Pellene alone had been an active ally of Sparta. In their own city, the oligarchs of Argos put down the democracy, with the help of the Lacedaemonians, and Argos was now entirely governed in the interests of Lacedaemon; even Elis, finding she had as little to hope from the Athenians as from the Lacedaemonians, in a short time ceased to take any part on either side.4 13. The hopes of Alcibiades appeared to be ruined. After the battle—too late to be of any service at the critical moment—reinforcements had arrived at Mantinea from Athens and Elis; and while the Lacedaemonians were occupied with the Carnea, these allied forces marched upon Epidaurus to punish an invasion which tho Epidaurians had made into the Argive territory. They began siege of to surround the city with a wall, and when the EPidaurus. Athenians had completed their portion, a garrison was left in it composed of contingents from the various cities, and the allies returned home. Little was gained by their labour; by 1 Time. v. 79, 80. 2 Thuc. v. 29. 3 Thuc. v. 81; Xen. Hell. v. 2. 2. 4 Thuc. v. 82. 288 PARTIES AT ATHENS, £18. [IX. 14. the terms agreed upon, since the commencement of the work, between Argos and Lacedaemon, Argos was compelled to evacuate Epidauria and call on Athens to do the same.1 Not long afterwards, the Athenians sent Demosthenes to bring their troops away: he succeeded in getting the fortifications into his own hands, but it was impossible to remain ; the Athenians renewed their treaty with Epidaurus, and gave up the position.2 For these disasters Alcibiades and Nicias were chiefly to blame. The restless spirit of Alcibiades had involved Athens in the complications which had turned out so Athens: ill; Nicias had been dilatory in sending out ostracism of the necessary forces. The popular leaders at Athens believed that their opportunity had come. What the failure of Nicias at Pylus had been to Cleon, the failure of Alcibiades at Mantinea might be to Hyperbolus. Ostracism was demanded in the hope of getting rid of Nicias or Alcibiades, one the opponent, the other the rival, of the lamp-seller. It was thought that the supporters of Nicias would vote against Alcibiades, and the supporters of Alcibiades against Nicias. Alcibiades saw the danger, and met it by joining Nicias. Contrary to all expectation, the sentence fell on Hyperbolus, who left Athens, never to return. So absurd did the result appear, that ostracism was henceforth discontinued. It was not to protect Athens against such men as Hyperbolus that the institution had been invented; for him to aspire to the position of a tyrant was ridiculous.3 14. In the following summer (417) the Spartans discovered how slight was the hold which they had on Argos. The alliance, Athens and which was to last for fifty years, did not last Argos. twelve months. The popular party took ad- vantage of the Gymnopaediae at Lacedaemon to attack the 1 Time. v. 75. 2 Thuc. v. 80; O. I. A. i. 180; Dittenberger, Sylloge, p. 69. 3 Thuc. viii. 73 ; Plut. Ale. 13 ; Arist. 7. The year of the ostracism is, however, uncertain: 417 is the most probable on general grounds; see Beloch, Attisch. Pol. p. 339 f., Griech. Gesch. i. 567. IX. I4-] ARGOS AND ATHENS, 417-416. 289 oligarchs, of whom they slew some and expelled the rest. The Spartans, who were informed, unwillingly put off the festival and advanced to Tegea; but it was too late; they could only return home and resume the celebration of the festival. Even when both the Argive parties appeared before a congress of the allies at Sparta, the Lacedaemonians contented themselves with denunciations of the democrats, and idle promises of help to their opponents. Meanwhile the democratic party at Argos drew nearer to Athens. In order to secure their communications with the sea, should the Spartans invade Argolis, they began to build Long Walls from Argos to the coast. All the citizens, with their wives and slaves, were engaged in the work, assisted by masons and carpenters from Athens. Sparta was now thoroughly roused, and before the walls could be finished, Agis appeared with an army and destroyed them. Yet the constitution of the city was unchanged; the oligarchical faction was too feeble to help the Lacedaemonians or to be helped by them.1 In these movements at Argos we may trace the hand of Alcibiades. Meanwhile Nicias was engaged in the northern Aegean, where he blockaded the ports of Perdiccas, whom the Athenians now regarded as an enemy.2 In the summer (416), Alcibiades sailed to Argos, and, seizing three hundred of the citizens who were suspected of favouring the Lacedaemonians, he placed them in the adjacent islands. In spite of this severe purging, the democrats were still suspicious; and when the Lacedaemonians threatened an invasion towards the end of the year, they apprehended more of the citizens. The Spartans, however, finding the omens against them, returned home without entering the Argive territory.3 Athens and Sparta were still at peace; and the situation remained the same even when the Athenians at Pylus plundered the Lacedaemonians, and the Corinthians, on private 1 Thuc. v. 82, 83. 2 Thuc. v. 83 ; see Dittenb. Syll. p. 70. 3 Thuc. v. 115, 116. VOL. III. T 290 THE PEACE OF NIC IAS AND AFTER. [IX. 14. grounds, went to war with the Athenians. The Spartans contented themselves with proclaiming that any one who chose to make reprisals by plundering the Athenians was at liberty to do so.1 In the Archidamian war it was the Corinthians who took the lead in forcing the Lacedaemonians to take up arms; and in their forecasts they pointed out more clearly than others what was needed in order to ensure success. When peace was concluded they found that their exertions had been in vain; so far from gaining anything by ten years of war, their towns of Sollium and Anactorium had been lost to them, and Potidaea was now an Athenian colony. The same was the case with the Megarians, who saw their port in Athenian hands. The Boeotians had indeed gained something by the destruction of Plataea and Panactum, and their victory at Delium had given them a high position in Greece, yet they also must have felt that a peace which formally left Athens where she was at the beginning of the war was not the object for which they had taken up arms. In the negotiations which follow the peace of Nicias, the Corinthians again take the lead, but while refusing to accept the terms, they are conscious that they cannot themselves form a centre to which the discontented members of the confederacy will flock. Neither in legend nor in history was the city so famous that she could lead the Peloponnesus; she had never held the "Hegemonia" by acquisition or inheritance. Hence she betook herself to Argos, the city of Agamemnon, and for a time there was a probability that a second Peloponnesian confederacy would be formed with Argos at the head, while Sparta sought to protect herself by separate alliances with Athens and Boeotia, thus revealing the weakness of her position, and the selfishness of her aims. The project is wrecked on political difficulties. Argos was a democracy— which, though a recommendation in the eyes of Mantineans and Eleans, could not fail to excite jealousy in the minds of 1 Thuc. v. 115. IX. I5-] ATHENS AND MELOS, 416. 291 Corinthians and Boeotians. For if democracy formed the basis of union, Athens must come in. Alcibiades seizes a favourable moment, and endeavours to unite the democratic cities of Peloponnese with Athens. Hence the alliance of Argos, Elis, Mantinea, and Athens. Democracy is now ranged against oligarchy. This gives Sparta, to whom, as an oligarchy, her old allies return, the opportunity which she wishes for. The two opposing forces meet at Mantinea, and Sparta is victorious. The superiority of her army is re-established. Once more she becomes the leading state of the Peloponnesus and the acknowledged head of the confederacy. She avails herself of her position to establish oligarchy on a firmer basis where necessary, as at Sicyon and in Achaea. Argos is isolated and compelled to make terms—for a time; Mantinea comes in; Elis stands sullenly aloof, and we hear but little more of her in the Peloponnesian war. It must however be borne in mind that the Peloponnesians were still without a fleet. On the water Athens was supreme, and she could retaliate on the spread of Laconian oligarchy on land by the extension of Athenian imperialism at sea. Her second expulsion from any share in the affairs of the Peloponnese made her more determined to be absolute in her own dominions. Hence the attack on Melos, and the savage temper in which hostilities were carried on; hence, perhaps, among other motives, a desire to revenge on the Dorians in Sicily her failure against the Dorians at home. 15. For us who read our Greek history in Thucydides, all other events of the year 416 are overshadowed by the expedition which the Athenians now sent against Melos. In the year 426 Nicias had made an attack on the island, and though the attempt was unsuccessful, we find the Melians assessed at 15 talents in the tribute list of 425. Steps were taken to enforce this payment, or, at any rate, to coerce the Melians into becoming subject allies of the Athenians, and at length they were driven into open hostilities. The Athenians resolved to make an example of them, and teach the Greeks that if Sparta had won her cause in the 292 THE ATHENIANS AT ME LOS, 416. [IX. 15. Peloponnese, she was powerless to help her allies in the islands. Athens was mistress of the sea, and if islands such as Melos and Thera were allowed to be independent, or to range themselves on the side of Sparta, they held their position on sufferance. Athens had long held her hand, but now she allowed it to fall with fearful severity.1 A large force was despatched against the island, but before taking further steps, envoys were sent to treat with Athenian ^e Melians. These were not brought before expedition the people, as was common in democratic states, to Melos. kut were reqUested to explain their views to the magistrates and chief men of the city.2 The Athenians agreed to this with some reluctance—they would gladly have displayed their eloquence—and suggested that the conference should take the form of a dialogue, in which each side should state their opinions. This dialogue is reproduced in the history of Thucydides. What opportunity he had of making himself acquainted with the actual substance of the discussion we do not know; he is not likely to have been at Melos at the time; and it was impossible to get information from the Melians who took part in it—for they were put to death. His information can only have come from the Athenian side,3 and if the dialogue has any claim to authenticity, if it is not merely a record of the arguments which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Athenians and Melians, as suitable to the situation of each, we must suppose that there were Athenians who thought that the arguments used by the envoys could be repeated without discredit to the Athenian people. Or shall we 1 Thuc. v. 84. Thuc. says: "The Melians are colonists of the Lacedaemonians who would not submit like the other islanders. At first they were neutral and took no part; but when the Athenians tried to coerce them by ravaging their lands, they were driven into open hostilities." The generals in command were Cleomedes and Tisias. Thuc. I.e. ; cp. Dittenberger, Syll. p. 70. 2 Thuc. v. 85; cf. iv. 22 and v. 27. 3 Unless the partisans of the Athenians in the city were spared in the general massacre. IX. IS] THE CLAIMS OF THE ATHENIANS, tf6. 293 suppose that the historian, before narrating a deed which left even in antiquity an indelible stain on the name of Athens, endeavours to explain—not %o palliate—their action by showing that such deeds were the natural result of the ideas which, under the tuition of Cleon and Hyperbolus, and perhaps of Alcibiades, had now begun to take possession of the Athenian mind ? We have not come here, the Athenians say, with any pretence of justice, which is a question to be discussed between equals. We fall back on an older principle—that those who have the power will take what they can, and the weaker must submit. It is to our interest that you should be our subjects, for every independent island is at once a danger to our empire and evidence of its weakness; if you will submit without resistance no harm will befall you, but if from any foolish love of freedom or loyalty to Lacedaemon you resist an overwhelming power, you will be the authors of your own destruction. If you trust to the chances of war, in which the result is sometimes contrary to all expectation, we remind you of the delusive nature of hope—a spendthrift who ruins every one who stakes his all at her bidding. If again you believe that the justice of your cause will win you the favour of heaven, we reply that we are no less confident. In acting as we act, we are but doing as men have always done, and as we believe that the gods also do: we rule where we have the power. This always has been and always will be the guiding principle of action. And if you trust in the honour of the Lacedaemonians, we reply that their virtue begins at home and ends at home. In their dealings with foreign nations they are well known to regard what is pleasant as honourable, and what is convenient as just. It was in vain that the Melians pleaded the claims which bound them to- their kinsmen at Lacedaemon. The point at issue was not honour but existence. Honour is a foolish word which has brought many men to ruin, and to shame too, because their disasters were the result of their own 294 MASSACRE OF THE MEL1ANS, 416. [IX. 15. folly. "Remember this," the Athenians said in conclusion, "and be on your guard against a seductive name. The safety of your city rests on your decision !"* In spite of this plain speaking, the Melians resolved to hold out. They would not surrender without a struggle the freedom which they had enjoyed for 700 years; and they still hoped that assistance would come from Lacedaemon. They were willing to remain neutral, but to this proposal the Athenians would not listen. The envoys returned to the army, and the city was at once surrounded by a wall; a garrison was left, and the troops dispersed. The siege lasted through the summer; twice did the Melians break through the wall and bring in supplies, but as the winter approached a larger force was sent out. Within the walls there was treachery, and at length no other course was left but to surrender at discretion. The men of military age were massacred, the women and children sold into slavery. 1 Thuc. v. 112. It is probable, though not certain, that in the years 424-415 was written the singular treatise on the Athenian Republic, which is commonly included among the works of Xenophon. It is the work of some Athenian oligarch, who, though quite out of sympathy with the Athenian constitution, criticises it as an instrument adapted for a certain object. The expansion of the democracy, and the maintenance of Athens at the expense of the allies, are the main thesis of the book, ideas which were naturally popular at a time when Athens was absolute mistress of the sea, and which resulted in the Sicilian expedition. See Forbes, Thuc. 1. lix. f.; and Newman, Politics of Aristotle, i. 538 f. CHAPTER X. AFFAIRS IN SICILY, 422-413. I. So far as ridding Sicily of the Athenians went, the pacification of Gela was a masterstroke. From the departure of Eurymedon and his colleagues in 424 down to the great expedition nine years later, no Athenian ships of war visited the island. Less was achieved in putting an end to domestic strife; in this respect Hermocrates had hardly hoped for success; he was aware that factions would break out in the cities, and if they confined their quarrels within the limits of Sicily, he was willing to let things take their course. It was at Leontini that disturbances arose, and Syracuse herself, the city of Hermocrates, had a share in them. After the withdrawal of the Athenians, the Leontinians had enrolled a number of additional citizens, and in order to find land for them, it was proposed to redivide the Faction at territory of the state. This popular measure Leontini-alarmed the notables, who at once sought the aid of Syracuse, and drove the demos out of the town to seek refuge where they could, after which they abandoned their old home and went to live at Syracuse as citizens of that city. Not long afterwards a number of them, discontented with their new position, returned, and established themselves partly at a fortress in the Leontine territory, partly in Leontini itself, from which, supported by the majority of the exiled demos, they carried on war with Syracuse. Their efforts availed little; the Leontine territory still remained a part of Syracuse ; Leontini ceased to exist as a community, and all that now remained of the once flourishing city state was a band of exiles encamped in two fortresses; democrats who had 296 PHAEAX IN SICIL Y, J&S. [X. 2. been driven from Leontini, and oligarchs who had exiled themselves from Syracuse.1 At Messene also domestic faction broke out soon after the congress; the aid of the Locrians was invited by one of the Faction at parties, and so numerous were the settlers who Messene. took Up their abode there, that for a time Messene became "a possession of the Locrians." But the absence of so large a body weakened Locri, and when a revolt broke out among some of the Locrian colonies, she could no longer maintain her position at Messene.2 2. On hearing of these domestic quarrels, the Athenians resolved to renew communication with their friends in The Athenians Sicily. ^n tne sunimer of 422 a commission sendPhaeax was sent out, consisting of Phaeax and two to Sicily. others, in the hope of forming a combination against Syracuse. Such a combination was necessary if Leontini was to be restored, and Phaeax could now answer Hermocrates by pointing out that the enemy whom all had to fear was not the foreigner against whom he had warned them, but the city which he represented. In choosing Phaeax as an envoy, the Athenians appear to have carefully selected a man who was known as a diplomatist rather than a general. He was smooth of tongue and conciliatory in manner, a man of persuasive conversation rather than an orator, yet subtle in argument and forcible in expression— a favourite among the fledgling disputants of Athens.3 On his way Phaeax was able to make terms with the Locrians, who alone of the allies had refused to make peace with the Athenians at the time of the pacification of Gela. From Locri he went on to Camarina, the city which had most to fear from Syracuse, as her immediate neighbour. Here, and at the more powerful city of Agrigentum, he was successful, but at Gela he failed; the city adhered to her policy, choosing Syracuse before Athens. Phaeax was disheartened; and, thinking it useless to visit the rest of the 1 Thuc. v. 4. 2 Thuc. v. 5. 3 Eupolis, Frag. 95 K. Aristoph. Knights, 1374 f. X. 3-] PROSPERITY OF ATHENS, 421-415. 297 cities, he returned through the country of the Sicels to Catana, where his ships met him. On the way he visited Bricinniae, one of the fortresses in which the Leontines were encamped, and gave them what encouragement he could.1 In his voyage home he endeavoured to establish amicable relations with those maritime cities of Sicily and Italy at which he touched, but his embassy had little or no result. The time had not yet come when Athens could interfere with effect in the affairs of Sicily, and indeed it never came. And at this moment the spirit of enterprise at Athens was crushed. The tide of success had turned in favour of Sparta: the defeat of Delium and the loss of Amphipolis, with other successes of Brasidas in Chalcidice, weighed heavily against the gains at Pylus and Cythera. Danger threatened the city in a very vital part of her empire; and till the career of Brasidas could be checked, a distant expedition to the west was out of the question. 3. In the years which followed the peace of Nicias, Athens rapidly recovered from the disasters of the Archidamian war. Her revenues were unimpaired, and we are informed that seven thousand talents of surplus were Athens during deposited in the Acropolis in the time of the peace of Nicias.2 The population increased till the Nlcias* ravages of the plague were forgotten. There were many who longed for the stirring times of war, and with the genuine spirit of Athenians thought the years wasted which passed in inaction. They longed for novelty; they dreamed of empire; and why not, when the men and money were at hand % Others turned their thoughts to the revenues which 1 Thuc. v. 5. 2 Andocides, Da Pace, § 8; Aeschines, Fals. Leg. p. 337. But I agree with Grote, v. 144, note 3, that we cannot place confidence in either of these authorities. For the inscription to which Grote refers as proving that 3000 t. had been stored in the Acropolis during the peace of Nicias {O. I. A. i. 32 ; Hicks, Hist. Inscrip. 37) see Jowett's Essay on Inscriptions, Thuc. I. lxii. ff. Though written down after 420, it is supposed by some authorities to refer to a period before the war. Money was accumulated, Thuc. vi. 26. 298 THE SEGESTAEANS AT ATHENS, 416. [X. 3. were lying useless in the treasury of Athena. The soldier's calling was rapidly becoming a profession, by which he expected to live, and for him war was a time of plenty. There could be no better use of the public funds than the acquisition of new territory, from which new revenues would flow to the city, and new pay to the citizens. In the autumn of 416 a quarrel broke out between two neighbouring cities in the west of Sicily—Segesta and Selinus. Segesta and Segesta was a town of the Elymi, with which, Selinus. as we ^ave seeilj tne Athenians had entered into alliance about the middle of the century—an alliance apparently renewed by Laches.1 Selinus was a colony of the Sicilian Megara, a Dorian city which could rely on Dorian Syracuse. The quarrel related to those trivial matters which were always disturbing the peace of neighbouring towns: rights of intermarriage, and the use or limits of neutral ground. Selinus sought the aid of Syracuse, and thus succeeded in reducing her enemy to great straits by sea and land. In her distress, Segesta called to mind her ancient ally, the city beyond the sea, whose eyes had long been fixed with an eager gaze on Sicily. Her envoys appeared at Athens, reminding the Athenians of the old connection, and begging for assistance.2 They had many complaints to make, but throughout they dwelt chiefly on the aggression of Syracuse. Was the desolation of Leontini to go unpunished ] Was Syracuse to destroy the allies who still remained to Athens in Sicily 1 In that case Dorian would join Dorian, and colonist would join mother-city, and the west would come with an overwhelming host to overthrow the empire of Athens. It was prudent for the Athenians to meet the danger before it was too late by sending help to their oppressed allies; ample means would be supplied for the support of any assistance which might come.3 1 Supra, p. 188. In Thuc. vi. 6 Classen omits Acoptivcju. 2 Diodorus, xii. 82, asserts that Segesta applied in vain to Acragas and Syracuse,—and to Carthage. The first statement is so improbable that we cannot ascribe any weight to the second. 3 Thuc. vi. 6. X. 3-1 THE ATHENIANS AND SICILY, 41$. 299 The appeal of the Segestaeans led to much discussion. Some supported it; others pointed out that Segesta was a distant barbarian city of which little was „ J m Envoys sent known. After many meetings, it was resolved from Athens to send envoys to Segesta to report on the to Segesta# resources of the city, and the state of the war with Selinus. Here for the moment the matter rested, but the thoughts of the Athenians were once more turned to Sicily. We may imagine how the subject grew in the minds of men during the winter months (416-415) before the return of the envoys. The distance of the island, the extent and resources of it, the number and size of the cities, their population, their sympathies and antipathies, their past history—all these were subjects of discussion in the colonnades and shops of Athens. Any one who had more information than the rest became the hero of the hour; men gathered round him and hung on his lips, forming in their minds bright pictures of the gain and glory that was coming. Foremost in the movement was Alcibiades, whose restless spirit foiled at Mantinea, was eager to seek distinction in some new field of action. Athens at peace and limited by treaties, Athens unable to put forth her strength, was no city for him. He saw himself sailing to Sicily at the head of a larger force than any which had ever visited the waters of the west, winning the cities by force or persuasion, and so passing onwards, " roaming with a hungry heart," till he reached Carthage, the metropolis of the west. The greatest of Phoenician cities would fall before his attack; her fleets would be added to his own, and he would then turn upon his course, and bring an irresistible armament against the Peloponnesus. Meanwhile the envoys arrived at Segesta. They were more than satisfied by what they saw of the wealth of the town; they were entertained most hospitably, and at every house they saw an abundance of gold and silver plate; they also heard of large reserves in the treasuries and temples; and what they heard they believed, without further examination. On their return they were accompanied by Segestaean 300 ATHENS WILL HELP SEGESTA, 415. [X. 4. envoys, who brought with them sixty talents, a month's pay for the sixty ships which they asked the Athenians to supply. The Athenians hesitated no longer. On hearing the report of the envoys, they decreed to send sixty ships to Segesta, The Athenians un(^er ^ne command of Nicias, Alcibiades, and decree aid to Lamachus. The immediate object of the ex-Segesta. pedition was to aid Segesta against Selinus, but if time and means permitted, the generals, who were granted full powers, were to promote the restoration of Leontini, and advance in any way that they could the interests of Athens in Sicily (415). 4. Four days after this decree was passed, the Assembly was again summoned to discuss the details of the expedition. Opposition Nicias seized the opportunity to give expres- of Nicias. gjon {.Q kjs vjewSt jn hjs opinion the decree was a mistake; and it was against his wish that he had been chosen one of the generals to conduct the expedition. " We are met to discuss the details of our force," he said ; "but in my judgment it would be better to discuss the original question." It was useless to advise Athenians to be content with what they had, or to warn them against risking present advantage in the hope of future gain. But was it wise to seek new enemies in Sicily, when they were leaving so many enemies behind them in Greece ? They must not rely on the peace; those who maintained it had many complaints to make, and others did not maintain it at all. The Chalcidic cities were still in revolt; the Corinthians had never accepted the terms of agreement; the Boeotians were only held in check by a truce terminable at ten days' notice. Was this a time to divide the Athenian power and send the greater half across the sea 1 " If we are successful," he continued, " we cannot maintain our conquests; and what can be more foolish than to enter into a war in which we gain nothing if we succeed, and lose much if we fail 1 We are warned that if we do not interfere, all Sicily will fall into the hands of Syracuse—but what have X. 4.] NIC/AS OPPOSES, fyl5. 301 we to fear % The Syracusans will not risk their empire by joining the Lacedaemonians against us—that would prepare the way for their own destruction. Leave Sicily to the Siceliots, and be on your guard against the old enemy, who is plotting to overthrow your democracy first, and then your empire.1 "The best way of terrifying the Siceliots is to keep at a distance from them, or, if we visit the island at all, to display our power and return at "once. Men are always afraid of what is strange and distant. And we must not despise the Lacedaemonians because we have defeated them. They are still planning to retrieve the past. We ourselves have only recently recovered from great disasters; we cannot afford to waste our resources on those who will make no adequate return if successful, and if they fail will involve us in their own destruction. He who urges you to undertake this war is a young man without experience, pleased with the novelty of office, and eager to gratify his own ambition, or find means to support his extravagance. He has gathered his friends round him, but you must not be afraid of them; remember the risk, and do not be shamed into voting against your convictions. Leave the Siceliots to manage their own affairs, and tell the Segestaeans that as they began the quarrel without consulting you, they must bring it to an end without your help." Nicias then turned to the presiding officer, and begged him not to shrink from putting to the vote a question which had been decided already. Such an act might be informal, but no formalities should be allowed to stand in the way of the safety of the state.2 1 Thuc. vi. 11 : oirws nokiv 6V oXiyapxias emftovXevovo-av oi-eoas fyvka^optBa, a passage which shows that Nicias at any rate was fully alive to the action of Sparta after Mantinea. 2 Thuc. vi. 14 : kol (TV S> irpyravi ravra, e'lnep rjycl croi 7rpo(rr)K€iv KrjbtarOaL re ttjs iroXeoas icai* (SovXci yeveaticu 7to\{ttjs aya^d?, eVmfr^tfe kcu yvwpas irporidei avdis 'A8r)vaiot,s, vopiaas, el oppcobels to dpay^rjfpiaai, ro p-iv \veiv tovs vopovs p.i) pera toctoovS' clv paprvpcav alriav > k.t.X. In what did the illegality consist ? In the case of the Mytilenaean decree, iii. 36, a subject already decided was 302 ALCIBIADES AND NIC/AS, 415. [X. 5. 5. Though Nicias had not mentioned Alcibiades by name, the audience were well aware who the young man was whom The answer ne accused of urging Athens to her destruction, of Alcibiades. All eyes were turned upon him, and he was not slow to respond. The public policy at once became a personal question, as was invariably the case with Alcibiades. His own wishes, his own interests, his own influence and position were of paramount importance to him. In genius, both political and military, he wns far the first man of his day, and he did not underrate hi. abilities. Nor did the Athenians underrate them, but they looked with suspicion on one whose personal extravagance and contempt of all social custom marked him out as a man who had objects in view which he could never satisfy as a citizen among citizens. The ever-present dread of "a tyranny" gave a legitimate sanction to the envy with which many Athenians regarded every eminent citizen. " Nicias has attacked me," Alcibiades said, " for my wish to take command in this expedition. My answer is that I have as good a right to command as any other man, or better; and I am equal to the post. The extravagance which he charges against me has been of the greatest service to the city. At a time when our resources were thought to be exhausted, I made a display at Olympia which was the astonishment of all Greece, entering seven chariots for the race, and obtaining the first, second, and fourth places.1 Such success is rewarded with public distinctions, and it is also evidence of power. That I should be envied is natural; but those who are disliked in their lifetime often become, in a later age, the pride of their cities. At any rate, I had influence enough to combine the Peloponnesus against Sparta. I proposed for reconsideration, and not a word is said about any illegality. In this ease, it may be urged,'the reconsideration of the decree was not the object for which the meeting had been summoned; it was brought up in the course of the debate; and to this extent the Mytilenaean decree is not strictly parallel. 1 Probably in 01. 90 (b.c. 420). 2C. 5.] ALC1BIADES SUPPORTS THE EXPEDITION, UB. 303 appeal to you, then, to make use of my impetuosity while it lasts; combine my rashness and the good fortune of Nicias to secure success in this great expedition. Do not change your minds under the impression that Sicily is a great power: the Sicilian cities are not like ours; they are inhabited by a mixed population, without common sympathies, or fixed sentiments. No one thinks of his city as his home, nor is he prepared to fight for it—to him it is a place to make a fortune in, which he may carry elsewhere when he pleases. Among such cities there can be no consistent policy: they will not follow one leader, nor are their armies so large as we think; and indeed throughout Hellas, the fighting force has been found far less than the estimate. " But Nicias says: • Remember what an enemy you are leaving behind you.' This consideration will weigh with us but little, if we look at the matter fairly. When our fathers acquired this empire, they were at war with the Pelopon-nesians and the Persians too, but, owing to the superiority of their fleet, they overcame both. And we also shall leave behind a fleet more than sufficient to keep the Peloponnesians in check. On these grounds, then, we have no reason to hesitate, nor have we any excuse for throwing over our allies. We must keep our engagements with them, regardless of loss and gain. We did not attach them to us with the intention that they should come to our assistance, but in the hope that they would prevent our enemies from crossing the sea. It was by helping others—Greeks or barbarians—when they called upon us, that we acquired our empire, and if we abandon this policy to stay at home and make nice distinctions in sending assistance, we may lose what we have got. We cannot fix a limit to our empire, and say that we will go thus far and no farther: we must rule or be ruled; and before we can change our politics, we must change our nature. If we sail to Sicily, we shall humble the pride of the Peloponnesians ; we shall add Western Hellas to our empire, or at least injure the power of Syracuse to our own advantage. 304 EXTENSIVE PREPARATIONS, 415. [X. 6. " Do not follow Nicias in his want of energy and mistrust of youth. Youth and age must go together; each supplying the defects of the other, as they have done in the past. The state, if at rest, like everything else will wear herself out by internal friction. Every pursuit which requires skill will bear the impress of decay, whereas by conflict fresh experience is always being gained, and the city learns to defend herself, not in theory, but in practice. My opinion in short is, that a state used to activity will quickly be ruined by a change to inaction; and that they of all men enjoy the greatest security who are truest to themselves and their institutions even when they are not the best."1 6. Such a speech could not fail to be convincing, for it appealed to the strongest impulses of the Athenians; and when the envoys from Segesta and Leontini came forward, reminding them of the pledges which they had given, they were more eager than ever for the expedition. Nicias saw that it was useless to press his arguments further; the stream was too strong for any direct opposition; he hoped that a change might come when the Athenians realised the vast preparations which would be required. It was not now a question of thirty or forty ships. To meet the forces of Sicily with any hope of success, a large army must be sent out, including slingers and bowmen who would act against the Sicilian cavalry; the fleet must be on a great scale to ensure a constant supply of food, besides that which would have to be conveyed from Attica. An ample supply of money would also be necessary, for the promises of the Segestaeans might be found delusive. The words of Nicias, so far from diverting the Athenians from their purpose, merely confirmed them in it. They thought that with a general so cautious, and an equipment so complete, they could not fail. The Sicilian fever ran higher than ever. All alike were seized with a passionate desire to sail, the elder among them convinced that they 1 Thuc. vi. 16-18. See Jowett's translation. X.7.] OMENS AT ATHENS, $15. 305 would achieve the conquest of the island, the younger longing to see with their own eyes the marvels of a distant country, while the main body of the troops expected to receive present pay and to conquer territory which would be an inexhaustible mine of pay for the future.1 At last one of the audience, weary of the objections and delays of Nicias, came forward and asked him to state plainly what forces he considered necessary.2 Nicias replied that so far as he could form an opinion, without further consideration, a fleet of not less than 100 triremes, and a force of 5000 heavy-armed, with a proportionate number of light-armed, would be required. On this the Assembly at once decreed that the generals should receive full powers to decide about the number of the fleet, and arrange for the despatch of the expedition. The day on which this decree was passed was a day of evil omen at Athens. It was the sacred day of Adonis, and if Aristophanes may be believed, the cries of the women who came out upon the roofs of the houses to lament Adonis were heard even in the Assembly.3 Other tokens of impending evil were not wanting, and even Socrates is said to have been warned by his familiar sign against the expedition. 7. At this moment, when every one was more than usually disposed to pay attention to signs and omens, an outrage was committed at Athens which spread a panic through the city. 1 Thuc. vi. 24. 2 Thuc. vi. 25. Thucydides does not give the name, but there is little doubt that the man Mas Demostratus. See Plut. Nic. 12: dvao-ras yap 6 fiaXia-Ta tg>v ^ijpaycoycov erri rbv irokcpov 7rapo£vva)P tovs '&9r)vaLovs Arjfioa-TpaTOs ecfjt) rbv Nadav irpocfxio-eis Xeyovra iravo-tiv kcu ^(pio-fia ypdyjras o7ra>s avroKparopcs dncriv oi (TTpaTrjyoi Kavravda Kernel jSovXcvo-pevoi Kai npaTTovTcs, €ireiiaoyxos ovtos ovtt\ tg>v T€yav9 o5 'ya> 7ror' &v fjicovov ev Tr]KK\r)(Tiq. eXeycv $' 6 fir) oopaai ji€V Ar}fi6(TTpaTOS 7rXeii> els 2iKeXiav t) yvvr\ 5' op^ovp-evrj "at, ait*Ada>viv," a\Xo> rov kvkKov Ttpos rov TpayiKov seems to mean the part of the besiegers' wall towards Trogilus. For though in vi. 98 we can join npas Bopeav rov kvkKov, we cannot join irpos rov TpcayiKov rov kvkKov. In some other points also the language of Thucydides is obscure. Why does he use the extraordinary expression at the beginning of c. 97 : ravrr)s rrjs vvktos rfj iniyiyvopwr) rjpcpq ? There is nothing to which ravrrje rrjs v. can conveniently refer. What we expect to be told is that the Athenians came to Leon during the night, and on the next day ascended Epipolae. But he also speaks of a review—e^rdfoj/To, c. 97 ; and where does this come in ? It is difficult to suppose that it was held at Leon, for time was everything in seizing Epipolae. See Freeman, Hist, of Sicily, iii. 211, Appendix xiii. 326 WALL AND COUNTER-WALL, 4U- [X. 16. engagement. They at once began to build a wall which should extend from the edge of the Great Harbour to the open sea towards Trogilus, using the " circle " wan and the as a Dase °f operations. They first took in hand first Syracusan the section towards the north of the circle; and "wa ' the Syracusans, seeing them engaged in that direction, resolved, on the advice of Hermocrates, to run a counter-wall, protected by a stockade, south of the circle from the city wall, so as to cross the line on which the Athenian wall would be built. Even if they did not succeed in carrying their counter-wall past the Athenian line, they would at least divide them, and prevent them from carrying on their work with their whole force. And as the Athenian ships had not yet sailed into the Great Harbour, the Syracusans could still make free use of the shores of it. Without any opposition from the Athenians, who refused to be drawn from their building on the north, they completed the wall, and placed a garrison on it. The Athenians replied by severing the conduits which conveyed water into the city, and afterwards, taking advantage of the carelessness of the garrison at noonday, they drove the Syracusans from the counter-wall and destroyed it.1 On the next day the Athenians began to carry their wall southwards from the circle, to secure the cliffs which over-The second hung the marshy ground between Epipolae and Syracusan wail. tke Qreat Harbour; and the Syracusans, on seeing this, resolved at any rate to prevent them from advancing from the cliffs to the shore of the harbour. Abandoning the higher ground, and even the lower level on the southern slope of Epipolae, they now cut a trench " through the middle of the marsh," and planted a stockade alongside. The Athenians in reply ordered their fleet to sail from Thapsus into the Great Harbour, and when they had brought their 1 Thuc. vi. 99, 100. The nature of the counter-wall is clear from O. 100 : o0r) kcli alcoBofirjdrj rov V7rorei;(io7zaro9. It was also furnished with wooden towers. There is no doubt that it ran eouth of the circle, though in Poppo-Stahl—on vi. 99—it is put north. X. i6.] THE SECOND COUNTER-WALL, 414. 327 wall to the edge of the cliffs, they at once attacked and destroyed the newly erected stockade. In the battle which followed they defeated the Syracusans, but the Death of victory was dearly purchased by the death of Lamachus-Lamachus, who, while reinforcing the Athenian right, was Reference. I. Wall between Tycha and Yemenite's || i2. First Athenian Camp 3. Athenian march to Euryalos 4. Athenian Wall 15. Labdalon 6. First Syracusan Counter Wall 7. Second $, ,, ,, . 8.Third „ „ „ jj « * English Miles Walker &>Boutalls* SYRACUSE DURING THE ATHENIAN SIEGE. This plan has been copied, with the permission of the Delegates of the Clarendon Press*, from that in Professor Freeman's History of Sicily, vol. iii. p. 167. The fortifications of Tycha and Temenites are quite uncertain; perhaps the dotted line 1 should be extended south-east to the point where the dotted line 7 leaves the wall of Achradina, and the solid lines enclosing Temenites (on all sides but the east) removed. This is the view taken in the map given in Lupus, Syrdlcus. cut off from the main body, and slain, with five or six others. Nicias had taken no part in the attack. He had 328 THE SYRACUSANS IN DESFA1R, Uk [X. 17. remained behind in the " circle " on Epipolae owing to illness. He too found himself in danger of being cut off, for while the engagement in the marsh was still going on, a party of Syracusans, who had fled into the city, formed again, attacked the circle,, and even carried an outwork connected with it. Nicias, who was almost alone, could only save himself by setting on fire the engines and timber which lay scattered round. By this means he not only kept off the enemy, but gave a signal to the Athenians on the lower ground, who at once sent assistance. At the same time the sight of the Athenian ships sailing into the Great Harbour recalled the Syracusans to the defence of the city. From all quarters they retired within the walls, and abandoned the attempt to prevent the Athenians from completing their siege wall.1 17. The death of Lamachus was a severe blow to the Athenians—the more severe because the sole command of the fleet and army was now in the hands of Nicias, who, owing to illness, was more than ever unequal to his position. Fortunately, no further action was required for a time. The Athenians went on with their work, unmolested by the Syracusans, carrying a double wall from the cliffs of Epipolae to the edge of the harbour.2 The tide of feeling now changed in their favour; supplies were brought in from all parts of Sicily; from Etruria came three ships of fifty oars; and many of the Sicels, who had hitherto wavered, sent con-Despondency ot tingents. The Syracusans, on the other hand, the Syracusans. began to despair; no help came to them from the Peloponnesus, and the complete blockade of the city seemed inevitable. In their vexation they deposed the generals, including Hermocrates, whom they blamed for their misfortunes, and chose three others in their place. 1 Thuc. vi. 101, 102 ; Freeman, I.e. p. 669. The words diro tov kvkKov eT€i^ifov tov Kprjfivov are explained by ineibrj to npbs top Kprjfivov e^eipyao'To just below. 2 Thuc. vi. 103 : diro r&v 'E7tmto\wv ko.1 tov KpTjfivabovs . . . ^XPl rijs BaKda-aris, X. 17.] GYL1PPUS AT HIMERA, 414- 329 The surrender of the city was publicly discussed, and negotiations were opened with Nicias. Unknown to them the Deliverer was on his way. On receiving his instructions (supra, p. 321), Gylippus had arranged with the Corinthians to despatch two Approach of ships without delay to Asine in Messenia, and GyHPPus-prepare for starting, when the season arrived, as many more as they meant to send.1 With these ships he had reached Leucas on his way to the west, when he was informed that Syracuse was completely invested by the Athenians and beyond relief. Gylippus at once showed of what metal he was made. If Sicily were lost, he might still save Italy, and he determined to press on. Accompanied by Pythen, the Corinthian commander, he sailed with two Laconian and two Corinthian ships to Tarentum, leaving the rest to follow. From Tarentum, after an unsuccessful effort to win over Thurii, of which city his father had once been a citizen, he passed along the coast, intending to visit the adjacent cities, but he was caught in a violent storm, and only with difficulty made his way back to Tarentum.2 Nicias was informed of his arrival, but treated it as a matter of no importance. What harm could a privateering expedition, with four ships, inflict on the Athenian army 1 And this had been the opinion at Thurii. But Gylippus thought differently. After refitting his ships at Tarentum, he advanced to Locri. Here he received more precise information about the situation of affairs at Syracuse, He lands at and formed his plans accordingly. He deter- Himera-mined to sail to Himera, and after collecting what,forces he could, to come back to Syracuse by land. He succeeded 1 Time. vi. 93. 2 Thuc. vi. 104. dpirairdels vir1 avepov Kara rbv Tepiwlop koXttov, os €K7n/€i TavTy p,€yas Kara Bopeav iaTTjicas, airofapeTai €S to irikayos. The Terinaean gulf is on the other side of the " foot" of Italy, and Gylippus could not have reached it without passing through the straits of Messina. Why Thucydides chooses so distant a point in determining the position of Gylippus it is difficult to say. Was he misled by imperfect information ? 330 GONGYLUS REACHES SYRACUSE, 4U- [X. 18. in passing the straits unseen by the ships which Nicias, on hearing of his advance to Locri, had sent to intercept him, and reached Him era. The Sicels of the district/ were favourable, and as their king, Archonides, who was a friend of the Athenians, had recently died, they could render efficient assistance; Himera, Selinus, and Gela also furnished contingents. Gylippus quickly found himself at the head of a force of about three thousand men, including the rowers on his own vessels, whom he armed. With these he at once marched on Syracuse. 18. The great news had already reached the city. After the departure of Gylippus, the Corinthian ships had crossed . j , with all speed from Leucas, and Gongylus, one Gongyius at of the commanders, though latest in starting, Syracuse. wag tne first to arrive at Syracuse, which he seems to have had no difficulty in entering. He found the citizens on the point of meeting in the Assembly to discuss the terms of peace with the Athenians. Hopeless of success, they wished to bring the war to an end. This mood was quickly changed when they heard from Gongylus that his was the first of a number of ships, and that a Lacedaemonian, Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, was on his way to Syracuse. They at once abandoned all thought of peace, and resolved to march out with their whole force to meet Gylippus. Of the double wall which they were building from the southern edge of Epipolae to the harbour, the Athenians had now completed about a mile; only a small portion at the harbour's edge remained to be finished. From the cliff to the " circle," the wall, a single one, was finished; from the "circle" to Trogilus on the north, part of the wall was finished, part was being built, and for the remainder the stones were placed in readiness. It was still possible to enter Syracuse at this point.1 Gylippus seems to have been 1 We do not know what interval of time separated the seizure of Epipolae by the Athenians from the coming of Gylippus, but a more active general than Nicias could now be would certainly have X. 18.] GYLIPPUS ENTERS SYRACUSE, 4U- 331 accurately informed of the state of affairs. Seeing that the Athenians were engaged upon their wall on the edge of the harbour, he rushed on Epipolae, ascending Gyiippus on by the Euryelus, as the Athenians had done ^v'1?01**-before him, and united with the Syracusans, who had come out from the city to meet him. With their support he advanced on the Athenian fortification.1 The Athenians were taken at a disadvantage, and thrown into some confusion, but they drew out for battle. Their astonishment was great when Gyiippus, before giving the order for attack, sent a herald to say that he was willing to grant an armistice for five days, if in that interval the Athenians would leave Sicily. To this proposal no reply was made; and, when we remember that the Athenian force was many times as great as that commanded by Gyiippus, and that they held, or ought to have held, complete control of the sea, we cannot wonder that they treated the offer with contempt. The engagement which followed was not fought out; Gyiippus, seeing that the Syracusans had a difficulty in forming, withdrew to a more open position, and He enters when Nicias declined to follow, led his army syracuse-within the walls to encamp in the Temenites. The next day, to divert the attention of the Athenians, he drew out the greater part of his army in front of the Athenian lines; while, with a smaller force, he captured Labdalum, which was out of sight of the Athenian lines. The Syracusans^also obtained their first success at sea by seizing an Athenian completed his wall of circumvallation without delay. A single wall, cutting off the city from sea to sea, might have been built in the time required to build a double one for a much smaller distance, but such a wall did not satisfy Nicias, who never recognised that rapidity is one of the first conditions of success in war. He had of course failed in his duty in taking insufficient measures for intercepting Gyiippus and the Corinthians, and in allowing Gongylus to enter Syracuse. 1 Thuc. vii. 2: em to Tcixurpa r&v *A0r)vals iv fieyaky irokei Kai dpxrjv cxovoyi, f)p,apTr]8r) kol 6 is 2LK€\iav 7r\ovs' os ov toctovtov yvd>fjLi]s dp,dpTT)ixa rjv npos ovs iirrjco-av, ovov ol eWe/i^ai/rey ov ra 7rp6o-(j)opa rols ol%oiievois iTTiyiyvavKOVTes, aXka Kara ras IBlas diafioXas irep\ ttjs tov brjfiov TrpovTacriaS) rd re iv rco o-rparoiTeba a/i/3XuVepa iiroiovv, Kai ra irep\ rrjv ttoXiv 7rp&TOV iv dXkrjkois irapdxfyo-av. 336 VIOLATION OF THE TRUCE, 4U- [X. 21. hesitation about sending out reinforcements on the most liberal scale. And though the Athenians refused to relieve Nicias from his command, they chose two officers from the troops in Sicily—Menander and Euthydemus by name—to support him till new generals should arrive from home.1 Preparations were made for a second expedition, of which Demosthenes, now the best officer in Athens, and Eurymedon, who was already known in Sicily, were placed in command. Eurymedon was despatched at once (midwinter 414) with ten ships and 120 talents. He did not, however, remain at Syracuse, but sailed back to return with Demosthenes in the following year. At the same time twenty ships were sent to cruise round the Peloponnesus, and keep watch at Naupactus, to prevent any reinforcements reaching Syracuse.2 This momentous resolution was taken at a time when the situation of affairs at home was becoming more serious from day to day. To the end of the summer of 414 the peace between Athens and Sparta had been maintained, at least to the extent that neither state had invaded the territory of the other. Such restraint satisfied the letter of the treaty, and that was enough. But in the autumn of 414, when an Athenian fleet had gone to the help of Argos in resisting an invasion from Lacedaemon, the generals in command— Th a henians Pytnod°n -J an(^ others—were persuaded to violate the make a descent on Laconian territory at truce in the Epidaurus Limera and Prasiae.3 This was the Peloponnesus. r . . opportunity for which the Lacedaemonians had long been waiting; the marauding excursions from Pylus, and damage done to other parts of the Peloponnesus beyond the limits of Laconia, did not amount to actual violation of the terms of peace, and if they had acted upon them, they would again have been haunted by the feeling that they were the aggressors in the quarrel, as they had been during the 1 Cp. Grote, Hist, of Greece, iv. 196. * Thuc. vii. 17 : 7re^iTovcri de kol nepl rrjv ILeXoTrovvrjo-ov oi 'Afyvaioi e"kovi vavs, k.t.X. These must be the same as reus iv rfj NavnaicTG) eticoo-iv'ATTiKais, c. 19. 3 Thuc. vi. 105; cp. c. 95. X. 22.] A GIS IN VADES A TT1CA, 418. 337 Archidamian war. But now the violation of the truce was undeniable; and they entered on the war with a clear conscience and a hearty good will.1 22. At the beginning of spring (413), "earlier than ever before," the Lacedaemonians and their allies once more invaded Attica. King Aeris was in command. ^^ jr\.£ris invades After ravaging the plain of the Cephisus, they Attica, and set about fortifying Decelea, as Alcibiades had °ccupies Decelea. urged them to do. At the same time large reinforcements, amounting to 1600 heavy-armed, were sent out to Sicily from Lacedaemon, Boeotia, Corinth, and Sicyon, and twenty-five Corinthian ships which had been prepared earlier in the year were despatched to hold in check the Athenian squadron at Naupactus, while the merchantmen, with the troops on board, should pass on to Sicily.2 Nor were the Athenians less active, though their plans were marred by a want of decision. Charicles was sent out early in the spring to coast round Peloponnesus as a kind of counterstroke to the occupation of Decelea, but he was also ordered to put in at Argos to take on board a force of heavy-armed. Demosthenes, who was in command of the fleet destined for Sicily —sixty Athenian ships and five Chian, 1200 heavy-armed "from the roll," and as many others as could be got from the islanders—was ordered to act with Charicles, but wasted time at Aegina waiting for his forces to assemble. When the armament was at last complete, he joined Charicles off Laconia. Together they ravaged Epidaurus Limera, and landing on the coast opposite Cythera, they erected a fortress to form a second Pylus, a Decelea in Laconia, a base from which excursions could be made, and a point to which Helots might flock.3 Demosthenes then sailed to Corcyra on his way to Sicily ; Charicles returned home with the Argives. The effects of the occupation of Decelea by the Pelopon-nesians were quickly felt at Athens. Deprived of the use of 1 Thuc. vii. 18. 2 These merchantmen were driven far out of their course, infra, 348. 8 Thuc. vii. 26. VOL. III. Y 338 ATHENIAN FINANCES, US. [X. 23. their fields, the citizens were now entirely dependent on imported supplies—chiefly from Euboea. These could no Exhaustion longer be carried over land past Oropus; and of Athens. the conveyance by sea round Sunium was longer and more costly. The sources of public and private income, so far as Attica was concerned, were dried up, so that many families who had hitherto lived in comfort were now penniless. Those who possessed shops and manufactories were hardly better off, for the slaves, especially those employed in any kind of handicraft, deserted by hundreds. The efforts necessary to send out the second expedition to Sicily seem to have exhausted the treasury; and in the hope of improving the finances, the Athenians changed the tribute hitherto paid by the subject cities for a tax of five per cent, on their maritime trade. The demands of military service were severe; the cavalry were constantly in requisition to keep the raids of the enemy in check, and the horses, as their hoofs were not protected by iron, were soon lamed by their incessant work on rocky ground. The city walls needed a guard day and night, and owing to the absence of so many men in Sicily, this duty fell the heavier on those who were left. Yet in spite of these difficulties, the Athenians maintained their spirit, and once more astonished the Grecian world by their courage and tenacity. They did not suffer themselves to be diverted from the war in Sicily by the renewal of the conflict at home; regardless of the presence of the enemy in their land, which they sacrificed now as readily as they had done in the Persian war, they still indulged their dream of conquest in the west. 23. But the strain was great, and the Athenians felt it. What could be done towards cutting down expenses, they did. A force of Thracians, 1300 in number, had been hired at a drachma a day to take part in the expedition to Sicily, but before they arrived Demosthenes had set sail. To keep them idle at Athens was a greater expense than the treasury could bear. They were sent back under the command of Diitrephes, who received orders to do the enemy any injury that he could on the way. When passing through the X. 24.] FIRST SEA-FIGHT AT SYRACUSE, 418. 339 Euripus, Diitrephes landed his men, and led them against Mycalessus, a Boeotian town at some distance Massacre at from the sea. The town was easily surprised, Mycalessus. for no attack was apprehended, and no guard had been set. The Thracians burst through the gates and crumbling walls, plundering the houses and temples, and slaying every living thing that came in their way—man, woman, child, or beast. To crown their murderous work, they fell upon a school in which the boys had recently assembled, and slaughtered every one of them.1 Happily vengeance was not long in coming. Before they could regain the shore, the Thracians were overtaken by the Thebans, and two hundred and fifty of the number were cut down. 24. Meanwhile affairs were going from bad to worse in Sicily. With the spring (413) Gylippus had returned to Syracuse bringing large reinforcements. He was no The Syracusans sooner in the city than he urged the Syracusans determine to to attack the Athenians by sea as well as land. Athenians His appeal was supported by the eloquence of at sea-Hermocrates, who pointed out that the skill of the Athenians at sea, which caused so much alarm, was after all acquired rather than innate and inherited. They had become mariners under the stress of a great war, and why should not the Syracusans do the same 1 The Syracusans were persuaded. A combined assault on Plemmyrium was arranged. Under cover of night Gylippus led out the whole of his forces to be in readiness for an attack on land. The next morning, at a concerted signal, forty-five ships advanced from the arsenal in the Lesser Harbour to the mouth of the Greater, in order to join other thirty-five which put out from the Great Harbour in delivering an attack by sea. The Athenians answered the challenge by sending First engage-twenty-five vessels to engage the Syracusans in ment-the Great Harbour and thirty-five to keep the entrance. For 1 Thuc. vii. 29 f. For Diitrephes, cf. Aristoph. Birds, 798 ff. It was doubtful whether he was a citizen: rbv fiaivofievov, tov Kpfjra, tov fioyis 'AttikoV, Plato, the comedian, calls him, 'Eoprcu, frag. 31. 340 SUCCESS OF GYLIPPUS, 413. [X. 24. a time the Syracusans were victorious; those in the harbour defeated the Athenians, those outside succeeded in forcing their way in. But the advantage was not maintained. As the ships streamed through the entrance they were carried upon those in the harbour, and both were thrown into confusion. The Athenians seized the opportunity, and defeated the combined fleet, sinking eleven of their enemy's ships with a loss of three of their own. What was gained on sea was more than lost on land. In the early morning, when the fleets were engaged, Gylippus g h us *e^ uPon tne *orts on Plemmyrium They had acquires not been left without defence, but the garrisons piemmynum. were qUj£e inadequate, and the movements of Gylippus were as rapid as they were unexpected. He captured the largest of the three forts without any difficulty, and the garrisons of the other two did not even wait to be attacked. The loss to the Athenians in captives and stores was great, for Plemmyrium was regarded as a safe repository in which trierarchs could place their tackle and merchants their goods. It was also the granary of the army. Gylippus knew how to make use of his conquest. Of the two smaller forts one was destroyed, the other, and the larger fort, were strongly garrisoned. It was now difficult for the Athenians to bring supplies into the harbour or control the entrance to it, yet on this depended the very existence of the army. Dismay and despondency fell upon them.1 The army was confined to the camp between the siege-walls, where these came down to the water's edge and the Anapus;2 they had no hope of effective operations on land, and were entirely dependent on their ships for supplies. Meanwhile each side endeavoured to damage the other as opportunity offered. , The Syracusans, to protect their docks, had driven piles off the shore, some of which were not even visible above the water. These the Athenians now endeavoured to destroy 1 Thuc. vii. 22-25. 2 See Freeman, Hist. Sic. iii. 285, X. 25.] REINFORCEMENTS FOR SYRACUSE, 41S. 341 in any way that they could, for the two fleets were in close proximity, and in part they succeeded—but for a time only, for the Syracusans replaced them as soon as possible. Not content with merely defensive measures, the Syracusans, hearing that supplies were at hand for the Athenians off the coast of Italy, sent out twelve ships which destroyed most of them. Envoys were also despatched to Old Greece, and to the Greek cities in Sicily, to announce the capture of Plem-myrium and ask for fresh aid. In an attempt to intercept the twelve Syracusan ships on their return home, Nicias was unsuccessful; in the engagement which took place off Megara one ship only was taken— ten others escaped safe into the harbour of Syracuse, and the twelfth had sailed with the envoys to Greece. With them came one of the merchant-ships from Peloponnesus, having on board a number of Thespians, who were destined to take a memorable part in the defence of Syracuse. In another quarter Nicias was more fortunate. He persuaded the Sicels, who were still his friends, to lie in wait for the reinforcements which the envoys sent to the Greek cities in the west of Sicily were bringing through the interior of the island to Syracuse, and they did so with such success that about a third of the force was destroyed.1 Still the Corinthian, who alone of the envoys escaped, brought in about 1500 men; and in addition large reinforcements came from Camarina and Gela. Agrigentum, alone of the Dorian cities of Sicily, still refused to range herself on the side of Syracuse. 25. The news of this disaster so far damped the spirits of the Syracusans that they desisted from the immediate attack on the Athenians by land and sea which they ,_. 0 -1-r.i i i -1 «• i The Syracusans had planned. .But when they heard of the prepare for a approach of Demosthenes and his fleet they second battle, delayed no longer; their reinforcements, in spite of the loss, were considerable, and they had prepared their ships in a 1 Thuc. vii. 25, 32. 342 SECOND SEA FIGHT AT SYRACUSE, 413. [X. 25. way which they hoped would enable them to overcome the skill of the Athenians. From their experience of the last engagement, they perceived that the battle would be fought out prow to prow : the Athenians would have no room within the limits of the harbour for their ordinary manoeuvres, and as the shore was now in Syracusan hands, except the small part occupied by the Athenian camp, they would not be able to retire to the land to recover impetus for a fresh charge. Nor could they sail out into the open sea, for on either side in their docks and at Plemmyrium, close to the mouth of the harbour, the Syracusans lay in wait for them. To meet the new conditions of warfare, the Corinthians suggested alterations in the form of the prows of the vessels, which were made shorter and stronger, and strengthened in a manner which the Corinthians had already adopted in a conflict off Erineum.1 When all was ready, a combined attack was made on sea and land. Nicias was taken off his guard; he had expected Second naval an attack on land only, misled perhaps by his engagement. wjgj1 tkat n0 attack by sea should take place till the arrival of Demosthenes. Amid some confusion troops were despatched to meet the Syracusan army, and seventy-five ships were launched against the Syracusan eighty. Of the fortunes of the army, Thucydides says but little; his interests are mainly occupied with the great struggle at sea. No decisive advantage was gained on the first day; the fleets advanced and retreated without coming to an engagement. The next day was spent by Nicias in preparing for the attack which he saw would be renewed; any ship which had been damaged was repaired, and a secure retreat provided for those which might be hard pressed. On the third day the Syracusans again advanced to the attack, and it seemed as if the fleets would spend their time in ineffectual skirmishes as they had done before, when Ariston, a Corinthian, "who was the 1 Infra, p. 344. The changes necessary for meeting the Athenians in the Corinthian gulf had no doubt been discussed at Corinth for some time past. X. 26.] THE SYRACUSANS VICTORIOUS, US, 343 ablest pilot in the Syracusan fleet," persuaded the admirals to give orders for supplies to be brought down to the water's edge, in order that the sailors might take their meal and rejoin their ships with the least possible delay. This was done, and the Syracusans at once retired to the shore. The Athenians, mistaking their action for a sign of defeat, under the impression that the contest was at an end for the day, disembarked at their leisure and set about preparing their meal. Suddenly they saw the Syracusan fleet bearing down upon them. In great confusion, and many of them still fasting, they rushed on board, and after some delay, feeling that their only hope was in immediate action, they charged the enemy face to face. Their light prows were shattered by the heavy ships of the Syracusans, and their victory of the crews wounded by the ceaseless stream of darts Syracusans. which were poured upon them, partly from the Syracusan decks, and partly from small boats which crept up under the blades of the oars. Outmanoeuvred in every way, they at length desisted from the conflict, and retired behind the merchantmen which Nicias had moored in front of his stockade for their defence.1 Beyond these the enemy did not venture to pursue them, owing to the leaden dolphins which had been suspended aloft in the merchantmen. Two Syracusan ships, which advanced too near, were disabled, and one of them captured with the crew. A victory had been won—a clear, undoubted victory. " The Syracusans were now quite confident that they were not only equal but far superior to the Athenians at sea, and they hoped to gain the victory on land as well. So they prepared to renew the attack on both elements." 26. In the midst of these preparations the Athenian reinforcements arrived. While engaged in collecting forces in the neighbourhood of Corcyra, Demosthenes had been joined by Eurymedon, who brought from Syracuse the news that Plemmjrium had been taken by Gylippus. At the same 1 Thuc. vii. 36-41. 344 DEMOSTHENES SAILS TO SICIL F, 413. [X. 26. time Conon appeared from Naupactus asking for help against the Corinthian ships, who were threatening to engage him. Engagement Ten of the best ships in the fleet were handed offErineum. over to him, and soon after an engagement took place off Erineum in Achaea, in which the Corinthians, who had specially prepared their ships for charging the enemy prow to prow, inflicted some damage on the Athenians, and the two fleets parted without any decisive result. The Corinthians were triumphant. For them it was victory not to be defeated. The Athenians were proportionately downcast. In this, the first engagement fought at sea between Peloponnesians and Athenians since 425, they had failed to win, and such failure was in their eyes a defeat.1 From Corcyra the Athenian fleet, increased by fifteen ships from Corcyra, sailed to Iapygia, where they renewed an old The fleet of friendship with Artas, a Messapian chief, who Demosthenes, furnished javelin-men. They passed on to Metapontum, from which they received reinforcements, and thence to Thurii. On finding that the party opposed to Athens had just been expelled from the city, they remained there for some days, and succeeded not only in obtaining reinforcements from the Thurians, but in persuading them to become allies of the Athenians. The ships then sailed towards Crotona; the men were reviewed and led to the river Hylias, which divided the Thurian and Crotoniate territory. They were forbidden to pass through the latter, and descending to the mouth of the river, were again taken on board the fleet, which coasted along till it reached Petra in the territory of Ehegium. From Petra it crossed over to Sicily, and entered the Great Harbour of Syracuse. The force consisted of seventy-three ships, five thousand heavy-armed, and large numbers of javelin-men, slingers, and archers.2 1 Thuc. vii. 34. No Athenian ship was sunk, but seven of them were rendered useless, by this novel mode of attack. 2 Thuc. vii. 35, 42. Demosthenes arrived at Syracuse about the middle of August; yet the fleet left Athens early in the spring. X. 27.] HE ARRIVES AT SYRACUSE, 1*13. 345 27. At the sight of this great armament, the Syracusans were filled with dismay. The resources of Athens seemed to be inexhaustible. Their labour had been in vain; their successes unavailing. The Athenians were encouraged in proportion to their previous despondency, but unhappily for them, Demosthenes had not come with plenary A . . , r J Arrival of powers; he, the most enterprising and ener- Demosthenes getic of Athenian officers, was in joint com- atSvracuse-mand with Nicias and others, who could outvote him on any proposal. When Demosthenes saw in what a position the Athenians were, he was eager to strike at once. He believed it to be impossible to remain where they were without decisive action, and he had no intention of bringing upon himself the contempt of the Syracusans as Nicias had done by wasting a winter at Catana. The counter-wall of the Syracusans, which prevented the Athenians from carrying their wall of investment to the northern edge of Epipolae, was but a single wall, and might be captured. If he succeeded in the attempt he would be able to complete the Athenian wall; if he failed, he would carry the army back to Athens, abandoning all further operations in Sicily. He had left Athens after the renewal of the war, and knew that she was in need of money and men at home. The mode in which his attack was carried out is obscure. We first hear of an assault by engines,—apparently on the south side of the Syracusan wall, from the " circle " which was still in the hands of the Athenians. When this failed, it was decided, on the urgent advice of Demosthenes, to attempt to regain possession of the northern and western part of Epipolae, from which the Athenians had been dislodged by Gylippus. To do this in the daytime was impossible; but in the night a surprise might be successful. Night attack Leaving the camp early in the night, Demos- on Epip°lae. thenes, Eurymedon, and Menander led the whole army round the western end of Epipolae to the path by which This long delay is very remarkable, especially when we read in c. 26 : ottods €K€lBev (from Corcyra) top ifkovv a>s Ta^iora 7roir)Tai. 346 A TTA CK ON EPIPOLA E, 413. [X. 27. the Athenians had first climbed the heights. Unnoticed by the Syracusan guards, they attacked and took the fort of the Syracusans which commanded the ascent. Fugitives carried the news to the three camps which had been established on Epipolae, and the troop of six hundred, which were stationed as a guard at this point. These rushed forward to the defence, but part of the Athenian force beat them back, while others swept on to the Syracusan counter-wall, of which they captured a part and began to destroy it.1 Gylippus at the head of his forces sallied out from the fortified camps to render aid, but, startled at the sudden attack, he too was at first beaten off. In the elation of victory, the Athenians pressed on too rapidly; they were thrown into disorder, and when they came into collision with the Boeotians (the Thespians who had joined the Syracusans at Locri, supra, p. 341) they were repulsed and put to flight. The details of the engagement Thucydides Defeat of the was unable to discover. Many things con-Athenians. tributed to increase the confusion. It was night, and though the moon shone brightly, it was impossible 1 Thucydides does not make it clear how far the Syracusan cross-wall passed beyond the Athenian siege-wall to the west. Grote and Freeman thought that there was a wall running along the whole of the northern part of Epipolae, from Euryelus to the city, supra, p. 333; Freeman, Hist, of Sicily, Appendix xv. Thucydides mentions (1) a rei^ta-fia at the ascent of Euryelus; this the Athenians captured; (2) ra crrparoireba, a r\v enl twv 'EttittoXwi/ Tpia—to which the fugitives fled ; (3) to arrb ttjs 7rpa>Trjs TraparcL-X^o-fia t9 rjbr) avvetypovovv KaX oi 7ro\\ol y€vofievr)V V7TO rr)S (TeXrjvrjs' avrrjv de rrjv o-eAqvrjv, cotivl avyrvy-ydvovara Kai nebs atyvtbiov e< 7ravo~€\rjPov to . X. 30.] PREPARATIONS FOR A LAST BATTLE, 413. 351 " land-fight on sea." In order to counteract the effect of the heavy prows of the enemy's ships, the Athenian vessels were furnished with " iron hands," or grapnels, which would hold the attacking ship at close quarters, and prevent it from retiring to make a second charge. When all the preparations were complete, Nicias endeavoured to rouse the Address of soldiers from their despondency. They were Nicias-veterans in warfare, he said, who knew the changes and chances of battle. They might still hope for victory, for every precaution had been taken, and with their infantry they still had the superiority. He called on the sailors who were not Athenians, to save the empire, in whose advantages they shared, reminding them that by identifying themselves with Athens, speaking the Athenian dialect, and imitating Athenian manners, they had been admired throughout Greece as citizens of the great city.1 Let them show that, in spite of disease and calamity, they were still the first sailors in the world. To the Athenians in the army he pointed out how great was the issue at stake. The fleet and the army could not be replaced. If they failed in the impending contest, they would fall into the hands of the Syracusans, " and you know," Nicias said significantly, "with what intentions you attacked them," while the Athenians at home would be unable to save themselves from subjection to the Lacedaemonians. "Stand firm, therefore, now if ever, and remember, one and all of you who are embarking, that you are both the fleet and army of your country, and that on you hangs the whole state and the great name of Athens: for her sake, if any man exceed another in skill or courage, let him display them now; he will never have a better opportunity of doing good to himself and saving his country." 2 Gylippus also addressed his soldiers. He reminded them that the Athenians had come to Sicily with the intention of 1 Thuc. vii. 63 : 6t recos 'AOtjvcuoi vofjLi£6fi€voi koi firj ovres vfiwv rrjs re (fxovrjs rff iiTL(TTj]^rj kcu t&v TpdVa>i> 177 /u/i?}crei eOavfidfco-Qe Kara rnv 'EXXaSa. 2 Thuc. vii. 64, Jowett. 352 THE GREAT STRUGGLE, £13. [X. 31. enslaving the island, and using it as an instrument for enslaving Hellas. These hopes had been dashed to the ground. Address of The irresistible navy had been defeated, and Gyiippus. it would soon be defeated again. The pre- parations of the enemy, the crowding of their decks with heavy-armed and javelin-men, and the great number of ships, would be a hindrance rather than a help. The attack which they were about to deliver was the last effort of despair, for it was impossible for them to remain where they were. Their good fortune had left them and deserted to the Syracusans. "I need not tell you that they are our enemies, and our worst enemies. They came against our land that they might enslave us, and if they had succeeded, they would have inflicted the greatest sufferings on our men, and the worst indignities upon our wives and children, and would have stamped a name of dishonour on our whole city. Wherefore, let no one's heart be softened to them. Seldom are men exposed to hazards in which they lose little if they fail, and win all if they succeed."1 31. What followed can only be told in the words of Thucydides. "While Nicias, overwhelmed by the situation, and seeing how great and how near the peril was (for the ships were on the very point of rowing out), feeling too, as men do on the Athenians. eve °^ a great struggle, that all which he had done was nothing, and that he had not said half enough, again addressed the trierarchs, and calling each of them by his father's name, and his own name, and the name of his tribe, he entreated those who had made any reputation for themselves not to be false to it, and those wkose ancestors were eminent not to tarnish their hereditary fame. He reminded them that they were the inhabitants of the freest country in the world^ and how in Athens there was no interference with the daily life of any man. He spoke to them of their wives and children and their fathers' gods, as men will at such a time ; for then they do not care whether their common-place phrases seem to be out of date or hot, but loudly reiterate the old appeals, 1 Thuc. vii. 68, Jowett. X. 3L] NATURE OF THE FIGHTING, J£8. 353 believing that they may be of some service at the awful moment. When he thought that he had exhorted them, not enough, but as much as the scanty time allowed, he retired, and led the land-forces to the shore, extending the line as far as he could, so that they might be of the greatest use in encouraging the combatants on board ship. Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who had gone on board the Athenian fleet to take the command, now quitted their own station, and proceeded straight to the closed mouth of the harbour, intending to force their way to the open sea where a passage was still left. " The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with nearly the same number of ships as before. A detachment of them guarded the entrance of the harbour; the remainder were disposed all round it in such a manner that they might fall on the Athenians from every side at once, and that their land-forces might at the same time be able to co-operate wherever the ships retreated to the shore. Sicanus and Agatharchus commanded the Syracusan fleet, each of them a wing ; Pythen and the Corinthians occupied the centre. When the Athenians approached the closed mouth of the harbour, the violence of their onset overpowered the ships which were stationed there ; they then attempted to loosen the fastenings. Whereupon from all sides the Syracusans and their allies came bearing down upon them, and the conflict was no longer confined to the entrance, but extended throughout the harbour. No previous engagement had been so fierce and obstinate. Great was the eagerness with which the rowers on both sides rushed upon their enemies whenever the word of command was given; and keen was the contest between the pilots as they manoeuvred one against another. The marines too were full of anxiety that, when ship struck ship, the service on deck should not fall short of the rest; every one in the place assigned to him was eager to be foremost among his fellows. Many vessels meeting—and never did so many fight in so small a space, for the two fleets together amounted to nearly two hundred—they were seldom able to strike in the regular manner, because they had no opportunity of first retiring or breaking the line ; they generally fouled one another as ship dashed against ship in the hurry of flight or pursuit. All the time that another vessel was bearing down, the men on deck poured showers of javelins and arrows and stones upon the enemy ; and when the two closed, the marines fought hand to hand, and endeavoured to board. In many places, owing to the want of room, they who had struck another found that they were struck themselves ; VOL. III. Z 354 THE A THENIANS DEFEA TED, 413. [X. 31. often* two or even more vessels were unavoidably entangled about one, and the pilots had to make plans of attack and defence, not against one adversary only, but against several coming from different sides. The crash of so many ships dashing against one another took away the wits of the sailors, and made it impossible to hear the boatswains, whose voices in both fleets rose high, as they gave directions to the rowers, or cheered them on in the excitement of the struggle. On the Athenian side they were shouting to their men that they must force a passage and seize the opportunity now or never of returning in safety to their native land. To the Syracusans and their allies was represented the glory of preventing the escape of their enemies, and of a victory by which every man would exalt the Jionour of his own city. The commanders, too, when they saw any ship backing without necessity, would call the captain by his name, and ask, of the Athenians, whether they were retreating because they expected to be more at home upon the land of their bitterest foes than upon that sea which had been their own so long ; on the Syracusan side, whether, when they knew perfectly well that the Athenians were only eager to find some means of flight, they would themselves fly from the fugitives. " While the naval engagement hung in the balance, the two armies on shore had great trial and conflict of soul. The Sicilian soldier was animated by the hope of increasing the glory which he had .already won, while the invader was tormented by the fear that his fortunes might sink lower still. The last chance of the Athenians lay in their ships, and their anxiety- was dreadful. The fortune of the battle varied; and it was not possible that the spectators on the shore should all receive the same impression of it. Being quite close, and having different points of view, they would some of them see their own ships victorious ; their courage would then revive, and they would earnestly call upon the gods not to take from them their hope of deliverance. But others, who saw their ships worsted, cried and shrieked aloud, and were by the sight alone more utterly unnerved than the defeated combatants themselves. Others again, who had fixed their gaze on some part of the struggle which was undecided, were in a state of excitement still more terrible ; they kept swaying their bodies to and fro in an agony of hope and fear as the stubborn conflict went on and on ; for at every instant they were all but saved or all but lost. And while the strife hung in the balance, you might hear in the Athenian army at once lamentation, shouting, cries of victory or defeat, and all the various sounds which are wrung from a great host in extremity of danger. Not less agonising were the X. 32.] DEMOSTHENES WOULD FIGHT AGAIN, 418. 355 feelings of those on board. At length the Syracusans and their allies, after a protracted struggle, put the Athenians to flight, and triumphantly bearing down upon them, and encouraging one another with loud cries and exhortations, drove them to land. Then that part of the navy which had not been taken in the deep water fell back in confusion to the shore, and the arews rushed out of the ships into the camp. And the land-forces, no longer now divided in feeling, but uttering one universal groan of intolerable anguish, ran, some of them to save the ships, others to defend what remained of the wall; but the greater number began to look to themselves and to their own safety."l 32. Even in this dreadful hour there was one soldier in the Athenian army whose spirit was not broken, whose genius at once divined the best plan of saving the wreck of the army. The Athenians had still more WiShes to ships available for serviqe than the enemy; let renew the them go on board again and endeavour to force their way out at daybreak : such was the advice of Demosthenes. Nicias agreed, but when the order was given to the sailors, they refused to obey it. They would not again face the enemy on sea; and nothing remained for the generals but to arrange for retreat by land. Hermocrates suspected their intention, and resolved to prevent it by securing the roads and passes. Euined though it was, the Athenian army was still numerous, and, if settled in Sicily, might become a source of danger. The Syracusan authorities agreed with Hermocrates; but would their soldiers be willing to carry out the plan 1 They had just won a great victory, and were also celebrating a festival—to be called out for service at such a time would be too great a hardship. If Action of Hermocrates could not rouse the Syracusan Hermocrates. soldier to a sense of his duty, he could at least count on the folly of the Athenian commander. When night came on he sent out friends of his own to play the part of envoys from the 1 Thuc. vii. 69-71, Jowett. For the account of Diodorus, see Freeman, I.e. p. 348 ff. 356 THE ATHENIANS RETREAT, &$. [X. 33, Athenian party in Syracuse, and warn Nicias that the passes were guarded. Let him wait for daylight before moving his army. The Athenian generals swallowed the bait, countermanded the orders given, and even delayed till the following day, that the soldiers might set out as well equipped as the circumstances permitted. In this interval the Syracusans had ample time to secure the fords and passes into the interior, and to dispose their forces in the best positions for attack. They also towed the Athenian ships from the shore of the harbour to the city, except a few which the Athenians had burnt.1 33. At last the retreat began. " The Athenians were in a dreadful condition ; not only was there the great fact that they had lost their whole fleet, and instead of their expected triumph had brought the utmost peril upon Retreat of the A f, „ r & , * . * Athenians. Athens as well as upon themselves, but also the sights which presented themselves as they quitted the camp were painful to every eye and mind. The dead were unburied, and when any one saw the body of a friend lying on the ground he was smitten with sorrow and dread, while the sick or wounded who still survived but had to be left were even a greater trial to the living, and more to be pitied than those who were gone. Their prayers and lamentations drove their companions to distraction; they would beg that they might be taken with them, and call by name any friend or relation whom they saw passing; they would hang upon their departing comrades and follow as far as they could, and when their limbs and strength failed them and they dropped behind many were the imprecations and cries which they uttered. So that the whole army was in tears, and such was their despair that they could hardly make up their minds to stir, although they were leaving an enemy's country, having suffered calamities too great for tears already, and dreading miseries yet greater in the unknown future. There was also a general feeling of shame and self-reproach,—indeed they seemed, not like an army, but like the fugitive population of a city captured after a siege; and of a great city too. For the whole multitude who were marching together numbered not less than forty thousand. Each of them took with him anything he could carry which was likely to be of use. 1 Thuc. vii. 74. X. 33-] NIC/AS ENCOURAGES THEM, $1$. 357 Even the heavy-armed and cavalry, contrary to their practice when under arms, conveyed about their persons their own food, some because they had no attendants, others because they could not trust them ; for they had long been deserting, and most of them had gone off all at once. Nor was the food which they carried sufficient; for the supplies of the camp had failed. Their disgrace and the universality of the misery, although there might be some consolation in the very community of suffering, was nevertheless at that moment hard to bear, especially when they remembered from what pride and splendour they had fallen into their present low estate. Never had an Hellenic army experienced such a reverse. They had come intending to enslave others, and they were going away in fear that they would be themselves enslaved. Instead of the prayers and hymns with which they had put to sea, they were now departing amid appeals to heaven of another sort. They were no longer sailors but landsmen, depending, not upon their fleet, but upon their infantry. Yet in face of the great danger which still threatened them all these things appeared endurable."x Nicias was not wanting at this crisis. Though suffering so severely from a painful disease that his condition was apparent to every one, he endeavoured to Heroism of inspire his soldiers with such hope as their Nicias-circumstances admitted. He entreated them not to be cast down by their misfortunes. He himself, though his life had been passed in the performance of every duty, was now deserted by the good fortune which had hitherto attended him, and involved in the common calamity. Yet looking on the past he still cherished hope for the future. If they had been under the displeasure of any god when they set forth to attack Syracuse, their sufferings were an ample expiation ; they were now an object of divine compassion rather % than divine envy. They were still a great army, such as no Sicilian city could easily resist; and wherever they encamped they would at once form a city. The march must be made in good order, and in haste, for supplies were short; but as soon as they reached the territory of the Sicels they would be safe. They had no place of retreat near, to which a 1 Thuc. vii. 75, Jowett. 358 THEIR ROUTE BARRED, 413. [X. 33. coward could fly, and on their success it depended whether the power of Athens, overthrown for the time, should be restored. "It is men, not walls or ships, which make a city." The heavy-armed were arranged in two hollow squares, within which were placed the baggage and the light-armed, The line of and two divisions were made of the army: the march. grst marcning under the command of Nicias, the second under Demosthenes. At the ford of the Anapus they found a body of Syracusans waiting for them; these they defeated, and passed onwards, for about five miles, harassed all the way by the Syracusan horse and javelin men. The next day, after marching about two miles and a half, they encamped in a plain to obtain food and water; meanwhile the Syracusans built a wall across a steep hill path, between two ravines, up which their route lay. When the Athenians resumed their march on the third day they were again attacked by the horse, as before, and after a fruitless resistance returned to their camp. The next day (the 4th) they marched up to the hill, but only to find the pass held by the Syracusan army in great force. Their efforts to break through were in vain, and to add to their discouragement a storm of thunder and lightning burst over the army. The very elements seemed to be fighting against them. They succeeded, nevertheless, in preventing an attempt which Gylippus made to cut them off in the rear by a wall across the ravine through which they had passed. They then retired towards the level ground and encamped for the night. With the next day (the 5th) they again advanced, but the Syracusans set upon them from every side, retiring when the Athenians advanced, and attacking when they retired. After a long struggle the Athenians once more encamped in the plain about three quarters of a mile in advance of their former position.1 1 Thuc. vii. 77-79. Thucydides gives the name 'AKpdtov \eiras to the hill between two ravines where the Athenians were checked : it is the modern Monasterello, and the pass leading to it is the Cava Spampi-nato. See Freeman, Hist, of Sicily, iii. p. 375; p. 701 ff.; infra, p. 364. X. 34«] DEMOSTHENES SURRENDERS, 413. 359 The Athenian generals now changed their plans. They abandoned the attempt to penetrate into the interior, and resolved to retire to the coast under cover of night. In this way they hoped to shake off angeo the Syracusans, by whom such a change of route would be quite unexpected. They got away unobserved, but their ill luck still pursued them; a panic fell on the army; the division of Demosthenes was thrown into disorder, and greatly delayed on its march. At daybreak (6th day) Nicias reached the sea, and struck into the Helorine road, intending, when they arrived at the Cacyparis, to march up the river into the interior, where the Sicels, to whom they had sent envoys, would receive them. When he reached the river, he found the Syracusans engaged in cutting off their progress through the ford by walls and palisades. He succeeded in driving them off, but on the advice of his guides he abandoned the plan of marching up the Cacyparis, and went on to the Erineus, where, as he hoped, he would be less hindered by the Syracusans.1 34. The Syracusans, when they found the Athenians gone from their encampment, were for a moment dismayed and indignant. They even suspected Gylippus of surrender of allowing them to escape. But though the Demosthenes, fugitives had changed their route, it was easy to trace them, and in a short time the Syracusans came up with the division of Demosthenes (6th day), which had not yet In their attempt to win this pass, the Athenians were, in Professor Freeman's opinion, endeavouring to make their way to Catana—and this is the view of Diodorus, xiii. 18, irporjcaav enl Kardvrjs—which, however, must be a mistake. In c. 80. 1, Thucydides says rjv rj i-vimacra 686s avvq ovk eVt Kardvrjs ro> arparevfiaTLj and if rj £vfi. 6b6s means "the whole retreat" this is decisive. The only change in their plans was that whereas they originally intended to march inland at once, now they marched by the shore till they could find a favourable opportunity of striking into the country. Cp. 80. 2. 1 For the topography, see Freeman, Hist, of Sicily, iii. 706. The Cacyparis is apparently the Cassibile; about the Erineus there is more doubt: it may be the Cavallata, a small stream to the south of Avola. 360 NIC1AS CONTINUES HIS RETREAT, 413. [X. 34. recovered from the panic of the night, and was about six miles in the rear of Nicias. When they attacked him he abandoned all thought of retreat, and prepared to resist, but the enemy would not give him the opportunity of a battle. He was driven into an olive-garden, an enclosure surrounded by a wall, with roads running on each side of it. Here, the whole day through, his soldiers were exposed to the missiles of the enemy from every side, until at length Gylippus, seeing their distress, proclaimed that any islanders in the army, who came over to him, would retain their freedom. A few cities, and only a few, availed themselves of the permission; the majority, whether from distrust of the Syracusans or from loyalty to Athens, preferred the nobler part of sharing to the end in the disasters of the day. After some further delay the whole force, amounting to 6000 men, agreed to give up their arms on condition that their lives should be spared, a stipulation in which Demosthenes himself refused to be included. What money they had was collected—and enough was found to fill four shields —and the men were immediately led away to the city.1 Nicias meanwhile had crossed the Erineus and encamped his division on rising ground. The next day, the seventh of Nicias at the the retreat, when the Syracusans came up, they Assinarus. announced the surrender of Demosthenes, and called on Nicias to do the same. On finding that the state- 1 Thuc. vii. 81, 82, The narrative of Thucydides is not clear; he speaks as if both divisions entered the Helorine road and advanced to the Cacyparis. But this is not probable, for by the middle of the day Nicias is fifty stadia ahead of Demosthenes, though at some distance from the Erineus, yet the whole distance between the Cacyparis and Erineus is not more than forty stadia. Plutarch identifies the olive-garden as that of Polyzelus (the brother of Hiero), Nic. c. 27 ; and informs us that Demosthenes attempted to kill himself, but was prevented by his captors. Pausanias also mentions the attempt, on the authority of Philistus, the Sicilian historian (see below, p. 364, n.), i. 29. 12 : ypacfrco be ovbev bid(f>opa rj ^lXkttos, bs €(j)rj Ar)^io(rBevrjv \ikv (riropbas 7roirj(ra(rdai rols oXXot? 7rXrjP avrov, kclI a>s rjXiariccTOy avrov eirixeipeiv aTroKTeivai. The circumstances of the retreat make it probable that Demosthenes was overtaken before he reached the coast. X. 34-3 HE REACHES THE ASS IN A R US, 41S. 361 ment was true, Nicias offered, on the part of the Athenians, to pay a full indemnity for the cost of the war, if his army were allowed to go free, and to give sureties—one citizen for each talent—till the money was paid. The offer was not accepted; and the Syracusans at once began to attack the division in the same manner as they had done that of Demosthenes. Though greatly distressed for want of food, the soldiers held out for the whole of the day, and when night came they endeavoured to steal away unobserved. In this they were detected, though three hundred broke through the ring of the Syracusan guards, only to be captured later on. The rest remained where they were. Next day (the 8th) Nicias led them forward, amid the attacks of the Syracusans, to the Assinarus. Here they hoped to find some relief, and they would at least be able to quench their intolerable thirst. " No sooner did they reach the water than they lost all order and rushed in; every man was trying to cross first, and the enemy pressing upon them at the same time, the passage of the river became hopeless. Being compelled to keep close together, they fell one upon another, and trampled each other underfoot; some at once perished, pierced by their own spears; others got entangled in the baggage, and were carried down the stream. The Syracusans stood upon the further bank of the river, which was steep, and hurled missiles from above on the Athenians, who were huddled together in the deep bed of the stream, and for the most part were drinking greedily. The Peloponnesians came down the bank and slaughtered them, falling chiefly upon those who were in the river. Whereupon the water at once became foul, but was drunk all the same, although muddy and dyed with blood, and the crowd fought for it. "At last, when the dead bodies were lying in heaps upon one another in the water and the army was utterly undone, some perishing in the river, and any who escaped being cut off by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered to Gylippus, in whom he had more confidence than the Syracusans. He entreated him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they pleased with himself, but not to go on killing the men. So Gylippus gave the word to make prisoners."l 1 Thuc. vii. 85, Jowett. The Assinarus is identified with the Falconara. 362 SURRENDER OF NICIAS, 413. [X. 34. Demosthenes had surrendered on terms, and his soldiers became prisoners of the Syracusan state. It was otherwise with the division of Nicias; there was no formal agreement in this case; the slaughter was brought to an end at the request of Nicias, and the men passed into the hands of those who took them. Of the whole division only a thousand came into the possession of the Syracusan state. The slaughter had been great—both at the Assinarus and on the march thither—and many escaped, but the remarkable difference in the number of the captives in the two divisions is to be explained by the appropriation of the prisoners by their captors.1 In Pausanias we read a story which casts a ray of light on the horrors of the final scene. He tells us that Callistratus, one of the Athenian hipparchs, cut his way through the enemy at the Assinarus, and led his troop in safety to Catana. Then he returned to Syracuse, and finding the enemy still engaged in plundering the Athenian camp, he rode in upon them, and slew five of the number. Then he fell, and his horse also, beneath their spears.2 The return of the victorious Syracusans is described by Plutarch. The captives, so many of them, that is, as were state The return prisoners, were collected into a body to be taken to Syracuse. to the city. On the tallest and most beautiful of the trees which grew by the Assinarus were suspended the panopKes of the prisoners to serve as a trophy; the Syracusans adorned themselves with crowns, and their horses with splendid trappings, while they clipped the manes of any of the enemy's horses which fell into their hands. Thus they rode back to the city. The day was celebrated by a festival called the Assinaria. No contest so great had ever been 1 Thuc. I.e.: to de biaickairev tto\v. See Freeman, Hist, of Sicily, iii. 399. 2 Paus. vii. 16. 5. He may have got the story from Philistus. Cp. Lysias, 20. 26, eireibr) $e die(p6dprj [to orpaTonebop] ml dpeo-oadrjp el? Kardvyv, iXrj'i^6p,r)P oppvpevos eprevdcv Kal roits iroXe/JLiovs kclkods iiroiovp. X. 35-1 THE STONE-QUARRIES, 413. 363 fought between Greeks; no conqueror had ever won a victory so complete.1 35. An assembly was now held of the Syracusans and their allies to decide on the fate of the prisoners. The two generals—Nicias and Demosthenes—were at Fate of the once condemned to death, in spite of the prisoners, opposition of Gylippus. Demosthenes, perhaps, could hardly have expected any other doom. From the Lacedaemonians he had nothing to hope; the seizure of Pylus was not to be forgotten; nor were the Corinthians likely to spare the man who had dealt so severe a blow at their colony of Ambracia.2 Nicias was sacrificed, partly to the Athenian party in Syracuse, who were afraid of inconvenient disclosures, and partly to the Corinthians, who, knowing his wealth, thought that he might purchase his escape to Greece.3 " For these reasons or the like he was put to death," a man who, in the opinion of Thucydides, was less deserving than any of the Hellenes of his time of such a miserable end. The rest of the prisoners were placed in the stone-quarries on the southern slope of Achradina. A scanty measure of food and water, barely enough to sustain life, was allowed them day by day. There they remained, suffering the extremes of temperature—glowing heat in the day, and piercing chill at night—in the midst of intolerable smells, and " every kind of misery which could befall man in such a place." At the end of ten weeks the Syracusans took out all except the Athenians and their allies from Sicily or Italy, and sold them for slaves. The rest remained for nearly six months longer, when the survivors were removed to the public prison of Syracuse.4 Sicily " was now full of slaves " —not uncivilised slaves purchased from barbarous regions, 1 Plut. Nic. 27, 28. He fixes the day on the 27th Metageitnion (Sep. 21?). 2 Supra,?. 199. 3 Thuc. vii. 86. According to Diodorus, xiii. 19, it was at first proposed by Diodes to put them to death with torture. He gives the discussion at great length. 4 Thuc. vii 87 ; Diod. xiii. 33. 364 ENSLAVED ATHENIANS, US* [X. 35, but cultivated Athenians, superior in every way to many of their captors. It is to the honour of the Sicilians that their merits were recognised by their masters. Plutarch informs us that those who could repeat passages from Euripides were allowed their freedom; and even the wretched straggler who could sing a song out of the famous tragedies was supplied with food and water.1 Such was the end of the Sicilian expedition. " Of all the Hellenic actions which took place in this war, or indeed of any Hellenic actions which are on record, this was the greatest, the most glorious to the victors, the most ruinous to the vanquished, for they were utterly and at all points defeated, and their sufferings were prodigious. Fleet and army perished from the earth—nothing was saved; and of the many who went forth, few returned home." 2 1 Plut. Nic. 29. Later writers, as usual, supplement or correct the narrative of Thucydides. Justin (iv. 5) says that Demosthenes put an end to himself (thus improving on Philistus, supra), Plutarch, that he and Nicias were not put to death by the order of the Syracusans, but died by their own hands, Hermocrates giving them the opportunity of doing this while the Assembly was still in session. Diodorus tells us that they were put to death at the instigation of Gylippus, whose speech he gives {inter alia)—a correction of Thucydides due perhaps to some Sicilian historian who wished to remove the stigma from his nation. What value is to be attributed to the picturesque details given in the text from Plutarch it is impossible to say ; had we the history of Philistus before us we should be able to explain much. He was an eye-witness of the siege (Plut. Nic. 19), and wrote a history of Syracuse down to the capture of Agrigentum in 406. 2 Thuc. vii. 87. Approach to 'Aicpcuov Xeiras. A very narrow defile with steep sides at least one and a half mile long : then a very small space of open country. I climbed the hill to the left. The 'Aicpcuov Xenas in front, rising gently at first, more steeply afterwards ; a little road running up it: a comparatively open valley, with perhaps a ravine at the bottom, on the right (of the Xeiras, from the spectator's point of view): a very deep ravine running far up into the hills on the right, and forking after about a quarter of a mile. W. H. FOKBES, Note of a Visit to Syracuse, 1881. CHAPTER XL FROM THE END OF THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION TO .THE FALL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED (413-411). I, No formal report was sent to Athens of the destruction of her forces in Sicily, and the unauthorised rumours which reached the city were at first received with Feeling at incredulity, for the Athenians could not be- Athens on the lieve that so great a calamity had overtaken Sicilian so splendid an army and so safe a general; disaster, and even when they heard the story from the lips of the survivors, soldiers of known reputation who had escaped from the general destruction, it was long before they could bring themselves to accept the whole truth.1 When doubt was no longer possible, their minds were filled with rage, grief, and alarm. They turned fiercely upon the " orators" who had persuaded them into the expedition, forgetting that those who had opposed their wishes had been cried down as rogues and traitors. JSTot less bitter was their resentment against the prophets who had spoken smooth things, and the diviners who had foretold from the omens the conquest of Sicily. Their hearts were saddened, not merely by the failure of their hopes, but by the loss of friends and relatives. " The citizens mourned, and the city mourned." And when they thought of the war in 1 Thiic. viii. 1. Plutarch, Nicias 30, tells us that the news was first brought to AtheDS by a stranger, who on landing in the Peiraeus entered a barber's shop and spoke of the disaster as commonly known. The barber at once informed the magistrate, who summoned him before the Assembly, and called on him for his authority ; but as he could give no account of the stranger, he was put on the rack and tortured until his story was confirmed. 86$ 366 A THENS AFTER SICILIAN DISASTER, 418. [XI. X. which they were again involved, what a prospect was before them! The flower of the infantry and cavalry lay in the quarries of Syracuse, and their places could only be filled, if at all, by the old, or the young, or the incompetent. Crews could not be collected for the ships, and if they could, there was no money to pay them; the number of triremes in the docks was quite inadequate to the demands of the crisis. They foresaw that in this hour of her weakness not only would the old enemies of Athens redouble their efforts for her destruction; not only would the allies hasten to throw off the yoke under which they had groaned so long, but the forces of the West were now free to take part in the conflict. Since the capture of the Peloponnesian fleet in the harbour of Pylus in 425, Athens had had nothing to fear at sea, but the days of security were ended. The ships of Sicily, which even in 431 were expected to form the bulk of the Peloponnesian fleet, would now appear off the Peiraeus to complete the ruin of the tyrant of the seas. Yet even in this crisis of their fortunes, the Athenians did not lose heart, but with the marvellous buoyancy which they always displayed in misfortune, they made Courage of the J ,. r/ , ,, ,, .' * T- Athenians: preparations to meet the gathering storm. It they prepare was fortunate for them that the winter season or wa * was at hand, during which the Syracusan ships would not venture across the water; and that Brasidas, whose restless energy regarded all seasons of the year as equally fit for martial operations, was no longer alive to lead or inspire the Peloponnesians. In six months of comparative inaction on the part of the enemy much might be done; ships could be built; money saved or collected; and above all a strict watch set over the subject and allied cities. More especially the Athenians directed their Sunium: estab- attention to Euboea, which, since Agis had lishment of occupied Decelea, was doubly necessary to them Probuli. r , ' . * . , \ as a source of supplies; and m order to secure the safety of their merchantmen—as it was now impossible to import corn overland—they fortified the headland of XI. 2.] THE ENEMIES OF ATHENS, US. 367 Sunium. The strictest attention was given to economy, expenses were retrenched where possible; even the fortress in Laconia, which had been built by the fleet on the voyage to Sicily, was now abandoned. These measures were carried out under the superintendence of a board of ten Probuli or Commissioners of Public Safety, " who were chosen to advise together and lay before the people such measures as might be required from time to time."1 The establishment of such a board was felt to be a step towards oligarchy. Democracy was in fact on its trial, and many were ready to take advantage of the shock which it had received by the failure of the great popular enterprise, though, as yet, no one knew how deep was the distrust of existing institutions.2 • 2. By the enemies of Athens the news of the great disaster was received with a thrill of delight. At last the tyrant city was down; and but a few months would Feeiingofthe pass before her destruction was complete, enemies of Every one hastened to be in at the death. Athens* Those who had hitherto stood apart from the war were eager to join in it. They wished to share in the glory of the final victory which could not be long delayed; they longed to repay the evils which they had suffered in anticipation, knowing that if Athens had been successful in Sicily they would have been added to the list of her victims. The 1 Of the duties of these officers we can only form a vague opinion on evidence which is not very trustworthy. In the Lysistrata of Aristophanes, which was brought out in 411, a Probulus is introduced, and the duties assigned to him are partly financial and partly political. With his colleagues he seems to have had control over the public funds, and to have received deputations from foreign states, duties which usually devolved on the Prytanes. But they did not take the place of the Council, which still retained its administrative power and brought proposals before the Assembly. See Lysist. 11. 421 f., 433 ff., 980 ff. ; Gilbert, Beitrdge, p. 289. The number of the Probuli is fixed by Ath. Pol. c. 29. Two only are known to us by name: Hagnon and Sophocles. The first is the adoptive father of Theramenes ; the second may be the poet. 2 Thuc. viii. 1, 4. 368 THE ALLIES PREPARE TO REVOLT, 413. [XI. 2. subjects of Athens, allowing their temper to get the better of their judgment, were convinced that the tyrant city could not hold out for a year. The Lacedaemonians and their allies expected a large force from Sicily in the spring, with whose help they would bring.the war to a close, and free themselves for ever from the apprehensions which had for two generations agitated the Grecian world. The Athenian empire and Athenian dreams of conquest would be things of the past. Greece would fall back into the old grooves, and Sparta would be once more acknowledged as the leading state.1 But low as she was brought, Athens was still " mistress of the sea," and without ships Sparta could accomplish nothing.2 Preparations for In the winter of 413 Agis marched from aPeioponnesian Decelea upon the Oetaeans and neighbouring fleet* tribes, and in spite of the protests of the Thes- salians, whose subjects they were, insisted that they should not only join the alliance, but contribute money and give pledges of fidelity. On their part, the Lacedaemonians called upon the cities of the alliance to build a fleet of one hundred vessels (of which fifty were to be provided by themselves and the Boeotians in equal proportions); these were to be ready by the following spring. And now the evil which Athens had most to fear began to show itself. From all sides envoys from her allies flocked The allies pre- ^° the Lacedaemonians, requesting their help pare to revolt: jn throwing off the yoke. First in the field LesboTappiy were tne Euboeans, who visited Agis at Decelea. to Agis. Agis eagerly listened to their proposals, and at once sent home for additional troops and officers, of whom one was Alcamenes, the son of Sthenelaidas (supra, p. 89), but when he was about to transport them across the Euripus, a deputation from Lesbos arrived proposing to bring their 1 Thuc. viii. 2. 2 The Athenians had command of the sea during the winter of 413; for the Spartans were without ships, and were as always slow to take advantage of the situation. XI. 2.] EUBOEA, LESBOS, CHIOS, ETC., J^IS. 369 island over. As the Lesbians had the powerful support of the Boeotians, their ancient kinsmen, Agis abandoned Euboea and promised to send a small fleet to act with the Lesbians, under the command of Alcamenes, who was to be " harmost" of Lesbos, a title now mentioned for the first time. In making these arrangements he acted without reference to the home authorities.1 His position at Decelea allowed him to take up an independent line, and by his zeal and policy he had won the confidence of the allies. Like Brasidas, but in a less degree, he exhibited Spartan energy and ability without the severe formalism of the Spartan officer, and for this reason the cities applied to him for help more readily than to the impracticable govern- appiyto Sparta: ment on the Eurotas. To Sparta, meanwhile, Tissaphernes came the Chians and Erythraeans accompanied suppo s em* by an envoy from Tissaphernes, the King's general on the Asiatic coast and satrap of Sardis. Tissaphernes had lately succeeded Pissuthnes, with orders to crush the revolt which that satrap had excited. By purchasing Lycon, a Greek soldier in command of the revolted troops, he had forced Pissuthnes to capitulate; but the rebels still held their ground in Caria, under Amorges, the son of Pissuthnes; and the King now commanded Tissaphernes, not only to produce Amorges alive or dead, but to collect the arrears of tribute from the Greek cities of the coast, which though unpaid since 479 were duly entered as a debt against the satrap (cp. vol. ii. 73, 286). For these reasons Tissaphernes readily undertook to support any force which the Lacedaemonians' would send into Ionia. Finally, two exiled Envoys from Greeks, Calligitus of Megara and Timagoras of Pharnabazus Cyzicus, came from Pharnabazus, the satrap of at parta' Phrygia, who, being also pressed for arrears of tribute, was eager to bring over the Athenian allies in the Hellespont to Persia and negotiate an alliance between Lacedaemon and the Great King. But though the envoys of Pharnabazus 1 This is the more remarkable after the events of 418 and the arrangements mentioned supra, p. 281. VOL. III. 2 A 370 THE REVOLT SUPPORTED, W- [XI. 3. had brought twenty-five talents with them, a tempting bait to Spartan cupidity, Tissaphernes and the Chians found a powerful advocate in Alcibiades, who was the hereditary and personal friend of Endius, one of the ephors of the year. Before a final decision was pronounced, the Spartans sent an envoy to Chios to ascertain whether the island was able to make good her promises. On receiving a favourable report, they at once admitted the Chians and moniansedecide Erythraeans into alliance, and passed a vote to support the to send forty ships to their help (the Chians had sixty), of which Lacedaemon herself undertook to furnish ten. Melancridas, the admiral, was placed in command, but an earthquake occurring before the ships put to sea, Chalcideus was elected in the room of Melancridas, and the number of the ships was reduced to five.1 3. Meanwhile the allied vessels and those which Agis had collected to sail to Lesbos, thirty-nine in all, were assembled The Lacedae- i*1 tne Corinthian gulf. A meeting of the allies monian fleet to was held at Corinth, and it was agreed that the Lesbos, and the Aeet should sail first to Chios, then to Lesbos, Hellespont. and finally to the Hellespont. To each district a separate commander was assigned: Chalcideus to Chios, Alcamenes to Lesbos, and Clearchus to the Hellespont. In order to distract the attention of the Athenians, the ships were to sail in two detachments, and with this precaution it was thought safe, in the present state of the Athenian navy, to sail through the open sea without any attempt at concealment. When the season was sufficiently advanced for operations, the Chian envoys were most urgent that the Peloponnesian The fleet de. ships should sail at once, before their designs layedbythe became known to the Athenians (412). Three isthmia. Spartans were despatched to Corinth with orders to carry the ships over the Isthmus and set out for Thuc. viii. 5: vnb fiacrik£i/ ov ftvvdpevos 7rpd(rar€a6at eVox^f lXtjo-c : ibid. c. 6. Ctes. Pers. 52. XI. 3.] THE DEFEAT OFF PEIRAEUM, 412. 371 Chios. But an unexpected difficulty arose. The Corinthians would not sail till they had celebrated the Isthmia, nor even agree to the suggestion of Agis that he should send forward his detachment while they remained behind. Meanwhile the Athenians, who had received information of what was going on, sent to Chios to complain, and the Chians, though denying the accusation, complied with the Athenian demand for a contingent of seven ships. The time had not yet come for open rebellion; the oligarchs, who alone were in the plot, were not in a position to brave the enmity of the people, who had no wish to break with Athens.1 At the Isthmian games, which they visited under the protection of the sacred truce, the Athenians discovered the truth about Chios, and, on returning home, Th L d they took measures to prevent the Lacedae- monian fleet monian ships from leaving Cenchreae, the Corin- driven bythe . ' Athenians to thian port on the Saronic gulf. When the Peiraeumin Spartan Alcamenes set sail after the festival Cormthia-with twenty-one ships, he found his movements watched by an equal number of Athenian vessels, by which he was at length driven on shore at Peiraeum, a desolate harbour on the extreme edge of the Corinthian territory towards Epidauria. Leaving a sufficient number of ships to blockade the defeated foe, the Athenians retired to a small island close at hand, where they encamped and sent to Athens for reinforcements. In the engagement the greater part of the Peloponnesian ships had been disabled and Alcamenes slain. News of the disaster was at once conveyed to the Corinthians, who came to the rescue on the next day, and were quickly followed by the rest of the inhabitants of the district. At first they despaired of protecting the ships in a situation so desolate, but finally they drew them ashore, and left a force of infantry in charge, till some opportunity of escape should arise. It had been arranged between Alcamenes and the ephors 1 Thuc. viii. 7*9. For the date of the Isthmia see Goodhart's note on c. 9 ; he puts them in May, in this year. 372 ALCIBIADES AT SPARTA, 412. [XI. 4. that a horseman should be despatched to Sparta when his ships left the Isthmus. On receiving this information, they prepared to send off their own five vessels, sparta: under Chalcideus and Alcibiades, but when they influence of heard of the defeat at Peiraeum, they changed their plans, and resolved not only to send no ships of their own to Asia, but to recall those which had already put to sea. If Alcibiades had not been at Sparta, no further steps would have been taken; the "Ionic war" would have been abandoned before it had well begun; the Chians would have been left to their fate, and the offer of Persian aid neglected. He pointed out to the ephors that if Chalcideus set sail at once, he would reach Chios before the news of the disaster of Peiraeum; and for himself he had only to land in Ionia, and so persuasive would be his proofs of the inability of Athens either to protect or to punish her subjects, that the cities would at once come over. In private he appealed to the ambition of his friend Endius, urging him not to allow the honour of exciting rebellion in Ionia, and winning for Sparta the alliance of the Great King, to pass into the hands of Agis. The ephors withdrew their opposition, and allowed Chalcideus to set sail.1 About the same time, the prospects of the confederacy were a little brightened by the return of the ships which had sailed to Sicily with Gylippus. These, sixteen in number, had been roughly handled off Leucadia by the Athenian squadron which lay in wait for them, but had escaped with the loss of one trireme, and now sailed into the harbour of Lechaeum.2 4. As they crossed the Aegean, Chalcideus and Alcibiades seized every ship which came in their way, to prevent news chalcideus and of their aPProach reaching Chios. They did Alcibiades sail not make directly for the island, but put in to ioma. a£ corvcus on the mainland opposite, where they were met by some of their Chian confederates. It was arranged that the Chians should return home and summon a 1 Thuc. viii. 11, 12. 2 Thuc, viii, 13, XI. 4.1 CHIOS RE VOLTS; ALARM AT ATHENS, J,.12. 373 meeting of the Council, without announcing publicly the arrival of the Peloponnesians, who suddenly appeared in the harbour, to the astonishment of the populace. Alcibiades and Chalcideus were admitted to the Council; Revolt of Chios, and, on hearing that a fleet was coming to Erythrae, their assistance, the Chians revolted from clazomenae-Athens. Their example was followed by the Erythraeans on the opposite coast, and afterwards by Clazomenae. And, as Clazomenae lay on a small island, and was therefore quite at the mercy of any hostile fleet, the citizens fortified Polichna on the mainland as a place of retreat in danger. The revolted cities at once began to rebuild the walls which the Athenians had compelled them, in old days, to pull down, and prepared for war.1 The news was quickly carried to Athens, where it created the greatest excitement. Chios was the only " independent" ally remaining, except Methymna. Since the formation of the Delian League, she had continued Athens: the a faithful friend, rendering assistance when reserve funds required, and in return retaining unimpaired her old institutions, though, like the rest, she had been compelled to destroy her walls.2 She was the largest and perhaps the wealthiest of all the allied cities, and, amid the various storms of warfare, she had enjoyed profound peace. No island was so well and thoroughly cultivated : in none was there such an abundance of slaves. In their extremity, the Athenians considered that the time had come for rescinding the decree by which a thousand talents had been set apart at the beginning of the Archidamian war; and the money was partly spent in manning ships to sail to Chios, ships sent Eight were at once despatched under the com- t0 Asia> mand of Strombichides, and twelve more were to follow under Thrasycles. Both these squadrons were withdrawn from the blockading force at Peiraeum, their place being taken, at least in part, by fresh ships. Other thirty vessels 1 Thuc. viii. H. 2 Thuc. iv. 51. 374 ALCIBIADES AT MILETUS, 412. [XI. 5. were also to be manned, for, in the excitement of the moment, no sacrifice was thought too great. Strombichides sailed to Samos, and thence to Teos, in the hope of preventing a revolt there, but Chalcideus also sailed to the town with twenty-three ships, supported by the land forces of Erythrae and Clazomenae, and the Athenians were com- RevoltofTeos. ,, , „ rrt pelled to return to Samos. Teos went over to the Peloponnesians, and the wall which the Athenians had built to protect it towards the interior was pulled down. Having thus secured the most important of the Ionian islands for Sparta, Alcibiades resolved to bring over the most important of the cities on the mainland. He was on friendly terms with the leading citizens of Miletus, and flattered himself with the figure which he would make with the Chians and with Endius, if he could win the capital of Ionia before the arrival of any reinforcements from Peloponnesus. He persuaded Chalcideus, on his return from Teos, to leave behind the crews of the Peloponnesian vessels to form a force of heavy-armed infantry in Chios, and fill their places in the ships with Chians. With the five vessels thus manned, and other twenty obtained from Chios, he sailed in all secrecy to Miletus. The ships had barely reached the harbour before Strombichides and Thrasycles appeared with the united Alcibiades wins Athenian fleet. But it was too late. Miletus over Miletus. ka(j already revolted, and the Athenians could do no more than lie at anchor off the island of Lade and watch the progress of events.1 5. Alcibiades had made good his promise with regard to the revolt of Ionia, but he had still to arrange an alliance First alliance between Lacedaemon and the Great King, between Sparta This was a matter of little difficulty, after and the King. ^Q successes wnich had been gained, and on the revolt of Miletus Tissaphernes and Chalcideus agreed upon the following terms : that all the territory and all the cities which were now in the King's possession, or had 1 Thuc. viii. 17. XI. 5-] SPARTA AND THE GREAT KING, £?& 375 ever been in the possession of his forefathers, should be his; that the Lacedaemonians and their allies should help the King to prevent the Athenians from collecting tribute, or deriving any other advantage from these cities; that both parties should carry on war against the Athenians in common, and bring it to an end by common consent only; that cities which rebelled from the King should be treated as rebels from the Lacedaemonians and their allies, and vice versa.1 The words of this shameful bargain can hardly have been sufficiently weighed by Chalcideus, or he would have shrunk, as Lichas afterwards shrank, from surrendering to the King all the territory which his forefathers had ever Remarks on possessed. In the days of Xerxes, before 480, the the treaty-Persian dominions not only included all the Greek cities in Asia, all the islands off the coast, and the Cyclades, but extended into Europe as far as Mount Olympus. Even Thessaly and Boeotia might be considered as part of the kingdom of Xerxes, for they had been occupied by his troops with the consent of the inhabitants. And these concessions were more than a mere renunciation of claims; for the Spartans were bound to assist the King in reducing to submission any of the new subjects who might rebel. On the other hand, the King was pledged to nothing. No stipulations were made for the payment of the fleet, the bait by which Tissaph ernes had gained the assistance of Sparta. The truth was that Chalcideus was merely a tool in the hands of Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. In order to gain his immediate purpose, Alcibiades was willing to accept any conditions, regardless of the fate of his countrymen and the liberty of Greece, and it was a matter of no moment to him that the Spartans, who claimed to liberate Hellas, were pledging half of it into slavery. Tissaphernes gained all and more than all that he expected. The cities, which he could not reduce, were placed in his hands without the loss of a ship or a man; the tribute for which he was pressed would flow into his 1 Thuc. viii. 18. 376 ACTIVITY OF THE CHIANS, 412. [XI. 6. coffers, and the satrap of Sard is would once more occupy the position which he had lost at Mycale. The Chians were not content with sending out ships under a Spartan officer; they wished to play their own part in the Action of great work of liberation. After the departure the Chians. 0f Qhalcideus, they despatched ten ships which landed at Anaea,1 opposite Samos, wishing to gather news of the attempt on Miletus. But Chalcideus sent messengers to warn them away, asserting that Amorges was in the neighbourhood with his army; and at the same time, an Athenian squadron of sixteen triremes was sighted, which had been sent under the command of Diomedon, to join the other two generals. The Chians immediately fled, losing four ships to the Athenians, who went on to Samos. From Teos, where they had taken refuge, the Chians brought over Lebedos and Lebedos and Erae, after which their forces, both naval and Erae revolt: military, returned home. Not long afterwards recovered by Tissaphernes appeared at Teos, and completed Athens. the destruction of the wall, but he, in his turn, had no sooner gone than Diomedon arrived and persuaded the Teians to receive the Athenians as well as their opponents. Erae, however, which he also attempted, held out against him. While these events were taking place in Ionia, the Spartans were encouraged by success at home. The twenty ships which had been blockaded since the Isthmia at nesian ships Peiraeum, succeeded in breaking out. They break out from returned to Cenchreae, where they were joined by Astyochus, who had been appointed high admiral of the Peloponnesian fleet, and prepared to sail to Chios.2 6. So far the balance was against the Athenians. There was hardly a place on the mainland of Ionia which they 1 See Thue. iv. 75; supra, pp. 33, 164. 2 Thuc. viii. 19, 20. The appointment of Astyochus would lead us to suppose that the annual change of magistrates had taken place at Sparta; if so, new ephors were now in office, and Alcibiades lost the support of Endius, which would give Agis the opportunity he ought XI. 7-] RE VOL UTION A T SAMOS, 412. 377 could call their own; Chios was in active hostility; the Great King was in alliance with the enemy. All their hopes centred in Samos; if this island remained loyal, they samos ail had still a strong base of operations : if it imP°rtant . . , . , t T . r i, to Athens: joined in the revolt, Ionia was gone, it was state of the a subject city, without walls, crushed for a island-long time by a heavy indemnity,1 and subsequently called upon to pay tribute and furnish soldiers. The nature of the government after 440 is uncertain, but as the oligarchs took the lead in the rebellion, and Pericles, on his first voyage, established a democracy, we should naturally suppose that a democracy was left in power when the city was finally reduced. However this may be, the oligarchs certainly gained in influence, and if the government was not entirely in their hands, they were now a strong party in the island. Whether they entered into negotiations with the Chians is unknown, but it is probable enough that the success of the Chian oligarchs and the revolt of Miletus aroused in the minds of the Samian oligarchs the hope of Popular recovering their power. They were, in any revolution case, suspected, and the suspicion gave rise atSamos* to an outbreak of popular fury. With the help of three Athenian ships which were at hand, the demos attacked the notables, slew two hundred of them, banished four hundred more, and divided among themselves their houses and lands as spoils of victory. The Athenians, partly to reward such ardour in a good cause, and partly because they were now sure of their fidelity, allowed the democrats the privileges of independence. Henceforth they governed the city for themselves, excluding the old landowners or Geomori from every privilege, refusing even to marry or give in marriage among them.2 7. On their return from Teos, the Chians did not relax their energies. They despatched thirteen ships to Lesbos— the second point in the Lacedaemonian programme. On 1 Thuc. vii. 57 ; i. 117. 2 Thuc. viii. 21; C. I. A. i. 56. 378 ATHENIANS AT LESBOS AND CHIOS, 412. [XI. 7. arriving at the island, the ships put in at Methymna, which immediately revolted; and leaving four vessels to protect Attempted tne c^v> tnev Passed on t° Mytilene, which revolt of also joined them. Meanwhile Astyochus had es os' arrived at Chios from Cenchreae, and after a stay of two days followed to Lesbos; but before he could reach the island, the Athenian fleet, twenty-five vessels strong, under the command of Diomedon and Leon (who had come from Athens with ten additional ships) had appeared at Mytilene and recovered the city. When Astyochus heard of this disaster on his arrival at Eresus (in the south of the island) he abandoned Mytilene, and contented himself with bringing over Eresus. Arming the citizens, while he sent the hoplites of his own ships, under the command of Eteonicus, to Antissa and Methymna, he himself sailed thither to support them. Soon afterwards he returned to Chios, taking his soldiers with him. The attempt on Lesbos proved a failure at every point; the island fell back into the hands of the Athenians, who settled affairs to their liking, and afterwards crossed over to the mainland, where they destroyed the fort which the Clazomenians were building at Polichna. The authors of the revolt fled to Daphnus, a neighbouring town; the rest of the inhabitants returned to their island, and Clazomenae also was once more Athenian.1 Encouraged by these successes, Diomedon and Leon carried the war into Chios. Using Lesbos, the Oenussae, and some forts in the territory of Erythrae as a basis, they landed at various points in the island. Their ships had been manned by hoplites "from the roll," who had been compelled to serve The Athenians as marines, and with these excellent troops they in Chios. defeated the Chians with great slaughter, and laid waste their country. Such a disaster had not been known at Chios since the days of the Persian war, and it was the more deeply felt owing to the high cultivation of the 1 Thuc. viii. 22, 23 § 4; supra, p. 373; see Jowett's Thuc. i., Essay on Inscriptions, xciii. XI. 8.] BATTLE OF MILETUS\412- 379 island. Hardly any other people in Greece had enjoyed so long a respite from the miseries of war, and in the judgment of Thucydides none had made a better use of their prosperity. Their present sufferings were indeed of their own making, but their opinion of the desperate state of Athens was one shared by almost all the Greeks, and therefore a pardonable mistake. What they had not accurately estimated was the indolence, timidity, and incapacity of the Spartan rulers, and the almost superhuman energy which Athens displayed in the hour of need. When they found themselves driven off the sea and their country ravaged, a reaction set in, and overtures were made with a view to putting the city into the hands of the Athenians. But the plot was checked by the appearance of Astyochus, who was brought over from Erythrae for the purpose.1 8. Meanwhile the Athenian squadron of twenty ships still lay at Lade watching Miletus. A descent was made on the Milesian territory, and in the conflict which The Athenians followed, Chalcideus, the Lacedaemonian com- at Miletus-mander, was slain; but this success led to no change in the situation, and it was not till the close of the summer that affairs took a decisive turn. By this time Athens had once more gathered her strength; a fleet of forty-eight ships sailed to Samos, having on board 1000 Athenian hoplites, 1500 Argives—500 of whom were armed by the Athenians—and 1000 of the allied forces, under the command of Phrynichus and two others. From Samos they moved to Miletus, where they were met by 800 Milesians, the Peloponnesian forces of Chalcideus, and the auxiliaries of Tissaphernes, who also furnished a force of cavalry. In the battle which followed, the Argives, despising their enemies as Ionians, Battle of and meeting them in disorder, were defeated Miletus-by the Milesians with heavy loss; but the Athenians, after repulsing the Peloponnesians and their auxiliaries, marched 1 Thuc. viii. 24. The historian is very anxious that we should estimate at its proper value the (rco(j)po(rvvrj of a city which was not spoiled by prosperity. 380 HERMOCRA TES ARRIVES IN IONIA, 1^12. [XI. 8. up to the gates of Miletus, and there piled arms, for the Milesians, on seeing the defeat of their friends, offered no further resistance. After the battle, which was remarkable for the victory of Ionians on both sides, the Athenians proceeded to cut off Miletus by building a wall across the isthmus, which connected the city with the mainland.1 But ere the day closed, the news came that the combined fleet of the Peloponnesians and Sicilians was at hand, fifty-five triremes strong, under the command of Theramenes. What the Athenians dreaded had come to pass; their Syracusan enemy, Hermocrates, anxious to complete the ruin which he had so well begun, persuaded his city to send him over with twenty ships, to which Selinus, grateful for her deliverance, had added two; and, uniting with these, arrives with ^ne Peloponnesian squadron, which was at last ships from readv, had sailed over to join Astyochus. The Sicily. Ji - ,, ,Ja J appearance of the great Syracusan gives interest and elevation to the war. He was capable and honest, and sincerely in earnest in liberating Greece. His ability raised him above his Spartan colleagues; his honesty above Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. He takes no decisive part in the contest, but from time to time he will reappear, leaving always the impression of a noble and patriotic soldier. The fleet sailed to Leros,2 but on learning that the Athenians were at Miletus, they passed on to Teichiussa, in the Iasian gulf, to await further information. Here they were visited by Alcibiades, who not only acquainted them with the defeat of the Milesians, with whom he had fought, but urged them, as they wished to save Ionia, to lose no time in relieving Miletus. Upon this the Peloponnesians made preparations for sail- 1 Thuc. viii. 25. The Peloponnesians here mentioned are thought to be the e7rij3arai who served on board the ships of Chalcideus. Chalcideus had left his crews behind in Chios (cp. c. 17, 32). 2 Thuc. viii. 26. Leros is an island about forty miles from Miletus, but a convenient position from which to watch the city. See Herod. T. 125. XI. 8.] ATHENIAN HEADQUARTERS AT SAMOS, 412. 381 ing on the next morning to Miletus. But Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, who had heard of their approach, had no intention of risking an engagement, and though his colleagues were at first indignant retire fromianS that an Athenian fleet should retire before Miletus to the enemy, he convinced them of the wisdom of a cautious policy. The fleet broke up from Miletus and returned to Samos, whence the Argives, annoyed at their defeat and at the turn which events had taken, returned home. Next morning the Peloponnesians sailed out from Teichiussa, leaving their heavy tackle behind them, in expectation of an engagement, but after waiting a day, they returned, and on the instigation of Tissaphernes The Pelo on-went on to Iasus, where Amorges still held nesians at out. The Iasians, who never expected to see Iasus* any but Athenian ships in their bay, were taken unawares, and the town captured. Amorges was given up to Tissaphernes; his mercenaries, who were chiefly Peloponnesians, were pressed into the victorious ranks; while Tissaphernes was allowed to have the town, and all the captives, slave or free, on a payment of a daric (16s.) for each. The spoil, which was very great, the accumulation of many years of prosperity, was divided among the soldiers. The fleet then returned to Miletus.1 After the services rendered to him at Iasus, Tissaphernes could no longer refuse to make good the promise of support by which he had drawn the Spartans to Ionia. He now appeared at Miletus with a month's pay for the whole of the fleet, at the rate of an Attic drachma (8d.) a man; but with ill-timed parsimony he declared that he could not for the future provide more than half a drachma without special permission from the King. This proposal provoked a strong remonstrance from Hermocrates, which was so far effectual that Tissaphernes slightly increased the amount.2 The total 1 Thuc. viii. 28. 2 Thuc. viii. 29. He appears to have counted 55 ships as 60. See Goodhart's note. 382 ASTYOCHUS AND THE CHIANS, 418. [XI. 9. number of ships in the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus now amounted to eighty, of which twenty were Chian. About the same time the Athenians received a reinforcement of thirty-five ships from Athens, and as their numbers now amounted to a hundred and four triremes, they resolved to divide the force and send thirty under the command of Strombichides to Chios, while Phrynichus, Charminus, and others with the remainder kept watch over Miletus.1 9. Astyochus, the admiral of Sparta, was still engaged at Chios in suppressing the plot (p. 379), but when he heard of the arrival of Theramenes he took courage, and sailed out to make attacks on the mainland at Pteleum and Clazomenae. At neither place did he meet with success; and when leaving Clazomenae he was caught in a great storm and carried to Cyme, while the rest of the ships sought refuge in the adjacent islands. There they lay for eight days, consuming the property which the Clazomenians had conveyed to the islands for safety, after which, the storm abating, they also went on to Cyme. Astyochus was now solicited to take part Astyochus in another attempt to bring over Lesbos, but at Chios. as tke allies refused to join, he returned to Chios; and about the same time Pedaritus arrived from Lacedaemon as governor of the island. He brought with him the auxiliaries which had been obtained at Iasus, and found in Chios the crews of the ships which Chalcideus had left behind, 500 strong. Nevertheless he turned a deaf ear to the suggestions of Astyochus, and would neither sail to Lesbos nor allow the Chians to do so. Upon this Astyochus went away in a rage to Miletus, taking with him the few ships which he had in his own command, and declaring that a day would come when the Chians would need his help and fail to obtain it. On his voyage he narrowly escaped being caught by the Athenian squadron which was sailing to Chios. The fleets anchored on opposite sides of Corycus, 1 Thuc. viii. 30. Strombichides is mentioned as one of the generals who brought up these reinforcements. Had he gone back to Athens ? XI. 9.] SPARTA AND THE GREAT KING, #*. 383 hidden from each other by a spur of the mountain; and it was merely because Astyochus was called out of his course to investigate a supposed plot at Erythrae that he did not fall into the Athenians' hands.1 From Erythrae He returns to he made his way to Miletus. On their part Miletus-the Athenian ships were caught in a storm when leaving Corycus, by which three of their number were carried to the city of Chios, the crews being slain or captured as they were driven ashore. The rest sought shelter under the lee of Mimas, and sailed thence to Lesbos. So far Iasus had been the furthest point to the south touched by the Peloponnesians, and this town had. been attacked to please Tissaphernes. But the Peloponnesians now bethought themselves of their own kinsmen in Asia. A fleet under the command of Hippocrates, a Spartan, but chiefly composed of Thurian vessels, led by Dorieus of Rhodes, put in at Cnidus, a Dorian colony, which had been already won over by Tissaphernes.2 They were quickly followed by the Athenians from Samos, who captured six of the vessels, and were within an ace of recovering Cnidus. When Astyochus arrived at Miletus he found the Pelopon-nesian fleet in a high state of efficiency; pay being regular and good, and the spoil of Iasus yet unexhausted, while the Milesians were most eager in the cause. The spirits of the Peloponnesians rose with their prosperity, and the former treaty with Tissaphernes, which had been drawn up in the timidity of their first arrival, was no longer satisfactory. A second was arranged between Theramenes—who had not yet given up his command—and the satrap, in which Second treaty the King was pledged to maintain any army with the which he should invite to his aid, while it was Persians-in his country. In other respects also some modifications were introduced; the war was to be carried on in common as before, and neither party was to come to terms without the 1 Thuc. viii. 30-33. 2 Thuc. viii. 35, reading viro Ticro-afopvovs. See Goodhart. 384 PELOPONNESIANS SAIL TO HELLESPONT, 412, [XL 10. consent of the other, but if one party required the aid of the other he was to be satisfied with the assistance which he could persuade him to give: the King undertook not to attack the Lacedaemonians or their allies, and the Lacedaemonians on their part recognised the King's claim to all the country and cities which had belonged to him or his father, or his forefathers, and undertook not to exact tribute from these.1 After concluding this treaty, which was perhaps intended for the home authorities, Theramenes set out for Sparta in a boat, but on the voyage he was lost at sea. Affairs at Chios were going from bad to worse. The Athenians crossed over from Lesbos (p. 378), and after defeating the Chians in numerous engagements, established themselves at Delphinium, a strong fortress convenient for the sea, and close to the town of Chios. Factions also broke out among the citizens. The revolt had been condition of brought about by the oligarchs, without the Chios. knowledge of the people, and even among the oligarchs there had been a reaction, owing to the ill success of the rising. Some citizens had been put to death by Pedaritus, the new governor, on a charge of Atticism, and a spirit of suspicion was abroad, which required most careful watching. Messengers were sent to Astyochus, begging him to send assistance, but in vain, and at length Pedaritus despatched an envoy to Sparta to make complaint of the conduct of the admiral.2 10. The Peloponnesians now carried out the last part of the programme which they had sketched in the autumn of the preceding year. The envoys of Pharnabazus had remained at Lacedaemon, in the hope of inducing the nesiln fleet is authorities to send out a fleet to the Helles-despatchedto pont. At length—it was now December— the Hellespont. .-, £ -, -, , , , . they were successtul, and twenty-seven ships were despatched under the command of Antisthenes. On 1 Thuc. viii. 37. 2 Thuc. viii. 38. XL io.] Distress of the ChiaNs, 41$. 385 its way the fleet was ordered to carry eleven commissioners, of whom Lichas was one, to Miletus, where they were to investigate the charges against Astyochus, and supersede him if necessary. The ships were then to sail to the Hellespont under the command of Clearchus. When crossing the Aegean, the fleet put in at Melos, where they came upon ten Athenian vessels; three of these were destroyed, but the rest escaped, and fearing that they would convey intelligence to Samos, the Lacedaemonians shaped their course to Crete, and so to Caunus, whence they sent to Miletus, begging for aid in conveying the ships past Samos. For since their return from Iasus, some three months previously, the Pelo-ponnesians had remained at Miletus, and over against them, on the island of Samos, were the Athenians, ever ready to make a descent when opportunity offered.1 Pedaritus still urged Astyochus to come to Chios, which was reduced to the greatest distress. The sea was closed to the Chians, their land laid waste, and since the ,,. Disastrous occupation of Delphinium by the Athenians, the state of affairs slaves had deserted in large numbers, putting at Chios-their knowledge of the country at the service of the enemy. If help were sent at once, it would be possible to prevent the Athenians from completing Delphinium and the still larger fortifications which they were planning for their army and fleet. Astyochus was preparing to despatch some ships, notwithstanding his threat (p. 382), when the news came of the arrival of the Peloponnesian ships at Caunus. Upon this he abandoned Chios, and sailed to join the new comers. It was of the first importance to bring the commissioners safe to Miletus, and by uniting the fleets, he might gain command of the sea. On his way he attacked Movements of and overran Cos, which had been recently Astyochus: desolated by a terrible earthquake, but on with the reaching Cnidus, he was compelled to sail, Athel«ans. without disembarking his men, against an Athenian squadron, 1 Time. viii. 39. VOL. III. 2b 386 LICHAS AND TISSAPHERNES, 412. [XL 10. which had been sent from Samos under Charminus to keep watch over the Peloponnesian ships. Charminus was reported to be off Syme, and thither Astyochus followed him. A storm of rain, followed by a thick fog, scattered his ships, and when morning broke, his left wing came in sight of the Athenians, the rest being hidden by the island. Charminus at once attacked with a few vessels, and defeated his opponents, but when the rest of the fleet came up he found himself outnumbered, and took to flight. The contingents of the Peloponnesians then united and returned to Cnidus, whither they were soon followed by the entire Athenian fleet, but neither side would risk an engagement,1 and the Athenians returned to Samos. The whole Peloponnesian fleet was now collected at Cnidus, and the eleven commissioners reviewed the situation. Th p io on- Tissaphernes also was present. Some criticisms nesian fleet at were made on his past conduct, and arrange-Cmdus. ments for the future discussed. Lichas was bold enough to express his dissatisfaction at both the treaties which had been concluded, pointing out that if the King was o rr 1 of to ^e master of the territory which had been Lichas and governed by his forefathers, his country would Tissaphernes. extend to Boeotia, and so far from liberating Hellas, the Lacedaemonians would be agents in establishing a Median empire. He must have better terms than these, which indeed he refused to observe, nor would he accept Persian support on such conditions. On this Tissaphernes went away in a rage, and for the time Persia and Sparta were estranged.2 The alliance now received an important acquisition. As they lay at Cnidus, the most influential inhabitants of Rhodes joins Ehodes made overtures to them, inviting them the alliance. ^0 vjsj^ the island. Ehodes was a powerful state, with a large force of infantry and numerous soldiers, 1 Thuc. riii. 41. For Charminus at Syme see also Aristoph. Thesmoph. 801 ff. * Thuc. viii 43; cf. 52. XI. II.] THE PELOPONNESIANS AT RHODES, 411. 387 wealthy enough to supply the funds so necessary at the present moment, when the allies were looking for supplies to take the place of the pay of Tissaphernes. The invitation was eagerly accepted, and the fleet, ninety-four vessels strong, put in at Camirus. The populace, as usual, had not been informed of the plans of the oligarchs, and as the place was unfortified, they fled in terror. The Lacedaemonians reassured them, and a congress was held of the three cities of the island, Camirus, Ialysus, and Lindus, after which Rhodes formally seceded to the Peloponnesians. On hearing of the revolt, the Athenians sailed to the island in the hope of saving it, but in vain; all that they could do was to make attacks on Khodes from neighbouring stations at Cos and Chalce. The Ehodians contributed to the allies no less than thirty-two talents, and Astyochus, M _ , n t i- lf . P ,, 1 ThePelopon- nnding himself in comfortable quarters, drew nesian fleet his vessels on shore and remained inactive for ^J"*?118 at nearly three months (January to March 411), equally regardless of the danger in Chios, and of the important events which, as he knew, were taking place in Samos. II. After the death of Chalcideus and the accession to office of new ephors, the feeling at Lacedaemon had turned against Alcibiades. Agis was his personal TheSpartans enemy, and others were doubtless jealous of his turn against success, while Endius was no longer in office to Alciblades-protect him. Before leaving Miletus, Astyochus had received instructions to put him to death, but Alcibiades, who had his suspicions, escaped by withdrawing to Tissaphernes. He was naturally indignant at the conduct of the Spartans; and perhaps he reflected that it was by his own act that the Greeks of Asia were passing into the empire of He esca the Persians, from which they had been so long Tissaphernes, and so successfully preserved. His thoughts h?m to reduce once more returned to Athens, and with his the pay of the usual energy he exerted himself to the utmost to Pel°P°nnesian*-damage the Pelopoimesian cause. Knowing that Tissaphernes 888 ALCIBIADES AND TISSAPHERNES, 411. [XI. II. could not or would not furnish supplies, he supported him in reducing the pay from a drachma to three obols—and even this was not supplied regularly—urging that the Athenians paid no more, not so much from economy as because they found that sailors if overpaid became dissolute and incapable. Arrears of pay were also an inducement to sailors to remain on their ships. The objections of the trierarchs and generals could be silenced by timely presents of money, and, in fact, Hermocrates alone refused the bait. When the cities applied for funds, Alcibiades had answers ready, telling the Chians with his own lips that the richest of the Greeks ought to be ashamed of asking for funds; would they not even pay the auxiliaries who had come to their assistance? Did they expect to be rescued without cost of money or life 1 The subject cities which had paid tribute to Athens were reminded that they were only spending on themselves what they had formerly spent on the Athenians. And to one and all he pointed out that Tissaphernes must needs be careful while he was spending his own resources, but if the King should send supplies, the pay of the sailors would be increased, and the wants of the cities considered. In private he advised Tissaphernes not to be in any haste to finish the war, either by bringing up the Phoenician fleet—a plan which he had in view—or by increasing the forces of the Peloponnesians. It was not to his advantage that the same state should be supreme by land and sea; a divided control was better, for in this case the King could use one power against the other. It was much The true policy safer, and much cheaper, too, to allow the of Persia is to Greeks to wear out their power on each other, let the com- . \ . . , batants wear than to Taise the bpartans into a position from each other out. wnicn they could not be dislodged without great expense and danger. And after all the Athenians would prove the more serviceable allies of the two; they had no desire to make conquests on land; they wished to enslave the seas, and could assist the King in enslaving the Greeks in his territory; whereas the Lacedaemonians posed as the XI. II.] ALCIBIADES AND ATHENS, 411. 389 liberators of Greece, and were not likely to free the cities from the Athenians in order to make them the slaves of the King. Let it be his object to reduce both, getting as much as he could from the Athenians, and then driving the Peloponnesians out of the country. This advice agreed with the wishes as well as the interests of Tissaphernes. He took Alcibiades into his confidence, and at once began to reduce his payments to the fleet. At the same time he refused to allow them to engage with the enemy till joined by the Phoenician fleet, which would give them an irresistible superiority. By this means he destroyed the efficiency of the fleet, and Astyochus, the admiral, being already in Persian pay, though he sought to conceal his own treachery by faint remonstrances, could offer no real opposition.1 In giving this advice to Tissaphernes, sound though it was, Alcibiades had other aims in view than the interests of the Persians. He must be a power somewhere, and a power in Greece; and he had no sooner ceased to be influential at Sparta than he wished to be again influential at Athens. Yet how could he hope to be restored to the The real aims city which he had so deeply injured ? or what of Alcibiades. influence could he gain so long as the people were governed by the leaders who had expelled him ? The position might well seem desperate, but he knew the divided state of feeling at Athens, and how to turn it to his own advantage. Since the Sicilian disaster democracy had lost in credit, and many citizens were inclined—even with the most patriotic views— to doubt whether a change might not be introduced with advantage. As the old sources of supply fell off, and the burden pressed more and more heavily upon them, the richer citizens sought to be rid of the war and the government which persisted in it at their expense. The old opposition between oligarchy and democracy which had divided Cimon and Pericles took a sharper edge; and if many wished to reform the democracy, there were others, and those perhaps 1 Time. viii. 45, 46. 390 OLIGARCHICAL MO VEMENT A TSAMOS, ill. [XL 12. the ablest men in the city, who wished to get rid of it altogether. If Alcibiades could hold out a hope of new supplies, he would certainly attract those who were being ruined by the war; and if this help were conditional on the overthrow of democracy, he would get rid of the popular leaders who stood in the way of his return. What his own position under an oligarchy would be he does not seem to have considered, but if he were the instrument in establishing such a government, he could hardly fail to profit by it. 12. Such were his hopes, and he no sooner found himself in favour with Tissaphernes than he began to feel his way in the fleet at Samos, intimating that if an proposes an oligarchy took the place of the "villainous oligarchical democracy " which had banished him, he would be willing to return, and secure for Athens the support of Tissaphernes. These overtures were met more than half way by the trierarchs and others at Samos, who were dissatisfied with the existing form of government. Of these a few visited Alcibiades, who explained his views clearly, promising to bring over Tissaphernes and the King if the democracy were abolished in which the King could place no confidence. They returned filled with hopes that they would get the government into their own hands, and bring the war to an end, and with this object in view, a plot for a revolution was formed. The proposals of Alcibiades were announced openly, and the people, though at first alarmed, were soon quieted by the prospect of receiving pay from the treasures of the Great King; but when the conspirators began to discuss matters more carefully among themselves, they found a formidable opponent among their own numbers. Of all the generals in the camp at Samos the ablest was Phrynichus, the son of Stratonides. We have already seen Opposition of that he prevented the Athenians from rashly Phrymchus. encountering the enemy at a time when defeat would have been fatal; and Thucydides, when recording his conduct, remarks that on this as on every other occasion "then XI. 12.] PHR YNICHUS OPPOSES, 411. 391 and afterwards " he showed himself a man of most capable judgment. He appears to have been of humble origin; he began life as a shepherd in the country, an occupation which he afterwards changed for the more promising but less honest career of a "sycophant" in the city.1 What his political convictions were it is difficult to say ; for on the one hand he saw very clearly the advantage which Athens derived from her democratical constitution, and on the other he became one of the chief agents in overthrowing it. Whether democrat or oligarch, he was probably guided by personal motives only, and above all by a hatred and distrust of Alcibiades, whose return to Athens he wished to prevent by every means. This hatred now brought him into opposition to the proposed revolution, and his keen insight at once detected the difficulties which attended it. The King was not likely to throw over the Lacedaemonians when their fleet had become powerful, and join the Athenians in destroying what views of he had helped to create; they had done him phrynichus. no harm, while the Athenians were justly the objects of his suspicion. The change from democracy to oligarchy would gain Athens no advantage in the subject cities; on the contrary, her empire mainly rested on the support of the demos, and those who had gone over to the Lacedaemonians had not revolted to establish an oligarchy, but to obtain independence. The desire of freedom would not be satisfied by a change of constitution, and the oligarchs, "the gentlemanly party," would cause the Athenians quite as much trouble in the allied cities as the democrats; they were selfish and unscrupulous, and would not shrink from bloodshed without form of trial, while the people were the refuge of the oppressed.2 On general grounds, there- 1 Lysias 20, §§ 11, 12. 2 Thuc. viii. 48 : tovs tc koKovs KayaOovs dvop.a£ofX€vovs ovk cXacro*© avrovs vofxifciv a(f)io~(, 7TpdyjjLara napei-civ rod brjpov, 7ropiaTas ovras kcu io-rjyrfTas roav kclk&v tg> dq/xa), £$• hv tcl Trkeia) avrovs w^ekelcrdai* kol to pev eV iiceivois clvai /cat aKpiroi av Ka\ (SiaioTcpov ano6vr)0-K€M top Se brj/jiov o~(j)<0v re Kara^vyrjv elvai kol ckcLvwv aa>poviaTijv. 392 HE ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY ALCIBIADES, 411. [XI. 13 fore, there was no reason why Athens should exchange democracy for oligarchy; and with regard to Alcibiades, Phrynichus was aware that he cared neither for the one nor for the other form of government. His only object was to return to his " clique " at Athens, by whose help he would be able to carry out his designs, whatever they might be. Above all, Phrynichus entreated his colleagues not to c .jate divisions among the people at a moment when it was nost important that all should act in harmony. 13. These were wise counsels, but they were not followed. The conspirators resolved to go on with their work, and despatched Pisander, with some others, to Athens, to prepare the way for the changes which were to win Persian help for the city—the return of Alcibiades, and the removal of the democracy.1 Phrynichus now found attempts to himself in a dangerous position, for if the destroy proposal to recall Alcibiades were carried at Athens, as he foresaw that it would be, his action in opposing it would probably cost him his life. He resolved, if possible, to get rid of Alcibiades; and with this object secretly informed Astyochus, who had not yet left Miletus for Rhodes, that Alcibiades was ruining the Lacedaemonian interests with Tissaphernes, and bringing him over to the Athenians. His own treachery he excused by the plea that a man might be pardoned for damaging his enemy even at the . expense of his state—such was the morality which faction and misapplied acuteness had taught the Greeks. But Astyochus had no mind to punish Alcibiades, who was grea^danger, indeed out of his power. He saw that he was from which in favour with Tissaphernes, and that his own hfmseifwith interests lay, not in punishing, but in serving much dim- him. He immediately went to Magnesia, cuty# where Alcibiades and Tissaphernes were, and laid before him the communications of Phrynichus. His services did not go unrewarded, and from this time he was 1 Time. viii. 49, 50. XI. 13.] HIS MESSAGE TO ASTYOCHUS, 411. 393 in the pay of Persia, an accomplice in the designs of Tissa-phernes, to whose injurious treatment of the Peloponnesian fleet he could only oppose a faint remonstrance (p. 389). Alcibiades at once sent a letter to the authorities at Samos, attacking Phrynichus, and demanding his execution as a traitor. Phrynichus was in greater danger than before, but he extricated himself with admirable skill. He addressed another communication to Astyochus, complaining of his conduct in revealing the former message, but nevertheless offering him an opportunity of destroying the entire Athenian fleet at Samos, and giving minute details for the execution of the plan; and as before, he excused his conduct on the ground that he must either destroy his enemies or perish miserably at their hands. He then announced to the army that the enemy intended to take advantage of the unprotected state of Samos to make an attack on the fleet, and being himself general, he pushed on the fortification of the city and kept the strictest watch at every point. Meanwhile Astyochus had communicated the intelligence to Alcibiades, as before; and Alcibiades, in his turn, sent a second letter to his friends in Samos exposing the treachery of Phrynichus. But the letter failed to have any effect, for, owing to the conduct of Phrynichus, Alcibiades Was not believed, and his communication was thought to be merely a malicious attempt to destroy his enemy. Alcibiades now addressed himself with yet greater zeal to the task of winning over Tissaphernes to the Athenian cause. The satrap was not unwilling to be persuaded, for the conduct of Lichas at Cnidus had con- not unwilling vinced him of the truth of Alcibiades' warning, to abandon and he now regarded the Lacedaemonians as U pa bent on the liberation of Greece—a policy not at all in his interests. But the numbers of the Peloponnesian fleet were so great that he did not venture openly to break with Sparta.1 Meanwhile the envoys from Samos, with Pisander at their * Time. viii. 52. 394 PISANDER AT ATHENS, 411. [XI. 13. head, arrived at Athens. An assembly was held, in which they stated the chief points in the new policy, insisting that Pisander ^ Alcibiades were recalled and the constitu- arrivesat tion changed, they would have the assistance Athens. Q£ ^e ^ng jn overcoming the Peloponnesians. The proposal met with much opposition. The people could not bear the thought of exchanging democracy for oligarchy, while the enemies of Alcibiades protested against the return of an outlaw, and the protest was supported in the strongest Excitement language by the Eumolpidae and Kerykes, the at Athens. guardians of the sacred rites which he had out- raged. Pisander was not to be turned from his purpose: regardless of the abuse poured upon him, he called up each of his opponents, and asked him the simple question, whether he had any hope of the city. The Peloponnesians had more ships at sea, more allied cities to support them; the resources of the King and of Tissaphernes were open to them, while Athens was without funds, and without prospect of funds; unless the King supplied them. To this question there could be but one answer. Pisander then plainly told the excited multitude that they would never succeed in gaining the King, unless the constitution were "sobered" and office confined to fewer hands. If this were done, the King would have confidence in them, and why should they discuss the constitution when their existence was at stake 1 At a future time they could restore what they had removed. Alcibiades also must be recalled, for he, and no one else, could carry the negotiations through. Upon this the people gave way, though unwillingly; agree to the the change seemed absolutely necessary at the change of moment, and they hoped that it would be for a time only, as Pisander suggested. A decree was passed empowering Pisander to return to Samos with ten envoys, and make the best arrangements that he could for securing Alcibiades and Tissaphernes.1 1 Thuc. viii. 53, 54. XI. 14.] POLITICAL CLUBS AT ATHENS, 411. 395 At the same time Phrynichus was removed from his command—at the suggestion of Pisander, who knowing that he was opposed to the return of Alcibiades, charged him with treacherously betraying Ionia to Amorges—and with him his colleague, Scironides. Their places were filled by Leon and Diomedon,1 who were at once despatched to Samos. 14. In his public advocacy of the revolution, Pisander acted a part as legitimate as it was courageous; but before leaving Athens he took other steps to secure his ends, pisander and which have left a dark stain upon the move- the clubs, ment. Among the characteristic features of Athenian life were the small associations, which tended to flourish and abound in a society where family influence was imperfectly felt, and where the church was not yet distinguished from the state. They were formed for all kinds of purposes—religious, social, and political—and known by very different names. The members were united by the closest obligations, which, being honourable rather than legal, they could not break without incurring the deepest infamy. So far as they were religious and social, these combinations were tolerated though not supported by the state; no one was thought a worse citizen because he sought enjoyment or protection by joining an epavos, whose members were pledged to some common entertainment, or to save any one of their body who fell into the hands of pirates. With political associations the case was different: these might be open or they might be secret, in support of the constitution, or against it. It had long been the custom of the leading politicians to gather round them Political a knot of friends on whom they could rely in associations carrying their measures. More especially was at Athens-this the case with the oligarchical party, who, being fewer in number, naturally sought the strength of union. In the stormy times which followed the expulsion of the tyrants, Isagoras had been supported by an association of this kind in his 1 Leon and Diomedon must therefore have returned to Athens from Chios, where we last heard of them, but Thucydides has not recorded this. 396 PISANDER SETS THE CLUBS TO WORK, 411. [XI. 14- attempt to establish an oligarchical government, and in the last struggle against Pericles, Thucydides had carefully organised and drilled his party. In these instances there had been no attempt at concealment, and though the result was a sharper opposition of parties, the practice was no more to be condemned than are the means by which we carry on our party government. It was otherwise in the Peloponnesian war, when personal aims took the place of public. The associations became more secret, their aims less legitimate. Thucydides speaks of conspiracies which had for their object suits at law and public offices, that is, secret societies formed with the purpose of securing for their members success in trials and elections. Such objects were not necessarily criminal; the richer men at Athens had reason enough to protect themselves from the attacks of sycophants, and found it difficult to maintain their position in the government of the city, but the societies might easily become criminal, and being secret they were suspected. Even if they were no more than clubs formed for common amusement, the prevailing distrust and discontent ascribed to them a more sinister motive, especially after the affair of the Hermae in 415. To these " conspiracies" Pisander now addressed himself, bidding them unite and form some common plan for the overthrow of the constitution. They must set to work at once and prepare the ground against his return from Samos.1 But the game was far from being won, as Pisander quickly discovered on reaching the court of Tissaphernes. In so far Pisander at as ne advised him to allow the combatants to the court of wear out their strength on each other, Alcibi-Tissaphemes. a(jeg j^ a reaj influence with the satrap, but beyond this point he could not carry him. Tissaphernes 1 Thuc. viii. 54 : ^vvcofioalas, atncp ervy^avov irporepov iv rrj noXci ovo-cu, eVl bUais v. The sons of Phar-naces are Pharnabazus and his brother. Hieramenes is a doubtful XL 15.] PELOPONNESIANS RETURN TO MILETUS, 411. 399 In this treaty we see that the remonstrances of Lichas had not been without effect; some limits are assigned to the " country of the King " which the Greeks were Nature of the not to molest. On the other hand, the question treaty-of the European possessions of the Persians is left open; and much more definite conditions are laid down about supplies. We observe also that the King now speaks of his own navy, implying that the Peloponnesian fleet is rather a useful ally than a vital force in the conduct of the war. By promising to bring up this navy—which never appeared—Tissaphernes had prevented the Lacedaemonians from engaging with the Athenians; and he now formally uses the same promise to put a limit to the supplies which they were to receive. On the conclusion of the treaty, Tissaphernes pretended to make arrangements for the arrival of the Phoenician fleet, while the Peloponnesians at last broke up from their long inaction at Rhodes and returned to nesLns leave Miletus. In this they were not only consulting Rhodes for the wishes of Tissaphernes; they were putting themselves in a better position for the relief of Chios. Envoys had also arrived from Eretria, asking assistance in bringing over Euboea, a step which was again in serious contemplation, and the more so because a combined party of Boeotians and Eretrians had been successful in persuading the garrison of Oropus, on the borders of Attica and Boeotia, opposite Eretria, to surrender the place. The request was refused, or perhaps referred to the authorities at home, who soon after took the matter up. On the way to Miletus, the fleet came in sight of the Athenian squadron, which, under the command of Leon and Diomedon, had been watching them from Chalce, but neither side would engage.1 The Athenians now returned to Samos to keep watch over their enemy at Miletus. The relief which the Chians expected from the Pelopon- person. In Xen. Hell. ii. 1. 9, a Hieramenes is mentioned, who married a sister of Darius. 1 Thuc. viii. 59, 60, 55. 400 THE HELLESPONT, 41L [XI. 15. nesians never came, for Astyochus was unable to pass the Athenians without an engagement, which he was probably f or-The Peiopon- bidden to risk till the arrival of the Phoenician nesians in fleet. Their position was almost desperate, ehlos- when they succeeded in bringing up from Miletus a Spartan named Leon, to take the place of Pedaritus, and a small squadron of twelve vessels. Upon this the Chian fleet attacked the Athenians, and though the engagement was not decided, they certainly were not defeated. A few days afterwards the Athenian commander Strombichides found it necessary to leave Chios for the Hellespont, where Abydus and Lampsacus had been induced to revolt by Dercyllidas, the Spartan, of whom we now hear for the first time. Strombichides succeeded in recovering Lampsacus, from which he carried off the slaves and materials of war, but Abydus could neither be persuaded nor forced to return to alliance. Strombichides had to content himself with establishing a garrison at Sestos, to keep watch over the Hellespont.1 The news of these successes so encouraged Astyochus that he at length ventured to sail with two ships to Chios, and finding that the island was no longer in any danger, he brought back all the Chian ships to join his own fleet at Miletus. With these reinforcements he sailed out to attack the Athenians, but in vain; they refused to leave the harbour. They were indeed in a miserable plight. On their return from Tissaphernes, Pisander and the envoys, far from aban-Attempted doning their plans, pursued them with still revolution greater eagerness, and even persuaded some of Plans of the ^ne leading Samians to join them in establish-oiigarchs. jng an oligarchy, though these had recently helped to destroy the Samian oligarchs. They resolved to go on with the war, and contribute the necessary funds from their own resources; the burden would not press so heavily if borne in their own interests. And with regard to Alcibiades, 1 Thuc. viii. 62. XI. I5-] PISANDER A GAIN AT A THENS, 411. 401 they now discovered that he was not a man suited to an oligarchy, and left him to go his own way. Being firm for revolution at all costs, they sent Pisander and half the envoys back to Athens to complete the Pisandersent revolution there, bidding them establish oli- to Athens to garchies in every city at which they touched on revolution the way; the other half they sent to various there-subject towns. Diotrephes, who had been chosen to command in the Thracian district, was despatched to his province, where he had no sooner arrived than he put Diotrephes down the democracy at Thasos; but the result at Thasos-was by no means answerable to the expectations of the oligarchs. Two months after his departure, the Thasians began to build walls, and in conjunction with some exiles who had taken refuge with the Peloponnesians, they summoned ships to their aid and went over to Lacedaemon, thus reforming the state and getting rid of the demos without any risk to themselves. And the same thing, Thucydides says, happened in many other cities. When the power of the demos had been checked and the oligarchs could act in safety, they threw aside the sham independence proffered by their fellow-oligarchs at Athens and secured complete freedom.1 On their way to Athens, Pisander and his colleagues not only put down democracies in any city at which they touched, but collected forces to aid them in their under- Pisander at taking. When they reached the city, they Athens, found that their partisans in the various clubs had been most active in preparing the ground. The first three or four months of the year 411 had been little better than a reign of terror in the city. Androcles, a leading demo- Reign of terror crat, who had taken the foremost part in ex- at Athens, polling Alcibiades, was secretly assassinated by some of the younger oligarchs, and the same fate overtook others who stood in the way of the conspirators. A programme of the 1 Thuc. viii. 64. For Diotrephes we ought perhaps to read Diitrephes {supra, p. 338). See Goodhart's note. VOL. III. 2 0 402 THE RE VOLUTION AT A T&ENS, 411. [XI. 16. Reformed Constitution had also been issued, in which it was declared that henceforth no one should receive money for service to the state other than military: that the franchise should be confinedt to those men who were most able to assist the city in purse and person, and that their numbers should not exceed five thousand. This was meant for the public, for of course the conspirators intended to keep the power Oligarchical *n tneir own hands. The Assembly and the plans at Council still continued to meet as before; but Athens. ^ their meetings such subjects only were dis- cussed as pleased the conspirators; no one spoke who was not of their party, or said anything which they had not previously considered. Opposition was indeed out of the question, for if any one was rash enough to support the democracy, he at once disappeared, and no attempt was made to discover his murderers, or to punish them if they fell under suspicion. The people were terror-struck and dumb; every one thought himself fortunate if silence secured immunity. The extent of the conspiracy was unknown, and therefore exaggerated; to claim sympathy was dangerous, to repel attack impossible: many were found among the conspirators, whose lives and opinions seemed to make such a position impossible, and the popular party, terrified by these instances of treachery, lost all confidence in themselves.1 16. Pisander and his colleagues now appeared at Athens, and lost no time in carrying oufc the remaining part of their The Revolution • Programme- The Athenians were summoned meeting at to an Assembly, at which ten 2 commissioners Colonus. with full powers were chosen to frame a con- stitution, and they were to report by a given day to the people. When the day came, the Assembly was again summoned, not in the Pnyx, nor in Athens at all, but in the precinct of Poseidon at Colonus, rather more than a mile 1 Thuc. viii. 66. 2 In Aih. Pol. c. 29 we have thirty, including the ten Probuli ; see Sandys' note. XL 16.] THE ASSEMBLY AT COLONUS, 411. 403 distant from the city.1 The Commissioners then brought forward their report, if report it can be called, for they had made no attempt to frame a constitution; and contented themselves with recommending the suspension of the law against illegal proposals, by which, more directly than by any other provision, the stability of the constitution was in ordinary times maintained. Every citizen was now at liberty to make what proposals he pleased, however unconstitutional they might be, and any one who attacked him on the score of illegality was threatened with severe penalties. In other. words, the Athenian constitution was now thrown into the melting-pot, and those whose business it was to provide a new model left matters to take their own course, which was exactly what the conspirators wished. Pisander at once came forward with a scheme for a new form of government. He proposed to sweep away all Government the existing arrangements for public offices; of the Four and for the future to abolish the payment of officers ; to restrict the franchise, as before, to five thousand citizens; and to place the management of the state in the hands of a new Council of four hundred members, who were to be irresponsible, and empowered to summon the five thousand at their pleasure, and at their pleasure only. The election of the four hundred was arranged as follows: five proedri were chosen by the Assembly; of these Hve, each selected nineteen others; and each of the hundred thus chosen selected three.2 Not a word was said against these proposals. So well had 1 Thuc. viii. 67 : ^vveKkyaav ttjv eKKkr)(riav is rbv KoXowou (ccttl be lepov Hoaeibcopos e£a) TroXcats, dnexov trradiovs paXta-To. 8e*a). Thucy-dides gives us no explanation of the curious word gweKXyaav, and no reason for the choice of Colonus. The oligarchs no doubt took steps to hinder the free action of the people by limiting the number present; see Goodhart's note. 2 Thuc. viii. 67. For the contradiction between Thucydides and Aristotle, see Appendix ii. I follow Thucydides throughout: (1) as a contemporary, his authority stands firBt; (2) so vivid and impressive a narrative as his deserves more credit than the confused account of Aristotle. 404 THE FOUR HUNDRED ESTABLISHED, 411. [XI. 16. the ground been prepared, so widespread was the conspiracy, so great the ability of the leading conspirators, that the „ , . e Athenian people were brought to surrender Expulsion of 111. ii. 11 ,, the Council of without a struggle the freedom which they had Five Hundred, enjoyed for a hundred years. But the Council of Five Hundred yet remained, and, if resolute, might prove a serious obstacle to the revolution. It was the Council which, in the days of Isagoras, had frustrated the attempt to govern Athens by an oligarchy. The conspirators thought it necessary to proceed with the greatest caution. At this time, owing to the presence of their enemies at Decelea, the Athenians, contrary to their usual custom, were constantly under arms. On the day fixed for the enterprise, the Four Hundred allowed those who were not in the plot to leave their posts for rest or food, but ordered those in their confidence to remain within reach of their arms. They were also supported by a number of foreign troops, Tenians, Andrians, Carystians, and by colonists of Aegina; above all by a band of a hundred young men, whom they could trust to carry out their instructions. Thus prepared against any resistance from the people, they proceeded to the Council-Chamber, each carrying a concealed dagger. Their precautions were needless : the Council of Five Hundred showed not the slightest sign of resistance, and were quite willing not only to leave the House, but to take the pay due for the remainder of their year of office, which was offered to them at the door as they passed out. Their expulsion took place about a month before the close of the Attic year in July.1 The Four Hundred were now absolute masters of the city. The people had been partly cheated, partly frightened into Proceedings of accepting the revolution, and even those who the New council. were under arms for the defence of the city looked on with indifference. All the functions of government, deliberative and executive, were in the hands of the new Thuc. viii. 69. Ath. Pol. 32. Cp. Aristoph. Thesmoph. 808, 809: dXX' EvfiovXrfs ra>p iripvaiv tls fiovXcvrris €ho were in the city were constantly in armour, cp. ibid. 555 ff., and Thuc. viii. 69. 5 Dittenberger, Syll. 44; C. I. A. i. 188. 422 DEMOCRACY RESTORED, 411-410. [XII. 3. whether payment to the poorer people to enjoy the festivals, or payment to the jurors, such payment was not contemplated in the first ardour of financial reform. And in the Constitution of Athens we are told that this payment was proposed by Cleophon, who was the leader of the extreme democratic party. Cleophon may have been a government member of the Five Thousand, but he is not towards likely to have occupied a leading position democracv. among them unless the temper of the Athenians had undergone a considerable change. But the brilliant success of Cyzicus, and the financial relief which followed it, may have made it impossible to repress an outburst of democratic fervour, or to adhere to the strict rule of expenditure laid down in 411.1 3. While Athens had been well-nigh reduced to despair by the revolt of Euboea, the war in the East had taken a T .. .. - more favourable turn. For some time the Inactivity of the Peiopon- Peloponnesian sailors had been much dis-nesians. satisfied with the conduct of their admiral Astyochus, and Tissaphernes. No advantage had been taken of the anarchy prevailing among the Athenians, though Astyochus had a far superior fleet. Tissaphernes neither brought up the promised Phoenician ships, nor provided regular pay. Astyochus attempted to satisfy his men by offering battle; but the Athenians refused. They had summoned Strombichides from the Hellespont, whither he had been sent with twenty-four ships, and till he arrived .they felt their numbers to be insufficient. The Pelopon-nesians, on the next day, were about to attack Samos, but, 1 Ath. Pol. c. 28. That the sura of two obols constituted some well-known payment at Athens at the time when the Frogs was acted (405) is clear from 1. 141 of that play : o>? fieya dvvacrdov iravraxov to> fiv' o/3oAo>. The scholiast, ad loc, explains it by the juror's fee, and it is possible that the juror's fee, which was abolished under the Four Hundred, was reintroduced at a lower rate—two obols instead of three. But Aeschines, Fals. Leg. § 76, asserts that Cleophon corrupted the Athenians by the distribution of money, which is the view taken in the Ath. Pol. of the " diobelia." XII. 3.] ASTYOCHUS, 411. 423 on learning that Strombichides had returned, they retired to Miletus, and when the Athenians offered battle, they too refused in turn. The large fleet (a hundred and twelve ships) could not be maintained without Persian help, and, as Tissaphernes was remiss in payment, Astyochus accepted the offer of Pharna-bazus, and despatched forty ships to the Hellespont. A storm drove them back, and ten only reached the strait. These brought over Byzantium, where Clearchus, their commander, joined them.1 The ill-feeling against Astyochus and Tissaphernes continued to increase, and when it was known that Alcibiades had returned to Samos, the sailors were more Mutiny at exasperated than ever. More especially the Miletus. Syracusan and Thurian sailors, who were free men, were outspoken in their demands for pay, and when Astyochus answered them roughly and even threatened Dorieus of Thurii with his staff, they broke into open violence. Astyochus only saved his life by taking refuge at an altar. The Milesians, not less indignant, drove out the garrison from a fort which Tissaphernes had built in their city, in spite of the remonstrances of Lichas, the Spartan general, who counselled submission.2 About midsummer, Astyochus was succeeded in his office by Mindarus. He returned to Sparta, and with him an envoy from Tissaphernes, to complain of the Mindarus conduct of the Milesians, and defend himself succeeds against attacks. The Milesians also sent Asty°chus-envoys, together with Hermocrates the Syracusan, who had been especially vehement in condemning the inactivity and treachery of the Spartan management of the fleet. Meanwhile Tissaphernes went to Aspendus, under pretence of bringing up the Phoenician fleet, which was there, in number 147 ships, and appointed Tamos his agent in his absence. At Aspendus he was joined by Alcibiades.3 1 Thuc. viii. 78-80. a Time. viii. 83, 84. 3 Thuc. viii. 87, 88. 424 MINDARUS IN THE HELLESPONT, 411. [XII. 4. Upon this Mindarus delayed no longer. Convinced of the dishonesty of Tissaphernes, he left Miletus for the Helles-He moves to pont, but a storm compelled him to take the Hellespont. refUge at Icarus, whence he sailed to Chios. Thrasyllus started in pursuit with the Athenian fleet, and observing that the enemy was at Chios, he made Lesbos his headquarters, intending to attack him there. He also wished to recover Eresus, which had revolted. Thrasybulus had already reached the place, having sailed direct from Samos. While they were thus engaged, Mindarus was able to slip away from Chios to Ehoeteum in safety. The small Athenian squadron, which had previously been sent into the straits to watch Clearchus {supra, p. 423), escaped with some loss to Lesbos, and joined the fleet, which they found quietly besieging Eresus, never supposing that the Peloponnesians would escape them. The Athenians at once followed the enemy to the Hellespont, and prepared for action.1 4. The battle took place off Cynossema, a promontory in the Chersonese, near Madytus. The Athenian ships, seventy-Battle of six in number, lay along the Chersonese, from Cynossema. Idacus to Arrhiani. The Peloponnesian, which numbered eighty-eight, extended from Abydus to Dardanus on the opposite shore. Mindarus, on the left wing, was opposed to Thrasybulus; the Syracusans, on the right, to Thrasyllus. As the Peloponnesian left extended beyond the Athenian, Mindarus wished to shut them into the strait, and, at the same time, to force their centre back upon the land. Thrasybulus was, however, able to over-lap Mindarus, and secure the passage into the open; but, at the same time, the Athenian left passed beyond Cynossema, and the centre being thus weakened by the extension of the wings, the Peloponnesians were able to drive it on shore. Neither right nor left wing could render assistance, and, indeed, the projecting promontory prevented Thrasyllus from seeing what was taking place. But the Peloponnesians, in their eager pursuit of the defeated enemy, 1 Thuc. viii. 99-101. XII. 4-] DEFEATED AT CYNOSSEMA, 411. 425 allowed their line to fall into disorder. Thrasybulus at once left off extending his wing, turned upon the ships opposed to him, and put them to flight. He then attacked the victorious centre, which, owing to the confusion, fell into a panic, and hardly offered any resistance. Thrasyllus meanwhile had defeated the Syracusans ; the Athenians were victorious along the whole line.1 In material advantage the Athenians did not gain much by the victory, for though they destroyed twenty-one of the allied ships, they lost fifteen of their own. But the moral effect was great; they had once more proved their superiority at sea. They ceased to depreciate themselves or to think much of their enemies' seamanship. In the city the news of the victory was received with delight ; the Athenians could hardly believe their good fortune. Their spirits rose; once more they began to have hopes of victory, and their immediate anxiety was greatly lessened on finding that the Peloponnesian ships were summoned by Mindarus from Euboea to the Hellespont. After repairing their ships, the fleet captured eight more of the enemy's fleet, and recovered Cyzicus.2 Alcibiades now returned from Aspendus, declaring that he had made Tissaphernes a firmer friend of the Athenians than ever. Tissaphernes, however, finding that the ' . . , . , . Tissaphernes. Peloponnesians were resenting his conduct in every way, thought it prudent to follow them to the Hellespont and explain; it was not to his advantage that Pharna-bazus should succeed where he had failed. His first step was to visit Ephesus and offer sacrifice to Artemis.3 The fleet from Euboea did not reach Mindarus without very serious loss, owing to a storm.4 It was followed by a l Thuc. viii. 104,105. See the plan in Goodhart's Time. viii. p. 164. * Thuc. viii. 107. 3 The history of Thucydides breaks off with the arrival of Tissaphernes at Ephesus. 4 Diod. xiii. 41 states that Epicles and Hippocrates, whom Mindarus sent to bring away Hegesandridas and his fleet, sailed back with fifty ships, which were entirely lost, except twelve men, of whom Hippocrates must have been one, for we hear of him again. 426 ALCIBIADES IN THE HELLESPONT. [XII. 5. small detachment of Athenian vessels, which were no longer required at home, and a slight engagement took place. Soon afterwards Dorieus brought up his ships from Ehodes. The Action in the Athenians attacked him as he entered the Hellespont. Hellespont, and a general engagement followed. The event was still undecided when Alcibiades arrived with eighteen ships from Samos, upon which the Peloponnesians broke and fled to Abydus. When they reached the shore, they were vigorously supported by Pharnabazus, who rode his horse into the sea, calling on his soldiers, horse and foot, to follow him and beat off the enemy. The Athenians sailed back to Sestos, taking with them thirty of the enemy's ships, and those which they had lost in the previous engagement. The greater part of the fleet then dispersed to collect money. Thrasyllus was sent to Athens to report and ask for reinforcements.1 5. Tissaphernes, on arriving in the Hellespont, was at once visited by Alcibiades, who brought presents and tokens of friendship. The Persian replied by arrest- Alcibiades. . .. ni. 1 1111 r 1 mg him, declaring that he had orders from the King to make war on the Athenians. Alcibiades was taken to Sardis, and there remained for thirty days, when he escaped to Clazomenae. He subsequently rejoined the Athenians at Cardia, whither they had retired to avoid an attack from Mindarus, and on hearing that the Peloponnesians had gone to Cyzicus, he resolved to attack them there. Crossing over to Sestos, where the fleet was instructed to meet him, he was on the point of setting out, when he was joined by two detachments of ships, one under Theramenes from Macedonia, the other under Thrasybulus from Thasos.2 1 Xen. Hell. i. 1; Diod. xiii. 45, 46; Plut. Alcib. 27. 2 After helping to arrange the new constitution at Athens, Theramenes had been sent to the Euripus, where he vainly endeavoured to prevent the completion of a mole, joining Euboea and Boeotia. He then visited the islands, levying contributions, and restoring democracy at Paros; subsequently he aided Archelaus of Macedonia in besieging Pydna, whence he sailed to the Hellespont (Diod. xiii. 47, 49). The Four Hundred were deposed in August or September XII. 5-] BATTLE OF CYZICUS, $10. 427 Alcibiades was anxious to come upon the enemy before this addition to his force was known. When, on tha next day, he arrived at Proconnesus, he found that Mindarus, supported by Pharnabazus, had captured Cyzicus. He remained in the island for the rest of the day, keeping under strict control all the craft, down to the smallest boat, and forbidding any one to cross to the mainland under pain of death. Next morning he assembled his men and addressed them, pointing out that they had no supplies, while the enemy was supported in abundance by the Persians; whatever the conditions, they must fight—on sea, on land, and if necessary against walls and fortifications. In the midst of a storm of The battle rain and a heavy fog he set sail for Cyzicus, of Cyzicus. but as he approached the town the sky cleared, and he saw the Peloponnesian fleet exercising at a distance from the harbour, to which his ships prevented their return. The Peloponnesians, when they saw themselves cut off from the town by a superior force, hastened to land, and forming their ships into a compact line, defended themselves against the Athenian attack. Alcibiades now withdrew twenty ships from his line, and passing behind it, put the crews on shore in order to take the Peloponnesians in the rear. He was met by Mindarus, who also disembarked a number of his men, but Mindarus was slain, and his soldiers put to flight. The whole fleet fell into the hands of the Athenians, except the ships of the Syracusans, which were set on fire. Alcibiades returned with his prizes to Proconnesus.1 From Proconnesus he again advanced to Cyzicus, intending to attack the town, but the inhabitants, finding themselves abandoned by Pharnabazus and the Peloponnesians, admitted him without resistance. Once more master of the sea, he used his power to recruit the finances of Athens. From 411, and the battle of Cyzicus was fought in March 410—so that little time can have been devoted by Therauienes to the new constitution. 1 Xen. Hell. i. 1. 13 ff. Biodorus, xiii. 49-51, gives a different account, and Plutarch also in some points, Alcib. 28. 428 PHARNABAZUS AND THE PELOPONNESIANS. [XII. 6. Cyzicus, where he remained twenty days, he exacted lar^e sums; then he sailed to the Bosphorus, collecting money on A1 ... . the way from Perinthus and Selymbria. At Alcibiades J # J collects Chrysopolis, opposite Byzantium, he built a supplies. fortress and custom house, after which he returned to the Hellespont, leaving Theramenes with thirty ships to collect the dues and keep the strait open.1 6. The Peloponnesians were for a time paralysed by their defeat. Hippocrates, the second in command, sent home a message of despair, which never reached Sparta, but was intercepted and carried to Athens: " Our ships are gone: Mindarus is dead: the crews are starving: we know not what to do." From this helpless plight they were roused by the energy and faithfulness of Pharnabazus. To every soldier he gave a cloak and money sufficient for two months. The sailors he equipped in heavy arms, and bidding them take no heed of the loss of timber while their lives were safe, he dispersed them to guard the coast of his satrapy. He then assembled the generals of the various contingents in the Peloponnesian fleet, and bade them build triremes at Antandrus as many as they had lost.2 Wood they could get from Ida, and money he would supply. But though the Syracusans seem to have replaced their twenty ships in a short time, it was many months before the Peloponnesians were again in possession of an adequate fleet.8 The success of the Peloponnesians since the renewal of the war had not been such as to make a warlike policy popular at Sparta. It was true that Agis was master of Attica, and that the Asiatic cities of the Athenian empire were in revolt; but Athens could still keep a fleet on the sea, and she had triumphed over domestic faction, her greatest danger. 1 Xen. Hell. i. 1. 20 f. ; Diod. xiii. 52, 64. 2 The Autandrians had obtained a garrison from the Peloponnesians on their arrival in the Hellespont to protect them against the oppression of Tissaphernes and the treachery of his lieutenant Arsaces; Thnc. viii. 108. For the previous fortunes of the town see supra, p. 234. 3 Xen. Hell. i. 1. 23-26. XII. 7-] THE SPARTANS PROPOSE PEACE, 410. 429 Tissaphernes had proved a faithless friend; Alcibiades was again an Athenian general; Astyochus had shown himself incompetent and dishonest. The reports brought home from the fleet, the conflicting statements of Tissaphernes, Astyochus, Hermocrates, and the envoys from the sailors, had opened the eyes of the Spartans: they now understood why their fleet had remained inactive for months at Ehodes; and why Astyochus had taken no advantage of the distracted state of the Athenians at Samos. Since the fleet had gone to the Hellespont, in spite of the active aid of Pharnabazus, one disaster had followed on another, and now came the tidings of its utter destruction. If peacJe could be had on tolerable terms, peace was desirable. So Endius (supra, p. 370) appeared at Athens, proposing a uti possidetis so far as the t r ° ., 4 The Spartans cities ranged on either side were concerned; a propose peace; withdrawal of troops from the garrisons, and Athens rejects an exchange of prisoners, man for man. The Spartans, no doubt, greatly exaggerated the distress to *vhich they had reduced Athens by the desolation of Attica, the liberation of Euboea, and the cutting off of supplies from the cities of the empire; and Endius is said to have pointed out that peace was needed quite as much in the interests of Athens as of Sparta. They were quickly undeceived. So far from being cast down by misfortune, the Athenians were elated by their victory; their constitution was being restored to them; their revenues were much improved, and they had hopes of recovering their empire. On Cleophon's motion the proposals for peace were rejected.1 7. The misfortunes of the Peloponnesian fleet were increased 1 Xenophon does not mention this proposal; Diodorus, xiii. 52, 53. The terms are: ras fiev wdXcts e%€LV, as cfcdrcpoi Kparovfitv, ra Se (f)povpia ra Trap' dWr)\ms Karrikvarai, twv be dixpahobTcov Xvrpovvrcs av6* cvos yA6rjvaiov \afieiv eva Ad/cwva. In the arcnonship of Theopompus (411-410), Philoch or us, frag. 117. Diod. gives us the speech of Endius, and his account is supported by Nepos and Justin. For Cleophon, who from now till his death in 404 was among the leaders of the democracy, see wpra, p. 422, and infra, p. 450. B.Q was a lyre-maker by trade. 430 HERMOCRATES BANISHED, 410. [XII. 7. by the loss of Hermocrates and his colleagues. Though not less unsuccessful than the rest in the recent conflicts, they had displayed more capacity and resolution; but they had lost their ships, and to this they probably owed the loss of their position. During the absence of Hermocrates from Syracuse the extreme democrats, with Diodes at their head, had risen to power, and as Hermocrates was not in Banishment of favour with the party or their leader, they did Hermocrates. not }et faG opportunity slip. He was banished with his colleagues, and new generals were sent out to take his place.1 Hermocrates communicated the decision of his government to his soldiers, and at their request he remained in office till his successors arrived. In the interval the new vessels were finished, and they were sent to join the new generals at Miletus. Hermocrates himself repaired to Pharnabazus, with whom he visited the court of Susa. We shall hear of him again in Sicily, but he takes no further part in the Peloponnesian war.2 Meanwhile Thrasyllus was raising a force at Athens. He nad returned to the city shortly before the battle of Cyzicus. The success of the fleet was greatly in his favour, and he was able to convince the Athenians of his personal capacity by obtaining a slight advantage over Agis, who, venturing Thrasyllus too near the walls of the city, was repulsed at Athens. yr\\fo loss. He took out a fleet of fifty ships, with a thousand heavy-armed and a hundred horse. Soldiers were needed now no less than sailors, for the victories of the fleet had enabled the Athenians to attack the revolted cities on land. That the Athenians should have been able to furnish such a force is truly wonderful; the fleet was still in the Hellespont, it was still necessary to keep watch on the walls of Athens day and night, and no supplies could be drawn from Attica and Euboea. With reason might Agis 1 Infra, p. 481. 2 Xen. Hell. i. 1. 27-30. For the journey to Susa, cp. Thuc. viii. 85, infra, p. 434. In a short time the Syracusans found it necessary to withdraw their ships from the Aegean for use at home. XII. 8.] THRASYLUS IN IONIA, 410. 431 exclaim, as he saw the corn ships sailing past from Pontus to the Peiraeus, that it was of little use for him to remain at Decelea, if Athens could be fed from the north. At his request Clearchus, who must have been recalled (supra, p. 424), was sent back with a few ships, collected from Megara and other allies, to the Hellespont. He succeeded in escaping from the Athenians with some loss, and once more established himself at Byzantium.1 8. In the summer of 410 Thrasyllus set sail from Athens. He had come to the city to collect forces for the support of Alcibiades in the Hellespont, but the subsequent victory of Cyzicus made this unnecessary, and he directed his course to Ionia. After defeating the Milesians at Pygela, and obtaining possession of Colophon, he made an incursion into Lydia, where the corn was now ripe, and collected a large amount of spoil, burning the villages and devastating the country. He then attempted an attack on Ephesus. Dividing his forces into two detachments, he landed his He is defeated heavy-armed at the foot of Mount Coressus, atEPhesus. to the south of the city, the light troops and cavalry on the marsh to the north. In both divisions he was severely defeated; the Ephesians being greatly assisted in their defence by the Syracusans, whose twenty ships had by this time been completed and placed under the command of the new generals, together with &vq additional vessels, and by troops brought up by Tissaphernes, who had received warning of the intended attack. Thrasyllus retired to Lesbos. While lying at anchor at Methymna, he caught sight of the Sicilian vessels sailing back to the Hellespont, and at once put to sea in pursuit. Five of the ships he Thrasyllus in captured with their crews; the remainder he the Hellespont, pursued to Ephesus.2 He now joined Alcibiades at Sestos, 1 Xen. Hell. i. 1. 35, 36. According to Diodorus, Clearchus was present at the battle of Cyzicus, I.e. c. 51. 2 The captives were placed in the stone quarries of Peiraeus, but in the following winter they dug their way out, and escaped, some to Decelea, others to Megara. 432 ATHENS LOSES PYLUS AND N/SAEA. [XII. 8. and the whole fleet crossed to Lampsacus, to winter quarters. But when Alcibiades wished to combine the squadron of Thrasyllus with his own, his soldiers refused to unite with men who had been recently defeated, and it was not till they had joined in a successful engagement with Pharnabazus that the two sections became one army. The winter was spent at Lampsacus, in fortifying the town and in making incursions into the King's country.1 During this winter (i.e. October 410-April 409) the Lacedaemonians at length succeeded in driving the Athenians out of l recovered Pynis- Xenophon merely informs us that " the by the Lace- Helots who had deserted from Malea to Cory-daemomans. phasium " were allowed by the Lacedaemonians to go out on terms. From Diodorus we learn that the Athenians, on hearing that Pylus was closely invested, sent Anytus with thirty triremes to relieve it, but he was prevented by contrary winds from passing Malea, and returned home. Eager to bring the siege to an end, the Lacedaemonians seem to have offered favourable terms, which were accepted. Whether Anytus was to blame, or not, he was put on his trial on his return, and only escaped conviction by bribing his judges.2 Another misfortune which befell Athens about this The Megarians time was the loss of Nisaea. With the help of recover Nisaea. ^e Syracusan prisoners who had escaped from Peiraeus, and perhaps at their instigation, the Megarians, by a sudden attack, recovered their port. The Athenians at once came up with a considerable force, and succeeded in 1 Xen. Hell. i. 2. 1-17 ; Diod. xiii. 64 ; Plut. Ale. 29. I hare put the expedition of Thrasyllus in 410 in spite of the difficulty about the rebuilding of the twenty Syracusan ships, which were fiuished between the battle of Cyzicus (spring) and some little time before the battle of Ephesus (summer). If we put the expedition in 409, we have to account for (1) the long delay of Thrasyllus at Athens (from the beginning of 410 to May 409), and (2) for the inaction of Alcibiades during these months. But see Beloch, Oriech. Gesch. ii. 79, note, and his paper in Philol. 43, p. 293 f. 2 Xen. I.e. 2. 18 ; Diod. xiii. 64 ; Aih. Pol. 27. Anytus is said to have been the first who succeeded in bribing a jury. Afterwards he became notorious as one of the accusers of Socrates. XII. 9-1 ALCIBIADES AT CHALCEDON, 409. 433 defeating the Megarians, but their success was in vain. Nisaea passed out of their hands.1 The Spartans also had their losses. From the first their colony at Heraclea had been a source of disaster to them, and now, owing to the treachery of the Achaeans, their harmost Labotas was slain with 700 men in a conflict with the neighbouring Oetaeans.2 9. In the spring of the following year (409) the Athenians advanced to Proconnesus, with the intention of carrying on the war in the Bosphorus. Their first operations were at Chalcedon, The Chalcedonians, who had been informed of their approach, had collected their movable property, and placed it for safety with their friends and neighbours the Thracians of Bithynia. Alcibiades at once marched to the Bithynian frontier with a small force of horse and foot, supported by the fleet, and demanded the property. The Thracians were unable to refuse the request, and Alcibiades returned to Chalcedon laden with spoil. He Alcibiades at invested the city by drawing a trench and Chalcedon. palisade round it from the Bosphorus to the Propontis, and where the work was intersected by the river Chalcedon (?) he fortified the banks on either side as securely as the nature of the ground permitted. The Lacedaemonian governor of the town, Hippocrates, offered battle within the lines, while Pharnabazus appeared with a large force outside the city. The issue was doubtful for a time, but when Alcibiades brought up reinforcements, the Chalcedonians fled into the city, with the loss of their commander, and Pharnabazus retired to his camp. Alcibiades then left for the Chersonese to collect money, placing the army in the command of Thra-syllus and Thrasybulus. In his absence these A reement generals came to terms with Pharnabazus, who with agreed to pay the Athenians twenty talents, Pharnabaz"s. and to conduct their ambassadors to the King. The Chalcedonians on their part pledged themselves to pay the ordinary 1 Diod. xiii. 65. Xenophon does not mention this incident. 2 Xen. Hell. i. 2. 18. For Heraclea, see supra, p. 275. The Lacedaemonians seem to have recovered the place from the Boeotians. VOL. III. 2 E 434 ATHENS ACQUIRES BYZANTIUM, 409. [XII. 9. tribute1 to Athens, with all arrears; and the Athenians undertook not to make war on Chalcedon till the return of the embassy. The convention was subsequently ratified by Alci-biades on behalf of Chalcedon, after which Pharnabazus retired to Cyzicus, bidding the envoys meet him there. The embassy, which consisted of five Athenians and two Argives, was joined by envoys of the Lacedaemonians, including Pasippidas, the admiral chosen to succeed Mindarus, together with Hermo-crates and his brother Proxenus. When the winter came on, they had advanced no further than Gordieum, in Phrygia, where for the present they remained.2 Alcibiades, who had not only collected large supplies in the Chersonese on his previous visit, but had captured Selymbria, and even made an attempt on surrender of Byzantium, had taken the oaths to Pharnabazus Byzantium. by pr0Xy at Chrysopolis in the Bosphorus. He now led the fleet to the European coast to attack Byzantium, which was held by Clearchus with some Laconian, Megarian, and Boeotian troops (supra, p. 431). The assault soon passed into a siege, and Clearchus did not hesitate to reserve what food there was for the use of the garrison. He then left the city in the care of the Megarian and Boeotian commanders, and repaired to Pharnabazus to collect money and ships—for the Lacedaemonian fleet was now being restored : a few ships had been left in the Hellespont by Pasippidas; others had been built at Antandrus; others were off the coast of Thrace in command of Agesandridas,3 all which Clearchus hoped, with the help of Pharnabazus, to collect, organise, and make efficient. In his absence a party in Byzantium betrayed the city to the Athenians to save the inhabitants from starvation. The garrison were surprised, and compelled to surrender,4 1 This implies that the duty on exports {supra, p. 338) had been removed and the old system revived—in certain places, at any rate. 2 Xen. I.e. i. 3. 1-14. For Pasippidas, who had fallen under a suspicion of treacherous dealings with Tissaphernes while collecting ships at Thasos, see Xen. I.e. i. 1. 32. 3 Xen. Hell. i. 3. 17. 4 Xen. Hell. i. 3. 18-22. XII. 10.] CYRUS SENT TO THE COAST, 408. 435 and the Athenians thus acquired possession of both sides of the Bosphorus. 10. In the next spring (408) Pharnabazus and the envoys went forward from Gordieum on their way to Susa. They were met by a former embassy of Lacedaemonians, Boeotius and others,1 returning from Susa, who informed c rug .g sent them * that their mission was useless ; the down to the Lacedaemonians had carried every point with coast* the King. With them was Cyrus, the King's younger son, who had been sent to take the command on the coast, and aid the Lacedaemonians in the war.2 He carried with him a royal letter addressed to all the cities of the coast, and bearing the King's seal, by which he was appointed " 'Caranus,' or chief, of all the forces which muster at Castolus." The Athenian envoys on hearing this wished to go on at once to Susa, or to return home; but at the request of Cyrus, Pharnabazus detained them, and it was three years before they were set at liberty. The Lacedaemonians, Argives, and Syracusans in the embassy were not, of course, subject to any restraint. With the exception of Abydus, the whole of the Hellespont was once more a part of the Athenian empire. The city was in possession of an all-powerful fleet, and her Alcib-ad resources had been largely increased. This had prepares to mainly been the work of Alcibiades, and the return home-time seemed to have come when he might return to Athens with safety. The fleet had been divided into three portions. Thirty ships had been sent to Thrace under Thrasybulus to collect money; twenty Alcibiades took to Samos and Caria, where he collected no less than a hundred talents immediately after the conquest of Byzantium; the remainder returned to Athens in the care of Thrasyllus. From Caria, Alcibiades sailed to Samos, and from thence to Paros, with a 1 This embassy has not been mentioned before by Xenophon, and nothing more is known about it. 2 Xen. Hell. i. 4. 3 : Kapavov t£>v els KaoTa>X6i> ddpoi^ofievoov. Both Tissapfrernes an$ {*)jjirnabazus were now subject to Cyrus. 436 ALCIBIADES AT ATHENS, 408. [XII. II. small part of his force, and hearing that the Lacedaemonians were preparing a new fleet of thirty vessels in their dock at Gytheum, he at once sailed thither to satisfy himself of the fact. He was also anxious to receive news from his friends at Athens, being still uncertain of the feeling towards him in the city. He now learned that he had been elected one of the generals for the year, and without further delay he sailed to the Peiraeus. Seven years had elapsed since he had left the city, in the pomp of the great Sicilian expedition—years in which he had done great good and great evil to his state. He had become the foremost man in Hellas. At Sparta and at Sardis, no less than The return of at Athens, he had carried all before him. At Aicibiades. his approach the Athenians crowded to the port, eager to catch a glimpse of their great citizen. Some were his ardent partisans, who declared that his banishment had been unjust, the work of enemies who wished to bring about his destruction for their own purposes. Others still looked on him as the chief source of evil in the past, and of danger in the future. So apprehensive was Aicibiades that some attack would be made upon him that he refused to go ashore, till he caught sight of his cousin Euryptolemus and other friends, to whose protection he could trust. Meetings were held of the Council and Assembly, at which he declared that he was the victim of injustice, and guiltless of the sacrilege laid to his charge. He carried the people with him, and without a protest from his enemies he was elected general with full powers, as the one man who could save Athens and restore her empire.1 II. Aicibiades arrived at Athens on the day of the Plyn-teria, on which the statue of Athena was disrobed and 1 Xen. Hell. i. 4. 10, Diodorus, xiii. 68, and Athenaeus, xii. 49 give a highly coloured account of the return of Aicibiades, which becomes more highly coloured still in the hands of Duris ; but the historians of the fourth century are more restrained. Aicibiades no doubt brought with him the hundred talents from Caria, but the spoils and captured vessels had already been conveyed to Athens by Thrasyllus, and helped to turn the tide in favour of Aicibiades. XII. II.] LYSANDER BECOMES ADMIRAL, 408. 437 cleansed. It was a solemn day in the Athenian calendar, on which business was suspended; and this was afterwards remembered as ominous of the later fortunes „ A r Return of of Alcibiades. He remained in the city three Aicibiades months or more, and made amends to the toIonia-Eleusinian deities, whose rites he had profaned, by conducting the procession to Eleusis at the time of the mysteries by land, which the Athenians had not ventured to do since Agis had occupied Decelea. In October he set sail with a large armament, 1500 heavy-armed, 150 horse, and 100 ships. After an attack on Andros, which had revolted, he returned to Samos, and found that in his absence changes were taking place of the first importance. Cyrus, as we have seen, had been sent down in the spring of the year to take command of the forces on the coast. He spent the summer, we do not know how L and or where, for it was not till late in the year sent out as that he arrived at Sardis. Here he was visited navarch-by Lysander, who, shortly before the return of Alcibiades, had come out as admiral of the Lacedaemonian fleet, in the place of Cratesippidas, who had succeeded Pasippidas. Lysander had employed the interval in collecting ships, and before approaching Cyrus, he was master of a fleet of seventy vessels. The meeting of the two men was the turning-point in the war. Sparta had at last found the right man for her work, and her action was no longer to be crippled by the vacillating and treacherous policy of Tissaphernes.1 Cyrus had brought a large sum of money with him, and was also prepared to spend his own resources, even to melting down the throne on which he sat. But Lysander and when Lysander asked for a drachma a day for Cyrus, his sailors, he replied that his instructions from the King would not allow such a rate of pay. Half a drachma (3 obols) and no more would be paid to each man, but the Lacedae- 1 That Cyrus came to the coast early in the year is clear from Xenophon, Hell. i. 4. 3, for the envoys actually saw him. 438 LYSANDER AND CYRUS, 408. [XII. 12. monians might maintain as many ships as they pleased. Lysander was not to be foiled. After the banquet, when Cyrus drank to him, and asked how he could gratify him, he replied, " By adding an obol to the sailors' pay." This was done, and the timely liberality roused the greatest enthusiasm among the Spartan fleet. The Athenians were proportionately discouraged. They endeavoured, with the help of Tissaphernes, to bring Cyrus back to the old plan of wearing out each combatant upon the other, but Cyrus would not listen to the suggestion. A new policy was on foot, and Alcibiades must have been bitterly conscious of the change. He was no longer a power with the Persians. 12. Lysander returned to Ephesus, where he remained for the winter (408-407), quietly refitting and repairing his ^ f . _. fleet. Alcibiades, who had hitherto remained Defeat of the . ' Athenians inactive at Samos, now sailed to the help of atNotium. Thrasybulus, who was fortifying Phocaea, leaving his pilot Antiochus in command, with instructions not to attack Lysander. Moved by curiosity or contempt, Antiochus sailed with his own ship and one other into the harbour of Ephesus, and passed under the prows of Lysander's vessels. This led to an engagement, in which Lysander bringing his whole fleet to bear upon the Athenians, who hastened up in detachments, defeated them, and destroyed fifteen of their ships. Alcibiades at once returned to Samos and offered battle, but Lysander refused, as his fleet was by no means equal in numbers to that of the Athenians1 (407). When this reverse became known at Athens, the popular feeling turned against Alcibiades. He had done nothing to ...... . realise the great hopes entertained at his elec- Alcibiades is # © \ . . deposed from tion; he had failed in the negotiations through his command. Tissaphernes; and he was now accused of negligence in his command, and deposed. In his room ten generals were elected, whose names are connected with one of the most melancholy passages in Greek history—Conon, 1 Xen. Hell. i. 5. 1-15. XII. 12.] ALCIBIADES DEPOSED, 407. 439 Diomedon, Leon, Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Arches-tratus, Protomachus, Thrasyllus, Aristogenes.1 Alcibiades retired to a fortress which he had built in the Chersonese, near Bisanthe. His place at Samos was taken by Conon, who was despatched from Andros where he had been left by Alcibiades, with the twenty ships under his command. He at once reorganised the fleet, selecting seventy of the best ships, and manning them with the most efficient sailors. With this force, though less by forty ships or more than the fleet of Alcibiades, he was able to make descents on the territory of the enemy.2 Conon's place at Andros was taken by Phanosthenes, with a small squadron of four triremes. On his way thither he overtook two Thurian ships, which he captured with their crews. Among the prisoners was Dorieus of Rhodes, a famous athlete, who having been banished from Ehodes by the sentence of the Athenians—in the period when Ehodes was still a subject ally of the Athenian empire—had settled at Thurii, and taken command of Thurian ships against Athens.? When he was brought to Athens, the citizens decided by public decree to treat him with the respect due to an 1 Xen. i. 5. 16-17 ; Plut- -Alcib. 36 ; Diod. xiii. 73. That he was deposed is clear from Lysias, 21. 7. Xenophon mentions Aristocrates and Adimantus as generals chosen with Alcibiades to act on land when he left Athens, Hell. i. 4. 21. Thrasybulus and Conon were also generals for this year, ib. i. 4. 10, and probably Thrasyllus. If so, Conon, Androcles, and Thrasyllus were continued in office; Thrasybulus, Alcibiades, and Adimantus deposed. It is doubtful whether the elections of generals were always held at the ordinary time in these later years of the war, or whether the ten were always elected at one time. Before Alcibiades returned to Athens, he, Conon, and Thrasyllus were chosen ; this may have been at the ordinary time. Then Alcibiades seems to have received full power by a later election or confirmation; and the election of Aristocrates and Adimantus is not mentioned till Alcibiades is leaving Athens. The date of the battle of Notium is uncertain, but it would seem to have taken place late in the summer of 407, for the generals elected after it are in office in autumn 406, when the battle of Arginusae was fought. 2 Hell. i. 5. 18-21/ 3 Thuc. iii. 8; viii. 35, 84, supra p. 426. 440 FERICLES THE YOUNGER, [XII. 12. Olympian victor; the rest of the captives were sold, but he was set at liberty.1 Before entering on the final crisis of the war, we may turn aside for a moment to listen to a conversation which, as . ¦ ^ Xenophon tells us, Socrates held with Pericles Conversation of x Socrates with the younger, the son of the statesman (supra, Pericles the p 132) about the time when he was looking for- younger. , ward to becoming one of the generals of Athens. We cannot of course be precise about the year, but we may fix it at no long time before the battle of Arginusae. After dwelling on the glorious actions of Athens in old days, Pericles continues:— The wonder to me, Socrates, is how our city ever came to decline. Soc. I think we are the victims of our own success. Like some athlete, whose facile preponderance in the arena has betrayed him into laxity until he eventually succumbs to punier antagonists, so we Athenians, in the plenitude of our superiority, have neglected ourselves and are become degenerate. Per. What then ought we to do now to recover our former virtue ? Soc. There need be no mystery about that, I think. We can rediscover the institutions of our forefathers—applying them to the regulation of our lives with something of their precision, and not improbably with like success ; or we can imitate those who stand at the front of affairs to-day, adopting to ourselves their rule of life, in which case, if we live up to the standard of our models, we may hope at least to rival their excellence, or by a more conscientious adherence to what they aim at, rise superior. You would seem to suggest (he answered) that the spirit of beautiful and brave manhood has taken wings and left our city; as, for instance, when will Athenians, like the Lacedaemonians, rever- The decline of ence old age__the Athenian who hates his own father the Athenian .° . character. as a starting-point for the contempt he pours upon grey hairs ? When will he pay as strict an attention to the body, who is not content with neglecting a good habit, but laughs to scorn those who are careful in the matter ? When shall we Athenians so obey our magistrates—we who take a pride, as it were, in despising authority 1 When, once more, shall we be united as a 1 Xen. Hell. i. 5. 19. XII. 13,] THE ATHENIAN SOLDIER. 441 people, we who, instead of combining to promote common interests, delight in blackening each other's characters, envying one another more than we envy all the world besides ; and—which is our worst failing—who, in private and public intercourse alike, are torn by dissension, and are caught in a maze of litigation, and prefer to make capital out of our neighbours' difficulties rather than to render mutual assistance ? To make our conduct consistent, indeed, we treat our national interests no better than if they were the concerns of some foreign state; or make them bones of contention to wrangle over, and rejoice in nothing so much as in possessing means and ability to indulge these tastes. From this hot-bed is engendered in the state a spirit of blind folly and cowardice, and in the hearts of the citizens spreads a tangle of hatred and mutual hostility which, as I often shudder to think, will some day cause some disaster to befall the state greater than it can bear. Do not (replied Socrates), do not, I pray you, permit yourself to believe that the Athenians are smitten with so incurable a depravity. Do you not observe their discipline in all naval matters ? Look at their prompt and orderly obedience to the superintendence at the gymnastic contests, their quite unrivalled subservience to their teachers in the training of our choruses. Yes (he answered), there's the wonder of it; to think that all these good people should so obey their leaders, but that our hoplites and our cavalry, who may be supposed to rank before the rest of the citizens in excellence of manhood, should be so entirely unamenable to discipline.1 13. In the following spring (406), Lysander, who seems to have remained inactive at Ephesus during the winter, was succeeded as admiral by Callicratidas.2 When , ,. ....*'_ Callicratidas handing over his ships, Lysander reminded his succeeds successor of the victory which he had won, and Lysander' claimed for his fleet the supremacy at sea. Callicratidas bade him take the fleet to Miletus, passing between Samos and the mainland, and give it into his charge there; he would 1 Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 13 ff. Dakyns' translation. 2 The time is fixed by Xenophon's mention of an eclipse of the moon, which is, no doubt, that of April 15, 406—unless, indeed, this notice of time is spurious ; see Wilkins, Mus. Phil. Cant. i. 555, and Beloch, I.e. Callicratidas had probably been appointed admiral in the preceding autumn. 442 CALLICRA TIDAS SUCCEEDS L YSANDER, 406. [XI I. 13 then allow that the Peloponnesians were masters of the waters. This Lysander refused to do, as he was no longer admiral of the fleet. Callicratidas immediately increased his fleet to 140 ships with the intention of attacking Conon; but he found that he was the object of a conspiracy on the part of LySander's adherents, who loudly complained of the folly of the Lacedaemonians in changing their admirals, and sending out inexperienced men to replace those who had acquired a thorough knowledge of their ships and crews. Callicratidas met them with the plain statement that he was not the maker of the laws of his city; it was his business to obey them. This he intended to do, and while he held his office he would make the best of it, but it was for them to say whether they wished him to stay or return home and explain the position of affairs. Other difficulties were in store for him. Lysander had paid back to Cyrus all the money remaining in his hands, and when Callicratidas repaired to Sardis to ask for supplies, he was kept waiting at the doors of Cyrus with designed humiliation. Exasperated at the indignities put upon him, he returned to Miletus, resolved, if ever he reached Lacedaemon again, to bring about a reconciliation between Athens and Sparta, and put an end to the discreditable relations now existing between Greeks and barbarians. From Miletus he sent to Lacedaemon for supplies, and summoning an assembly of the Milesians, asked for contributions to enable him to make use of his force. The Milesians, in spite of their partiality to Lysander, could not refuse to contribute, and, having also procured a sum of money from Chios, Callicratidas was able to sail to Methymna, which was protected by an Athenian garrison. He Callicratidas took the town by storm, but of the captives he at Lesbos. g^ onjy fae Athenian garrison and the slaves; the rest he set at liberty, declaring that no Greek should be sold into slavery while he was in command. To Conon, who had sailed up from Samos to the aid of Methymna, he sent word that he would put an end to his adultery with the sea, and when he saw him putting out on his return, he XII. I4-] CONON AT MYTILENE, 4O6. 443 intercepted his ships and pursued him to Mytilene, with his whole fleet consisting of one hundred and seventy vessels. Conon, with whom were Leon and Erasinides, was compelled to fight at the harbour's mouth, and lost thirty out of his seventy ships before reaching the town. Here he was blockaded by Callicratidas, who summoned forces from Methymna and Chios, and was now supplied with money by Cyrus. The position of the Athenians was indeed alarming; Mytilene was without provisions, shut in on every side, and unless intelligence could be conveyed to Athens, conon blockaded Conon had no hope of relief. Selecting two of at Mytilene-the swiftest vessels, he prepared them for four days, and on the fifth, at mid-day, when the enemy's vigilance was relaxed, he sent them out of the harbour, one towards the Hellespont, the other across the open sea. Pursuit was immediate, and before sunset the second vessel was brought back. The other escaped and carried the news of the siege to Athens. 14. If Conon and what remained of his fleet were to be saved, immediate action was necessary, and that on no small scale. In thirty days the Athenians prepared and launched a fleet of one hundred and ten vessels. All who were of age to serve, whether slave or free, and even a large number of the class of the knights, were compelled to go on board. On reaching Samos, the fleet added ten Samian vessels to the number, and more than thirty others were collected from the allies. The generals were now in command of a force of more than one hundred and fifty ships, with which they sailed to the islands of Arginusae, opposite Lesbos, and there took their evening meal. Callicratidas, who had advanced to meet them with one hundred and twenty ships, leaving Eteonicus to blockade Conon with fifty, when he saw their fires, attempted to surprise them by a night attack, but was prevented by a storm. Towards morning the weather cleared, and he sailed at daybreak to Arginusae. The battle which followed was the greatest fought in the whole course of the war. For Athens it was a decisive battle; if she was defeated, the war was at an end; she had ventured 444 BATTLE OF ARGINUSAE, 406. [XII. 14. her last stake. The Athenians had the advantage in numbers, but their fleet had been hastily prepared, and was manned by inexperienced sailors; they were conscious that it was incapable of the skilful manoeuvres for which they had long been famous. It was drawn up in two massive wings, each of sixty vessels; the centre, which apparently lay on the islands of Arginusae, was formed by a single line. On the left wing, which put out towards the open sea, Aristocrates and Diomedon were in command in the first line, Pericles and Erasinides in the second, each with fifteen ships; the centre was occupied by the Samians and other allies; on the right, between the islands and the shore, were Protomachus and Thrasyllus, supported by Lysias and Aristogenes, each with fifteen ships as on the left. The Peloponnesians were drawn up in a single line: they were old sailors, and wished to take whatever advantage of their skill they could.1 The pilot of Callicratidas, observing the disparity of numbers, advised him to decline battle, to which he replied that he was by no means a necessary man at Sparta, and it would be disgraceful to retreat. The battle was hotly contested, but when Callicratidas, who commanded the right, was hurled into the sea by the force of his impact on an enemy's ship and drowned,2 and the left wing was defeated by Protomachus, the whole fleet turned to flight, some to Chios, but most to Phocaea. The Athenians returned to Arginusae. They had lost twenty-five vessels and their crews, but in the Peloponnesian fleet at least seventy ships had been destroyed, including nine ships out of ten in the Lacedaemonian contingent. The victory was complete, and at once restored to Athens the control of the Aegean.3 Immediately after the battle, the Athenian generals issued orders to Theramenes and Thrasybulus to collect the crews 1 Hell. i. 6. 29 if. See Zeune's note. 2 For Callicratidas, see Grote, Hist, of Greece, v. 496 f., 503 f. 3 Hell, i. 6. 34. The hattle was fought in the archonship of Callias (406-405), Ath. Pol. c. 34; and not long before the Apaturia (November). XII. I5-] LOSS OF THE SAILORS, 4O6. 445 from the floating wrecks, and were about to sail with the rest of the fleet to relieve Conon when the storm of the previous night again broke over them and Escape of rendered any movement impossible. Eteonicus, Eteonicus. however, was able to take advantage of the delay to escape from Mytilene. A despatch-boat brought him the news of the defeat, but he at once bade the sailors leave the harbour without a word, and return with crowns proclaiming the victory of Callicratidas and the destruction of the Athenian fleet. On their arrival, Eteonicus offered sacrifice openly for the good news. He then despatched his triremes with all haste to Chios, for which the wind was favourable, and himself led his army into camp at Methymna. "When the wind moderated, Conon sailed to meet the Athenians, who were advancing from Arginusae, and informed them of the escape of Eteonicus. After an ineffectual movement to Mytilene and Chios, the fleet returned to Samos.1 15. The victory of Athens had not been gained without loss, and in this case the loss fell not only on hired crews and slaves, but on Athenian citizens who had been compelled to serve as sailors. The Athenian general who risked or lost the lives of his citizens could not rely on the generosity of the people to save him from the attacks of rivals and enemies; his success was too often forgotten, and his failure punished with unjust severity. When it became, known that the survivors had not been saved from the wrecks after the battle, the city was filled with indignation. All the generals, except Conon, were deposed and ordered home. Two of them, Protomachus and Aristogenes, did not return, but Pericles, Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasyllus, and Erasinides appeared at Athens to answer the charges against them.2 1 Xen. Hell. i. 6 ; Diod. xiii. 98. 2 The tenth general, Archestratus, seems to have died at Mytilene before the battle; Diod. xiii. 101 ; Lysias, 21. 8. Why we should have Lysias in this list and among those who commanded in the battle, while Leon is mentioned among the generals of the year, is not clear. In Xen. i, 6. 16, Leon is said to have accompanied Conon to Mytilene, and his name is not mentioned again. 446 THERAMENES AND THE GENERALS, 406. [XII. 15. At this time the leader of the people at Athens was Arche-demus, "a man with a clever tongue in his head."1 Having The attack on brought Erasinides into court on a charge of the generals. peculation, he seized the opportunity to attack him for his conduct as general. The Council took the matter up, and when the generals made their report, it was proposed that they should be arrested and the case referred to the people. In the Assembly which followed, the chief accuser was Theramenes. Together with Thrasybulus he had been directed to save the men on the wrecked ships, and the guilt of abandoning them, if it could not be brought home to the generals, would rest on these two. In the despatch written by the generals immediately after the battle, they had been exempted from any blame; the violence of the storm had rendered it impossible to save the survivors. The generosity of the generals availed them little. Theramenes had felt the public pulse, and saw that some victim would be demanded in the present state of excitement. That victim he was resolved not to be. He declared that the generals must explain why they had abandoned the sailors to their fate. In a brief reply —for the legal privilege of making a speech was denied to them—each general stated the facts : that they had intended to sail against Eteonicus, and left the recovery of the sailors to Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who were competent and experienced commanders, but the storm was so severe that nothing could be done.2 The Assembly was convinced of the 1 Xen. Hdl. i. 7. 2 ; cp. Mem. ii. 9. 4, where he says that he was poor because he would not make money by dishonest means. He was employed by Crito to keep the sycophants at bay. Aristophanes, if he is speaking of the same man, takes a different view [Frogs, 417): OS €TTT€Tr)S &V OVK €(f>V(T€ (frpOTOpaS, vvv\ Sc dr]fjLay(oy€t iv rols avco pcKpolcn KCLCTTLV TCL 7TpG)Ta TTjS t K€? p.O\6r]piaS. 2 Xen. Hell. i. 7. I ff., 5 : °^ yap irpovreOr) (r(j)i(Ti Xoyos Kara top vofiov. The words are ambiguous ; they may mean what is said in the text; or," according to the law under which they were being judged," i.e. some law relating to cases tried in the Assembly, "they were not allowed to make a set speech." XII. IS] TRIAL OF THE GENERALS, 406. 447 truth of their plea, and many came forward to offer bail for them, but as it was now too late to see the show of hands, the decision was deferred till another meeting. The generals were sent back to prison, and the Council were ordered to arrange a plan for their trial. The Assembly did not meet again till after the Apaturia— a festival at which, as at our own Christmas, the members of families gathered together. At such a time the gains and losses of the past year were e pa una* noted; and after the recent battle there could not fail to be many vacant places. Theramenes and his party did not let the opportunity slip. A number of men were kept ready to appear in the Assembly, clad in mourning for lost relations, and in the Council an indictment against the generals was prepared by Callixenus. When the Assembly met, he proposed that, as the case of the generals had already been discussed, the Athenians should at once proceed to vote on it. Two urns were to be placed for each tribe, one for condemnation, the other for acquittal, and if condemned, the generals should be put to death and their property confiscated. Discussion was thus silenced; at the same time the robes of mourning were to be seen everywhere in the Assembly, and at length a man who had saved his life by clinging to a meal-tub came forward declaring that his dying companions had charged him, if he escaped, to tell the Athenians that the generals had abandoned those who had done their duty to their country. Under such circumstances there was little doubt what the sentence of the meeting would be. Euryptolemus, a kinsman of Pericles, attempted to stay proceedings by indicting Callixenus for illegal proposals, but at this the people became infuriated, and declared that it was "monstrous if the demos might not do as it pleased." It was even proposed to include Euryptolemus and his supporters in the same vote with the generals if they did not withdraw their indictment. They were frightened into submission. For a time the prytanes refused to put the vote to the people in this illegal way; but they too were overawed, with 448 THEY ARE CONDEMNED, 406. [XII. 15. the exception of Socrates, who refused to the last to act contrary to the law.1 Euryptolemus then appealed to the people. He proposed that the generals should be tried either under the decree of Cannonus—a severe enactment by which the criminal wa8 brought before the people, not before a law-court, in chains, and, if condemned, his body was cast out unburied, and his property confiscated—or under the law against traitors and sacrilegious persons, but in either case let there be a fair triaL Let each general be heard separately; with a proper division of the day into a time for accusation, defence, and voting. In his opinion the generals were not to blame; it was not due to any negligence on their part that the men were not saved, but to the violence of the storm. " Do not then turn victory into defeat; do not visit inevitable misfortune with cruel punishment; do not treat inability as treachery. It would be far more just to honour the victorious generals with crowns than to punish them with death at the instance of scoundrels." Euryptolemus ended by proposing that the prisoners should be tried under the decree of Cannonus, but one by one, as against the proposal of the Council to decide upon them by a single vote.2 The Assembly were inclined to follow him, but Menecles interposed, and on a second voting the proposal of the Council Condemnation was adopted. The eight generals were con-of the generals, demned to death, and the six who had returned to Athens were executed. Afterwards the Athenians were seized with remorse, and turned upon those who had misled them, and though by a fortunate accident they escaped prosecution, Callixenus was regarded with universal hatred, and died of starvation.8 1 Cp. Plato, ApoL 32 B. ; Xen. Mem. i. 1. 18; iv. 4. 2, and the ironical reference in Plato's Gorgias, 473 E, when Socrates sajs that his conduct created great amusement; he did not know how to put a question to the vote. 2 The words 8i'xa etaorov in Xen. i. 7. 34 do not refer to the decree of Cannonus. 3 Xen. i. 7. The points which Xenophon marks as illegal are: XIX. 15-1 THERAMENES TO BLAME, 466. 44§ Our knowledge of the details of the trial and condemnation of the generals is derived from Xenophon, a contemporary witness, whose account may be accepted as true in the'main. While exulting over the great victory which had once more given Athens the command of the sea, the Remarks on Athenians were suddenly reminded of the loss the trial-of kindred and friends. Brave men had perished, and many of them through the culpable negligence of their commanders, or so at least it was asserted. In their fury they turned upon the generals—they would listen to no defence, and insisted on immediate punishment. It must be confessed that there were times when the Athenian people went mad, and blindly followed the advice which appealed to their worst passions. At such a time a wise citizen would exert any influence which he possessed to soothe the prevailing excitement, and bring the people into a better mood. Theramenes did just the reverse. He availed himself of every means in his power to rouse the passions of the mob, and to him the disastrous sentence is mainly due. Whether he wished to save himself—for the fault, so far as there was one, lay between him and the generals—or whether he had aims in view which the success of the generals would defeat, we cannot tell, but whatever his motive, his conduct on this occasion admits of no excuse or justification.1 (1) i. 7. 5: ov yap irpovreOrj crcfricri \6yos Kara, rbv v6p.ov, but see supra; (2) the proposal of Callixenus to vote on all the generals at once, i. 7. 12, 14, 25. Cp. Plato, Apol. 32 C: irapavoficos, cos ev ro> va-ripa Xpovo) ttclo-lv vpiv ebo&v. It was also illegal to prevent Euryptolemus from following up his indictment of Callixenus for illegality. Frank el, Die Geschwom. Gericht. p. 79 ff., endeavours to clear the Athenians from the charge of illegality in this matter. It is true that the trial did not take place in a law-court, but in the Assembly, and the forms of law which prevailed in a court cannot be applied to it. The fact that the Council were asked to prepare a form of procedure seems to imply that there was no fixed rule in these trials. 1 As a boat was able to reach Eteonicus immediately after the battle, and EteoniKvias Sia tovs e(f)6povs 61 ras 7rarplovs noKiTeias 7T€pir}yy€i\av. 470 INCREASING TYRANNY, 404. [XII. 25. Eleven were selected with especial care; at their head was Satyrus, who had already secured the condemnation of Cleophon. Ten officers were also chosen to manage the Peiraeus. With their help they got the leaders of the people, who had already been arrested, condemned and executed.1 Together with these, some citizens of evil reputation, informers and the like, were put to death to satisfy the public conscience. Towards the object for which they were elected, the Thirty did little or nothing beyond simplifying the ordinances of Solon, cancelling the laws by which the Areopagus was deprived of its authority, and limiting the power of the law-courts.2 This moderate behaviour did not long continue. Uncertain of their power, and conscious that they were contemplating measures which would not meet with the approval of the people, the Thirty applied to Sparta for a garrison, on whose help they could rely in removing unsuitable citizens, and seven hundred hoplites were sent under the command of Callibius. Then followed a reign of terror, of which we have a graphic picture in the speech of Lysias against Eratosthenes. At once Tyranny of greedy and hypocritical, the Tyrants looked the Thirty. round to see what rich citizen—not of their own order—or alien they could murder for his wealth, and excused their conduct by the pretence of clearing the city of undesirable persons, or aiding the poor in the distress which the war had caused. In a short time no less than fifteen hundred persons are said to have fallen victims to their rapacity, and numbers were leaving the city every day to find a refuge in Thebes3 or Megara. To Theramenes such excesses were repugnant; he remonstrated with Critias against the removal 1 Lys. 13. 36. The accused were not brought into a court, but before the Council—iv\ Se \6yco, ocroi €is to (SovXcvrrjpiov tiri roav Tpid-kovtcl elo-rjk&ov Kpidr)(r6fi€voL, d.iravT(Dv ddvaros KareyiyvaxTKero, See further, Ath. Pol. 36. 2 Ath. Pol. 35; Xen. Hell. ii. 3. ii. 12. 3 A very few months sufficed to show the Thebans that they would gain nothing by Sparta's victory. Hence a complete change in their feelings towards the Athenians. XII. 25.] CRITICS AND THERAMENES, 404. 471 of men whose only fault was their eminence or wealth. If men like Leon of Salamis, and Niceratus, the son of Nicias (who had never shown any sympathy with democracy), were put to death, their friends, who were now inclined to support the oligarchical party, would become hostile to it.1 Critias retorted that a tyranny needs equal watchfulness, whether the tyrants be thirty or one. Theramenes then pointed out that the basis of power was too small; they must associate with their rule a sufficient number of men to give them a real superiority in power. The Thirty, to prevent Theramenes from becoming the centre of a party, prepared a list of three thousand persons to whom they were willing to give a share in the constitution, and when he declared that the number was insufficient, they deprived all the citizens, outside their list, of their weapons. They were now above all fear; they robbed and murdered as they pleased, and bade Theramenes do the same, but he refused, saying that such conduct was worse than that of the sycophants whom they had put to death. It was now clear to the more violent members of the party that they must rid themselves of Theramenes. In a meeting of the Council, Critias attacked him for his criticism of their conduct, and demanded his execution. At Sparta, the best governed of all cities, no one was allowed to criticise the government under the severest penalties. If Theramenes were spared, he would inspire their opponents with a spirit of rebellion; if he were put to death, his execution would destroy the hopes of all the malcontents within the city or without. Theramenes defended himself in a manner which won the audience, and there was little doubt that he would be acquitted if the decision were left to the Council. For this Critias was prepared. He had gathered together a number of men armed with daggers to support him in any 1 For Leon see Plato's Apol. 32. Socrates with four others was bidden by the Thirty to bring him from Salamis to Athens for execution : Ola kol aiWois eKcivot iroXkois 7roXXa Trpoaerarrov ftov\6jj.€voi a>s 7rk€ihe had just emerged, and, as before, the mischief began with the quarrels of Segesta and Selinus. The success of Syracuse, which seiinusand supported Selinus, the annihilation of the Seeesta-Athenians, who were the allies of Segesta, could not fail to affect the mutual relations of the cities. Selinus was able to carry everything with a high hand; Segesta feared that by resistance she might bring upon herself the vengeance of Syracuse. She voluntarily retired from the territory which had been in dispute, but when the Selinuntians pushed their' encroachments still further, she sent envoys Segesta appeals to Carthage, begging for assistance, and offer- t0 Cartha&e. ing to place herself in the hands of Carthage. After some discussion the Carthaginians decided to send help, and appointed Hannibal, the grandson of Hamilcar who perished at Himera, general of the forces.2 Hannibal sent envoys with 1 Diod. xiii. 35, who ascribes to this Diodes what was true or thought to be so of the older statesman. Freeman, Hist, of Sicily, iii. 442, 722. 2 Cp. vol. ii. p. 446; Diodorus says that his father, Gisco, ended his life at Selinus, having been banished from Carthage owing to Hamilcar's defeat. 478 THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SICILY, 409. [XIII. 3. the Segestaeans to Syracuse to complain of the conduct of Selinus, and the Syracusans, who after the exhaustion of the previous war were in no mood to enter on a new one, voted to remain at peace with Carthage, though they would not renounce their alliance with Selinus.1 The Carthaginians upon this despatched a small force to the aid of Segesta, and the Selinuntians, who in the confidence of superior power had spread through the country, looting and destroying, were at length taken off their guard, and severely defeated, with the loss of all their spoil. Both sides now applied for help, the Selinuntians to Syracuse, the Segestaeans to Carthage. War between Sicily and Carthage was inevitable, and Hannibal, who was eager to wipe out from his race the blot of Himera, spent the winter in collecting forces.2 3. In the spring of 409 Hannibal landed on the promontory of Lilybaeum, at the head of a large force well equipped Hannibal lands with arms and siege-engines.3 He drew his in Sicily. ships ashore in the bay of Motye to show the Syracusans that he had no intention of sailing against their city, and marched with his forces to Selinus. The city was ill prepared for an attack. Though she had joined in the previous war, taking the part of the Carthaginians against Gelo, in two generations of peace her walls had been allowed to fall out of repair. Her energies had been absorbed in building the vast temples whose ruins attest the prosperity of Selinus,—temples still unfinished when the invader fell upon the city. Yet in the hope that succour would come from Syracuse she determined to resist. Hannibal brought Destruction up his engines, but nine days elapsed before of Selinus. a breach was made in the walls sufficient to admit of a successful assault. Even then the town was 1 Diod. xiii. 43. 2 Diod. xiii. 44. He informs us that in the force which came to the aid of Segesta were a number of Campanians who had been hired by the Chalcidian cities to support Athens. 3 About the numbers ancient authors were in dispute. Ephorus mentioned 200,000 foot and 4000 horse; Timaeus not much more than 100,000. XIII. 3-1 DESTRUCTION OF SELINUS, 409. 479 not captured without a good deal of hard fighting in the streets. It was given over to the soldiers, who slew without distinction of age or sex, and carried off everything of value from the houses and temples. Only those women were spared who had fled with their children to the temples, and they were spared not for mercy's sake, but lest in despair they should set fire to the sacred places and destroy the treasures in them—spared, too, for outrage and slavery. Six thousand persons are said to have perished; five thousand were carried captive into Africa; about half that number escaped to Agrigentum. The very corpses of the dead were mutilated; the savage conquerors went about with strings of hands round their bodies, and heads spitted on their spears. The walls of the city were levelled to the ground.1 When the envoys from Selinus applied for assistance, the Syracusans were at war with Naxos and Catana. They at once came to terms with these cities; and on hearing of the siege of Selinus they sent out a force of 3000 heavy-armed under Diodes to relieve it. The army had only reached Agrigentum when they heard that Selinus was taken. Thereupon they sent envoys to Hannibal, begging him to allow the captives to be ransomed, and to spare the shrines of the gods. Hannibal replied that the Selinuntians had failed to preserve their freedom, and must therefore submit to slavery; the gods, he added, had already left the city in resentment at the conduct of the inhabitants. Yet he received with kindness the aged Empedion, who came to him as an envoy from the fugitives, and, not only restored to him his own lands, but set at liberty any of his kinsmen who were among the captives. Empedion had not changed with his city; he had maintained the Carthaginian cause, and urged Selinus to open her gates to Hannibal. The citizens who had escaped were subsequently allowed to return and cultivate the soil on condition of paying a rent to Carthage.2 4. Hannibal now advanced to Himera, the city which was 1 Diod. xiii. 54-57. * Diod. xiii. 59. 480 DESTRUCTION OF HIMERA, 409. [XIII. 4. the scene of his grandfather's defeat and death, and which, therefore, above all ^ others, was marked out by him for vengeance. Part of his army he placed on some Himera, and httls at a little distance from the city; with the destruction resk he encamped round it. He battered the walls with engines, and drove mines under them, supporting the roof of his mines with beams, which he set on fire when the work was finished. The Himeraeans, aided by the army of Diodes, now amounting to about 5000 men, defended themselves with courage and energy; they repaired their shattered walls, and even drove the Carthaginians back to their camp on the hills, but only to be defeated with great slaughter by Hannibal. Diodes, alarmed for the safety of Syracuse by a report that Hannibal was about to march on that city, resolved to take his forces back at once; and though the Sicilian ships, which had been recalled from Ionia at the approach of war with Carthage, appeared off Himera, the town was unable to hold out longer. A considerable number of the women and children were carried away by these ships to a place of security, but before the whole population could be thus saved, a new breach was made in the walls, through which the irresistible Iberians in Hannibal's army fought their way. The same indiscriminate slaughter began as at Selinus, but Hannibal put an end to it: he wished to take as many captives as he could. The houses he gave up to the soldiers as spoil; the temples he plundered and burnt, the city he razed to the ground, the women and children he placed in the camps; but the men, to the number of three thousand, he "led to the place where Hamilcar had been executed by Gelo," and there put them to death with torture and mutilation.1 He then returned in triumph to Carthage (409). 5. Since his exile, Hesmocrates had been preparing for his 1 alKio-dfievos Karia-c^a^c, Diod. xiii. 62. According to the Carthaginian story (and Herodotus) Hamilcar was not executed by Gelo, but Diodorus follows some other version of his death (Hdt. vii. 165) XIII. 5-] DEATH OF HERMOCRATES, 407. 481 return to Syracuse, and he had received liberal support from Pharnabazus towards his object. He was now (408) at Messene, where he built himself five triremes, and took into his pay a force of a thousand hoplites. With these, and as many more of the fugitive Hermocrates Himeraeans, he endeavoured to make his way to Slclly-into Syracuse. The moment seemed favourable. It was clear that the military administration had not been improved by the recent changes in the city. Diocles had accomplished nothing, and was quite incapable of meeting Hannibal in the field; Hermocrates was known to be an able commander. But the attempt was made in vain; the opposition was still too strong. Hermocrates then marched through the island to Selinus, rebuilt a portion of the walls, summoned back the inhabitants who could be collected, and made the town a base of operations against the Phoenicians. He laid waste the country of Motye and Panormus, carrying off abundant spoils, and defeating the enemy with great loss. When his success became known at Syracuse, the demos were more inclined to receive him, but Diocles was still able to prevent his return. To gain their good will yet more, he repaired to Himera (407), and, encamping in the suburbs of the ruined city, collected the bones of the Syracusans who had fallen there. These he placed on wagons richly adorned, and sent them on their way to Syracuse. As an exile he could not enter the city, but the arrival of the wagons caused the outburst of faction which he expected. Diocles, who was responsible for abandoning the bodies unburied and now opposed the reception of the relics, was driven into exile, and the remains of the dead were honoured by a public funeral. Even after this service Hermocrates was not admitted to the city, so deeply rooted was the fear that he would make himself tyrant. He retired to Selinus; but not long afterwards, on the invitation of friends, he came again to Syracuse, and forced his way with a few Death of adherents into the town. He had reached Hermocrates. the market-place, when he was overpowered and cut down. VOL. III. 2 H 482 SIEGE OF AGR1GENTUM, 4O6. [XIII. 6. Of his supporters, a few owed their escape to the belief that they were slain, and among these was Dionysius,1 6. The Carthaginians, encouraged by their success, and perhaps irritated by the action of Hermocrates, resolved to attempt the conquest of the whole of Sicily. Hannibal was Hannib 1 again chosen general, and when, owing to his prepares for a age, he begged to decline the office, Himilco, of new campaign, ^e same family, was appointed to support him. Troops were collected from every quarter, allies from the Mauretanians and' Nomads as far as the borders of Cyrene, mercenaries from Iberia and Campania, until a total force of at least 120,000 was reached.2 Forty triremes, which were sent on in advance, were defeated with a loss of fifteen vessels off the coast of Sicily; but, in spite of this disaster, Hannibal succeeded in carrying over his army. He had no sooner arrived in Sicily than he marched upon Agrigentum 3 (406). Agrigentum was the second city of Sicily. It was strongly placed, and the advantages of natural position had been in-creased by art. The country round was fertile, capture of and in expectation of the war, large quantities Agrigentum. Qj pr0(juce had Deen conveyed into the town. On his arrival, Hannibal made two divisions of his army, as he had done at Himera. One division was encamped on the adjacent hills, the other close to the town. He then sent envoys to the city asking the Agrigentines to become his allies, or at least to remain neutral—requests which were rejected at once. The siege began. In his description of it, Diodorus, our only authority, gives us but little help in regard to the topography. One camp of the Carthaginians, as we have seen, was pitched close to the city, and we may place it to the south-west, on the right bank of the Hypsas. On this side of the city walls the generals, after a careful 1 Diod. xiii. 63, 75. The chronology is uncertain. 2 Diod. xiii. 80. So Timaeus, but here again Ephorus gives & larger number—300,000. 3 Diod. xiii. 80-85, who here digresses into a long account of Agrigentum. XIII. 6.] SYRACUSE SENDS HELP, 4O6. 483 examination, directed their attack. Two wooden towers were constructed, from which for a whole day the Carthaginians carried on the assault, till they were recalled at nightfall by the sound of a trumpet. Before morning the towers had been burned by the besieged. Hannibal now resolved to attack the wall at several points, and in order to obtain material for raising mounds against it from which the besiegers could carry on operations (x supra, p. 137), he gave orders for the destruction of the tombs which lay outside the city. His orders were being rapidly carried out when the work received a sudden check. A thunderbolt struck the monument of Thero at the moment when it was being pulled down, and the soothsayers forbade any further disturbance of the sepulchre. A plague also broke out in the camp, causing intense suffering. Hannibal himself was one of the victims, and Himilco, seeing his army distressed with superstitious terrors, not only countermanded any further destruction of the tombs, but even sacrificed a child to Cronos (Moloch) after the Carthaginian manner, and plunged victims into the sea to propitiate Poseidon. He did not, however, relax his efforts in the siege, but completed the mounds with the help of other materials, and placed his engines upon them. The Agrigentines were aided by Dexippus, a Lacedaemonian, at the head of 1500 mercenaries, and by 800 Campanians, who in the previous campaign had been in Hannibal's pay, but had left him in disgust at the close. The Syracusans, who now fully recognised the danger which threatened Sicily, sent large reinforcements,1 which were joined on the way by contingents from Camarina, Gela, and elsewhere, till the whole force is said to have amounted to 30,000 foot and 5000 horse, and they were supported by a fleet of thirty ships. The army had crossed the Himeras, when it was met by a detachment of the Carthaginians. These it severely defeated 1 Agrigentum had refused to aid Syracuse against Athens (supra, p. 341). 484 FALL OF AGRIGENTUM, 4O6. [XIII. 6. and pursued towards Agrigentum, capturing the camp on the hills, in which Daphnaeus, the Syracusan general, took up his quarters. The Agrigentines were eager to sally out and complete the destruction of the enemy, but their generals refused, and the fugitives found safety in the camp by the city. When the Syracusan soldiers joined those in the city, there were loud complaints of the conduct of the generals. A meeting was called, which ended in a tumult; four of the Agrigentine generals were stoned to death, the fifth being spared on account of his youth. Even Dexippus was suspected of treachery. Daphnaeus now contemplated an attack on the camp of the Carthaginians, and for a time succeeded in reducing them to such distress that the soldiers were on the eve of a mutiny, when Himilco, bringing up ships from Motye and Panormus, fortunately captured a Greek fleet laden with stores for the city. The situation was now entirely changed : the Agrigentines had consumed their stores so lavishly that there was little or nothing left; and it became clear to the auxiliaries that there was no hope of saving the city. The Campanians went over at once to Himilco; Dexippus was suspected of bribery, and at any rate refused to remain. Agrigentum was abandoned to its fate. After the departure of these troops, the Agrigentines, leaving the infirm and aged behind, slipped away to Gela under cover of night, in terror of the enemy, in sorrow for their friends and lost homes, in utter misery and despair. Himilco seems to have made no attempt to attack them; he was satisfied to gain the city without the risk and loss of a battle. The fugitives were allowed by the Syracusans to settle at Leontini.1 When Himilco entered Agrigentum there was the same ruthless slaughter of the helpless, the same desecration and destruction of temples as at Selinus. The amount of spoil was enormous: Agrigentum was one of the richest of Greek cities; from the day of its foundation it had never 1 Diod. xiii. 89. XIII. 7-1 DIONYSIUS A GENERAL AT SYRACUSE, 406. 485 been captured, and the inhabitants took a pride in acquiring the costliest furniture and the finest works of art. The choicest pictures and statues were sent to Carthage, among them the famous bull of Phalaris. The siege had lasted eight months, and came to an end in December 406. Himilco remained in the city for the rest of the winter.1 7. The fall of Agrigentum created the greatest consternation throughout Sicily. The inhabitants of the country sought shelter in Syracuse, and sent their The rise of families and their goods to Italy. The Syra- Dionysius. cusan generals were severely blamed for abandoning the city, but no measures were taken and merely formal accusations were brought against them by the Agrigentines till Dionysius, who had greatly distinguished himself at Agrigentum, came forward in the Assembly and attacked them as traitors; in punishing such men, he said, they ought not to wait for the legal sentence of condemnation, but to take the matter into their own hands at once. For this speech Dionysius was fined, as an incendiary, but the fine was at once paid by Philistus, the famous historian of his country, who urged Dionysius to go on as he had begun, and he would pay his fines the whole day long, if necessary. Dionysius then charged the generals with receiving bribes. He advised the people no longer to choose their generals from the rich, who were always ready to increase their own wealth at the expense of their country, but from the poorer citizens, who could be trusted. He had already resolved to make himself tyrant of Syracuse; and after the feeble and disastrous campaign which had just closed, it was not difficult to persuade the people that a strong hand was needed, if the war with Carthage was to be carried on with success. Daphnaeus and his colleagues were deposed, and other generals chosen, among whom was Dionysius himself. But he refused to act in concert 1 Diod. xiii. 90. The bull with other treasures was restored to Agrigentum by Seipio 260 years after the siege, and was to be seen there in the time of Diodorus. Timaeus, who lived in the interval doubted its existence. 486 DIONYSIUS AS TYRANT, 406. [XIII. 7. with his colleagues, and secretly spread reports that they were in communication with the enemy. To strengthen his position, he persuaded the Syracusans to recall the exiles— men of the party of Hermocrates, who were opposed to the democracy, and had no hope of regaining their position while it remained in power. Among these he would find friends as long as he could satisfy their demands. His schemes were aided by an appeal for help from Gela, which was in immediate danger of attack by Himilco. Dionysius The city was under the command of Dexippus, at Geia. ^0 wnose support Dionysius was sent with a moderate force. He found the city distracted by faction, and at once joining the party of the poor, he brought the rich to trial, got them condemned and their property confiscated. The money thus obtained he spent in paying the soldiers, and returned to Syracuse the idol of the army. There also he excited the poor against the rich, who, he declared, were neglecting the protection of the city at a time of the greatest danger. One plan, and one only, could save them; as in the days of Gelo their army must be led by a general with full powers. The people assented, and he was elected to the office. He had still much to fear. His opponents were many, and the city began to be suspicious. He knew the democratic instincts of the Syracusan people, among whom it was not safe openly to take a step towards tyranny. As general he ordered the military population, under forty years of age, to march out to Leontini, with provisions for thirty days. Leontini at this time was full of fugitives from Agrigentum, of exiles and strangers. There he encamped, and in the night he seized the Acropolis of the city, pretending that the step was necessary to protect himself against assassination. Next day an Assembly was called, consisting for the most part of soldiers and fugitives, and by their vote he was allowed to have the security of a bodyguard of six hundred men of his own selection. With this support he was able to throw off the mask and appear as tyrant. He got his rivals XIII. 8.] THE FALL OF GELA, 405. 487 Daphnaeus and Damarchus executed; Dexippus he dismissed to Hellas, as he found him unwilling to fall in with his schemes. He also strengthened his connection with the oligarchical party by marrying the daughter of Hermocrates, and giving his sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother of Hermocrates. By this means Dionysius, "who began life as a scribe and a common citizen, became tyrant of the greatest city in Greece, a position which he retained till his death thirty-eight years afterwards."1 8. In the spring (405), Himilco, after destroying what remained of the carved work of the temples at Agrigentum, and levelling the city with the ground, ad- Himilco vanced into the territory of Gela and Camarina. attacks Gela-After devastating the territory, he sat down .before Gela in an entrenched camp, and began his attack on the city. The Geloans defended themselves bravely, and Dionysius came to their aid with a large force from Syracuse.2 At first he pitched his camp near the sea, and attempted to cut off the enemy's supplies; afterwards he divided his army into three sections, and delivered an attack. Some slight success was gained, but the day ended in disaster, and Dionysius was driven back into the city with great loss. A council was held, at which it was decided that Gela was not the place where a decisive battle could be fought. Dionysius asked for a truce on the following _ • i Dionysius day in order to bury the dead, but, under cover fails to of night, he sent the people out of the city reheveGela-early in the night to Camarina, and afterwards withdrew himself, leaving two thousand light-armed to kindle fires, and so deceive the enemy into the belief that the city was occupied. These troops also were to leave at dawn. Gela was abandoned to the Carthaginians. At Camarina he compelled the women and children and the helpless part of the population to retire with the Geloans at once to Syracuse. 1 Diod. xiii. 96. 2 Diod. xiii. 109. As before, the numbers are differently given by different historians. 488 DIONYSIUS SECURES li I MS ELF, 405., [XIII. 8. It was a mournful exodus. The fear of the Carthaginians «'vcrpowered every other feeling; the highborn was mingled with the meanest; the maiden was forced to renounce her retirement and travel wearily on foot, in the eyes of all men. Some left all they had, satisfied if they could save their lives; some, under the burden of age and sickness, were unable to go at all. Dionysius was now as thoroughly hated as the men whom he had deposed and executed. If they had been bribed, Exasperation he had allowed the enemy to conquer in order at Dionysius. ^hat ^e might establish his power over the terrified cities. The contingents from Italy returned home. The cavalry, on finding that they could not slay Dionysius on his way back to Syracuse, owing to the presence of his bodyguard, not one of whom, it was observed, had perished in the battle, rode back to the city, and revenged themselves by burning his house and ill-treating his wife till she died. Dionysius, who suspected what was taking place, got together a few troops, on whom he could rely, and hastened home. He arrived at Achradina in the night and found the gates closed against him. These he burned, and rushed to the market-place, where his mercenaries shot down the knights who attempted to check him. He lost no time in executing or banishing all his opponents, and thus became master of the city. The Geloans and Camarinaeans, who suspected his action towards them, joined the Agrigentines at Leontini.1 Though victorious, Himilco was unable to continue the campaign. He had lost more than half his army by the Peace with plague, and could no longer remain in his camp. Carthage. jje 0ffered terms to Dionysius, which were readily accepted. The Carthaginians were to retain all their old colonies; the Sicanians, Selinus, Himera, and Agrigen-tum were to be given up to them; Gela and Camarina were to pull down their walls and pay tribute. Leontini, Messene, i Diod. xiii. 112 ff. XIII. 8.] PEACE WITH CARTHAGE, 405. 489 and the Sicels were to be independent, Syracuse was to be subject to Dionysius; the captives and any ships which had been taken on either side were to be restored. Thus the war ended. The Carthaginians returned to Carthage, carrying the plague with them, which raged for some time in the city and among the allies, till the state was brought to the brink of destruction.1 Sicily, though at a heavy cost, had got rid of the invading host, but Syracuse was once more in the hands of a tyrant. In the West, as in the East, democracy had been found unequal to the task imposed upon her. 1 Diod. xiii. 114. See Freeman, Hist, of Sicily, vol. iii. c. 9, for a minute account of the invasion. Our authority is Diodorus, who perhaps drew from Philistus—at first or second hand. CHAPTER XIV. LITERATURE, ART, SOCIETY, ETC. I. At the beginning of the Fifth Century, lyric poetry was not only the prevailing mode of poetical composition, but, in _ . A the hands of two great masters, it was attain- Lync poetry: ° ' Simonides ing a higher development than at any previous and Pindar. period. The odes of Simonides of Ceos (558-468) and Pindar of Thebes (520-440) were the acknowledged masterpieces of lyric art. Of Simonides we have unfortunately nothing but a few lyric fragments, and short elegiac poems, commemorative of some person or event, but even in what we have we find a depth of feeling and a felicity of expression unsurpassed in Greek poetry. Simonides before all things knew when he had said enough. It is this which makes his famous couplet on the Spartans who fell at Thermopylae so unapproachable.1 With Pindar we have been more fortunate, at least in regard to his Epinician odes. Of these a considerable number has come down to us, many of which rank among the most splendid compositions of the kind. It is indeed difficult to realise the full effect of the performance of one of these wonderful poems, owing to the difficulty of the language and our ignorance of Greek metres and music. As the Olympic victor was raised for the moment above all mortal men, so was his victory celebrated by a unique combination of music and verse, elaborated with the greatest skill, that each art might give her full support to the other.2 1 a> ^eiv', ayyeXXciv AaKebai^iovlois on rrjdc Kcifieda, rots kc'lvquv prjfiaai 7T€i.06fievoi. 2 Pindar's poems are dvai-i(f)6pfjuyy€s vfxpoi. However intricate the 490 XIV. i.] NO LYRIC POETS AT ATHENS. 491 Besides these two poets, there were others of lesser note, such as Bacchylides, the nephew of Simonides, of whose poems a considerable portion has recently been Decline of discovered ; and Timocreon of Rhodes, already lyric P°etry-known to us by his bitter attack on Themistocles (vol. ii. 287). But by the middle of the century the day of lyric poetry was over. The spirit of the time required something more comprehensive. Lyric poetry expresses a mood or celebrates an event, and, though Simonides and Pindar introduced ethical elements into their poetry, they did not get further than detached " gnomes" or thoughts; they never worked out an ethical situation. There were also other reasons why lyric poetry failed to satisfy the age. It was the poetry of a class—a cultivated and generally a wealthy class—who paid the great lyric poets for their services. The praises of the rich and mighty men, which we find in Pindar, were not spontaneous; they were purchased, and, what was worse, purchased by an individual. But after the Persian war, class feeling was discredited at Athens, and though dramatic poets were rewarded for success, it was one thing to be paid by Hiero, or Arcesilaus, or Lampon, and quite another to receive an honorarium from the people for providing them with the best of entertainments. In the Fifth Century, also, Athens became the centre of literary activity in Greece, and Athens, amid all her literary wealth, could never boast of a lyric poet of the first rank. During the short period of their rule, the tyrants endeavoured to supply the deficiency by importing lyric poets from other cities, but the style never took root.1 That Athenian poets were not deficient in the gift of lyric song is amply proved by the beautiful odes which we find in the tragedians and in Aristophanes. music and metre, the words rang out in the ears of the audience. It is just this which we find so difficult to understand. 1 Only two of the Epinician odes of Pindar are in honour of Athenians, and they are but meagre specimens of his art.—Pyth. vii. ; Nem. ii. The fact that the dithyramb was superseded by the drama may also have had some effect on lyric poetry at Athens, at least in the fifth century. 492 JRISE OF THE DRAMA. [XIV. 2. 2. However this may be, lyric poetry was now supplanted by dramatic poetry, which, though it had its origin in Dorian The develop- cities, was quickly domiciled at Athens, where mentofthe it rose to a height which has never been sur-drama. passed. Dramatic performances were indeed no novelty in the city at the beginning of the Fifth Century, when Aeschylus was twenty-five years old. In the time of Pisistratus, Thespis had brought upon himself the reproaches of the aged Solon, who saw in his " plays " the corruption of the Athenian people (vol. i. 462). Since that time considerable progress had been made, and when Phrynichus, after the fall of Miletus in 494, made the calamity of the chief city of Ionia and colony of Athens the subject of a drama, the whole audience were moved to tears—a proof of the power of the poet and the susceptibility of the people. Phrynichus was fined for his too successful realism, and the subject was forbidden for the future. A play must be a play, and deal with themes sufficiently remote and general to touch common chords of human sympathy only, unless, indeed, the drama were used to celebrate some glorious achievement of the sons of Hellas. For us the founder of Greek tragedy is Aeschylus (525-460 ?), in whose lifetime the drama became a part of the public Dionysiac festivals, and the arrange-esc y u . ments for the competition of the poets (infra, p. 500), the awarding of the prizes, and the maintenance and training of the chorus were introduced. From the plays of Aeschylus himself we can see what progress was made in dramatic composition in the first forty years of the century. To the single actor, who hitherto had been allowed to appear in dramas, he added a second, by this means making possible the conflict of two opposing forces, irrespective of the chorus, and the introduction of a story, in which the chorus took but a subordinate part. He was thus able to diminish the action of the chorus, and depose it from the prominent position which it occupied in older dramas, and in his own Sujpplices. Further improvements were intro- XIV. 2.] AESCHYLUS. 493 duced by his younger contemporary Sophocles, of which Aeschylus did not hesitate to avail himself, such as the introduction of a third actor, by which the plot became more intricate, and the interaction of characters more subtle. But though in technique he moved onwards with the time, he preserved to the end the spirit of the great days in which his early manhood was passed, for he took a personal part in the battles of Marathon and Salamis. The fall of the tyrants, the calamities which overtook Croesus and Xerxes, left a deep impression on the minds of the Greeks, leading them to reflect profoundly on the uncertainty of human prosperity. That justice was paramount in the ordering of human life, that evil overtook the wicked, that man must not contend with the gods, that he was often misled by some " power not himself " into the commission of evil—these were moral ideas which had slowly accumulated in the Greek mind; but in the age of Aeschylus a new belief was gaining ground, the belief that even without the commission of evil, by mere unalloyed prosperity, man brought upon himself the wrath of the gods. This is the doctrine of " Nemesis," which appears in Pindar, and more clearly still in Herodotus, who illustrates it by the famous story of the ring of Polycrates. Aeschylus took a nobler view; he would not allow that the gods were envious; "the house of the righteous is at all times happy in its children"; but prosperity may breed a spirit of rebellion, by which men are brought within the fatal meshes of wrong-doing, and hence evil falls upon them. In the same way he refined upon another doctrine familiar to the Greeks—the doctrine of an "inherited curse." A curse pursues a family from generation to generation, not by mere inheritance, as was commonly believed, but because one generation after another put themselves under its operation. So it was with Eteoeles, who cannot be restrained from meeting his brother at the gate of Thebes, and bringing upon both the curse of Oedipus; and so it was with Agamemnon, who brought upon himself the curse of the House of Atreus by sacrificing his daughter. From in- 494 AESCHYLUS. [XIV. 3. stances such as these we see that Aeschylus took a lofty view of the poet's vocation, and by the re-creation of old myths sought to bring his audience face to face with the problems of his age. He worked on broad lines, extending his argument through the three plays which custom demanded that the poet should bring out at the same time.1 As a playwright, that is, in the composition of his plots, he cannot be ranked high. In the Prometheus Vinctus there can hardly be said to be any plot at all; Prometheus is a fixed figure, to which a number of persons—the chorus, Ocean us, lo —are brought without any good reason for their coming. In the Agamemnon the idea of the beacon service between Greece and Asia, an idea prominent at the time of the Persian invasion,2 is worked into the Homeric situation, on which the play is founded, in such a manner as to create extraordinary confusion. And to the last, in spite of the improvements which he introduced, Aeschylus never succeeded in reducing the chorus to the limits required for the best development of the plot. Yet, in spite of imperfections in technique, the Prometheus Vinctus and the Agamemnon will always retain a place among the grandest efforts of human genius.3 3. Sophocles (495-405) is the poet of the Periclean age— the age of the Parthenon and the sculptures of Phidias. There is nothing in him of the rugged splendour Sophocles. p ,. j ,,. . of his predecessor, nothing superhuman or daemonic; we move within narrower limits, in which all is subdued and perfected with consummate art. In some respects Sophocles loses by this self-restraint; we cannot, for instance, compare his conception of Clytemnestra with that of Aeschylus ; but what he loses in one respect he gains in another; his plots, at least in some of his plays, are admirable, each scene is evolved out of what has gone before—in this respect the Oedipus Bex is a masterpiece of dramatic art—and the 1 The history of the "trilogy" is not accurately known, but it seems doubtful whether any poet but Aeschylus composed trilogies. 2 Herod, ix. 3. 3 For Greek criticism of Aeschylus, cp. Aristoph. Frogs, 768 flf. XIV. H-] SOPHOCLES. 495 chorus and the "argument" are brought into* the proper relation to each other. So also are the characters and the "incidents." It is an artistic rendering of particular situations which he presents to us, and often no answer is given to the graver questions which arise. Of him too it may be said with the greatest truth, that he "saw life steadily and saw it whole." It was in his boyhood that the Persians were driven back in ruinous defeat from the shores of Greece; he watched the growth of the Athenian empire, and took a part in establishing it as a general in the Samian expedition; and as his days were protracted almost to the end of the Peloponnesian war, he also saw Athens brought low by the Sicilian disaster, and torn by faction at the Kevolution of the Four Hundred. Through these changes he preserved a serenity and cheerfulness which not only endeared him to his countrymen, but left him peculiarly receptive to the influence of art. Sophocles wrote no trilogies. Each of his plays was complete in itself, and even when he composed plays on the same theme, they were brought out at different times, and were not always consistent with each other. 4. The third great tragic poet of the century is Euripides (480-406), about whose plays opinions greatly differed in the poet's lifetime, and have differed ever since. It is, indeed, difficult to write about him with u"pi es' consistency, for he is inconsistent with himself. He was the poet of the new movement at Athens, dear to Socrates and his school, the prophet of the enlightenment, whose verses were listened to throughout Greece with eager attention; but he was also the author of the Bacchae, in which he pleads for the ritual and worship of Dionysus. He is capable of writing scenes of touching simplicity, such as the death of Alcestis, but at other times he avails himself of the most wretched resources to excite compassion. In the Helena Menelaus is brought before us after his shipwreck clad in a piece of sailcloth; and the "rags of Telephus" have been rendered notorious by Aristophanes. His language is often 496 EURIPIDES. [XIV. 4. of extraordinary beauty, simple or splendid as suits the context, but there are also passages of misplaced rhetoric, false antithesis, and meaningless repetitions. And as fortune has preserved to us nearly three times as many plays of Euripides as of his predecessors, there is in his case wider scope for criticism; we do not judge of him merely from a choice selection of his best plays. But whether we like him or dislike him—whether we follow Aristophanes, who was never weary of exposing his weaknesses, or see in him the poet who, whatever may be said of him as a playwright, is certainly a master in creating tragic situations, it is impossible to deny that Euripides took the most important step that has ever been taken in the history of tragedy. It is human nature as he saw it round hirn and human passion, which, under thin disguises, are the motives of his tragedies. He interprets the old myths in the light of his own time, and the result is often sadly realistic. The illusion is completely swept aside: Apollo is the meanest of men; Aphrodite the worst of women; Agamemnon and Menelaus are just such kings of Sparta as we read of in Herodotus. When we remember the Homeric conception, the new presentment jars upon-us. And yet it is a step forwards; poetry is brought nearer to her great office of holding up the mirror to nature. By taking this step, Euripides introduced a new life into tragedy, and through his plays there breathes the same spirit which animated Shakespeare—the same, yet different, for in Euripides there is no sense of humour, and no Greek was a comic as well as a tragic poet. Besides these great tragic poets—all of whom, it must be especially noticed, were Athenians—there were numerous others; in fact by the end of the century Greece swarmed with fledgling tragedians whose twitterings were heard in the intervals of nobler strains. The most eminent was Agathon, a well-known figure in the Socratic circle, of whom Aristophanes gives us an amusing caricature in the Thesmophoriazusae. He is there represented as a creator of XIV. 5-1 COMEDY: EPICHARMUS. 497 effeminate characters, who endeavours, so far as possible, tc resemble his own creations, but at a later time when Agathon was dead, the comedian spoke more seriously, describing him as a "good poet, and regretted by his friends."1 5. More characteristic still of Athens, of city life and democratic feeling, was the rise of comedy. This was said to be of Dorian origin, as was perhaps the case with tragedy also in the last resort, but this merely means that the Dorians were the first to make an artistic use of elements which had long been in existence.2 The first to attain greatness in comedy was Epicharmus, who was neither an Athenian, nor brought out plays at Athens, but a native of Cos, who in his childhood was carried to the Sicilian Megara and thence to Syracuse in the time of the tyrant Gelo (vol. ii. p. 441). We can form but an imperfect judgment of his work, for only fragments remain—and those very short and disconnected. Plato speaks of him as the greatest of comic poets—a verdict not altogether impartial, for Epicharmus was a philosopher as well as a comedian. Living in the days of the tyrants, he could not, of course, make Sicilian politics the theme of his comedy; he took his subjects partly from the social life of the people and partly from mythology, which he burlesqued. The series of great comic poets at Athens begins with Cratinus. Only fragments of his works remain, but we have enough to prove that in his time comedy had cratinus already established her claim to deal with andEupoiis. persons and questions of the day. He was one of the fiercest of the opponents of Pericles and Aspasia, and in his Panoptae he ridiculed the sophists. He was followed by 1 Aristoph. Frogs, 84. The Symposium of Plato is supposed to take place in the house of Agathon. 2 The origin of literary comedy can hardly be traced, or of tragedy either. Aristotle seems to know nothing of Susarion or Thespis, the reputed authors of comedy and tragedy respectively in Attica; he derives the first from the phallic songs, of which we have a sample in the Acharnians of Aristophanes (235 ff.); and the second from the dithyrambs. VOL. III. 2 I 498 EUPOLIS AND ARISTOPHANES. [XIV. 5. Eupolis, Crates, Phrynichus, Pherecrates, Hermippus, Aristophanes, and many more. The plays of all these poets but Aristophanes have perished, an irreparable loss to the student of Athenian manners and history. Eupolis especially, so far as we can form an opinion from the fragments, appears to have taken a wide and statesmanlike view of public affairs; at any rate he estimated Pericles more accurately than Aristophanes, and from the sketches in his " Cities" of the various states which composed the Athenian empire, we glean something of their condition and relation to Athens.1 Of the plays of Aristophanes eleven have been preserved, some of which deal with politics, others with more general subjects. In the Acharnians, which was brought out in 425, he laughs at the war-party, and ventures to say a word for the Lacedaemonians \ in the Knights (424) he ridicules Cleon, who was then in the flush of his triumph at Pylus, and endeavours to diminish his influence over the Athenians; in the Wasps (422) he attacks the system of the law-courts, and the Athenian love of litigation. In the Peace (421) he hails the return of happier days with hopes which were doomed to disappointment. The Lysistrata also (411) must be ranked among the political plays. At the time when this play was acted, owing to the absence of the fleet at Samos, Athens may be said to have been left in the charge of the women and old men; and on this situation Aristophanes has founded his plot, in which the women seize the Acropolis and insist on putting an end to the war. The boldness with which the extreme oligarchy are here and there assailed on the eve of the revolution is creditable to the poet. In the Clouds (423) Socrates is caricatured. Whether Aristophanes misjudged him to the extent which the play implies may be doubted, but to a comedian all was grist that came to his mill, and Socrates in his appearance and his life 1 There were also earlier comic poets at Athens than Cratinus; Aristotle (Poet. 5) mentions Chionides and Magnes. Of the first we know hardly anything, of the second there is a criticism in Aristoph. Knights, 518 ff. For Cratinus, see ibid. 526; for Crates, 537 ff. XIV. 6.] THE PLAYS OF ARISTOPHANES. 499 was too good a subject to be lost through any scruples about justice to the man. The subject also allowed the poet to display his genuinely Athenian contempt for natural science and "materialistic ontology." In the Birds (416) there is nothing but pure fancy and delightful far-away echoes of political worries "refined away to fairy music in the enchanted air" of Cloud Cuckoo Town. In the Thesmophoriazusae (410) he directs his satire against Agathon and Euripides, not without smart hits at the murdered Hyperbolus and the baffled oligarchs. After the battle of Arginusae and the execution of the generals, politics were no longer a subject for comedy. The Frogs (405) is a criticism on the three great dramatic poets of the century. Sophocles and Euripides being both dead, Dionysus is in want of a poet, and goes in search of one to the shades, where he finds a contest raging between Euripides and Aeschylus for the first place. Where politics are touched it is in a grave and serious tone, as in the Lysistrata. In the Ecclesiazusae (392) we have a picture of Athens as she might be under the " regiment" of women, and a thoroughgoing socialism. The theme of the Plutus (388) is the old story of the blind god of wealth, and his restoration to sight. The play is far removed in subject and style from the Acharnians of 425. Greece is now on the eve of the Peace of Antalcidas, and Athens, though prosperous beyond her hopes, is no longer the great city of the previous century. From this short notice of his existing plays, it will be seen how closely Aristophanes keeps to the politics and society of his time. Often he is only too realistic, but in spite of much that startles and shocks us, the incomparable grace of perfect Attic art is spread over his compositions, and among the songs introduced into his plays are some which are unsurpassed in Greek lyric. 6. In connecting the growth of the drama with the development of democracy, we may seem to have forgotten the lessons of modern history. England was not a democracy in the days of Elizabeth and James I., nor was France in the days pf Louis XJV. Yet these were the days of Shakespeare 500 DRAMATIC CONTESTS AT ATHENS. [XIV. 6. and Moliere, poets who owed not a little to the favour of their sovereigns. But the Greek drama—so far at least as the representation of the plays went—was altogether different from the modern. It was not the affair of a company of actors and playwrights who lived by the stage, and brought forward such pieces as would be most likely to attract an audience. The Greek plays were a part of the festival of Representation Dionysus, and were acted before the whole of plays at population of Athens, and as many strangers as * ens' chose to visit Athens at the time. Originally, tragedies were acted only at the Great Dionysia in the spring, and they were brought out by poets who competed with one another. Each of the three poets whose plays had been thought worthy of a chorus by the archon, came forward with three tragedies and a satyric drama, and their dramas were ranged in order of merit by judges chosen for the purpose. Comedies were brought out, not only at the Great Dionysia, but also at the Lenaea, in the winter, and here also the poets competed, but with one drama each only. For this reason the drama stood in a far closer relation to the people and to city life in its ancient than in its modern form, and as the tragedians in the choruses and speeches of their plays often sought to correct and elevate the popular notions of ethics and religion, so the comedian was permitted in the peculiar form of chorus known as the pardbasis to come forward and tell the audience some home truths about himself or the city.1 The poems of Homer were still recited at the Panathenaic festival, but just for the reason that Homer was by this time established as the epic poet of Greece, there was no attempt to compose in his style. The epics which still continued to be written were genealogical or descriptive, such as the Heradeis of Panyasis of Halicarnassus, a relative of Herodotus, and the Founding of Elea by Xenophanes (vol. ii. 512 f.). Antimachus, a native of Colophon, also composed a Thebaid in twenty-four books. 1 See Haigh, The Attic Theatre, e. 1, § 11 ff.; Aristoph. Frogs, 1051 f. XIV. 7-] PROSE WRITING; HECATAEUS. 501 7. The beginnings of prose writing in Greece do not appear to go back beyond the Sixth Century. There could not, of course, be prose literature of any extent with- prose writing out facilities for writing, and though this art in Greece« had probably been known for centuries to the Greeks, and the Phoenicians, from whom the art came, could readily supply materials for writing—if they were wanted, for bark and skins were to be got in Greece as plentifully as elsewhere—the Greeks do not seem to have used it in literature till a comparatively late period. The sayings of the " wise men " were expressed in a brief, sententious form, which made it easy to commit them to memory, and in philosophy verse was the medium for anything like a formal treatise. But with the expansion of Greece, the development of commerce, and still more perhaps with the growth of national feeling, there arose the desire to record travels or write down the founding and early history of colonies. Towards the end of the Sixth Century a number of " Logographers," as they were called, had endeavoured to describe, even to the making of a map, the world as they conceived or knew it, and to reduce to some kind of order the confused mass of legends which were current about the past history of the cities of Greece. Of these men Hecataeus of Miletus was the most remarkable. He has already come before us in connection with the Ionic revolt, when, unfortunately for themselves, his countrymen refused to be guided by his sagacious counsels (vol. ii. 51). His works on geography and history attained the widest reputation—such at least is the conclusion which we draw from the constant allusions of Herodotus to "Ionian writers." In one point, the expulsion of the Pelasgians from the city, we find him dealing with the history of Athens. His works are said to have been written with some elegance of style, but the fragments which we possess do not allow us to form any precise judgment of his matter or his manner.1 1 See Forbes, Thuc. I., xlv. f., where some extracts are given; Miiller, Frag. Hist. Graec. 1., ix. ff., 1 ff. He wrote in pure Ionic; and his style is described as KaBapos ical aacprjs, iv b* tktl kcll rjbvs ov 502 HERODOTUS. [XIV. 8. 8. Herodotus (485426 ?), like Hecataeus, was an Asiatic— a Dorian of Halicarnassus, but Ionian in all but birth. His work, both in range and conception, was far in advance of anything which preceded it. He is the historian of the great Persian war, or rather of the great Persian invasion, for his history ends at the siege of Sestos in 478; but the history of the war is only a portion of his work, which is intended to save from oblivion the great and wonderful things that have been done in the world, and trace from its origin the cause of the long conflict between East and West. In his youth he took part in the politics of his native city, aiding in the expulsion of the tyrant Lygdamis, after which he spent his time in travelling through the East. The closing years of his life were passed at Thurii, where he settled with the Athenian colonists; but from the legends of his life, which are confirmed by his book, we may infer that he continued till his death to be in close connection with Athens. In structure his work closely resembles the Odyssey; in the earlier books we are carried to all the distant regions of the world—to Babylonia, Egypt, India, Libya, and Scythia—but after the fifth book the narrative becomes more and more concentrated on the duel between Greece and Persia: in conception it belongs to the age before the "sophists." Not that Herodotus is wanting in critical power; he is often led by his own observation and thoughts to differ from the opinions current in his time. He is moved to laughter at the sight of the Ionian maps, in which the earth is circular as "if turned out of a lathe," and surrounded by the ocean stream. Keason and research have convinced him that such a theory is untenable, and that the river Oceanus does not exist. Though a deeply religious man, who sees in everything the touch of a superhuman power, a firm believer in retribution (™W) fierpioos. The introduction to his work on genealogies ran as follows: 'l&KaTaios Mikfjcrnjs <*>§€ p,v6elrar rafte ypd(f)(Oy s e/xot (paivovrai, claiv. XIV. 9] HELLANICUS. 503 and divine envy (ve/Aecris), he has the Ionian interest in natural philosophy; he regards the sun as a mass of floating vapour, blown to and fro by the winds; he is averse to mysticism; he will not accept the doctrine of a future life, at any rate as he finds it current in Egypt and Thrace; and what is more remarkable still, he seems to have doubts whether any god has ever assumed a human form, or that any man is the descendant of a god and a human mother.1 Of all Greek authors he is the one of whom we know the most; wherever he goes he takes us with him, talking as it were by the way, and bringing before us the thoughts, beliefs, and aspirations of his age, 9. A younger contemporary of Herodotus was Hellanicus of Mytilene, whom Thucydides mentions as almost the only historian who had treated of the period subsequent to the Persian wars. Thucydides blames him for a want of chronological accuracy in his arrangement of events—a criticism which is the more important because chronology was the subject to which, above all others, Hellanicus devoted his powers. Taking the list of the priestesses at the Heraeum in Argolis for his basis (vol. i. p. 237), he carried his dates up to a remote past. Thus he fixed the accession of Cecrops in a year corresponding to 1606, the fall of Troy at 1209, and the Return of the Heraclids in 1149, dates which continued to compete with those subsequently founded on the list of the Spartan kings.2 Thucydides also may be called the younger contemporary of Herodotus, though the difference between the two historians 1 Thus he is driven to believe in Heracles the god, and Heracles the man, the son of Amphitryon and Alcmene, and though he speaks of Perseus as the son of Danae and Zeus (vii. 61), he seems to hesitate to accept the story (vi. 53). In Egypt no god had appeared in human form for three hundred and forty-five generations. On the other hand, Hecataeus traced his family to a divine ancestor in the sixteenth generation (ii. 143); cp. iv. 5, where Herodotus refuses to accept the statement that Targitaeus was the son of Zeus and of the daughter of the Borysthenes. 2 See Brandis, Be temp. Gfraec. antiq, rationibus, Bonn, 1857. 504 THUCYDIDES. [XIV. 9. tempts us to assign them to different generations. He was an Athenian, and his work bears the stamp of Athenian thought as strongly as that of Herodotus bears Thucydides. ° *t • « * » rni • .. the stamp of Ionian " enquiry. I he curiosity of the traveller whose attention is distracted by any strange custom or new belief is replaced by an intense application to the great subject which the writer has chosen as the work of his life. Thucydides is the historian of the Pelopon-nesian war: with that in view he studied the early history of Greece; with that in view he availed himself of every opportunity of ascertaining the precise events of the war, and the motives which weighed with the belligerents. On the one hand he estimates the effect of the war on character in Hellas, and on the other he shows how national characteristics contributed to success or failure. In the details of their criticism, Herodotus and Thucydides are at times not unlike each other; both have a distrust of the poets; both are guided by TeKpj/oia or indications in forming an opinion on the events of past history; but in the general principles which they follow they are far asunder. In the place of the religious feeling which dominates the earlier historian we have in Thucydides the economical and political conception of life. It is not rto-ts or veneris which guides him in his interpretation of events—such a phrase as XP1V auTw Kafcws yevko-dai would be impossible in his mouth—but the power of wealth, which enabled cities to build walls and ships and put down piracy; the ambition which seeks to acquire empire, and the pride which defends what has been won at any cost. He does not wish to astonish his readers by descriptions of what is vast or strange; he does not measure the importance of things by their remoteness; he perceives the greatness of the events which are taking place round him, and seeks to interpret them for all time. In his eyes the task of the historian is not only to tell what has happened—that is, to record events with the greatest possible accuracy—but to explain why it happened. Herodotus is impressed with the mutability of things, the decline of the great, and the rise of XIV. 10.] GROWTH OF ORATORY. 505 the insignificant—and this is the inference which we naturally draw from a first acquaintance with history. Thucydides believes that the motives which influence mankind are at all times and everywhere much the same; and thus by a study of the past and present we may advance forearmed to the future. From this point of view he is the first and perhaps the greatest of historians, and as History moves onward in the accomplishment of her task, she will follow more strictly in his footsteps.1 10. The Greeks were at all times keenly sensitive to the power of eloquence; from Homer downwards " shapeliness " of words never failed to win favour with a Greek audience. As we have seen (supra, p. 57), a great development of the art of oratory took place in Sicily about the middle of the Fifth Century; and it was not long ere the teachers of the art carried their skill to Old Greece, where it received a ready welcome. It was mainly owing to his eloquence that Pericles maintained his ground at Athens so long, and every young Athenian who wished to come forward in public life began by acquiring skill in speech. Those who would not or could not attend the new masters became jealous of those who did attend them, and perhaps this is one reason for Cleon's abuse of the clever speakers of his time. Here, as everywhere, native force and acquired dexterity were in conflict; and " What is it that you young men want ?" was a question asked at Athens as well as Syracuse.2 Yet even in the Peloponnesian war, when Anti-phon defended himself in a speech wThich Thucydides describes as the best of its kind spoken in Athens down to that time, Athenian oratory was immature, and it was not till the next century that eloquence was raised to its greatest height in the speeches of Lysias and Demosthenes. 1 See Forbes, Thuc. i. Introd. Thucydides may be attacked in details: he omits much that we should like to know; he is not precise, even when vivid, in his descriptions, etc., but what would we not give for a Thucydides in the great periods of our own history ? 2 Thuc. vi. 38. 506 IONIAN PHILOSOPHY. [XIV. II. The same was the case with the prose of science. In the Fifth Century no writer on morals or physics can be compared in respect of style with Plato, who belongs to the next generation. But this must not blind us to the real progress which was being made during the century in speculation on the nature of the universe. II. The early Ionian philosophers had endeavoured to explain the origin of the world by assuming some primary Phil o h element from which, by a variety of changes, all existing phenomena arose. Thales of Miletus (vol. i. 427) fixed on water as this primary element, to which he may have been led partly by observa-The Milesian tion, and partly perhaps by the example of School. older cosmogonies, in which Oceanus and Tethys were the parents of all things. However this may be, by assuming as his basis a material element, changing apparently by some innate force of its own, Thales separated himself from the older cosmologies, in which the world was created by divine agencies, and with him begins the series of Greek philosophers. A farther step was taken by Anaximander, also of Miletus (611-545), who was otherwise famous as the constructor of the first map. He assumed as the primary element an aireipov or " illimitable," something unlimited in extent and imperishable, out of which all things, plants, animals, and men, were developed through a series of gradations. This theory had the advantage over that of Thales in so far as the aireipov was abstract rather than concrete, and therefore more easily conceived as assuming different forms.1 As the power of thought deepened, these attempts at an explanation of the universe were found unsatisfactory. It was difficult by such means to explain the qualities found in things, and no account was given of the* cause of the changes which were assumed. By degrees also it became clear that there was a contrast between the universal and the particular, 1 See Windelband in I wan Miiller's Handbuch, v. 1; Zeller, Outlines of Greek Philosophy ; Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy. XIV. ii.] MOTION AND REST. 507 between reality as conceived by the mind, and actuality as apprehended by the senses. The one led to unity, the other to change. So physical inquiries passed into metaphysical, and two great schools arose, the school of the Eleatics and the school of the Heracliteans. The founder of the Eleatic school was Xenophanes (c. 590-500), who emigrated from Colophon to the west, and finally settled at Elea (vol. ii. p. 512). With him the The Eieatic principle of change, so necessary in the Milesian School, philosophy, disappeared. The world was One, enop was God, without beginning, without change, without end. From such a principle the variety of the existing world could not of course be explained, but in regard to physical phenomena Xenophanes seems to have taken over, with some inconsistency, the views of Anaximander.1 Thus the principle of unity was brought forward and held a place beside the early principle of change, without any attempt at reconciliation. The philosophers who came after Xenophanes adopted one or other of these principles without regard to the opposite. Heraclitus of Ephesus (540-470) maintained the principle of ceaseless change; his philosophy was expressed in the phrase lravra pet. He disregarded altogether the unchangeable principle which Xenophanes had introduced into philosophy, for neither in the created world nor beyond it could he find a trace of such a principle. Yet he does not, like the Milesians, merely assume a primary substance, which changes into created things; and if he chooses fire as a symbol of his principle, it is not "real fire that crackles and burns,"2 but fire as a process in which change is always going on. Parmenides (515-440 V) took up the opposite principle. What Xenophanes had expressed vaguely and in language half theological he developed into a metaphysical theory. "Being" alone exists, for it alone is the object of thought, and being is unchangeable in quality and time. In the 1 See Windelband, I.e. p. 146. 2 See, however, Burnet, Lc 508 EMPEDOCLES AND ANAXAGORAS. [XIV. 12. hands of Zeno, the friend and pupil of Parmenides,1 the difficulties and contradictions to which the ordinary opinions of the plurality and changeability of things give rise were stated from a purely logical point of view. Motion for instance was disproved by the infinitesimal division of time and space—just as an instantaneous photograph represents a rapidly moving wheel at rest. These logical paradoxes became the admiration of the Greeks, and as " dialectic" Zeno's method was a powerful instrument of discussion.2 12. On the principles of Parmenides and Heraclitus physical philosophy could hardly continue to exist. Some via media must be found by which the world of phenomena could be brought into relation to the world of thought. Hence the philosopher who in his teaching, if not in his date (for he was slightly the older man of the two), came after Empedocles of Agrigentum (vol. ii. p. 465), Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (500-428, supra, p. 57), and the atomists Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera, attempted in various ways to combine the principle of unity with the principle of change. The great Sicilian had explained the universe on mechanical principles. All matter consisted of the four elements, earth, water, air, fire, which were set in motion by two opposing powers, Love and Hatred (attraction and repulsion). These elements were mixed together in a vast orb or sphere, which was whirled round by the energy of the contending powers. By attraction air and fire 1 From the first those who devoted themselves to science or philosophy seem to have gathered as pupils round some eminent teacher, and formed a school. And so we can speak of the schools of Miletus, Elea, and Abdera. This had always been the case in medicine, and we observe it in poetry and art also. It was a feature of Greek life to unite into 6iao~oi. See Windelband, I.e. p. 132. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 28. 2 For Heraclitus and Parmenides, see Grote's Plato, vol. i. c. 1 ; also Zeller's Pre-Socratic Philosophy. Specimens of the Zenonian dialectic will be found in Grote, I.e. i. p. 94 ff. (ed. 1888). It was the same instrument which proved so powerful in the hands of Socrates. The influence of the two great lines of thought is shown in an interesting manner in Pater's Plato and Platonism, cc. i. ii. XIV. 12.] LEUCIPPUS AND DEMOCRITUS. 509 were drawn into the outer parts of the sphere, and formed the atmosphere and the luminaries; earth and water sank to the middle. Anaxagoras improved upon this system; instead of four elements he assumed the existence of " things " (x/o^ara), equal in number to the qualities of which we have perception; and by the union and separation of these the objects of sense came into being. In everything there was a portion of everything, but not of course an equal portion, and hence arises the difference between one thing and another —between flesh and blood, earth and water, etc. In order to account for this union and separation, Anaxagoras assumed a moving and directing "Mind," which was of a nature separate and distinct from everything else; by the action of " Mind " the original mass or mixture was separated and arranged. Yet Anaxagoras did not succeed in escaping from the difficulties which beset his predecessor. Just as in Empedocles the existence of " Love " and " Hate " is a mere assumption made to explain the world, so it is with the " Mind " of Anaxagoras : he required a motive power for the creation of objects of sense, and therefore assumed the existence of a cause, the origin and nature of which he cannot explain. Other difficulties arose from the qualitative nature of the elements assumed by Anaxagoras. Democritus following in the steps of Leucippus, his master at Abdera, sought to give a still more simple, and more purely mechanical, account of the origin of the universe. He discarded the qualitative difference of the elements or "atoms," which were, however, of various shapes and sizes, and indivisible. Moving downward through the "void," these atoms impinged on each other, and thus becoming entangled formed masses larger or smaller, more or less dense or rough. From these primary qualities arose the secondary qualities of taste, smell, etc. Besides atoms and "void" there was nothing; by them and them only was explained the whole world of matter and mind. Such was the great physical system of Democritus; in his own age it was disregarded, at any rate at Athens; Socrates 510 THE PYTHAGOREANS: PHILOLAUS. [XIV. 12. turned away from it to his dialectic, Plato to his "ideas." More than a century afterwards, Epicurus made it the foundation of his philosophy; and in modern times it has been adopted in a slightly different form as the basis of natural science.1 Finally the Pythagoreans, some of whom, after the dispersion of the societies in Magna Graecia (vol. ii. p. 488), found The Pytha- a home at Thebes, brought their theory of goreans. numbers to bear upon the difficulty of unity and change. The leader of the school was Philolaus, who published his views in a treatise, of which fragments remain. " All is number," they maintained ; for in all things number exists as a defining principle. Numbers were the original forms of which things were copies. The odd and even were identified with the limited and unlimited, and all things could thus be arranged into two great categories, which, however, run up into the one, a number both odd and even. In this warpaths were projected through the multiplicity of objects, and the contrast of change and unity reconciled in a higher harmony.2 13. Such speculations were little appreciated at Athens. Anaxagoras was thrown into prison, the books of Protagoras were burnt, and though Democritus paid a visit to the city, his teaching was disregarded. The feeling of the older citizens strongly condemned the sophists and all their works. Yet of some of these writers it must be said that they made greater contributions to moral science than Plato himself. The "sophists" were among the first to protest against slavery, an honour which Euripides shares with them, and to Protagoras we owe the wise saying that ro agoras. punishment is inflicted for the reformation of the offender, not for the satisfaction of revenge or the adjust- 1 See Grote, I.e. vol. i. 67 ff.; Zeller, Pre-Socratic Philosophy, vol. ii.; Windelbandjlc. 205 ff. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy. Leucippus is in other accounts a native of Elea or of Miletus ; but in any case he must be considered the master of Democritus. 3 gee Grote, I.e. i. p, 9 f.; Pater, Ic, c, iii, XIV. I3-] ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY: DEMOCRITUS. 511 ment of the balance of fault and retribution. In other respects, we must allow, the views of Protagoras were less advanced: he maintained that might was right, which was inconsistent even with his own condemnation of slavery. His most famous doctrine was expressed in the words, " Man is the measure of all things "—which, if it meant that there was no knowledge outside the human mind, was true enough, but far from true if it implied that every man was entitled to have his own rule of right and wrong. He refused to enter into any arguments about the existence or nature of the gods on the ground that the human faculties were inadequate, and human life too short for such discussions, views which naturally brought him into disrepute as an atheist. In his metaphysical speculations he seems to have been a follower of Heraclitus (supra, p. 507), and, in fact, his teaching on the nature of knowledge implies a theory in which all things are in constant change.1 Of the ethical teaching of Democritus, the greatest representa- emocn us-tive of the school of Abdera, we have many interesting fragments. Sometimes he speaks as a utilitarian: "Pleasure and disgust are the criteria of good and evil"; which is, however, but another way of saying that a properly trained nature will hate evil and love good. The highest virtue is to fulfil all duty to the state—it is in the state that a man's nature becomes realised, and he shows his qualities, good or bad. Duty must be done for its own sake, without thought of the gods or of a future existence, for which indeed there is no room in the system of Democritus. From the consciousness of 4uty fulfilled arises that peace of mind which is the true human felicity. This peace is neither the rapture of the mystic nor the dream of the idealist; it is the calm satisfaction of the man who does not seek his pleasures in what is mortal, or undertake tasks which are too high for him, for the old sayings /Jirjdev ayai>, yvtodi an-avTov are still among the best guides in life. The greatest help towards attaining 1 See Protagoras in Pauly's Real-Encyclopaedie. 512 POLITICAL SCIENCE: HIPPODAMUS. [XIV. 14. this peace is education, of which Democritus nobly says, that it is an ornament to the prosperous and a refuge to the unfortunate. There is also no greater pleasure for a man than the contemplation of great actions and the investigation of truth ; and for his own part, Democritus would rather be the discoverer of a single new truth than sit on the throne of the Great King. The soul is the home of the genius which shapes our lives, and chance is but a phantom invented by mankind to excuse their own folly.1 14. The beginnings of political science also go back to the Sixth Century. The Pythagorean societies had drawn upon Political themselves the hatred of the cities in which science. tnev were formed because their principles seemed hostile to civic life. In other cases, we find philosophers taking a leading part in the political movements of their cities. Empedocles and Parmenides were remembered with honour at Agrigentum and Elea. As time went on, the various constitutions were classified, and their merits discussed; in the time of Herodotus there were already three types— monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy—though he strangely places the discussion of them in the mouths of the Persian conspirators.2 A further step was taken when men who were in no way connected with practical politics drew up ideal constitutions. The first to do this was Hippodamus of Miletus (supra, p. 19), who wished to introduce something like mathematical precision into his state, and, led perhaps by some knowledge of Athenian juries, wished that the sentences of the popular juries should be revised by a supreme court. The sophists, of course, gave much attention to such subjects. Protagoras was inclined to maintain the authority of the state; he regarded justice as the uniting principle in politics, and a knowledge of justice, he said, comes insensibly to any one who has been bred in a civilised state—a common-sense doctrine which does credit to the "sophist." Other teachers 1 See Beloch, Griech. Gesch. i. 626 f., and the quotations there given from Democritus. 2 Herod, iii. 80 f. XIV. 15-] THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE CITIZEN. 513 held more dangerous doctrines. Much was made of the difference between convention and nature. Thrasymachus in the Republic of Plato regards justice as the outcome of a social compact which limits the natural rights of man. Hippias considered those laws only as divine which were universal. But what is to become of the state if "nature " is only another name for " force "—especially as it became more and more clear, in the transformation of Greek politics, " that the government of a state must have force at its back " % During the later period of the Peloponnesian war, the opposition of oligarchy and democracy became an all-absorbing interest, and as Sparta gained in the contest, her institutions attracted more attention, and greatly influenced the political speculation of the time.1 15. The views of the philosophers, if they had become popular, would have destroyed the orthodox religion. In the system of Democritus the gods were allowed philosophy to exist, but only as spirits who took no part and relision-in the ordering of the world; Anaxagoras put intellect in the place of divine power, and Protagoras was an " agnostic." It was only in the teaching of the Pythagoreans that religion maintained a place, and their religion was not that of the common people. There was also an opposition between the philosopher and the citizen; the man who, as a rule, was without family ties, who wandered from his native city, or did not hesitate to criticise her institutions, was regarded with suspicion by the citizen whose life was passed within his native walls, and who thought it the highest virtue to have the same friends and the same enemies as his state. But the Greeks were not readers, though it is probable that almost every Athenian could read, and fdr a long time the speculations of philosophy were either written down in books, or discussed in narrow circles. In Athens, at any rate, philosophy and religion did not diverge so widely as among the bolder thinkers of Ionia and Thrace. This was due, in a 1 See Newman, Politics of Aristotle, vol. i. Introd. p. 380 ff. VOL. III. 2 K 514 SOCRATES. [XIV. 15. great measure, to the influence of Socrates, the son of So-phroniscus (469-399), who, discarding physical inquiries altogether, devoted himself to moral and mental speculation and criticism. He was an Athenian of the Athenians, so great a lover of his city that he never left it except to serve in the battlefield, and when condemned to death, refused to save his life by disobedience to the laws under which he suffered; a man of so religious a nature that he claimed to be guided in all his actions by a divine voice. He took up the questions opened by the wandering sophists, so far as they related to ethics or politics, and endeavoured to find answers to them based on deeper investigation. A sculptor by trade, he was satisfied with the barest pittance of wages, and spent his time in talking to any one whom he could find ready to enter into discussion with him. Asking no fee for his instruction^if instruction it could be called when he always insisted that he was the most ignorant of the company—he associated with rich and poor, till he gathered round him a band of disciples, who shaped the philosophy of the next century. He wrote nothing, nor did he attempt to frame any system of ethics, or to teach in any regular course. His power lay in conversation ; by a series of subtly contrived questions, he led the discussion this way and that, till his opponent had become involved in inextricable difficulties, or downright contradictions. Professing to know nothing himself, he was always convincing others of their ignorance, and at the same time stimulated them to a sure foundation of knowledge and virtue. Among those who listened to him was Xenophon, who, in the simple memorials which he has written down of his master's conversation, has given us an accurate picture of Socrates as he might be seen in the market-place of Athens, or at a barber's shop, or in the house of a friend, day by day, asking questions and tearing to pieces the answers which he received, till he exposed their superficiality, if he did not attain to the truth beyond them. Plato, also a disciple, made the conversations of Socrates the basis of his dialogues. Through his XIV. 16.] PHYSICAL SCIENCE. 515 genius, Socrates has become the best-known figure among the philosophers of the world, and the account which he has given of his master's closing days is little less than a canonisation. For Socrates, whose whole life was passed in the performance of duty, fell a victim to the religious and political susceptibilities of the Athenians; he was accused of atheism, and of perverting the young men with whom he associated, and, when more than seventy years of age, he was condemned to death (399). l6. Through Socrates, Athens became a centre of philosophy, so far as it concerned ethics and politics. In the department of science she had, as we have said, but little share. Hippocrates^ the great physician of the century, was a native of Cos, and what may be called the medical schools of the time were to be found in that island and at Epidaurus, Cnidus, and Croton. To Croton also belonged Democedes (vol. ii. 38), and in the next generation Alcmaeon, who was the founder of anatomy. From Cnidus came Euryphon, and Ctesias, who was physician to Artaxerxes Mnemon at the close of the century. The writings of Hippocrates were the " classics " of the art. Disease was no longer regarded as due to supernatural influence, and to be cured by charms and incantations, or by dreams in the temple of Asclepius. Hippocrates maintained that all diseases have a natural cause, and natural means must be taken for their cure. Nature must be aided where possible, and when she cannot be aided, she must be left to herself. "What drugs cannot cure, the knife must heal; where the knife fails, fire must be tried; and if fire fails, there is no cure."l In the kindred sciences of botany and biology little was done, though Democritus laid a foundation for future studies in his treatises on the causes of seeds, plants, and fruits, and on the structure of animals. More attention was paid to 1 See Beloch, Or. Gesch. i. 605 ; Pauly, Real-Encycl. Hippocrates. The treatise, De acre et aquis, is still valuable for the acute observations recorded in it of the influence of climate on health. 516 MATHEMATICS: GEOGRAPHY. [XIV. 16. mathematics ; in the Platonic system they occupied the foremost place among studies preparatory to philosophy—a position due not so much to the teaching of Socrates as to Plato's sympathy with exactness of thought. Yet no Athenian seems to have attained great eminence as a mathematician, except perhaps Meton, who arranged the calendar on a new and more accurate system (432), based on a cycle of nineteen years, by which the solar and lunar years were brought into closer connection with each other. Other mathematicians and astronomers of the Periclean age were Oenopides of Chios, Hippocrates also of Chios, Anaxagoras, Hippodamus of Miletus, and Theodorus of Cyrene.1 In geography, both scientific and descriptive, the Greeks took the liveliest interest. In his Prometheus Vinctus the poet Aeschylus makes an opportunity to give his audience a sketch of the wanderings of Io; and, as we have seen, geographical works were among the first efforts in prose. The Pythagoreans advanced so far as to conceive of the earth as a cone, and Parmenides, following this up, invented a theory of zones; but the current view in the Fifth Century was still that of the Ionians, who regarded the earth as a flat plate floating on air in the middle of the universe. This view seems also to have been held by Herodotus, though he discards the notion of an ocean stream and of a circular earth. The general form of the Mediterranean was pretty well known, but measurements were inaccurate, and therefore conflicting. Whether Libya was surrounded by the sea, or the Caspian closed at the northern end were still open questions. Little or nothing was known of the west or north of Europe—for what the Phoenician traders had discovered they kept as a trade secret—or of India, in spite of the voyage of Scylax.2 1 For Meton's cycle see Pauly, I.e. iii. 141 f. Anaxagoras is said to have occupied himself when in prison with the quadrature of the circle. Windelband, I.e. 130; Burnet, I.e. 281. 2 Herod, iv. 44. XIV. 17-] FINE ARTS: PAINTING. 517 17. In all the departments of fine art, though not equally in all, a new impulse seems to have stimulated Greece in the Fifth Century. The art of painting had long been employed in a subordinate manner for the decoration of houses and of marble tombs, and on a smaller scale for the decoration of vases. Of pictures in the modern sense—pictures on wood—we hear of one executed at the command of Mandrocles, of the bridge built by him over the Bosphorus, and placed in the Heraeum at Samos. There is also the legend of the picture of the battle with the Magnetes painted by Bularchus for Candaules of Lydia, who paid for it with its weight in gold.1 At the end of the Sixth and beginning of the Fifth Century there was a remarkable development in vase painting, the black figures which had long been in use being discarded for red. But the creator of painting as a fine art was Polygnotus of Thasos, who, in Cimon's time, decorated the walls of the Painted Porch at Athens. The most famous of his works were the paintings in the porch of the Cnidians at Delphi, in which he depicted the underworld and the destruction of Troy, of which, fortunately, Pausanias has given us a minute description.2 The skill of Polygnotus was shown, not so much in his colouringj as in the expression which he gave to the face and figure, and in the composition of his pictures. "He knew how to breathe into the old forms and rules a higher intellectual life, and develop from them a higher artistic beauty."3 A painter who did much to improve the decoration of the stage was Agatharchus of Samos, the younger contemporary of Polygnotus, and as a good scene could hardly be painted without some knowledge of perspective, we may suppose that Agatharchus made this his study.4 But the greatest of 1 Herod, iv. 88; Plin. N. H. vii. 126; xxxv. 55. * Paus. x. 25-31. 8 Brunn. See the article "Malerei" in Baumeister, DenkmcUer, vol. ii., by Von Rohden. 4 It was Agatharchus whom Alcibiades compelled to paint his 513 FINE ARTS: SCULPTURE. [XIV. 18. Greek painters were Zeuxis of Hefaclea and Parrhasius of Ephesus, who belong to the end of the century. Of the works Zeuxis and of Zeuxis we have no details, with the excep-Parrhasius. tion of his Centaur Family, which is described by Lucian. In the Acharnians of Aristophanes there is an allusion to the Eros which he painted in the temple of Aphrodite at Athens—"a beautiful boy crowned with roses." Aristotle says of him that his art was such that he could make even the impossible credible, but his paintings were deficient in the expression of character, being in this respect the reverse of those of Polygnotus.1 Parrhasius was the contemporary and rival of Zeuxis. About twenty of his paintings are mentioned: among them the Healing of Telephus, the Madness of Odysseus, Philoctetes on Lemnos, and Prometheus, which show an inclination towards subjects in which strong emotion was expressed without loss of dignity. The story of the contest between Zeuxis and Parrhasius is well known. Zeuxis painted grapes with such fidelity that the birds came to pluck them. Confident of success, he went to the studio of Parrhasius, and seeing his picture, bade him draw the curtain which concealed it. But the curtain was the picture, and Zeuxis acknowledged that Parrhasius had won. l8. In sculpture, the artists of the Fifth Century attained an eminence which has never been surpassed. By what inspiration of genius and sleight'of hand they Sculpture. r & » . . / were able to pass at once from the heavy, insipid forms of the previous century, so rigid in their attitude, so vacant in expression, so coarse in the colouring, to the graceful and animated perfection of the age of Pericles, cannot be explained. As it was in the drama, so it was in sculpture; great masters appeared who carried the art forward with astonishing rapidity. The progress was not confined to house by shutting him up in it, and bidding him either finish the work and come out with a handsome payment, or break out as best he could. 1 Luc. Zeuxis. Arist. Ach. 955; Arist. Poet. 6. See the article on Zeuxis in Pauly's Real-Encyclop. XIV. i8.] SCULPTORS OF THE FIFTH CENTURY. 519 Athens, but spread through the cities round the Saronic gulf, with the exception of Corinth. Canachus of Sicyon, and Hageladas of Argos were widely known quite early in the century; the first was pre-eminent in working in bronze, and his success in this material greatly influenced the work in stone. He also made a statue of Aphrodite in ivory and gold for her temple in Sicyon. At Aegina the sculptures of the temple of Athena belong to this period; the chief master here was Onatas, whose works were thought equal to those of the greatest sculptors of the Attic school.1 In Athens, soon after the Persian war, Critius and Nesiotes executed statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton, to replace those which Xerxes had carried off to Susa.2 These artists were followed by Calamis and Myron, whose bronze figures of animals were among the finest efforts of Greek plastic art. Greater still was Phidias, in whose hands the human form was rendered with a dignity and perfection which is still the wonder and despair of the sculptor. His material was generally marble; the figures in the pediments of the Parthenon, by which his style is best known, were necessarily of this material, but he also wrought in bronze, and, in his finest efforts, in gold and ivory. The statue of Zeus at Olympia, which was regarded in antiquity as something almost superhuman, and the statue of Athena in the Parthenon, were executed in these materials. In estimating the effect of such statues, we must remember that they were placed in the dimly lighted cellae of temples, where the brilliance of the colouring would be much subdued.3 After the death of Phidias the primacy in art passes from Athens to Argos, where Polyclitus executed work only ° y° ' US* second, and not in all respects second, to the Athenian 1 See Pauly, Jtteal-Encycl. Onatas, and Paus. viii. 42. 7; v. 25 ad fin. 2 Lucian, Philosoph. c. 1&; Paus. i. 8. 5, who ascribes the statues to Critius only. 3 See Beloch, G. G. i. 586, who compares the use of gold mosaics in basilicae. Myron was a native of Boeotia, but naturalised at Athens; both he and Phidias were pupils of the Argive Hageladas. 520 STYLES OF ARCHITECTURE. [XIV. 19. master. The Argive Hera was thought worthy to rank with the Olympian Zeus, and in his Amazon Polyclitus carried off the prize from his rival. Other very famous statues were the Diadumenus—a youth binding the chaplet of victory on his brow, of which a copy still exists in the Villa Farnese—the Doryphorus, and the Apoxyomenus. 19. In architecture the advance was not so great as in sculpture, though here also the finest efforts of the art belong to this century and were to be found at Athens. To the two styles already in use—the Doric and the Ionic, of which the Doric was employed in Old Greece, the Ionic in Asia,—a third, the Corinthian, was added with its richly carved capital, but the innovation was not received with much favour. It was even a departure from the severer styles which had hitherto prevailed, when the Erech-theum was rebuilt on the Acropolis, towards the end of the century, with Ionic pillars and Caryatids. The great temples were all Doric: the Parthenon, the Theseum, so-called, the best-preserved piece of Athenian architecture, the temple at Bassae, the temples of Aegina and Olympia, of Agrigentum and Selinus, though varying in detail, are all of this style. The great architect of the age was Ictinus, the builder of the Parthenon (completed in 438), and of the temple of Apollo Epicurius at Bassae (see supra, p. 127), but he was ably supported by others—by Callicrates, who was joined with him in building the Parthenon, and Mnesicles, the architect of the Propylaea (437-432). Athens now became incomparably the most beautiful city of Greece, a city which every one wished to see, and which those who had seen wished to see again. In other parts of Attica also, temples arose at the bidding of Pericles—at Eleusis, where the temple of the Holy Goddesses was rebuilt on a much larger scale; at Sunium, which is still crowned by the columns of the ruined temple of Athena; and at Ehamnus, where the temple to Nemesis was rebuilt. In Sicily, also, Hiero of Syracuse and Thero of Agrigentum vied with each other in building great temples to celebrate the deliverance XIV. I9-] BUILDINGS OF PERICLES. 521 of Sicily from the attack of the barbarians. Agrigentum now became, owing to its wealth and prosperity (see supra, p. 484), the "fairest of the cities of men"; and among the many temples which adorned the town, the temple of Olympian Zeus rose conspicuous, " surpassed in magnitude by no Grecian building of the kind, except that of Diana at Ephesus."l At Selinus, also, temples, hardly less splendid, were erected, and in both cases the work seems toiiave been interrupted by the Carthaginian invasion (c. xiii.). At Segesta, too, are the remains of a temple—" one of the most perfect and striking ruins in Sicily "—which appears to have been left unfinished. At Athens, Pericles did not occupy himself with temples only. To the south of the Acropolis, a little eastward of the theatre of Dionysus, he built an Odeum or other music-hall, for the performance of musical con- buildings, tests, a detached circular building with a dome-shaded roof, supported by numerous pillars in the interior, a copy it was said of the tent of Xerxes.2 With the help of Hippodamus, he laid out the Peiraeus in the approved mode of straight streets crossing each other at right angles, and the work of Hippodamus was commemorated by the market-place which bore his name.3 More important by far was the addition of the second of the Long Walls which connected Athens and Peiraeus. It ran parallel to the wall already built (vol. ii. p. 327), to the south of it, and was apparently erected soon after the ostracism of Thucydides, when Pericles ruled without a rival. When this wall was completed, that joining Athens and Phalerum became of little use, and was allowed to fall into decay.4 20. Yet in spite of this great expenditure in temples and 1 See Bunbury in Smith's Diet, of Geog. sub voc. Agrigentum. 2 Plut. Per. 13. The building seems to have attracted attention: the comedians compared it to the peculiarly shaped head of Pericles, Faus. i. 20. 4: In Theophrastus, Char act., the ddoXco-^iyy asks: iroaoi CiVi Kioves tov 'Qdeiov ; 3 See Baumeister, Denhmdler, Peiraeus, 1198 a. 4 Plut. Per. 13; Plato, Gorg. 455 E. 522 THE CITY OF ATHENS. [XIV. 20. public buildings, little was done for the comfort and convenience of the residents in the city. We can hardly be Condition of wrong in supposing that Athens was better cared Athens. for khan most Greek towns; yet what a picture do we get of the streets from the comedians and the orators! The old men who visit their fellow-juror in the early morning, in the Wasps of Aristophanes, grope their way through the gloom by the light of a few lanterns carried by boys. " Hold the lantern lower," cries one, " that we may not do ourselves a mischief on a stone." "Take care," replies the boy, "and step clear of the mud." Conscious of their own danger, they imagine that their friend is unable to join them because he is suffering from some accident of this kind. Water used in the house was thrown into the street at evening without ceremony, a cry of warning being thought enough for the protection of the passers-by. From a scene in the Ecclesia-zusae it is clear that no rules of decency were observed in the streets at night.1 To these natural dangers and disgusts were added others arising from a love of practical jokes, or the wildness of Athenian youth. The mutilation of the Hermae is a notorious instance of the outrages which could be perpetrated in the public streets with little fear of detection ; and Lysias gives us a graphic description of a disreputable street row, which only came to an end when every one engaged had got a broken head.2 Bands of young men roamed the street—Triballi or Autolekythi, or whatever the name of the society might be—and any one who fell into their hands had reason to remember his misfortune. Or at the breaking up of an entertainment, the more excited of the party would burst open the doors of a mistress or a companion and bring the night to a close there. The less frequented parts of the town were the resorts of the worst characters, and no one could be found there without some risk to his reputation. The astynomi, who were in charge of the city, do not seem to have taken any measures for the preservation 1 Wasps, 246 ff.; Acharn. 590 f. ; Eccl. 321 f. 2 In Simm. XIV. 21.] GREEK RELIGION. 523 of order, at least we never hear of any organised ni^ht police or watchmen. The only remedy for outrage was the law-courts, in which a victory might be worse than Cadmean if obtained by the poor man against the rich. 21. We have already seen {supra, p. 55) how sensitive the Greeks were to any innovations in religious teaching, and this was peculiarly the case at Athens. There were, no doubt, some who had their doubts and their heresies, but as a whole the people wished to worship the gods as their fathers had done, and regarded them from the traditional point of view. The Greek deities were originally personifications of natural forces and phenomena, and, to the last, traces of their origin clung about them. Zeus was lord of the sky, and Poseidon ruled the sea. But impulses and emotions also gained a place among divine powers, and the gods themselves were swayed by them. There were also numerous local deities, and spirits without any special name, who influenced men for good and evil. From the first, too, there was an ethical element in Greek religion, as may be seen, for instance, from the fact that oaths were placed under divine sanction, and Ethical however great the resistance which faith offered Pro&ress-to philosophy, it was inevitable that the higher minds should from time to time find something to criticise in the beliefs of older generations. We have seen how Xenophanes attacked the current ideas of the deities, and insisted on a higher conception of their moral nature (vol. ii. p. 514). How difficult it was to take such a step is clear from the example of Pindar and Aeschylus, who, great poets though they were, and filled with noble conceptions of the divine nature, yet accepted the ordinary mythology so far as to ascribe the worst vices to the srpreme Deity. The old ideas and the new continued to exist side by side; and, indeed, such inconsistencies seem inseparable from the history of religion. Still, much was gained, and this was not the only point in which progress was made. By slow degrees the idea of one 524 THE OLD AND THE NEW. [XIV. 21. deity began to prevail over Polytheism. Not only did Zeus rise above the rest of the deities—that conception is as old The mono- as Homer—but he becomes almost the only thcistic idea. object of veneration—at least to the noblest minds, such as Aeschylus.1 And besides the Oeoi of popular belief, the divine power, regarded as the operation of divine beings apart from the intervention of a personal deity, is denoted by the abstract and impersonal expression, to deiov. That this tendency did not, however, shake the public faith in polytheism, is shown, on the one hand, by the numerous temples which were erected in the Fifth Century, and on the other, by the last acts of Socrates, who was careful before he left the world to compose poetry in obedience to the oracle, and pay his offering to Asclepius; and by the last play of Euripides, who atoned for the rationalism of earlier years by writing the Bacchael Nor was the grossness of the old conceptions purged away. The attitude of the comedians towards the deity shows that in their opinion at any rate the " gods love a joke," without much caring whether it was indecent and made at their own expense or not.2 It is significant, also, that Aristotle in the next century speaks of the temples as places where pictures may still be seen which it is not good for the young to see.3 There was a sacredness about such primitive representations which sank deep into the popular mind. We need only remember the intense excitement caused at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermae. Two other movements characteristic of Greek religion may be noticed in the Fifth Century: the growing popularity of mystic rites, and especially of the mysteries of Eleusis, and the introduction of foreign rites into Greece. (1.) In mysticism religion cleared itself to some degree of the polytheism of the poets and cosmographers.4 Not only was 1 Agam. 74 f., Zrjva 6e tis 7rpo(pp6v(os imviiaa tckdfav rcv^crai p€p5)u to irav. Cp. Siippl. 90 f., 524 ff. 2 Plato, Grat. 406 0.: i\o7raio~povcs yap kcl\ oi Oeoi. * Arist. Pol. vii. 17. lo=1336 b. 4 See Windelband, Lc. p. 134. XIV. 21.] MYSTERIES AND FOREIGN RITES. 525 the circle of the mystic deities very limited, but it was the individual soul and its fortunes in the future life with which the rites were concerned. The ethical element might at least become predominant; for what- e mys enes* ever the nature of the ritual, there was at least some idea of guilt and retribution accompanying it. In some way or other it was well with those who had been initiated, and so widely was this belief diffused that the ordinary Greek would not willingly die without the rite.1 The attempt of Pericles to make the mysteries a centre of Greek religious life, and the necessity of rebuilding the temple of Eleusis on a larger scale, are evidence of the increasing numbers which flocked to the annual commemoration.2 (2.) The Greeks who settled on foreign shores were always hospitable to the deities whom they found in their new abodes; and in their own country they allowed the slaves who were imported in great numbers oreign ntes-from the north and east to practise the ceremonies and ritual which they brought with them. By degrees the more important of these, which naturally appealed to the curiosity of the Greeks, were recognised by the state. Soon after the Persian war, a shrine was built in the market-place at Athens for the Magna Mater of Phrygia.3 From Phrygia also came the wine-god Sabazius, who is mentioned in the Wasps of Aristophanes, and in a few years became a popular deity, as might be expected from his nature.4 The Thracian goddess Bendis had a temple in the Peiraeus at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Amnion was by that time worshipped in Laconia; and Lysander, when checked by Pausanias at Athens, went to consult his oracle in Libya. Among the women of Athens the worship of Adonis, an importation 1 Aristoph. Pax, 370. I. 2 Supra, p. 25. The mysteries of Samothrace were also becoming more popular, but initiation in them was the exception rather than the rule: cp. Aristoph. Pax, 277 £ : aXX' eT tis vpibp iv SapoBpaicg rvyxavci iiepvripevos, k.t.\. 3 See Beloch, G. G. ii. 5, n. 3. 4 Aristoph. Wasps, 9, 10 ; Lysistr. 388 : o! nvKvoi SajSaftoi. 5?6 TRADE AND COMMERCE. [XIV. 22. from Cyprus, was much in vogue; at the time when the expedition to Sicily was being discussed, the ominous cry of the lament for Adonis was heard in the Assembly.1 Other rites, introduced from Phrygia or Thrace, were of a kind which appealed to the dregs of the people. Noisy processions rushed along the streets to the sound of fife and drum; while at night the faithful gathered together for the initiation of some neophyte, and availed themselves of the opportunity to indulge in excesses of every kind.2 Thus at the time when in one direction religious feeling in Greece was struggling upwards to a higher conception of the deity, it was sinking in another into the utter degradation which for centuries to come left its mark on the nation.3 22. Down to the time of their disastrous revolt, the Ionian cities of Asia were the centres of Greek trade. The ^cc . c^ ships of Miletus were known from the Cim- Effectsofthe r . Ionian revolt merian Bosphorus to Naucratis in Egypt; the on trade. cjfcy was on frxendly terms with Eretria in Euboea, and with Sybaris in Italy. The Phocaeans opened the trade to the far west; the Samians were known at Cyrene; the Dorian city of Cnidus was in close relations with Croton. Through these Ionian cities the products and wares of the interior of Asia were shipped to Greece. After the suppression of the revolt and the outbreak of hostilities between Persia and Old Greece all this was at an end. For twenty years (500-480) Grecian ships were excluded from the eastern Aegean, and " all beyond Delos seemed as far off as the pillars of Hercules." The altered relations with Persia would doubtless check the trade with the interior, at least for a time, and, their power and prosperity lost, the cities fell into the second rank. Much of the trade which they lost passed into the hands of Athens. At the time when Xerxes crossed the Helles- 1 Aristoph. Lysistr. 389 f. Supra, p. 305. 2 See the lively description in Beloch, G. G. ii. 7. 3 On Greek religion as represented in literature, see Professor Campbell's Religion in Greek Literature. XIV. 22.] AGRICULTURE. 527 pont she was importing corn from the Euxinej and after the liberation of Ionia and the ^llespont, trade would be free to follow the natural channels, and Trade o* gather round the city which now became the Athens-centre of the Greek world. Under the shadow of the Delian League, the trade of Athens became firmly rooted. She not only entered into treaties with numerous emporia in the Aegean—even in the far east—but she felt herself sufficiently strong to impose " navigation laws" on many cities which traded with her. In the importation of corn, more especially, the most stringent precautions were taken to secure an ample supply at a moderate price. By the conquest and final destruction of Aegina, she got rid of a powerful rival; and though the trade with the west still remained chiefly in the hands of Corinth, the commerce of Athens was so firmly established that even the capture of the city by Lysander failed to destroy it. It was otherwise with agriculture. From the days of Pisistratus till the outbreak of the war, with the exception of the invasion of Xerxes, Attica had enjoyed unbroken security. The land was not only tilled wherever tillage was possible—and used as pasture in the wilder parts—but the owners of the soil lived on their farms, built themselves handsome houses, and enjoyed to the full the quiet and independence of a country life. All this was changed by the Peloponnesian war. Those who had lived in comfort and abundance were driven into Athens to find shelter where they could, and, by the end of the war, most of them were ruined. Of the straits to which they were reduced we have melancholy proof in the Memorabilia of Xenophon. In the Plutus of Aristophanes also, which belongs to the period after the war, we get a picture of dire poverty. In the earlier plays the poor man complains of the aggression of the rich, and of their monopoly of the good things of the state, but it is not wealth which he covets so much as power. He is happy enough on three obols a day if only he can show his contempt for the rich. To have the great man 528 SOCIETY: SLAVERY. [XIV. 23. at an advantage, to make him cringe and cog—this is marrow to the juryman who sA highly paid offices going into the hands of the " son of Coesyra." 1 23. When we attempt to form any general conception of the social life and character of the Greeks, we are met at the outset by some facts of the first importance. The institution of slavery divided every city and every household into two sections, of which one was supposed to exist for the comfort and convenience of the other. It may be true that slaves were kindly treated in daily life by the Greeks, but their legal position was intolerable : in his own house every man was a tyrant, with more than a tyrant's power over those around him. The moral dangers of such relations are obvious, and they must also have been fatal to a great extent to elevation of character. The slave-owner alternated between a self-sufficient pride when he compared himself with the " living tool" which he employed, and an ever-present apprehension that his tools might combine Society. rr. , ,. 0 . , ° against him. Society was on an insecure basis, and though the difficulties which attend the opposition of labour and capital were avoided, even trade and industry were greatly injured by the system. Again, there were no professions in Greece, and even if their place may have been taken to some slight extent by the various societies so popular among the Greeks, the profound influence which professions now exercise on character was not brought to bear in shaping the life of the Greek.2 Once more, as we have seen, women were not admitted into society at Athens, and though in some other cities, as at Sparta, they were not so strictly secluded, social life in the modern sense did not exist. 1 Aristoph. Pint. 535 ff. ; cp. Wasps, 546 ff., where the juror ends the description of his office with the words: up' ov fieyakr) tovt9 cot' apxh KaL T°v tt^ovtov Karaxfivr). 2 Perhaps an exception ought to be made in favour of medicine, but even this art was largely practised by slaves. The army at Sparta, and the navy at Athens, were also useful in bringing men together, and diffusing an esprit de corps among them. XIV. 23-] TYPES OF CHARACTER. 529 The Greeks were proudly conscious of certain broad distinctions which separated them from the " barbarians " (vol. ii. p. 25), but they were not less conscious of the endless variety of types to be found in their different cities. Not only did Ionian differ from Dorian^ but each city, and almost each village, had its characteristics. The Argives were sots and thieves; the Tirynthians were given to incontrollable laughter; the Boeotians, as a nation, were dull, but while Thebes was the home of "insolence," Tanagra was a very pleasant place for a stranger to visit. The bearded Carystian was regarded as dangerous to the peace of families. Even in Attica a distinction was drawn between the Attici and the Athenians; the first were meddlesome, prying sycophants; the second of a noble, generous nature.1 If we confine ourselves to Athens, we find in the plays of Aristophanes " all sorts and conditions of men " : the coarse countryman who hates the sophist-taught citizen, the carefully nurtured and educated boy, the dissolute youth who has discarded the old teaching for the new (supra, p. 59). We conclude that there was much that was good, and much that was bad; and, in the fearlessly outspoken language of comedy, the bad seems to predominate. Yet there is something of an ideal beauty about the fine conception of youth which Aristophanes has sketched in the Clouds, and even in his Trygaeus and Dicaeopolis there is a soundness which redeems the coarser elements. Of Athenian women it would be monstrous to take our opinions from the comedians, though m Aristophanes, even in the Lysistrata and Thesmophoriazusae, there are some pleasant glimpses of domestic life. And if in the Fifth Century Greece declined somewhat from that wonderful age in which Arete and Nausicaa, Penelope and Andromache had their birth, Athens was at least still capable of admiring an Alcestis and an Antigone. 1 See Pseudo-Dicaearchus in Miiller, F. H. G. ii. 255 (Frazer, Pans. i. xliii.); Theophrastus, ap. Athen. vi. 261, d. VOL. IIL 2L APPENDIX I. EXPENDITURE ON THE WAR. It is impossible, with the evidence at our command, to give any accurate account of the cost of the Peloponnesian war, though the attempt has been made more than once. The statements about the income of Athens are vague and inconsistent^ the account of expenditure incomplete. 1. Xenophon asserts that the total income of Athens at the beginning of the war amounted to 1000 talents; Aristophanes, in 422, puts it at 2000*; Thucydides gives no annual total, but informs us that the Athenians had a reserve of 6000 talents at the beginning of the war, and that the annual income from the allies was 600 talents. From inscriptions we learn that the Athenians borrowed 4730 talents in the seven years between 433-427 from the sacred treasury of Athena 2 ; but whether this sum is wholly included in the 6000 talents of reserve, is not clear. 2. Confining ourselves to Thucydides, we find that the Athenians set apart 1000 talents at the beginning of the war, leaving a sum of 5000 available for expenditure. From this we may perhaps deduct another thousand for the expense of Potidaea, after the beginning of the war. To the 4000 thus remaining we have to add, in the autumn of 428, the income for three and a half years, which, at 600 talents a year, would amount to 2100 talents. Yet these resources were so far diminished that an extra tax was then found necessary. We need not of course assume that the treasury was bankrupt in 428, but if a year's income (600 t.) was in hand, the expenditure had amounted to no less than 5500 talents in three and a half years, supposing that the ordinary income of Athens covered her ordinary expenditure. At this rate the average expense of the war was about 1600 talents a year. It is clear from Thucydides that the Athenians began by paying their soldiers at an extravagant rate, which they were unable to maintain, and even in 425 the war was regarded as a fruitful 1 Arist. Wasps, 660; Xen. Anab. vii. 1. 27. 2 0.1. A. i. 193. 530 App. I.] EXPENDITURE ON THE WAR. 531 source of income to those who took service in it. Envoys and generals are particularly mentioned for the high pay which they drew. And we are perhaps justified in regarding the extravagant expenditure as a cause of the popularity of the war.1 But the immediate reason for the imposition of the war-tax at the time of the revolt at Mytilene was probably the prospect of a siege which experience had proved so costly, and the danger of further revolt. And Cleon, who was now a power in the state, might take advantage of this to throw an extra burden on the rich. 3. Once more, if we ask how Athens, if her reserve was so nearly exhausted in 428, was able to continue the war, the reply seems to be : (1) that the war-tax was continued, and this, with the income of the allies, would produce about 800 talents per annum in addition to the ordinary income ; (2) that in 427 and 426 operations were not carried on on any great scale ; (3) and that in and after 425 the tribute was raised,2 till the yearly amount reached 1200 talents. 1 This is clearly the view of Aristophanes in the Acharnians. 2 On this subject, see Jowett, Thuc. i. p. lxviii. ff. ; KirchhofF, Zur Gesch. des Athen. Staatsschatzes, Abh. der Berl. Akad. 1876, p. 54 f.; also Beloch, Rhein. Mus., Bd. 38; Boeckh, Staatsh. p. 360, ed. 3, and Frankel, note 471. I have left out of the calculation the ordinary receipts of the city, say 400 talents, and the ordinary expenditure; and anything which might be borrowed from the revenues of the temples, an amount which cannot be calculated with any accuracy. The average yearly sum of 1600 talents for expenditure is, I think, as low as can be reckoned at the beginning of the war. But we must admit that our ignorance of the relation in which the sums borrowed from the treasurers of Athena (O. I. A. i. 193) stand to the 5000 talents of reserve, introduces an element of uncertainty into the whole calculation. The question of the raising of the tribute is discussed by Jowett, I.e. p. xliv. ff. There is no reason to doubt that the amount of tribute received after 425 was much larger than before, and it may by degrees have reached 1200 talents, the sum mentioned by Andocides (De Pac. 9), and Aeschines (F. L. 186). The rise was probably due to Cleon ; it certainly was not due to Alcibiades, as Andocides {in Alcib. 11) says, if made in 425, for Alcibiades had not then come forward in public affairs. Cp. also Forbes, Thuc. I. lxxxvii. lxxxviii APPENDIX II. THE REVOLUTION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED. 1. We learn from Thucydides that the movement which ended in the establishment of the Four Hundred began in the Athenian camp at Samos, and had its origin partly in the feeling of the trierarchs and leading men in the fleet, who were dissatisfied with the existing form of government—under which the heaviest burdens fell on them, as wealthy men—and partly in the overtures of Alcibiades, who let it be known that he would be glad to return and make Tissaphernes the friend of Athens, but this was possible on one condition only : " they must establish an oligarchy and abolish the villainous democracy which had driven him out" (viii. 47, 48). From the camp at Samos the matter was introduced at Athens by Pisander and his fellow-envoys, who were sent by the conspirators to the city to get Alcibiades recalled and the democracy suppressed, and finally to make Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians (supra, p. 394). Of all this there is not a word in the Athenaion Politeia. Tlie author never mentions Samos or Alcibiades. He merely says, c. 29, "when the Lacedaemonians had gained the upper hand through their alliance with the King of Persia, the Athenians were compelled to abolish the democracy, and establish in its place the constitution of the Four Hundred"—and at once goes on to give an account of the meeting at which the change was proposed. He adds: "The real argument which persuaded the majority was the belief that "the King of Persia was more likely to form an alliance with them, if they should establish an oligarchy "—(Kenyon's translation). 2. In the account of Thucydides the change in the constitution was first proposed at Athens by Pisander and the envoys on their arrival from Samos. See the graphic description in viii. cc. 53, 54 (supra, I.e.), in which we notice the following points :— 1. The opening speech of Pisander. 2. The furious opposition. 532 App. II.] THUCYDIDES AND ARISTOTLE, 535 3. The pertinent question of Pisander put to individual citizens. 4. His final declaration, "after which, partly in tear and partly in hope that it might be hereafter changed," the people gave way. 5. The passing of the decree that Pisander should go to Samos with ten others and negotiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. 6. The deposition of Phrynichus and Scironides from their office as generals, and the sending out of Leon and Diomedon to take their places. 7. The visit of Pisander to the clubs, "one after the other," which he exhorts to unite and put down the democracy. The author of the Politeia ignores these details. He begins his account of the change with a description of a meeting held at Athens, which is quite distinct from the meeting convened to hear Pisander and the envoys. " The speech recommending the change before the vote Was made by Melobius, and the motion was drawn up by Pythodorus (but the majority were persuaded by the belief that the King would be more likely to enter into an alliance with an oligarchy). The motion was to the following effect: 'The popular Assembly was to elect twenty persons over forty years of age, who, in conjunction with the existing ten members of the Committee of Public Safety, should take an oath that they would frame such proposals as they thought best for the state, and should then draw up proposals for the public safety. In addition, any other person was to be free to make any proposition he liked, so that the people might be able to choose the best of all the courses suggested to them.' Clitophon concurred with the motion of Pythodorus; but proposed that the committee should also investigate the ancient laws drawn up by Clisthenes when he created the democracy, in order that they might have these too before them in deciding on what was the best; his suggestion being that the constitution of Clisthenes was not really democratical, but closely akin to that of Solon," c. 29, K.1 Not one of these three names is mentioned by Thucydides in connection with the Four Hundred, and, as we shall see, by the time 1 Melobius is mentioned as one of the Thirty in Lysias 12. 12, and this is no doubt the same person. Pythodorus is mentioned as one of the Four Hundred by Diogenes Laertius, ix. 8. 54. He may be the same Pythodorus who in 414 landed on the coast of Laconia. For Clitophon see Aristoph. Frogs, 967, where Euripides claims him as a pupil along with Theramenes. 534 REVOLUTION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED. [App. II. that the commissioners were appointed to report on the constitution, it was impossible to hope for alliance with Persia. 3. Thucydides informs us that Pisander and his colleagues were compelled to break with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes on their return to the East. But though they lost the hope of help from Persia, they determined to go on with the revolution. (Thuc. viii. 63; supra, p. 400.) So Pisander and half the envoys were sent back to Athens to carry out the scheme (which was also extended to the subject cities). On their arrival they found the revolution more than half accomplished by the oligarchical clubs, who had created a Reign of Terror. And meanwhile a public programme had been put forward : 1. That no one ought to receive pay who was not on military service. 2. That not more than five thousand should have a share in the government—those namely who were best able to serve the state in person and with their money (supra, p. 402). In the Politeia the two points mentioned in the "programme" are included in the recommendations of the commissioners appointed under the proposal of Pythodorus. Beyond this not a word is said of the means by which the oligarchs went to work to secure their object. 4. From Thucydides we learn that when Pisander and his colleagues arrived at Athens (this was, of course, his second visit), they " at once set to work and prepared to strike the final blow." They began by calling an Assembly and proposing the election of ten commissioners, who should have full powers to frame for the city the best constitution they could, and were to report to the people by a given day (viii. 67, supra, p. 402). As we have seen, the nomination of commissioners is said in the Politeia to have taken place at the first meeting convened to discuss the subject—at any rate no previous meeting is mentioned or suggested.1 5. When the day arrived which had been fixed for the report, so Thucydides continues, Pisander and his party convened an Assembly at Oolonus, but the commissioners merely moved that any Athenian 1 The number of commissioners in the Politeia is thirty; in Thucydides ten. The Politeia is supported by Androtion and Philochorus, cp. Harpocration, s.v. avyy panels, who notices the contradiction and identifies the ten commissioners mentioned by Thucydides with the ten Probuli. Thucydides may be right ; it was easy for later authors to confuse these commissioners with the Thirty tyrants. App. II.] THUCYDIDES AND ARISTOTLE. 535 should be allowed to make any proposal that he pleased, and threatened with severe penalties any one who indicted the proposer for unconstitutional action (supra, p. 403). In the Politeia we are told that the commissioners made two preliminary proposals: 1. The Prytanes were to be compelled to put to the vote any motion offered on behalf of the public safety. 2. All indictments for illegal proposals were abolished, all im- peachments and public prosecutions, in order that every Athenian should be free to give his counsel on the situation, if he chose ; and they decreed that if any person imposed a fine on any other for his acts in this respect, or prosecuted him, or summoned him before the courts, he should, on an information being laid against him, be summarily arrested and brought before the generals, who should deliver him to the Eleven to be put to death. They then drew up the constitution in the following manner: 1. The revenues of the state were not to be spent on any purpose but the war. 2. All magistrates should serve without remuneration as long as the war should last, except the Nine Archons and the Prytanes for the time being, who should each receive three obols a day. 3. The general franchise was to be restricted, so long as the war should last, to'all Athenians who w^re most capable of serving the state personally or pecuniarily, to the number of not less than Five Thousand. 4. The Five Thousand to have full powers, even of making treaties with whomsoever they willed. 5. Ten men, over forty years of age, were to be elected out of each tribe to draw up the list (icaTaktijovo-i) of the Five Thousand (c. 29, E.). In this account Thucydides and the Politeia agree so far as the "preliminary" measures are concerned, but while in the Politeia the rest of the measures proposed are all said to be the work of the commissioners ("these were the proposals put forward by the Committee," c. 30), Thucydides draws a distinction between the proposals of the Commissioners and the decrees of the Assembly. After describing the proposals of the commissioners as given above he goes on : " The whole scheme now came to light. A motion was made by Pisander (Thuc. viii. 68). 536 REVOLUTION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED. [App. II. "1. To abolish all the existing magistracies and the payment of magistrates. " 2. To choose a presiding board of five; these five to choose one hundred; and each of the hundred to co-opt three others. "3. The Four Hundred thus chosen to meet in the Council chamber ; to have absolute authority to govern as they thought best. "4. The Five Thousand to be summoned by them whenever they chose (viii. 67)." 6. In the Politeia we are informed that after the proposals of the Committee had been ratified, the Five Thousand (who must therefore have been enrolled1) elected a hundred commissioners from their own numbers to draw up the constitution. These framed two constitutions, one for the future, in which there is not a word about a Council of Four Hundred, and another for the present. In this last there was to be a Council of Four Hundred, as in the ancient constitution, forty from each tribe, chosen out of candidates of more than thirty years of age, selected by the members of the tribes. This Council was to appoint the magistrates, and draw up the form of oath which they were to take ; and in all that concerned the laws, in the examination of official accounts, and in other matters generally, it might act according to its discretion. It must, however, observe the laws that might be enacted with reference to the constitution of the state, and had no power to alter them or to pass others. The generals were to be provisionally elected from the whole body of the Five Thousand, but so soon as the Council came into existence it was to hold an examination of military equipments, and thereon elect ten persons, together with a secretary, and the persons thus elected should liold office during the coming year with full powers, and should have the right, whenever they desired it, of joining in the deliberations of the Council. The Five Thousand were also to elect a single Hipparch and ten Phylarchs ; but for the future the Council was to elect these officers according to the regulations above laid down (c. 31, K.). 1 Cp. Lysias, Orat. 20, which is in defence of Poly stratus, one of the KaTaXoyelff. Poly stratus claims to have put nine thousand citizens on the list in eight days, after which he left for Eretria to take part in the battle. This implies that the selection of the Five Thousand was one of the last, not one of the first, acts of the Four Hundred. App. II.] THUCYDIDES AND ARISTOTLE. 537 No office might be held more than once, except that of councillor and general. Comparing this account with Thucydides we see that there is a discrepancy (a) in the account of the Five Thousand, who in Thucydides are only to be summoned when the Four Hundred shall think fit, and in the Politeia are definitely chosen, and in turn choose the commissioners under whose arrangements the Four Hundred come into power; (6) in the account of the election of the Four Hundred. In the Politeia it is not stated by whom the Four Hundred are chosen, but they are chosen equally from the ten tribes, out of candidates previously selected by the tribes. In Thucydides they are chosen by co-optation—and practically five men are responsible for the whole Four Hundred. 7. From Thucydides we learn that after the assembly at Colon us, the Four Hundred were installed in the Council-Chamber. Of this he gives a full and graphic account (supra, p. 404). In the Politeia we are told that when the constitution as just stated had been drawn up by the Commissioners, and had been ratified by the general voice, the existing Council was dissolved before it had completed its term of office. It was dissolved on the fourteenth day of the month Thargelion, in the archonship of Callias (May 411), and the Four Hundred entered into office on the twenty-first (c. 32, K.). 8. Finally, we are told in the Politeia that when the constitution had been established, the Five Thousand were only nominally selected, and the Four Hundred, together with the ten officers on whom full powers had been conferred, occupied the Council-Chamber, and really administered the government. They began by sending ambassadors to the Lacedaemonians, proposing a cessation of the war on the terms of the status quo, but as the Lacedaemonians refused to listen to them unless they would also abandon their maritime empire, they dropped the negotiations (c. 32 K.). Thucydides informs us that when the Four Hundred had installed themselves in the Council-Chamber, they elected Prytanes by lot of their own number, and did all that was customary in the way of prayers and sacrifices to the gods at their entrance into office, but in a short time they wholly changed the democratic system, and governed the city with a high hand. They also sent heralds to Agis at Decelea, wishing to conclude peace with him—and finally, on his advice, to Lacedaemon, but without effect. Thus, at the cost of contradicting himself about the Five Thousand, who he now says 538 REVOLUTION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED. [App. II. were only nominally selected, whereas they have hitherto been a working part of the constitution, the author of the Politeia comes into agreement with Thucydides. Both authors also agree that the leading spirits in the oligarchical revolution were Antiphon, Pisander, and Theramenes, but Phrynichus is not mentioned in the Politeia. Of the reaction by which the government of the Four Hundred was suppressed, we have a full and graphic account in Thucydides. Here also the movement begins in Samos, and the democratic party go back to the point where the oligarchs had begun, the recall of Alcibiades and alliance with the Great King (Thuc. viii. 73 and 74). Thucydides traces the return to democracy step by step, and shows us how the counter-revolution was rendered possible and accomplished. His chief points are : 1. The Four Hundred send ten commissioners to Samos, who, however, on hearing of the reaction there, advance no further than Delos (viii. 72). 2. The oligarchy at Samos is overthrown, mainly owing to the exertions of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, Leon, and Diomedon. The Samians and Athenians unite, after hearing the exaggerated reports of Chaereas, and resolve to oppose oligarchy and carry on the war (viii. 74, 75). 3. Alcibiades is recalled, and elected general (viii. 82). 4. The envoys from Athens now go on to Samos. They declare that all the citizens are in turn to be members of the Five Thousand, and make other explanations (viii. 86). 5. Message of Alcibiades to the Four Hundred (ibid.). 6. Keturn of the Commissioners to Athens. The message of Alcibiades stimulates the moderate oligarchs, led by Theramenes and Aristocrates. They maintain that the Five Thousand should be established in reality and not in name, and the constitution made more equal. They are afraid (a) of Alcibiades, (b) of their extreme colleagues, who were sending envoys to Lacedaemon. These were Antiphon, Phrynichus, Aristarchus, and Pisander (viii. 89, 90). 7. The extremists fortify Eetionea, and negotiate with Lacedae- mon (viii. 90). 8. The moderate party alarmed. Theramenes takes the lead. Assassination of Phrynichus, and demolition of Eetionea. w Let the Five Thousand rule." (The popular party feared that the Five Thousand might actually exist. The Four App. II.] THUCYDIDES AND ARISTOTLE. 539 Hundred did not wish the Five Thousand to exist, or to be known not to exist, viii. 92.) 0. Negotiations between the popular party and the Four Hundred, who promise that they will publish the names of the Five Thousand, and that the Four Hundred shall be elected out of those in turn in such a manner as the Five Thousand may think fit (viii. 93).1 10. The approach of the Lacedaemonians puts an end to nego- tiations. ^Battle of Eretria (viii. 94, 95). 11. On the news of the loss of Euboea the Four Hundred are deposed, and the constitution placed in the hands of the Five Thousand. "This number was to include all who could furnish themselves with arms. No one was to receive pay for holding any office, on pain of falling under a curse. This government, during its early days, was the best which the Athenians ever enjoyed within my memory," viii. 97 (cp. supra, p. 418). To compare with this vivid account we have in the Politeia no more than the following meagre statement:—" After the loss of the naval battle of Eretria (when the Four Hundred had been in office about four months), and the revolt of the whole of Euboea except Oreus, the indignation of the people was greater than at any of the earlier disasters, since they drew far more supplies at this time from Euboea than from Attica itself. Accordingly they deposed the Four Hundred, and committed the management of affairs to the Five Thousand, who consisted of persons possessing a military equipment. At the same time they voted that pay should not be given for any public office. The persons chiefly responsible for the revolution were Aristocrates and Theramenes, who disapproved of the action of the Four Hundred in retaining the direction of affairs entirely in their own hands, and referring nothing to the Five Thousand. The constitution of the state seems to have been admirable during this period, since it was a time of war, and the franchise was in the hands of those who possessed a military equipment" (c. 33, K.). When we compare these two authorities, we cannot doubt that in the history of Thucydides we have the account of a contemporary who had studied the movement thoroughly in its rise and fall, and 1 Is this the basis of the constitution "for the future" given in Ath. Pol c. 30 ? 540 THUCYDIDES AND ARISTOTLE. [App. II. accounted for every step. In the Politeia we have details which are partly confused, and partly, so far as we can tell, mere propositions which were never carried out. The meeting at which Melobius spoke may have taken place in the interval between the first and second visits of Pisander, but it is confused in part with the meeting lield after his second arrival. The Five Thousand are spoken of as the Four Hundred may have spoken of them " when they wished them neither to exist nor to be known not to exist." In two points there is a direct conflict of testimony : in Thucyd des we have ten Commissioners, in the Politeia thirty ; and the election of the Four Hundred is quite different in the two accounts. In both points I am inclined to think Thucydides the safer guide. The differences between the account of the Thirty Tyrants in the Politeia and in Xenophon are noticed in the notes to the text. We cannot, of course, give the same weight to Xenophon as we do to Thucydides. INDEX. (The references are to Chapter and Section ; the numbers in parentheses give the date of the. event mentioned.) A Acanthus, receives Brasidas (424), viii. 5. Acarnania, alliance of Athens with, i. 22; organised attack on, by the Ambraciots and Lacedaemonians (429), v. 15. Acarnanians, their quarrel with Demosthenes, vii. 3 ; aid the Argives against the Ambraciots (426), vii 4. Achaea, brought into alliance with Sparta and made more oligarchical (418), ix. 12. Actium, battle of (435), iii. 3. Adimantus, appointed Athenian general (406), xii. 17 ; and Lysander (405), xii. 20. Adonis, festival of, at Athens on the day when the expedition to Sicily was finally decreed (415), x. 6. Adramyttium, the Delians settled at (422), viii. 13. Aegina, inhabitants expelled from (431), v. 6 ; fame of the island, Herodotus' feeling towards the Aeginetans, Pindar's praises of them, viii. 1. Aeginetans, massacre of the (424), viii. 1. Aegitium, Demosthenes defeated at (426), vii. 8. Aegospotami, battle of (405), xii. 19. Aeschylus, xiv. 2. Aetolia, invasion of, by Demosthenes (426), vii. 3; the Aetolian tribes described, ibid.; their territory, Hid. Agatharchus, a Syracnsan general (413), x. 31. Agatharchus of Samos, xiv. 17. Agathon, the tragedian, xiv. 4. Agis, succeeds Arehidamus as King of Sparta (427), vii. 1; leads out the Peloponnesian troops, " no one knows whither ". (419), ix. 8; invades Argolis (418), ix. 9; concludes peace with the Argives, ibid. ; censured for his conduct in the Argive campaign, ix. 10; ten commissioners sent out with, ibid.; at Argos, destroys the unfinished Long Walls (417), ix. 14; invades Attica (413), x. 22; fortifies Decelea, ibid.; at Decelea, marches ag inst the Oetaeans and neighbouring tribes, xi. 2; negotiates with Euboea and Lesbos, ibid. ; advances on Athens (411), xi. 16; (405), xii. 21. Agriculture, i. 14; xiv. 22. Agrigentum, refuses aid to Syracuse (418), x. 24; Diodes at (409), xiii. 3; escape of the Selinuntians to, ibid.; siege of (406), xiii. 6; abandoned to the Syracusans, ibid.; destruction of the city, ibid.; given up to Carthage at che peace in 405, xiii. 8; temples at, xiv. 19. 'AicpaCov Xen-as, the, in Sicily, x. 33, note. Alcauienes, appointed "harmost" of Lesbos (413), xi. 2; slain, xi. 3. Alcetas, 3on of Alexander, i. 19. Alcibiades, and Pericles, iii. 1; comes to the front at Athens, ix. 5; his hereditary friend -ship with Sparta, ibid.; negotiates with Argos, ibid.; outwits Nicias, ix. 3; general in 419, ix. 8; in Achaea, ibid. ; in Epidauria, ibid.; p rsuades the Argives to renew the war with Sparta, ix. 10 ; after Mantinea, ix. 13; at Argos (416), ix. 14; eagerly supports the expedition to Sicily, x 3 ; appointed one of the generals to Sicily (415), ibid.; his speech on the Sicilian expedition, x. 5; his extravagance and success at Olympia, ibid.; no evidence to prove that he was connected with the affair of the Hermae, x. 7; guilty of profanation of the mysteries, ibid., see note; demands to be put 542 INDEX. on his trial before leaving for Sicily (415), ibid.; he is allowed to go. ibid.; endeavours to gain Messene, x. 10; his plan of campaign in 415, ibid.; plot of his enemies at Athens, x. 11; the Salaminia sent to Sicily to bring him home, ibid.; he escapes at Thurii, ibid.; at Sparta (414). x. 13; his advice to the Spartans, ibid.; his influence at Sparta: and with Endius (412). xi. 3; sails to Ionia (412), xi. 4; revolt of Chios, Erythrae. Clazo-menae, ibid.; at Chios, ibid.; sails to Miletus, and causes the city to revolt (412), ibid. ; estranged from Spartans, xi. 11; escapes to Tissaphernes (411),ibid.; intrigues for his return to Athens, xi. 12; proposes an oligarchical revolution in Athens, ibid.; approached by Athenians at Samos (411), I xi. 19; elected general, ibid.; reply to the Commissioners of the Four Hundred, xi. 20; decree passed for his recall, xii. 2; dealings with Tissaphernes, xii. 3, 5 ; at the battle of Cyzicus (410), xii. 5 ; collects supplies for the Athenians, ibid. ; invests Chalcedon (409), xii. 9 ; ratifies convention with Pharnabazus, ibid.; besieges Byzantium, ibid.; returns to Athens (408), xii. 10; sails to Samos with a large force (408), xii. 11; deposed from his command by Athenians (407), xii. 12; returns to the Chersonese, ibid.; his advice to the Athenians at Aegospotami, xii. 19; leaves the Chersonese for the court of Pharnabazus (404), xii. 23 ; assassinated, ibid. Alcidas, a Spartan admiral (428-427), iv. 3; in the Aegean, vi. 6, 7 ; his cowardice and cruelty, vi. 7; his return from the Aegean, ibid. ; at Corcyra (427), vi. 15. Alcinous, sacred wood of, at Corcyra, vi. 13. Alciphron, an Argive, proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, ix. 9. Alexander of Macedon, i. 18; his sons, i. 19. Allies, Athenian, compelled to destroy their walls, i. 17; " who tax themselves," or have been " enrolled by private citizens," i. 20 ; of Sparta, in the Peloponnesian war, iv. 4; of Athens, in the Peloponnesian war, ibid.; Athenian, revolt of, after the Sicilian expedition (413), xi. 2 f. Ambraciots, the, seize Amphilochian Argos, driven out by Phormio, i. 22; organise an attack on Amphilochian Argos (430), v. 11; invade Amphilochian Argos (426), vii. 4; great slaughter of the, at Idomene, vii. 5. Ammon, xiv. 21. Amorges, son of Pissuthnes, xi. 2. Amphipolis. foundation of (437), i. 20; and Argilus, taken by Brasidas (424), viii. 5; is not surrendered by Clearidas after 421, ix. 1. Amyntas, son of Philip of Macedonia, v. 20. Anactorium, betrayed to Corinth, iii. 6; Acquired by the Athenians (425), vii. 14. Anaea, Samian oligarchs at (439), i. 16; attack Lysicles (428), vi. 5; remonstrate with Alcidas, vi. 7. Anaxagoras, and Aspasia, ii. 3; and Pericles, ii. 4; and Lampon, ibid.; attack on, he is imprisoned, but escapes, ii. 8; his philosophy, xiv. 12. Anaximander of Miletus, xiv. 11. Andocides, sent to Corcyra (433), iii. 5; his oration on the mysteries, x. 11. Androcles, the leading democrat in 415, opposed to Alcibiades, x. 7. Angites, valley of the, i. 20. Antandrus, Lesbian exiles at, viii. 3. Anticles, general at Samos, i. ] 6. Antimachus of Colophon, an epic poet, xiv. 6. Antiphon, arrested and put to death (411), xi. 23 ; his oratory and character, ibid. | Apaturia, the festival of, xii. 15. | Apodoti, the, an Aetolian tribe, vii. 3. Apollo Maloeis, temple of, at Mytilene, vi. 1; Pythaeus, temple of, at Argos, ix. 8. Arbitration, the Athenians ask for, before j going to war, iii. 12 ; cf. iii. 10. Arcadia, Plistoanax in, ix. 4. Archidamus, king of Sparta, his speech on the war, iii. 10; attempts further negotiations before invading Attica, v. 3: invades Attica in June 431, v. 4; at Oenoe, ibid.; repulsed, ibid. ; at Acharnae, ibid. ; at Plataea (429), v. 13 ; hi^ death, vii. 1. Architecture, xiv. 19. Argilus, discontent at, owing to the foundation of Amphipolis, viii. 5. Arginusae, battle of (406), xii. 14; loss of Athenian crews at, ibid. Argives, invade Epidauria (419), ix. 8; maintain the same day in the calendar, ibid. ; take the field against Agis (418), ix. 9; come to terms with Agis, ibid.; persuaded by Alcibiades to renew the war with Sparta (418), ix. 10; the Select Thousand in their army at Man-tinea, ibid.; the, at Miletus as auxiliaries of Athens (412), xi. 8 ; they return home, ibid. Argolis, coast of, attacked by the Athenians ) (430), v. 8. INDEX. 543 Argos, Select Thousand in the army, iv. 5, I ix. 2; her attitude to Sparta in 422, viii. 16; nourishing condition of in 421, ix. 2; urged by the Corinthians to take the lead in the Peloponnese, ibid.; a democracy, ibid.; forms alliance with Mantinea, Elis, Corinth, and Chalcidice in 421, ix. 3; and Boeotia, unsuccessful negotiations between (421), ix. 4; and Sparta in negotiation (420), ix. 5; Alcibiades negotiates with, ibid.; and Athens (420), ix. 6 ; alliance between Argos, Elis, Mantinea, and Athens, ibid. ; and Epidaurus, quarrel between (419), ix. 8; and Sparta in 418, ix. 9, 10; and Sparta, alliance between (after Mantinea), ix. 12; renounces her alliance with Athens, Mantinea, and Elis, ibid.; the oligarchs put down the democracy (418), ibid. ; evacuates Epidauria, ix. 13 ; the democratic party aided by Athens renounces the Spartan alliance (417), ix. 14 ; Alcibiades at (416); he seizes a number of the oligarchical party, ibid.; supplies troops to Athens (413), x. 22. Argos, Amphilochian, i. 22 ; at war with Ambracia, ibid. ; attack on (430), v. 11; invasion of (426), vii. 4. Ariapithes, king of Scythia, i. 19; murdered by Spargapithes, i. 21; his sons, ibid. Aristarchus, an Athenian general (411), xi. 23. Aristeus, of Corinth, takes help to the Poti-daeans, iii. 7; escapes from the city, ibid. ; seized by Sitalces and given up to the Athenians (430), v. 12. Aristophanes, his caricature of the sophiatic teaching, ii. 6; his view of the causes of the war, iii. 1; his view of the orators at Athens, vi. 9; his advice to the Athenians after Arginusae, xii. 17; views upon Thera-menes, Cleophon, and Alcibiades, ibid.; remarks upon the new coinage, ibid. ; his plays, xiv. 5. Army, decline of the Athenian, i. 2, viii. 4; of Athens, iv. 4 ; of the Peloponnesian confederacy, ibid.; the Argive, a standing force of a thousand men, ix. 2. Arnae, a town in Chalcidice, viii. 5. Arrhibaeus, Brasidas comes to terms with, contrary to the wishes of Perdiccas, viii. 5. Artaphernes, a Persian envoy, arrested (425), vii. 14. Artas, chief of the Messapians (413), x. 26. Artaxerxes, death of (425), vii. 14. Artemon of Clazomenae, i. 16, note. Asopius, in Western Greece (428), vi. 5; his death, ibid. Aspasia, ii. 3; and the Sophists, ii. 7; attacked by Hermippus, the comedian, ii. 8; her fugitive slaves received by the Megarians, iii. 1. Assembly, Athenian, a source of difficulty in the management of the Empire, iv. 2; and generals, ibid.; reopening of a subject already discussed, vi. 8, x. 4 ; cf. Mytilene. Assinaria, the, a festival at Syracuse, x. 34. Assinarus, Nicias reaches the river, x. 84. Astacus, v. 5. Astyochus, the Spartan admiral, at Lesbos, xi. 7; arrives at Chios, ibid.; attacks Pteleum and Clazomenae (412), xi. 9; suggests an expedition to Lesbos, ibid.; quarrels with Pedaritus, aud returns to Miletus, ibid.; engagement with Athenians, xi. 10; sails to Chios (411), xi. 15; and Pharna-bazus, xii. 3; returns to Sparta, ibid. Atalanta fortified by the Athenians (431), v. 5. Athena, of the Brazen House, the onrse of, iii. 12. Athenagoras, leader of the democrats at Syracuse, in 415, denies that the Athenians will come, x. 9. Athenian, empire, destruction of the walls of the allied cities, i. 17; the Carian and Ionian district divided in 442, reunited in 436, ibid.; changes in the "Thracian district," i, 20; fleet, movements of, in 431, v. 5 ; in the Euripus, ibid.; sent round the Peloponnesus (430), v. 8; empire, a tyranny (Pericles), v. 9; Mytilenaean view of, vi. 3; fleet, at Pylus (425), vii. 10; attacks the Peloponnesian, at Pylus, ibid.; part of their forces too late for Mantinea, ix. 13; besiege Epidaurus, ibid.; envoys visit Segesta (416), x. 3; deception practised I upon, ibid.; fleet, in Sicily, at Naxos, Catana, and Syracuse, x. 10; sails into the Great Harbour of Syracuse (414), x. 16 ; opposes the Four Hundred (411), xi. 18; unites with Samians (411), ibid.; generals, trial of (406), xii. 15; condemned, ibid.; democracy, liable to sudden passion, ibid.; fleet, leaves Chios (405), xii. 19; captured at Aegospotami, ibid.; generals, gross incompetency of, xii. 20. See Empire. Athenians, the, superstitious, ii. 4; at war with Perdiccas, iii. 7; their reply to the charges of Corinth at Sparta, iii. 9 ; defence of their empire, %bid.; character of the, 544 INDEX. iv. 1; leave the country for the town (431), I y. 3; their exasperation at the invasion, V. 4; occupy Aegina, y. 6; their dissatisfaction with Pericles (430), v. 9; arrange I with Sitalces to make an attack on the I Chalcidic cities, but fail to keep their I appointment (429), v. 20 ; action on hearing I of the revolt of Lesbos, vi. 1; at Mytilene, vi. 2; their energy in 428, vi. 4; their finances, vi. 5, see Appendix 1; their cruelty, vi. 8; sail to Sicily (427), vi. 17; inconvenient neighbours, vii. 5, see Heraclea; the, resolve to send a large fleet to Sicily, in 426, vii. 6; their duplicity in regard to the Spartan fleet, vii. 10 f.; the, in Sicily (425), vii. 15; the, capture Nisaea (424), viii. 2; attempt on Megara foiled by Brasidas, ibid. ; the, leave Sicily (424), viii. 3; the, defeated at Delium (424), viii. 4; their anger at Scione, viii. 9; view of their empire expressed in the Melean dialogue, ix. 15; in Sicily, advance from Catana to the shore of the Great Harbour of Syracuse, x. 12; the, encamp on the shore of the Great Harbour of Syracuse (415), ibid.; their first engagement with the enemy, ibid.; their fear of the Syracusan cavalry, ibid.; retire from I Syracuse to Catana, for the winter of 415, ibid.; send to Athens for horsemen and money, ibid.; the, in Sicily, visit Messene, x. 14; leave Catana for Naxos, ibid. ; the, at Camarina, ibid.; negotiates with Sicily (415-414), ibid.; the, send envoys to Carthage and Etruria, ibid.; at Syracuse, first year, ibid.; arrival of reinforcements from Athens (414), x. 15; obtain cavalry from Athens and Segesta, ibid.; the, destroy the first Syracusan counter-wall (414), x. 16; the, destroy the second counter-wall of the Syracusans, ibid.; at Syracuse, their prosperous condition (414), x. 17; their fortunes at Syracuse begin to sink, x. 18; a trireme captured by the Syracusans, ibid.; their miserable condition at Syracuse (414), x. 20; the, resolve to send a second expedition to Syracuse (414), x. 21; the second expedition to Syracuse delayed, x. 22; suffer greatly by the occupation of Decelea, ibid.; their first battle in the Great Harbour of Syracuse (413), x. 24; lose Plemmyrium, ibid ; their transports captured, ibid.; second engagement in the Great Harbour of Syracuse; they are defeated (413), x. 25; engage with the Corinthians off Erineum (413), x. 26; their reinforcements arrive under Demosthenes, ibid., their third engagement with the Syracusans in the Great Harbour (413), x. 29; their defeat, ibid.; last engagement in the Great Harbour (413), x. 30, 31; the, refuse to go on board their ships after their last defeat, x. 32; their retreat from Syracuse (413), x. 33 f.; number of those who retreated, ibid.; number of the prisoners taken at Syracuse (413), x. 34; their fate, x. 35; the, incredulous of the result of the Sicilian expedition, xi. 1; the measures then taken, ibid. ; the, discover the plans for revolt among their allies (412), xi. 3; the, send ships to Asia, xi. 4; the, at Miletus, xi. 8; their fleet assembled at Samos, ibid.; moves to Miletus, and then returns to Samos, ibid.; agree to an oligarchical constitution (411), xi. 13; submit to the Government of the Four Hundred (411), xi. 16; their courage after Aegospotami(405), xii. 21; the, religion, xiv. 15; disregarded physical science, xiv. 12, 15,16. Athens, change of policy at, i. 2; and her allies, ibid. ; parties at, after 445, i. 4; ruled by right of superiority, i. 8; and the West, i. 9; and the Messapians, i. 12; and Neapolis, ibid. ; and the North, i. 18 ff. ; and Macedon, ibid.; her policy towards Perdiccas and Sitalces, i. 21 ; supports Philip, endeavours to gain the friendship of Sitalces, ibid.; forms an alliance with Perdiccas, ibid.; and Western Greece, Amphilochian Argos, i. 22; makes an allianee with Acarnania, ibid.; and Corinth, ibid.; parties in, after 445, ii. 1; religion at, ii. 4; sophists and sophistic teaching at, ii. 6; at variance with Megara, iii. 1; and Corinth, iii. 2; envoys from Corcyra and Corinth, at, iii. 4; her policy towards Corcyra, iii. 4, 5; enters into a defensive alliance with, iii. 5; sends ten and afterwards twenty ships to protect her, ibid.; her ships at the battle of Sybota, iii. 6; they prevent a second engagement, ibid.; insists that Potidaea shall raze her wall, iii. 7; and Sparta contrasted, iv. 1 f.; her fleet in 431, iv. 4; her army, ibid. ; financial position of, at the beginning of the war, iv. 6; and Plataea, vi. 11; concludes a truce with Sparta for a year (423), viii. 8; and Sparta, INDEX. 545 alliance between, in 421, ix. 1; and Argos (420), ix. 6; in alliance with Mantinea and Elis, ibid.; sends forces to aid the Argives in Epidauria (419), ix. 8 : politics at, after Mantinea, ix. 13; aids the democratic party in Argos, ix. 14 ; her attempt to gain a footing in Sicily, in 422, a failure, x. 2; prosperity of, after the peace of Nicias, x. 8; an ally of Segesta, ibid.; visited by envoys from, ibid.; fear of conspiracy at, in 415, x. 11; alarm at, on the revolt of Chios (412), xi. 4; the reserve fund now employed, ibid.; in danger from the Peloponnesian fleet, xi. 28 ; siege of, by Lysander (405-404), xii. 21; surrender of, to Sparta (404), xii. 22; state of the city, xiv. 20 ; trade of, xiv. 22 ; Pericles' ideal of, see Funeral speech. Atomists, the, xiv. 12. Attica, Pericles' measures for the security of, v. 5 ; invaded (431), v. 4; (430), v. 8 ; (428), vi. 1; proposed second invasion in the same year, vi. 4; invaded (427), vi. 6; (425), i. 8. B Bacchylides, xiv. L Bacis, ii. 4. Bassae, temple of Apollo at, xiv. 10. Bendis, a Thracian deity, xiv. 21. Biology, xiv. 16. Bisaltia annexed by Macedon, i. 18. Boeotia, popular movement, and organisation of a rising (424), viii. 4; and Corinth, in 421; ix. 4; forms an alliance with Sparta, ibid. Boeotians, have a truce terminable at ten days' notice with Athens in 421, ix. 1; unwilling to join Argos in 421, ix. 3. Bosphorus, importance of corn-supplies from, xii. IS. Botany, xiv. 16. Bottiaeans, the, aid the Potidaeans, iii. 7. Brasidas, opposition to his policy, iv. 8; at Methone, v. 5; with Cnemus in the Corinthian gulf, v. 17; adviser of Alcidas, vi. 15; at Pylus, vii. 9; appointed to Thrace, viii. 2 ; in the Megarid (424), ibid. ; inarches to Chalcidice, viii. 5 ; and Perdiccas, ibid.; at Acanthus, ibid.; at Amphipolis, ibid.; his policy in Thrace, viii. 6 ; sends to Sparta for reinforcements, and begins building ships on the Strymon (424), viii. 7; at Toroue, ibid.; at Scione, viii. 0; he refuses to give up the VOL. III. city, ibid.; receives Msnde (423), ibid.; his mistake on leaving Chalcidice to invade Lyncestis, ibid.; joins Perdiccas in the invasion of Lyncestis, his retreat, and breach with Perdiccas, viii. 10; commissioners sent to (423), viii. 11; unsuccessfully attempts Potidaea (423), viii. 12; why absent from Torone when Cleon arrived ? viii. 13 ; defeats Cleon at Amphipolis (422), viii. 14; his death and the honours paid to him, ibid.; his strategy, viii. 15 ; the helots who served in his army, settled at Lepreum (421), ix. 4; present at the battle of Mantinea, ix. 10. Bricinniae, a fortress in the Leontine territory visited by Phaeax (422), x. 2. Budorum, a fort on Salamis, v. 19. Byzantium, revolts from Athens (440), i. 15; returns to her allegiance, i. 17; joins the Peloponnesians (411), xii. 3 ; besieged by the Athenians (409), xii. 9; captured by them, ibid.; taken by Lysander (405), xii. 21. Cacvparis, Nicias reaches the river, x. 38. Calamis, an Athenian sculptor, xiv. 8. Calendar, Greek, ix. 8. Callias, an Athenian general at Potidaea, iii. 7. Callicrates, xiv. 19. Callicratidas, appointed Spartan admiral (406), xii. 13; his relations with Lysander and Cyrus, ibid.; his humane treatment of Greek captives, ibid.; drowned at Arginusae (406), xii. 14. Callistratus, an Athenian hipparch at Syracuse, x. 34. , Callixenus, xii. 15. Camarina, plot to betray the city to Syracuse (425), vii. 15 ; and Gela (424), viii. 8 ; visited by the Athenian fleet (415), x. 10; Hermo-crates at (415), x. 14; the Athenians at, ibid.; sends aid to Syracuse (413), x. 24; abandoned to the Carthaginians (405), xiii. 8. Canachus of Sicyon, xiv. 18. Cannonus, decree of, xii. 15. Carian district, i. 2; defection of allies in, i. 15 ; defections in 441-436, i. 17. Carthage, Athenians contemplate an attack on (?), x. 13 ; the Athenians send envoys to (415-414), x. 14; and Segesta, xiii. 2 ; concludes peace with Dionysius (405), xiii. 8; terms of the peace, ibid.; plague at, ibid. 2M 546 INDEX. Carthaginians in Sicily (409), xiii. 3; their brutality at Selinus, ibid. ; Carthaginian invasion of Sicily (406), xiii. 6. Catana, the Athenian fleet sails to, x. 10 ; the Athenian army returns to, in 415, x. 12; the Athenians return to, from Naxos, x. 14; the Athenian army leaves for Epipolae, x. 15. Centoripa, acquired by the Athenians, x. 15. Cephallenia, becomes an ally of Athens, v. 5. Ceramicus, Athenians buried in the, v. 7. Cercinitis, Lacus, i. 20. Chaeronea, a rising contemplated at (420), viii. 4. Chalce, Athenian fleet at (411), xi. 14. Chalcedon, siege of (409), xii. 9; convention at, ibid.; occupiedbyLysander (405), xii. 21. Chalcideus, a Spartan commander (413), xi. 2; appointed to command at Chios, xi. 3; at Teos, xi. 4; at Chios, ibid.; sails to Iouia, ibid.; his alliance with Tissaphernes, xi. 5. Chalcidians, the, become allies of Argos in 421, ix. 3; terms respecting, in the peace of 421, viii. 17. Chalcidice, threatened by Sitalces (429), v. 20; application to Sparta for help (424), viii. 2; Brasidas marches to (424), viii. 5; success of Brasidas in, and weak defence of the Athenians, ibid, and ff.; Cleon in (423-422), viii. 13 f. Chaonians, aid in attacking Amphilochian Argos (430), v. 11; aid Cnemus in attacking Acarnania, v. 15; their defeat at Stratus, ibid. Charicles, a member of the commission to investigate sacrilege (415), x. 7; general with Demosthenes (413), x. 22; collects troops at Argos, ibid. Chians, the, compelled to pull down their walls (425), vii. 14 ; send to Sparta wishing to revolt (413), xi. 2 ; supply seven ships to Athens, ix. 13 f.; their revolt delayed, ibid.; activity of, xi. 5; they bring over Lebedos and Erae, ibid.; attempt to bring over Lesbos to Sparta (412), xi. 7. Chios sends ships against Samos, i. 16; and Lesbos, send fifty ships to the Athenian fleet (430), v. 8; Chalcideus appointed to the command in, xi. 3; revolts from Athens (412), xi. 4; devastation of, by the Athenians (412), xi. 7; great prosperity of the island down to this time, ibid.; their mistake as to the power of Athens, ibid.; under Pedaritus, xi. 9; desperate condition of, during Athenian occupation, xi. 10; com- pletely invested by the Athenians (411), xi. 14; conspiracy among Peloponnesian fleet at (406), xii. 16. Chrysopolis, xii. 5. Cimon, change in Athenian policy after his death, i. 2; his liberality, ii. 1. •' Circle," the, on Epipolae, x. 15; attacked by the Syracusans, and barely saved by Nicias, x. 16. Clazomenae, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 4; returns to its allegiance, xi. 7. Cleandridas at Thurii, i. 12. Clearchus, appointed to the command of the Hellespont (413), xi. 8; at Byzantium (410), xii. 7. Clearidas, established in Amphipolis (423), viii. 11 ; refuses to give up Amphipolis, in 421, ix. 1; he is recalled home, ibid. Cleomenes, regent for Pausanias, lead® the invasion into Attica (427), vi. 6. Cleon, chief of the demagogues at Athens, iu 7; supports Pericles in his war policy, ibid.; said to have attacked Anaxagoras, ii. 8; supports the war party, ii. 9; his proposal about the Mytilenae&ns (427), vi. 8 ; his speech, ibid.; his view of the Athenian empire, ibid.; his view of the " orators " at Athens, vi. 9; attacks Paches, vi. 10 ; his extravagant demands aftertne seizure of Pylus,' vii. 10; his attack on the generals about Pylus, vii. 11; he is sent there, ibid.; and Demosthenes (425), vii. 12 ; his conduct at Pylus, vii. 13 ; sails to Chalcidice (423), viii. 13; he takes Torone, ibid.; his ability as a general shown at the capture of Torone, ibid.; at Eion, viii. 14 ; captures Galepsus, ibid.; marches on Amphipolis (422), ibid. ; discontent of his army at, viii. 14, 15 ; his defeat and death, viii. 14; his conduct at Amphipolis examined, viii. 15. Cleophon, leader of the extreme democratic party at Athens, xii. 2 ; opposes peace with Sparta (410), xii. 6; opp »ses peace with bparta alter Arginusae (406), xii. 16 ; views of Aristophanes on his character, xii. 17 ; again resists proposals for peace with Sparta, xii. 22 ; brought to trial and executed, ibid. " Cleruchs" at, Lesbos, vi. 10. Clouds (of Aristophanes), scene from, ii. 6. Clubs at Athens, their nature and aims, xi. 14. Cnemus, a Spartan admiral (430), iv. 3; in Acarnania (429), v. 15; defeated by Phormio (429), v. 17, 18; his proposed attack on the Peiraeus, v. 19. INDEX. 547 Cnidus, expedition to, by Hippocrates (412), xi. 9; a school of medicine at, xiv. 16. Coinage, new, at Athens (407), xii. 17. Colonus, meeting of Athenian assembly at (411), xi. 16. Colophon, revolution at (430), v. 12; in the hands of the Persians, vi. 7. Comedy, xiv. 5. Congress (proposed) of the Greeks, i. 18. Conon, stationed at Naupaetus (413), x. 26; one of the ten generals (406), xii. 12 ; blockaded at Mytilene, xii. 13. Corcyra, and Corinth, iii. 2; navy of the Cor-cyraeans, ibid.; her action in the Persian war, ibid.; her colony at Bpidamnus, iii. 3 ; defeats Corinth at sea (435), ibid. ; the oligarchs of Epidamnus appeal to and are received, ibid.; the Corcyraeans besiege Epidamnus, ibid.; sends envoys to Athens, ibid. ; defeated at Sybota, iii. 6; but saved from further disaster by the Athenians, ibid.; sends fifty ships to Athens (431), v. 5; change in her attitude to Athens, vi. 13; envoys sent to Athens, ibid.; sedition at, vi. 13,14; after 433, ibid.; help sent to Athens, ibid.; end of the sedition (425), vi. 16 ; the rendezvous of the Sicilian expedition in 415, x. 8. Corinth, her relations with Athens, iii. 2; with Corcyra, ibid.; adopts Epidamnus as her colony and sends aid, iii. 3; preparations for war with Corcyra, ibid.; battle off the Ambracian gulf, and defeat of the Corinthians, ibid.; sends envoys to Athens, iii. 4; her war with Corcyra a mistake, iii. 5 ; prepares for a second conflict, iii. 6; the battle of Sybota, ibid.; defeats Corcyra at Sybota, and takes many captives, ibid.\ excitement at, owing to the affairs of Poti-daea, iii. 8; complains of the conduct of Athens at Sparta, ibid.; and Boeotia in 421, ix. 4; unable to take a leading part in the Peloponnesus, ix. 14; Syracusan envoys at (415), x. 13; proposes destruction of Athens to Sparta (404), xii. 22. Corinthia, Nicias makes a descent on (Solygea) (425), vii. 14. Corinthian war, the, iii. 3 f.; fleet, movement of, in 431, v. 5; ships, arrive at Syracuse (414), x. 18. Corinthians, their action at the time of the Samian revolt, i. 16; their view of the Athenians, iii. 8; threaten to seek a new alliance if Sparta will not help them, ibid.; speech before the allies at Sparta on the war, iii. 11; their skill in adapting their navy to new conditions, iv. 5; refuse to accept the peace of 421, viii. 16; urge Argos to take the lead in the Peloponnesus, ix. 2 f.; become allies of Argos, in 421, ix. 3 ; wish to be on a truce with Athens terminable at ten days' notice, Athens refuses, ibid.; refuse to join in the alliance with the Athenians (420), ix. 6; their naval engagement with the Athenians off Erineum (413), x. 26; wait for the Isthmian games before sailing (413), xi. 3. Coronta, Phormio at (429), v. 19. Cos, a school of medicine, xiv. 16. Cratinus, xiv. 5. Crestonice, annexed by Macedon, i. 18. Critias, his life in exile, xii. 23; returns to Athens (404), ibid. ; his work as member of the Thirty, xii. 25; brings about the execution of Theramenes, ibid.; death of (403), xii. 26. Critius, an Athenian sculptor, xiv. 18. Crotona, unfriendly to Athens (413), x. 26. Cuneiform alphabet, the, Persian despatches written in, vii. 14. Cynossema, battle of (411), xii. 4. Cyrus, sent to take command on the coast and to aid the Lacedaemonians (408), xii. 10; and Lysander, xii. 11; supplies Ly-sander with resources (405), xii. 17; leaves Sardis (405), xii. 18; makes Lysander his vice-regent, ibid. Cythera, capture of, by Nicias (424), viii. 1; restored by the Athenians in 421, ix. 1. Cyzicus, recovered by the Athenian fleet, xii. 4; battle of (410), xii. 5. D Damarchus, a Syracusan general, executed (406), xiii. 7. Damon, his advice to Pericles, ii. 2; ostracised, ii. 8. Daphnaeus, a Syracusan general at Agri- gentum (406), xiii. 6; deposed, xiii. 7; executed, ibid. Daphnus, the Athenians from Clazomenae take refuge in, xi. 7. Dascon, a promontory on the shore of the Great Harbour of Syracuse, x. 12. Decelea, Alcibiades advises the occupation of, x. 13; effect of the occupation on Athens, X. 22, 548 INDEX. Delians, the, expelled from their island and j settled by Pharnaees at Adramyttium (422), viii. 13; restored to their island in 421, ix. 3. Delium, the Athenians fortify the temple (424), viii. 4; the battle of, ibid.; the temple captured, ibid. Delos, earthquakes at, v. 3; purification of the island and restoration of the games (426), vii. 7. Delphi, the oracle and Thurii, i. 10, 12; attitude of the oracle towards Sparta about the war, iii. 11; funds at, iv. 6 ; stipulations about, in the truce of 423, viii. 8 ; the temple not impartial, ibid., note: terms respecting, in the peace of 421, viii. 17. I Delphinium, fortress in Chios seized by Athenians (412), xi. 9. Demeter Thesmophoros, i. 14. | Democracy, supported by Athens, i. 8 ; established at Samos (439?), i. 16, note; at Argos, ix. 2; and Mantinea, ix. 3; on its trial at Athens (413), xi. 1; established at Samos in 412, xi. 6; destroyed in Greece (404), xii. 24; at Syracuse, xiii. 1; and the drama, xiv. 5, 6. Democritus, his physical philosophy, xiv. 12; his ethical philosophy, xiv. 13. Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, in Leu-cadia, vii. 3; in Aetolia, ibid.; he is defeated, ibid. ; contemplates an invasion of Boeotia (426), ibid. ; unwilling to return to Athens after his defeat, ibid. ; at Olpae (426), vii. 4; his strategy, ibid.; at Idomene, vii. 5; returns to Athens, and accompanies the fleet (425), vii. 8 ; and Cleon (425), vii. 12 ; employs light-armed troops on Sphacteria, ibid.; his conduct atPylus, vii. 13 ; in the Megarid (424), viii. 2 ; sent to Naupactus to arrange for an attack on Siphae, viii. 4 ; sent to Epidaurus to bring the Athenian troops away (418), ix. 13; appointed to command in Sicily, x. 21; and Charicles erect a fort in Laconia (413), x. 22 ; his voyage to Syracuse (413), x. 26; his arrival at Syracuse, x. 27; he attempts the counter-wall of the Syracusans, ibid.; his attack by night on Epipolae, ibid.; wishes to carry the Athenian forces back to Athens, x. 28; or to move to Thapsus and Catana, ibid.; his proposal after the last defeat of the Athenians (413), x. 32; surrender of his army, x. 34; attempts his own life, ibid., note; cp. note to x. 35 ; put to death at Syracuse, x. 35. Demostratus, urges Nicias to fix the amount of troops needed for Sicily, x. 6, and note. Dercyllidas, a Spartan, xi. 15. Derdas, nephew of Alexander, king of the Elimiotae, i. 19. Dexippus, a Lacedaemonian at Agrigentum (406), xiii. 6; dismissed from Sicily, xiii. 7. Diitrephes, conducts Thracian mercenaries from Athens (413), x. 23. Diobelia, paid out of state funds, xii. 2. Diodes, the democratic leader at Syracuse, xiii. 1, and note; sent to relieve Selinus (409), xiii. 3; aids the Hinieraeans, xiii. 4. Dioclides, gives information about the profanation of the mysteries, x. 11. Diodotus, opposed to Cleon, vi. 9. Diognetus, a member of the commission to investigate sacrilege (411), x. 7. Diomedon, recovers Teos in part for Athens, xi. 5. Dionysius, the " copper" at Thurii, i. 10. ----- of Syracuse, attacks the Syracusan generals for their conduct at Agrigentum (406), xiii. 7 ; at Gela, ibid. ; elected general with full powers, ibid.; at Leontini, ibid.; allowed to have a bodyguard, ibid.; marries the daughter of Hermocrates, and becomes tyrant of Syracuse, ibid.; recognised as tyrant of Carthage (405), xiii. 8; attempts to relieve Gela, but fails, ibid. ; hatred of, owing to his failure at Gela, ibid.; ill-treatment of his wife, ibid. ; his return to Syracuse, ibid. ; he concludes peace with Carthage (405), ibid. Diopithes, attacks Anaxagoras, ii. 8. Diotimus, at Neapolis, i. 12. Dorians, at Thurii, i. 12 ; and Ionians, iv. 1. Dorieus of Rhodes, leads Thurian vessels to Cnidus (412), xi. 9; captured by Athenians (407), xii. 12 ; liberated by them, ibid. Dracontides, attacks Pericles, ii.9;(?) proposes election of the Thirty at Athens, xii. 24. Drama, development of the, xiv. 2; the, its connection with democracy, xiv. 5, 6. E Earthquakes in 426, vii. 1. Eclipse of the moon, the Athenians deterred by, from leaving Syracuse (413), x. 28. Eetionea, fortification of, xi. 21; destruction of the fortification (411), xi. 22. Eion, saved from Brasidas by Thucydides (424), viii. 5. INDEX. 649 Eleans, the, refuse to accept the terms of the peace of 421, viii. 16; withdraw from the allied army (418), ix. 10. Eleatics, the, xiv. 11. Eleusis, i. 14; the Greeks invited to bring offerings to, ibid.; seized by the Thirty (403), xii. 26; established as independent (403-401), ibid. Elis, joins the alliance with Argos, ix. 3; quarrels with Sparta, ibid.; and Athens in alliance (420), ix. 6 ; and Lepreum, ix. 7 ; sends troops to Mantinea which arrive too late and take part in the siege of Epidaurus (418), ix. 13. Ellomenus in Leucadia, vii. 3. Elpinice, and Pericles, i. 17. Empedocles, xiv. 12. Empire, the Athenian, i. 6; it ensured the safety of the Aegean, i. 7; and diffused civilisation, ibid.; a tyranny which failed to satisfy Greek feeling, i. 6-8; the rule of the superior, i. 8 ; supported democracy, ibid. ; defence of, iii. 9; its extent, a source of difficulty, iv. 2; managed through the Assembly, ibid.; want of consistent policy, ibid. ; a tyranny, vi. 8; view of, ix. 15; defence of, at Camarina, x. 14. See Athenian. Endius, ephor at Sparta (413), xi. 2 ; and Alci-biades, xi. 3; envoy from Sparta to Athens (410), xii. 6. Ephors, the Spartan, visit Pylus (425), vii. 10 ; at Athens (404), xii. 23. Ephorus, his account of the origin of the Peloponnesian war, iii. 1. Epic poetry in the fifth century, xiv. 6. Epicharmus of Cos, xiv. 5. Epidamnus, applies for help to Corcyra, iii. 3; asks advice at Delphi, ibid.; applies to Corinth, ibid. ; a colony of Corcyra, ibid.; government of, ibid. ; factions at, ibid; besieged by the Corcyraeans, ibid.; capitulates, ibid. Epidaurus, and Argos, quarrel between (419), ix. 8 ; siege of (418), ix. 13; a school of medicine, xiv. 16. Epidaurus Limera, ravaged by the Athenians (414), x. 21, 22. Epipolae, seized by the Athenians (414), x. 15 ; attack of the Athenians on (413), x. 27. Epitadas, commander .of the Spartans in Sphacteria, vii. 9, and vii. 12. e7riTeixio-/u.6s. See Heraclea, Decelea, Pylus, Minoa. Erae, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 5. Eretria, battle of (411), xi. 22. Erineum, battle off (413), x. 26. Erineus, Nicias reaches the river, x. 34. Er> thrae, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 4. Eteonicus, escapes from Mytilene (406), xii. 14; suppresses a conspiracy at Chios (406), xii. 16. Etruria, the Athenians send envoys to (415- 414), x. 14: three ships from, come to Syracuse (414), x. 17. Euboea, sends to Agis wishing to revolt (413), xi. 2; revolts from the Athenians (411), xi. 22. Eucles, an Athenian general at Amphipolis (424), viii. 5. Euphemus, his speech at Camarina (415), x. 14. Eupolis, the comedian, his remark on Pericles, ii. 2; xiv. 5. Euripides, popularity of, in Sicily, x. 35, xiv. 4 ; condemns slavery, xiv. 13. Euryelus, on Epipolae, x. 15. Eurylochus, a Spartan general (426), vii. 3; in Acarnania and Amphilochian Argos, vii. 4. Eurymedon, an Athenian general at Corcyra (425), vi. 16; at Pylus, vii. 8; in Sicily, vii. 15, viii. 3; fined, ibid.; appointed to command in Sicily, x. 21; sent to Sicily (414), ibid. Eurytanes, the, an Aetolian tribe, vii. 3. Euthydemus, chosen to support Nicias, x. 21. Evarchus, tyrant of Astacus, v. 5. F " Festival-money," the, ii. 2. Finance, at Athens, iv. 6, vi. 5, see App. 1; drain of the Athenian finances (414-413), x. 22, 23 ; measures for economy at Athens after the Sicilian expedition, xi. 1. Fire-signals, at Salamis, v. 19; at Plataea, vi. 5. Five Thousand* the, establishment of (411), xi. 23. Fleet, Athenian, at Samos, amounts to more than two hundred ships, i. 16; of Athens, iv. 4; of Sparta, ibid.; of Sparta, acquired by the Athenians, vii. 10. Four Hundred, the, establishment of (411), xi. 16; nature of their rule, ibid.; intrigues with Agis, xi. 16; send commissioners to Samos, xi. 20 ; divisions among them, xi. 21; send embassy to Sparta, ibid.; are deposed, xi. 23. Funeral speech of Pericles, v. 7. 550 INDEX. a Galbpsus, captured by Cleon (422), viii. 14. Gela, and Camarina (424), viii. 3; the congress of, ibid.; sends aid to Syracuse (413), x. 24; abandoned to the Carthaginians, xiii. 8; besieged by Himilco (405), ibid. General, relation of, to the Assembly, iv. 2. Generals, afraid of sacrificing the lives of the citizens, iv. 2; at Syracuse the number reduced to three, x. 13. Geography, scientific and descriptive, xiv. 16. Glanis, *' the elder brother of Bacis," ii. 4. Glaucon, sent to Gorcyra, iii. 5. Gongylus, a Corinthian commander, brings the news of the coming of Gylippus to Syracuse, x. 18. Gorgias, comes to Athens as an envoy, vi. 17. Grapnels in the Athenian ships at Syracuse, x. 30. Great King, envoys to, from Lacedaemon. vii. 14; from Athens, ibid.; from Persia to Sparta, ibid. See Persia. Greece, divided by the peace of 445, i. 3; in 421-415, ix. 14; feeling in, after the Sicilian expedition, xi. 2. Greek character, varieties of, xiv. 28. Grundy, G. B., his view of the geography of Pylus, vii. 10, note. Gylippus, appointed to take the command in Sicily (415), x. 13; at Leucas, x. 17; his voyage to the west, ibid.; collects forces at Himera, and marches on Syracuse (414), ibid.; ascends Epipolae, his ultimatum to the Athenians, x. 18; captures Labdalum, ibid.; sets out to collect reinforcements, x. 20; captures Plemmyriuin, x. 24; brings reinforcements to Syracuse (413), ibid.; brings reinforcements to Syracuse, x. 28; his address to his men before the final battle in the Harbour, x. 30. H Hageladas of Argos, xiv. 18. Hagnon, general at Samos, i. 16; founds Amphipolis, i. 20; his proposal about Pericles, ii. 9; and Sitaloes, v. 20. Halieis, Athenian attack on (430), v. 8. Hannibal, grandson of Hamilcar, appointed Carthaginian general, xiii. 2 ; sends envoys co Syracuse, ibid. ; lands in Sicily (409), xiii. 3; destroys Selinus, ibid.; destroys Himera, xiii. 4; returns to Carthage, ibid.; invades Sicily for the second time (406), xiii. 6; besieges Agrigentum, ibid.; dies of the plague, ibid. "Harmost," the title first mentioned in 418, xi. 2. Hecataeus of Miletus, xiv. 7. Hellanicus, xiv. 9. Hellas, feeling in favour of Sparta in the war, v. 3; opinion that it would be ended in two or three years, ibid. Hellenism, destroyed by the Peloponnesian war, v. 21. Hellespont, the, Clearchus appointed commander to, xi. 3 ; recovered by the Athenians (408), xii. 10. Helots, Lacedaemonian dread of, vii. 13 ; the Spartan fear of, viii. 2; iniquitous massacre of the, ibid. Heraclea, founded by Sparta (426), vii. 1; seized by the Boeotians (420), ix. 7. Heraclitus of Ephesus, xiv. 11. Hermae, the mutilation of the, at Athens (415), x. 7; possible explanations of, ibid. Hermaeondas of Thebes, at Mytilene, vi. 2. Hermione, Athenian attack on (430), v. 8. Hermippus, attacks Aspasia, ii. 8. Hermocrates of Syracuse, his speech at Gela (424), viii. 8; has information of the coming of the Athenian fleet, x. 9; he proposes to go to meet them, ibid.; chosen general at Syracuse, x. 13; deposed by the Syracusans (414), x. 17; deceives £Jicias, and secures the roads and passes near Syracuse (413), x. 32; and Tissaphernes, xi. 8; arrives at Miletus from Sicily, ibid. ; goes as envoy to Sparta (411), xii. 3; banished by the Syracusans (410), xii. 7; repairs to Pharna-bazus, ibid.; returns to Sicily (408), xiii. 5; at Himera (407), ibid.; attempts to return to Syracuse and is slain, ibid. Herodotus, xiv. 8. Hesiod, his death, vii. 3. Himera, Athenians not received at (415), x. 12; Gylippus at (414), x. 17; Hannibal at, xiii. 4; destruction of, ibid. Himilco, general with Hannibal (406), xiii. 6; at Agrigentum, ibid.; attacks Gela (405), xiii. 8. Hippias, (1) of Notium, vi 7; (2) the sophist, xiv. 14. Hippocrates, an Athenian general in the Megarid (424), viii. 2; in Boeotia, viii, 4; defeated at Delium, ibid. INDEX. 551 Hippocrates, the physician, xiv. 16. Hippodamus, architect of Thurii, i. 10; and of the Peiraeus, ibid., xiv. 14. Hipponicus, his wife married to Pericles, ii. 3. Hybla Galeatis, attacked unsuccessfully by the Athenians (415), x. 12. Hyccara, captured by the Athenians (415), x. 12 ; sale of the slaves taken at, ibid. Hyperbolus, ostracised, ix. 13; assassinated at Sainos (411), xi. 17. i Ialysus, refuses tribute in 440 (?), i. 17. Iasus, captured by the Peloponnesians (412), xi. 8. Iberians, in Hannibal's army, xiii. 4. Ictinus, xiv. 19. Idomene, battle of (426), vii. 5. Illyrians, their attack on Brasidas (423), viii. 10. Imbrian, the, "cleruchs" serve in the Athenian army, vii. 11. Impiety, charges of, against Phidias, Anax- agoras, and Aspasia, ii. 8. Independence, Greek desire of, vi. 11. "Ionia unfortified," i. 17. Ionian, district, i. 2; philosophy, ii. 5. Ionians, and Dorians, iv. 1; Athenians and Asiatic Ionians, ibid. Italy, attitude of the cities in, to the Sicilian expedition (415), x. 8. K Kings, Spartan, did not command the fleet, iv. 3; both the, leave Sparta at the same time, ix. 10, 11. Knights, the Athenian, unwilling to serve under Cleon in Chalcidice (422), viii. 15. L Labdalum, a fort built by the Athenians on Epipolae (414), x. 15; captured by Gylippus, x 18. Lacedaemonians, arrange to send forty ships to Lesbos, vi. 4; determine to increase their navy (427), vi. 15 ; colonise Heraclea (426), vii. 1; treachery of, after .the defeat of Olpae, vii. 4; their retreat, ibid.; at Pylus (425), vii. 9; refuse to aid the Aegineians (424), viii. 1; send forces to aid the Epi-daurians (419), ix. 8; also send forces by sea, which is regarded as a breach of the treaty, ibid.; the Athenian view of their policy, ix. 15 ; resolve to build a fleet (413), xi. 2. See Sparta and Spartans. Lacedaemonius, son of Cimon, sent to Corcyra with ten ships (433), iii. 5. Laches, an Athenian general, sent to Sicily (427), vi. 17; recalled from Sicily, and put on his trial, vii. 6; proposes that the terms of the truce be accepted in 423, viii. 8; slain at Mantinea (418), ix. 11. Laconia, the Athenians land on, contrary to the terms of the peace (414), x. 21; the Athenians erect a fortress in (413), x. 22. Lamachus, appointed one of the generals to Sicily (415), x. 3; his plan of campaign in 415, x. 10; slain in battle at Syracuse, x. 16. Lampon, takes part in the founding of Thurii, i. 10; his report on Eleusis, i. 14; and Anaxagoras, ii. 4. Lampsacus, taken by Lysander (405), xii. 19. Lebedos, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 5. Lecythus, at Torone, viii. 7; taken by Brasidas, ibid. Lemnian, the, cleruchs serve in the Athenian army, vii. 11. Leon, an Athenian general (412), xi. 7. Leontini, at war with Syracuse (427), vi. 17; factions at, x. 1; the oligarchs seek the aid of Syracuse, ibid.; the city broken up, ibid.; two fortresses occupied on the territory of, ibid.; recognised as independent at the peace in 405, xiii. 8. Lepreum, Neodamodes settled at, ix. 4; quarrel between Elis and Sparta about, ix. 7. Lesbian, the, exiles settle at Antandrus, viii. 3. Lesbos, sends ships against Samos, i. 16; and Chios send fifty ships to the Athenian fleet (430), v. 8; revolt of (428), vi. 1; received into the Peloponnesian alliance, vi. 4; divided into lots and occupied by Athenian cleruchs, vi. 10; sends to Agis wishing to revolt (413), xi. 2; the Chians attempt to bring the island over to Athens, xi. 7; remains Athenian, ibid.; treatment of, by Lysander, xii. 21. Leucadia, Demosthenes in (426), vii. 8. Leucas, attack on (428), vi. 6 Leucippus, xiv. 12. 552 INDEX, Lichas, sent as commissioner to investigate conduct of Astyochus (412), xi. 10 ; quarrels with Tissaphernes, ibid. Light-armed troops, their value recognised in the course of the war, iv. 5; at Spartolns, v. 14; their mode of fighting, vii. 3; employed on Sphacteria, vii. 12. Lindus, refuses tribute in 440 (?), i. 17. Liparaean islands, Athenian attack on (427), vi. 17. Locri, opposed to the Athenians in 415, x. 8 ; Gylippus at, x. 17. Locrians, the, at Messene, x. 1; revolt among the colonies of Locri, ibid. Logographers, the, xiv. 7. Long Walls at Athens, destroyed by Lysander (404), xii. 22. Lucanians, the, destroy the Sybarites, i. 12. Lyncestis, invaded by Perdiccas and Brasidas (423), viii. 9, 10. Lyric poetry, did* not flourish at Athens, xiv. 1. Lysander, appointed admiral by Sparta (408), xii. 11 ; his relations with Cyrus, ibid. ; succeeded as admiral by Callicratidas (406), xii. 13 ; sent out as lieutenant of the fleet (405), xii. 17 ; at Ephesus, ibid. ; made vice-regent by Cyrus (405), xii. 18 ; his attitude to democracy aud Athenian empire, ibid.; destroys democrats at Miletus, ibid. ; sails to Aegina and Attica, ibid. ; returns to Abydus, ibid. ; takes Lampsacus (405), xii. 19 ; captures Atheivan fleet at Aegospotami, ibid.; massacres all Athenian prisoners after Aegospotami, xii. 20; takes cities in the Bos-phorus and Hellespont, xii. 21; at Lesbos, ibid.; advances upon Athens and blockades the Peiraeus, ibid. ; destroys the Long Walls (404), xii. 22; sails to Samos and restores the oligarchy, xii. 23 ; returns to Laconia, ibid. ; assists in the establishment of the Thirty (403), xii. 24 ; goes to Athens as har-most, xii. 26; decline of his influence at Sparta, ibid. Lysicles, sent to collect money in Caria (428), vi. 5; his death, ibid. M Macedonia, history of, after the Persian wars, i. 18; partition of the kingdom, i. 19 ; invaded by Sitalces (429), v. 20. Magna Graecia, Themistocles' views on, i. 9. Malea, a promontory on Lesbos, vi. 2. Mantinea, at war with Tegea (423), viii. 12 I alliance with Athens (420), ix. 6; battle of (418), ix, 10, 11; rejoins the Spartan confederacy, and concludes a peace for thirty years, abandoning her claim to supremacy in Arcadia, ix. 12. Mantineans, the, at Olpae, vii. 4 ; join Argos in 421, ix. 3; their aggression in Arcadia checked by the Spartans (421), ix. 4. Massacres at Corcyra (427), vi. 14,15. Mathematics, xiv. 16. Medicine, xiv. 16. Megara, invaded by the Athenians (431), v. 6; Megarian oligarchs at Pegae, viii. 2; popular party negotiates with Athens (424), ibid. Megarian, exiles allowed to live at Plataea, vi. 12; decree, the, a cause of the war, iii. 1; to what was it due ? ibid. Megarians, their complaints at Sparta of the conduct of Athens, iii. 8; their exclusion from the trade of Athens, iii. 12; have forty ships at Nisaea, v. 19; refuse to accept the peace of 421, viii. 16. Megarid, the, invaded by the Athenians, iii. 1. Melancridas, a Spartan admiral (413), xi. 2. Meleas of Lacedaemon, at Mytilene, vi. 2. Melesander, sent to collect tribute in Lycia (430), v. 11; his death, ibid. Melissus, commander of the Samians, i. 17. Melos, attacked by the Athenians (426), vii. 2; assessed by Athens in 425, ix. 15; conference between the Melians and the Athenians, ibid.; attack of the Athenians on (416), ibid. ; massacre of the inhabitants, ibid. Menander, chosen to support Nicias, x. 21." Mende, revolts to Brasidas (423), viii. 9; recovered by the Athenians, viii. 11. Menedaeus, a Spartan general, vii. 4. Menelaus, son of Alexander, i. 19. Mercenaries, from Peloponnesus, viii. S, 4; Thracian, at Athens, x. 23. Messapians, and Athenians, i. 12 ; friendly to the Athenians, x. 26. Messene, taken by the Athenians, vii. 6; lost to Athens (425), vii. 15; factions at, x. 1; Alcibiades visits (415), x. 10; unsuccessful attempt to win, by the Athenians, x. 14. Messenian troops, the, at Sphacteria, vii. 12 ; established at Pylus (425), vii. 13. Messenians of Naupaeius, propose an invasion of Aetolia (426), vii. 3. INDEX. 653 Methana, Nicias at (425), vii. 14. Methone, attack on, by Athenian fleet (431), v. 5; repulsed by Brasidas, ibid. Methymna, remains loyal to Athens, at the revolt of Lesbos (428), vi. 1; attacked by Mytilene, vi. 4; taken by the Pelopon-nesians (406), xii. 13. Meton, the Athenian mathematician, xiv. 16; his cycle, ibid. Miletus, quarrels with Samos (440), i. 15 ; applies to Athens, ibid.; revolts from Athens, xi. 4; battle or (412), xi. 8; oligarchy at (411), xi. 15 ; joins the Lacedaemonians, ibid.; the Milesian school of philosophers, xiv. 11/ Mindarus, succeeds Astyochus as Spartan admiral (411), xii. 3 ; takes the fleet to the Hellespont, ibid. Minoa, occupied by Nicias (427), vi. 17. Mnesicles, xiv. 19. Mycalessus, attack on, by Thracians, x. 23. Myron, xiv. 18. Mysteries, popularity of, i. 14; profanation of, by Alcibiades and others, x. 7 ; information about the profanation of, x. 11. Mysticism at Athens, xiv. 21. Mytilenaeans, revolt from Athens and organise Lesbos, vi. 1; defeated by the Athenians, and conclude an armistice to send envoys to Athens, vi. 2; also send to Lacedaemon, ibid.; at Olympia, vi. 3; received into the Peloponnesian alliance,vi. 4; attack Methymna, ibid.; Paches sent to Mytilene, ibid.; discussion of their fate at Athens, vi. 8; the Athenians cancel their severe decree, vi. 10; massacre of ibid. N Naupactus, Phormio sent to (429), v. 11; Phormio defeats the Peloponnesians off, v. 18; the Aetolians wish to attack (426), vii. 3; saved by Demosthenes, ibid. ; twenty ships sent to (4J4), x. 21. Naxos (in Sicily), attack on (425), vii. 15 ; the Athenian fleet sails to (415), x. 10 ; the Athenians encamp at, x. 14. Neapolis and Athens, i. 12. Neodamodes, the, settled at Lepreum (421), ix. 4 ; at the battle of Mantinea (418), ix. 10. Nesiotes, an Athenian sculptor, xiv. 18. Nicias, opposed to war, ii. 9; of Gortys, v. 17, note; occupies Menoa (427), vi. 17; at Melos, vii. 2; at Tanagra (426), ibid. and Cleon. in 425, vii. 11; criticism of his conduct in the matter of Pylus, vii. 13; at Solygea (425), vii. 14; at Methana, ibid. ; captures Cythera (424), viii. 1; at Mende and Scione, viii. 11; eager for peace in 422, viii. 16 ; his caution, and desire to be a safe general, ibid. ; outwitted by Alcibiades, ix. 6; after Mantinea, ix. 13; blockades the ports of Perdiccas (416), ix. 14; appointed one of the generals to Sicily (415), x. 3 ; his speech about the expedition to Sicily, x. 4; his pla» of campaign in 415, x. 10 ; divides the forces with Lamachus, after the departure of Alcibiades, x. 12 ; his excessive caution, ibid.; breaks up from Catana, and wins Epipolae (414), x. 15; his dangerous position in the "circle," x. 16; vainly attempts to intercept Gylippus, x. 17; his want of energy in the conduct of the siege, x. 18, note; begins to make use of the Athenian fleet (414), x. 19; seizes Plemmyrium, ibid.; endeavours to intercept the Corinthian contingent, ibid. ; sends a letter to Athens (414), x. 20 ; refuses to return to Athens after the failure of the attack on Epipolae, x. 28; or to go to Thapsus, ibid.; deterred by an eclipse from leaving Syracuse (413), ibid. ; his address to his m«n before the final battle in the Harbour, x. 3); deceived by Hermocrates into wasting time at Syracuse (413), x. 32; his heroism in encouraging the Athenians in their retreat, x. 33; reaches the Cacyparis, ibid. ; the Erineus, x. 34; the Assinarus, ibid.; surrenders, ibid.; put to Nieath at Syracuse, x. 35. Nicostratus, an Athenian commander, at Naupactus, vi. 13 ; at Corcyra, vi. 14; at Mende and Scione, viii. 11; slain at Mantinea, ix. 11. Nine Ways, the, i. 20, note. Nisaea, capture of, by the Athenians (424), viii. 2; retained by the Athenians in 421, vii. 17; recovered by the Megarians (410-409), xii. 8. Nomothetae, appointed to revise the laws, after deposition of the Four Hundred (411) ' at Athens, xi. 23, xii. 1. Notfum, factions at, vi. 7; Paches visits, ibid.; defeat of Athenian fleet at (407X xii. 12. Nymphodorus of Abdera, brother-in-law of Sitalces, i. 21; invited to Athens (431), v. 6. 554 INDEX. 0 Octamasades, son of Ariapithes, i. 21. Odeum, the, at Athens, xiv. 19. Odrysian empire, growth of the, i. 19; under Sitalces, i. 21; its extent and revenues, ibid. Oeniadae, saved by floods from attack, v. 19; Asopius attacks, vi. 5. Oeneon, Demosthenes at, vii. 3. Oenoe, Archidamus repulsed at (431), v. 4; captured by the Boeotians (411), xi. 23. Oetaeans, ravage the Trachinian territory, vii. 1. Oligarchies, establishment of, by Pisander, xi. 16. Oligarchs at Corcyra (431-427), vi. 13; escape to the mainland, vi. 15 ; final massacre (425), vi. 16. Oligarchy, at Samos, i. 15; suppressed by Athens, ibid.; restored, ibid. ; spread of, after the battle of Mantinea, ix. 12 ; Nicias apprehends dangers from, x. 4; established by Lysander (405), xii. 18. Olpae, seized by the Ambraciots (426), vii. 4; battle of, ibid. Olynipia, funds at, iv. 6; the Mytilenaeans at (428), vi. 3. Olympian festival (420), Spartans excluded .from, ix. 7. Olympieum, a temple near the shore of the Great Harbour of Syracuse, x. 12; the Athenians encamped near, but leave it un-• touched, ibid. Olynthus, becomes a common centre fo^ the Chalcidian Greeks, iii. 7. Onatas of Aegina, xiv. 18. Ophioneis, the, an Aetolian tribe, vii. 3. Oracles, constant appeal to, even ahgut trifles, ii. 4. Orator and general, iv. 2; orators at Athens, vi. 9. Oratory, growth of, xiv. 10. Orchomenus, surrenders to Argos (418), ix. 10. Ostracism of Hyperbolas (417 ?), ix. 13. p Paches, sent to Mytilene (428), vi. 4; at Mytilene, vi. 6, 7; his treachery at Notium, vi. 7; brought to trial, slays himself in the court, vi. 10. Pagondas, a Boeotian general (Boeotarch), viii. 4. Painting, the art of, xiv. 17. Panaetum destroyed, ix. 4. Pangaeus, Mount, i. 20. Panhellenic schemes of Pericles, i. 13. Panoptae, the, a play of Cratinus, xiv. 5. Panyasis of Halicarnassus, an epic poet, xiv. 6. Paralus, son of Pericles, ii. 3 ; carried off by the plague (430), v. 10. Paralus, the, escapes from Aegospotami (405), xii. 19. Parmenides, xiv. 11. Parrhasians, the, rescued from the Man-tineans by Plistoanax, ix. 4. Parrhasius, xiv. 17. Parthenon, the, ii. 2, xiv. 18,19. Paities, in Athens after 445, ii. 1; later, ii. 9. Pasitelidas, established in Torone (423), viii. 11; unable to maintain Torone forBrasidas, viii. 13. Patrae, Alcibiades causes the building of long walls at (419), ix. 8. Pausanias, king of Sparta, marches upon Athens (405), xii. 21; leads a force to Athens (403), xii. 26; dealings with Ly-sander, ibid. Payment of officers at Athens, abolition of (411), xi. 16. Peace, of 445, i. 1; envoys sent from Athens to Sparta about, but without result (430), v. 9; proposals for, by the Spartans in 425, vii. 10; feeling at Athens in favour of (424), viii. 8; desire for, in 422, viii. 16 ; negotiations for (422-421), ibid.; the majority of the Spartan allies accept it, ibid.; of 421, termg of, viii. 17 ; of 421, unsatisfactory to both sides, and could not be lasting, ibid., ix. 1; of 421, infringement of, by the Lacedaemonians (419), ix. 8 ; the terms of, infringed by Athens (414), x. 21; terms of surrender in 404, xii. 22. See Cyzicus, Arginusae. Pedaritus, governor of Chios (412), xi. 9; quarrels with the admiral Astyochus, ibid.; killed at Chios (411), xi. 14. Pegae, party of Megarian oligarchs at, viii. 2. Peiraeum, the Peloponnesian ships driven on shore at (412), xi. 3; the Peloponnesian ships break out from, xi. 5. Peiraeus, proposed attack on the (429), v. 19; architecture of, xiv. 19. Peithias of Corcyra, vi. 13. Pellene, a city of Achaea, on the side of Sparta, iv. 4, ix. 12. INDEX. 555 Peloponnesian, confederacy, the allies invited to Sparta, iii. 8 ; confederacy, the allies formally summoned to discuss the question of war, iii. 11; speech of the Corinthians, ibid.; confederacy, in favour of war, ibid.; slowness and inactivity of, ibid.; war, plans of campaign, iv. 7; criticism of the plan of Pericles, iv. 8; war, excitement at the outbreak of, v. 3; signs and wonders, ibid.; war, the first year (431), v. 4-7 ; second year (430), v. 8-12; fleet, sent against Zacynthus (430), v. 11; war, third year - (429), v. 13 to end; fleet, in 429, v. 16-18; war (428), vi. 1-5; war (427), vi. 6-17 ; war (426), vii. 1-7 ; war (426-425), vii. 8-15 ; fleet, acquired by the Athenians (425), vii. 10; fleet, given up to Athens, ibid.; ships return from Sicily (412), xi. 3; war (413-412), xi. 1-10; fleet to sail to Chios, Lesbos, and the Hellespont, xi. 3; at Peiraeum, ibid. and 5; in Ionia, xi. 3 f., see Chalcideus; first treaty with Persia, xi. 5; fleet, at Lesbos, xi. 7, see Astyochus; at Miletus, xi. 9; (second treaty with Persia, ibid.; fleet, at Cuidus, xi. 10; at Rhodes, ibid.; war (411), xi. 11-23, xii. 4; fleet returns to Miletus, xi. 15; third treaty with Persia, ibid.; fleet off Euboei, xi. 22 ; mutiny at Miletus, xii. 3; fleet in the Hellespont, see Mindarus, xii. 3 ; defeated at Cynossema (411), xii. 4; and at Cyzicus (410), xii. 5; recover Pylus, xii. 8; fleet, victorious at Notium, xii. 2, see Lysander, defeated at Arginusae (406), xii. 14 ; victorious at Aegos-potami (405), xii. 18, 19 ; war (410), xii. 5-8; (409), xii. 9; (408), xii. 12; (407), ibid.; (406), xii. 13-17 ; (405), xii. 17-21; (404), xii. 21-25. Perdiccas, son of Alexander, i. 19 ; becomes an ally of Athens, i. 21; expels his brother Philip, ibid.; supports the Potidaeans in their revolt, iii. 7; at war with Athens, ibid.; becomes an ally of the Athenians (431), v. 6; sends troops to aid Cnemus in Acarnania, v. 15; and Sitalces (429), v. 20; applies to Sparta for help (424), viii.^; -and Brasidas, viii. 5; visits Brasidas after the capture of Amphipolis(424), viii. 7 ; invades Lyncestis, with the support of Brasidas (423), viii. 9, 10; his retreat, ibid.; comes to terms with the Athenians (423), viii. 11; prevents reinforcements from reaching Brasidas, ibid.; friendly with Thessaly, ibid.; declared an enemy (416), ix. 14. Pericles, secures empire by the peace of 445, i. 2 ; supreme at Athens, i. 5; bis impevifl policy, i. 6; his Panhellenic schemes, i. 13, 14; at Samos, i. 15, 16; his conduct of the war at Samos, i. 17 ; his funeral speech after the Samian war, ibid.; his retort to Elpinice, ibid, note; his use of the money of the allies, ii. 2 ; introduces payment for service, ibid. ; saves largely from the revenues, ibid.; his aim in paying the law-courts, ibid.; result of the payment, ibid.; ruler of Athens, ibid.; elected general year after year, ibid.; change of the people towards, ii. 3; his wife and children, ibid.; his connection with Aspasia, ibid.; and the new philosophy, ii. 4; and the sophists, ii. 7 ; his argument with Protagoras, ibid. ; becomes unpopular, ibid. ; his attitude towards the demagogues, ibid.; attacked through his friends, ii. 8; defends Aspasia, ibid.: charges brought against him, ii. 9; prepares for war, ibid. ; his pecuniary difficulties a cause of the Peloponnesian war, iii. 1; could only govern Athens through the Assembly, iv. 2; his plan of campaign in the Peloponnesian war, iv. 7; was his plan the best? iv. 8; rejects overtures from the Lacaedemonians when they are in the field, v. 3 ; neglects to make proper arrangements for the countrymen in the city, ibid.; prevents the people from meeting, v. 4; maintains his policy, v. 5; takes measures for the security of Attica, ibid.; bis funeral speech (431), v. 7; the Athenians exasperated against (430), ?. 9; his speech to them, ibid.; he is deposed, and fined, v. 10; his sons, Xanthippus and Paralus, carried off by the plague, ibid.; his son by Aspasia made legitimate (430), ibid.; reelected general (429), v. 14 ; the death of (429), v. 21 ; effect of this at Athens, ibid.; ideals of, ibid. ; he left no successor, ibid. Pericles, the younger, son of Pericles, il. 3, note; made an Athenian citizen (4S0), v. 10. Persians, war with, discontinued, i. 2; treaty with Sparta, xi. 15; second treaty with Peloponnesians (412), xi. 9; estrangement from Spartans, xi. 10; third treaty with the Peloponnesians (411), xi. 15. Phaeax, sent to Sicily (422), x. 2; at Locrl, Camarina, Agrigentum, and Gela, his mission a failure, ibid. Phalaris, the bull of, sent to Carthage, xiii. 6. Pharnabazus, sends envoys to Sparta (413), 556 INDEX. xi. 2; induces the Peloponnesians to sail to the Hellespont (411), xii. 3; supports the Peloponnesians after Cyzicus, xii. 6; makes an agreement with Athenians at Chalcedon, (409), xii. 9. Pharnaces, the Persian satrap of Phrygia, (422), viii. 13. Phaselis in Lycia, a centre of trade, v. 11. Phea, the Athenian fleet at, v. 5. Phidias, attack on, he is thrown into prison, where he dies, ii. 8; his peculations a cause of the Peloponnesian war, iii. 1, xiv. 18. Phigalea, the plague at, v. 8; the temple at, ibid. Philip, son of Alexander, i. 19 ; expelled by Perdiccas, takes refuge with Derdas, i. 21; supported by Athens, ibid.; brother of Perdiccas, an ally of the Athenians, iii. 7. Philistus, the historian of Syracuse, x. 34, 35, notes; supports Dionysius, xiii. 7. Philocles, appointed Athenian general (406), xii. 17; his dealings with captives (405), xii. 20; executed by Lysander, ibid. Philosophers and sophists, ii. 5. Philosophy, physical, disliked at Athens, ii. 4; of Ionia, ii. 5; development of, xiv. 11 f.; and religion, xiv. 15. Phoenician fleet, expected at Samos, i. 16. Phormio, general at Samos, i. 16; at Amph^-lochian Argos, i. 22 ; helps to blockade Potidaea, iii. 7 ; sent against the Chal-cidians, v. 6; sent to Naupactus (430), v. 11; reinforcements sent to, but ordered to go to Crete, v. 17 ; his victories in the Corinthian gulf (429), v. 16-18 ; at Astacus, Stratus, and Coronta, v. 19; returns to Athens (428), ibid.; his death (?), ibid. Phrynichus, his opposition to Alcibiudes, and intrigues with Astyochus, xi. 12, 13; removed from his command (411), xi. 13; envoy to Sparta (411), xi. 21; assassinated, ibid. -----the tragedian, xiv. 2. Phyllis, i. 20, note. Pictures, famous, xiv. 17. Pindar, xiv. 1. Piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean (430), v. 11. Pisander, a member of the commission to investigate impiety, x. 7; advocates oligarchical revolution in Athens, and return of Alcibiades (411), xi. 13; iutrigues with political clubs, xi. 14 ; negotiations with Tissaphernes and Alcibiaies (411), ibid. ; returns from Samos to Athens (411), xi. 16; proposes the government of the Four Hundred, ibid. Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis, aids Samos in revolt, i. 16; aids the Persian party in Notium (427), vi. 7; his rebellion suppressed by Tissaphernes, xi. 2. Plague, the, at Athens (430), v. 8; reappears at Athens (427), vi. 17 ; in the Carthaginian camp at Agrigentum, xiii. 6. Plataea, and Thebes, v. 1; seized by a party of Thebans (431), v. 2 ; the attack repulsed, ibid.; the The ban prisoners put to death, ibid. ; perfidy of the Plataeans, ibid. ; the Peloponnesians at (429), v. 13 ; the territory inviolable (?), ibid.; wall built round at, ibid.; escape of part of the garrison (428), vi. 5 ;. surrender of (427), vi. 11; trial of the Plataeans by the Spartans, ibid.; position of, to Thebes and Sparta, ibid.; their appeal to Sparta, ibid.; retained by Thebes in 421, viii. 17. Plataeans, massacre of the, vi. 12; the survivors live at Athens and Scione, ibid* Plays, how represented at Athens, xiv. 6. Plemmyrium, t»ptured by Nicias. (414), z. 19 ; captured by Gylippus (413), x. 24. PUstoanax, his return from exile, vii. 1; king of Sparta, in favour of peace (422), viii. 16; in Arcadia, rescues the Parrhasians, and puts an end to the aggression of the Man-tineans (421), ix. 4 ; marches out to Tegea, at the time of the battle of Mantinea (418), ix 11. Polemarchs, insubordination of, at the battle of Mantinea, ix. 11. Political, parties at Athens after the war, xii. 23; parties at Athens, their reconciliation after the Thirty, xii. 26 ; science, in Greece, xiv. 14. Polyclitus, xiv. 18. Polydamidas, a Lacedaemonian, commander of the garrison at Mende, viii. 11. Polygnotus of Thasos, xiv. 17. Portents, how interpreted (the one-horned ram), ii. 4. Potidaea, the revolt of, a cause of the Peloponnesian war, iii. 7 ; a Corinthian colony, and governed by officers from Corinth, but a subject ally of Athens, ibid. ; applies to Lacedaemon for help, ibid,; Aristeus at, ibid.; battle of, ibid.; blockaded, ibid.; siege of (431), v. 6; surrender of (430), v. 12 ; Brasidas makes an unsuccessful attack on (423), viii. 12. INDEX. 557 Prasiae, Athenian attack on (430), v. 8; ravaged by the Athenians (414), x. 21. Priene, cause of a quarrel between Samos and Miletus, i. 15. Probuli, a board of ten, established at Athens (413), xi. 1. Professions, absence of, in Greece, xiv. 2B. Property-tax, iv. 6; at Athens imposed for the first time in 428, vi. 5. Propylaea, the, ii. 2. Prose writing in Greece, xiv. 7. Protagoras, at Athens, ii. 6; his argument with Pericles, ii. 7; banished from Athens, ii. 8, xiv. 13. Protagoras of Plato, scene from, ii. 6. Ptychia, an island near Corcyra, vi. 16. Pydna, acquired by Macedon, i. 18, Pylus, seized and fortified by the Athenian fleet (425), vii. 8; the Lacedaemonians are unable to dislodge the Athenians, vii, 9; the Athenians at, ibid.; the Spartan ephors visit, vii. 10; armistice agreed upon, ibid.; long delay in the operations^ vii. 11; criticism of the account of, vii. 13; Athens refuses to give up, in 421, ix. 1; the Athenians agree to withdraw the Messenians and Helots from (421), ix. 4; recovered by Lacedaemonians (410-409), xii. 8. Pyrrha, in Lesbos, acquired by Athens, vi. 8. Pythagoreans, the, xiv. 12. Py'then, the Corinthian commander, sails with Gylippus, x. 17; at Syracuse (418), x. 31. Pythodorus, sent to Sicily (426), vii. 6; in Sicily, ibid., viii. 3; is exiled on his return to Athens, viii. 3; lands in Laconia (414), x.21. R Religion, at Athens, ii. 4; and philosophy, xiv. 15; ethical progress in, xiv. 21; monotheism, ibid. ; mysticism, ibid.; foreign rites, ibid. Reserve fund of a thousand talents at Athens (431), v. 5; used after the revolt of Chios (412), xi. 4. Responsibility at Athens, iv. 2, vi. 9. Revenues of Athens, large savings from, ii. 2; after the peace of Nicias, x. 3. Rhegium, gives little support to the Athenians in 415, x. 8; the Athenian generals discuss their plans of campaign at, x. 10; the Athenian fleet at, ibid. ; the ships sent to make inquiries at Segesta, return to, ibid. Rhetoric in Sicily, ii. 5. Rhodes, joins the Peloponnesian alliance (412), xi. 10; harbours Peloponnesian fleet (411), ibid. Rhoeteum, viii. 3. s Sabazius, a Phrygian deity, xiv. 21. Sacrilege at Athens, commission to investigate, x. 7. Sadocus, son of Sitalces, becomes an Athenian citizen (431), v. 6. Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian envoy at Myti-lene, vi. 5; gives arms to the populace of Mytilene, vi. 6; put to death, vi. 8. Salaminia, the, sent to Sicily to bring home Alcibiades, x. 11. Salamis overrun by the Peloponnesians, v. 19. Samos, internal factions at, i. 15; quarrel with Miletus (440), ibid.; Pericles at, ibid. ; democracy established, ibid. ; reaction and revolt, ibid. ; the Samians defeated by Pericles, i. 16; capitulates, ibid.; terms of capitulation, ibid.; was a democracy established? ibid.; cost of the siege, ibid. ; importance of the island to Athens (412), xi. 6; popular revolt at, ibid. ; the island allowed to be independent, ibid*; becomes the Athenian headquarters in Ionia (412), xi. 8; attempted oligarchical revolution at (411), xi. 15; overthrow of attempted oligarchical government (411), xi. 17; attitude to the Four Hundred, xi. 18; alone remains faithful to Athens after Aegospotami (405), xii. 21. Satyrus, xii. 25. j Scione, revolts to Brasidas after the truce is signed (423), viii. 9; blockaded by the Athenians (423), viii. 11; capture of, and massacre of the inhabitants (421), ix. 3. Sciritae, the, in the army at Mantinea, ix. 10. Scu'pture, xiv. 18. Scyles, son of Ariapithes, i. 21; his love of Greek customs, ibid. ; he is initiated in the Dionysiac rites, ibid.; deposed, ibid.; put to death by Octamasades, ibid. Sea, the, regarded as the territory of the Athenians, ix. 8, Segesta, envoys from, at Athens, i. 9; her quarrel with Selinus in 416, x. 3; her alli- i' ance with Athens, ibid. ; seeks the aid of Athens, ibid.: Athenian envoys visit, and report upon, ibid.; deception practised 558 INDEX. upon them, ibid.; discovery of the fraud practised on the Athenian envoys at, x. 10; the Athenian fleet sails to (415), x. 12; a body of horse from, joins the Athenians, x. 15; and Selinus, xiii. 2; and Carthage, ibid. Selinuntians, the, defeat of, xiii. 2. Selinus, her quarrel with Segesta in 416, x. 3; seeks the aid of Syracuse, ibid.; and Segesta, xiii. 2; destruction of (409), xiii. 3. Sestos, taken by Lysander (405), xii. 21. Seuthes, the nephew of Sitalces, marries Stratonice, sister of Perdiccas, v. 20. Sicanus, a Syracusan general (413), x. 31. Sicels, the Athenians negotiate with (415-414), x. 14; destroy a body of reinforcements on their way to Syracuse (413), x. 24. Sicilian, fleet, vii. 15 ; expedition, causes of the failure of, x. 21. Sicily, Athenian passion for, i. 3; growth of rhetoric in, ii. 5 ; the Athenians send ships to (427), vi. 17; affairs in, in 426, vii. 6 ; ships sent to, in 425, detained at Pylus, vii. 8-10; affairs in, in 425, vii. 15; affairs in 424, the congress of Gela, viii. 3; after the congress of Gela, x. 1; attempt of the Athenians to gain a footing in, in 422, x. 2; Athenian interest in the island, x. 3; the Athenians resolve to send an expedition to Sicily (415), ibid.; Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus appointed generals, ibid.; first armament sent to (415), x. 6; departure of the great expedition, x. 8; reinforcements sent to, from Peloponnesus and Boeotia, x. 22; from Athens, x. 26; effect of the disaster in, at Athens (413), xi. 1; return of the Pelopon-nesian ships from Sicily (412), xi. 3. Sicyon, the constitution rearranged on a more oligarchical basis (418), ix. 12. i Siege, of Plataea (430), v. 13 ; engines used at Samos (?), i. 16, note; at Plataea, v. 13. Simonides, xiv. 1. Siphae, a rising contemplated at (424), viii. 4. I Sitalces, son of Teres, i. 19; the kingdom of the Odrysians united in his hands, i. 21; receives Scyles, and exchanges him for Sparadocus, ibid.; Athens wishes to form an alliance with, ibid.; alliance with (431), v. 6; arrests the Peloponnesian envoys on their way to the Great King, and gives them ' up to Athens (430), v. 12; invades Macedonia (429), v. 20; his levy, ibid. Slavery, condemned by the sophists, xiv. 23; in Greece, ibid. Slaves, the, at Athens, desert to Decelea, x. ! 22; number of, in Sicily after the defeat of the Athenians, x. 35. Society, at Athens, ii. 3; in Greece, xiv. 23. Socrates, and Aspasia, ii. 3 ; his views on the decline of the Athenian character, xii. 12; his conduct as one of the prytanes, xii. 15, xiv. 15; his death, ibid. Sollium, capture of, by Athens, v. 5. Solygea, Nicias at (425), vii. 14. Sophists, and philosophers, ii. 5; their wandering life, ibid.; their teaching at Athens, ii. 6; disliked at Athens, ii. 7; the, xiv. 13. Sophocles, an Athenian general, at Corcyra (425), vi. 16; at Pylus, vii. 8; in Sicily (425), vii. 15, viii. 3 ; exiled on his return to Athens, ibid., xiv. 3. Sparadocus, son of Teres, expelled by Sitalces, takes refuge in Scythia, given up to Sitalces, i. 21. Spargapithes, king of the Agathyrsi, i. 21. Sparta, her conduct in 446, i. 1; decision of the Assembly about the war, iii. 10; negotiations with Athens in the hope of avoiding war, iii. 12; her demands, ibid.; and Athens contrasted, iv. 1 f.; her fleet in 431, iv. 4; her army, ibid.; without any well-defined casus belli in 431, v. 3; assembles her troops at the Isthmus, ibid.; and Lesbos, vi. 2; bids the Mytilenaean envoys appear at Olympia, vi. 3; proposes peace after the seizure of Pylus, vii. 10; concludes a truce with Athens for a year (423), viii. 8; shortsighted policy of, in 423, ibid.; her attitude to Argos in 422, viii. 16; her indifference to the interests of her allies in the peace of 421, viii 17; and Athens, alliance between (421), ix. 1;. her position as head of the Peloponnesian league severely shaken by the peace of 421, ix. 2 ff.; forms an alliance with Boeotia (421), ix. 4; and Argos (420), ix. 5; her citizens excluded from the Olympian festival (420), ix. 7; and Argos, in 418, ix. 9, 10; and Argos, alliance between (after Mantinea), ix. 12; short duration of her alliance with Argos, ix. 14; Syracusan envoys at (415), x. 13; the Ghians and Erythraeans send to, proposing to revolt, xi. 2; the Spartans inclined to abandon the Athenian allies (412), xi. 3; overtures to, by the Four Hundred (411), xi. 21; magnanimity towards Athens, xii. 22. Spartan, confederacy, difficulties in the way of action, iv. 8; jealousies and enmities, INDEX. 559 ibid. ; confederacy, financial position of, iv. I 6; pay a contribution but have no public | funds, ibid. Spartans, characteristics of, slowness and deliberation, iii. 10; the common Greek opinion of, iv. 1, note; retained even incompetent officers in command, iv. 3; send commissioners to Cnemus, v. 17, see Bra-sidas; cut off in Sphacteria, vii. 9; send envoys to Athens to treat for peace (425), vii. 10; on Sphacteria, surrender, vii. 12; astonishment of Greece at this, vii. 13; carried captive to Athens from Pylus, ibid.; their fear of the Helots, viii. 2; iniquitous massacre of the Helots, ibid. ; their despondency in consequence of defeat (424), establish a force of cavalry, and send out garrisons into various parts of the country, ibid.; obtain a clear casus belli against the Athenians (414), x. 21; invade Attica (413), x. 22; propose^ peace after the battle of Cyzicus (410), xii. 6; after Arginusae (406), xii. 16. Spartolus, defeat of the Athenians at (429), i v. 14. J Sphacteria, the island of, vii. 9; geographical i difficulties connected with, vii. 10; blockade of, vii. 10,11; attack on the island, vii. 12; the captives taken at, restored by Athens in 421, ix. 1. Spindle, the=arrow, vii. 13. Sthenelaidas, ephor of Sparta, his speech on the war, iii. 10. Stone quarries, the, at Syracuse, the Athenians | placed in, x. 35. > Stratus, defeat of the Chaonians at (429), v. 15. Strombichides, an Athenian general (412), xi. 4. Strymon, geography of the lower, i. 20. j Styphon, commander of the troops on Sphacteria, vii. 12. Superstition, of the Athenians, ii. 4; fear of eclipses, x. 28. Sybaris, refounded and destroyed by Croton, i. 20. I Sybarites, the remnant destroyed by the Lucanians, i. 12. | Sybota, battle of, iii. 6. I Syke, the, on Epipolae, x. 15. Syracusans, outwitted by the Athenians, who • are able to transfer their fleet from Catana to the Great Harbour, x. 12; exhibit contempt for the Athenians, ibid.; their first | engagement with the Athenians on the ! shore of the Great Harbour (415), ibid.; excellence of their cavalry, ibid.; their preparations in the winter of 415, x. 13 ; send envoys to Corinth and Lacedaeinon, ibid.; enclose the Temenites (415), x. 14; place garrisons in the Olympieum and Megara, ibid.; their first counter-wall (414), x. 16; destroyed by the Athenians, ibid.; their second counter-wall, ibid.; destroyed by the Athenians, ibid.; despondency of, x. 17; depose Hermocrates, ibid.; contemplate surrendering (414), x. 18; prevented by the arrival of Gongylus, ibid.; their third wall, ibid.; under Gylippus, defeated, but afterwards victorious and carry their third wall past the Athenian line, x. 19; resolve to attack the Athenians at sea, x. 24; the first engagement (413), ibid.; capture Athenian transports, ibid.; their second engagement in the Great Harbour, they are victorious (413), x. 25; their third naval engagement with the Athenians (413), x. 29; their victory, ibid.; dangerous enemies to the Athenians because like them, x. 29; close the mouth of the Great Harbour (413), x. 30; last engagement in the Harbour, x. 30, 31; their triumphant return from the Assinarus to the city (413), x. 34; their treatment of the Athenian prisonei-s, x. 35. Syracuse, at war with Leontini (427), vi. 17; aid of, sought by Leontini, x. 1; news of the Athenian expedition carried to, x. 9; a general dismisses the Assembly, ibid.; the Athenians send ten ships into (415), x. 10; ten Athenian ships enter the Great Harbour, ibid.; the whole Athenian fleet enters, x. 12; the army encamps on the shore, ibid.; Alcibiades advises help to be sent to, x. 13; the Athenian fleet sails into the Great Harbour (414), x. 16; arrival of the Corinthian ships at, x. 19; retreat of the Athenians from, x. 33 f. T Taenarus, the curse of, iii. 12. Tanagra, attacked by Nicias (426), vii. 2. Tegea, at war with Mantinea (423), viii. 12; refuses to join Argos, ix. 3; the allied armies propose to attack (418), ix. 10; Agis marches to the relief of, ibid. ; and Mantinea, quarrel about the water, ix. 10. Temples, built in the fifth century, xiv. 19. Tenedos, hostile to Mytilene, vi. 1. 560 INDEX. Teos, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 4; I Diomedon partially recovers, for Athens, xi. 5. Terentum, opposed to the Athenians in 415, x. 8. ' Teres, king of the Odrysians, i. 19; death of, ibid.; his sons, ibid. I Teucer, gives information about the profanation of the mysteries, x. 11. Teutiaplus of Elis, his advice to Alcidas, vi. 7. Thales of Miletus, xiv. 11. Theban tactics, a line twenty-five deep, at Delium, viii. 4. Thebans, their conduct in the Persian war, vi. 11,12; their relations to Plataea, v. 1 ff, vi. 12; insist on the destruction of the walls of Thespiae (423), viii. 12 ; see Plataea. Thebes, wealth of, iv. 6; and Plataea, v. 1; proposes destruction of Athens to Sparta, xii. 22. Themistocles, and Magna Graecia, i. 9. Theodorus of Cyrene, a mathematician, xiv. 16. j Thera, pays tribute, iv. 4, note. Theramenes, the Spartan, makes second treaty with Persians (412), xi. 9; lost at sea, ibid. —— son of Hagnon, Lis position in the Four Hundred, xi. 21; breaks with the Four Hundred (411), xi. 22; at Arginusae, xii. 14; accuses the generals at Arginusae (406), xii. 15; views of Aristophanes upon him, xii. 17; visits Lysander (404), xii. 22; sent as envoy to Sparta, ibid. ; proposes return of the exiles, xii. 23; his part in the election of the Thirty, xii. 24; his policy, ibid.; opposes the conduct of the Thirty, xii. 25; attacked by Critias and executed (404), ibid. Therma, acquired by Macedon, i. 18; restored to Perdiccas (431), v. 6. Thero, monument of, at Agrigentum, xiii. 6. Thespiae,the walls pulled downby the Thebans (423V viii. 12. Thespians, the, arrive at Syracuse (413), x. 24; on Epipolae, x. 27. Thessalians, allies of the Athenians, v. 4. Thessalus, refounds Sybaris(?), i. 10 ; son of Cimon, impeaches Alcibiades for profaning the mysteries, x. 11. Thessaly, political feeling in the country, viii. 5; on friendly terms with Perdiccas, viii. 11. Thirty, the, election of, at Athens (404), xii. | I 24; character of their government, xii. 25; apply for Spartan garrison (404), ibid.; seize Eleusis (403), xii. 26; defeated by Thrasybulus, ibid.; deposed, ibid. Thrace, growth of the Odrysian empire, i. 19. Thracian, "district," i. 2; changes in, i. 18; from 437, i. 20; mercenaries, at Athens (413), x. 23. Thrasybulus, general of Athenian fleet, xi. 18; at Arginusae, xii. 14; makes terms with oligarchs (403), xii. 26; attacks the Thirty from Phyle, ibid. ; marches to Peiraeus, ibid. Thrasyllus, an Argive general (418), ix. 9; at the battle of Cynossema (411), xii. 4; sent to Athens, ibid.; raises a force at Athens (410), xii. 7; defeated at Ephesus (410), xii. 8; in the Hellespont, ibid. Thrasymachus, the sophist, xiv. 14. Thronium, captured by the Athenians (431), v. 5. Thucydides, the son of Melesias, ostracism of, i. 4; general at Samos, i. 16; said to j have accused Anaxagoras of treason, ii. 8. -----the historian, a general (424), at Thasos, viii. 5; fails to relieve Amphipolis, ibid.; an exile from Athens, viii. 6; his remarks on the Sicilian expedition, x. 21; his opinion as to the best Athenian government, xi. 23; his judgment on Antiphon ibid., xiv. 9. Thurii, foundation of, i. 10; construction of the town, ibid. ; dissensions at, i. 11; fresh colonists invited, ibid.; date of the foundation, ibid., note; Cleandridas at, i. 12; becomes Dorian and secedes from Athens, ibid.; refuses to join Gylippus, x. 17; the Thurians become allies of the Athenians (413), x. 26. Thyreatis, Ageinetans settled in the, v. 6, viii. 1. Timocreon of Rhodes, xiv. 1. Tissaphernes, sends an envoy to Sparta (413), xi. 2; his alliance with Chalcideus, xi. 5; obtains possession of Amorges, xi. 8; provides pay for the Peloponnesian fleet, ibid.; makes second treaty with the Pelopon-nesians (412), xi. 9; quarrels with Lichas, xi. 10; receives Alcibiades (411), xi. 11; reduces pay of Peloponnesian fleet, ibid.l concludes a third treaty with the Pelopon-nesians (411), xi. 15; follows Peloponnesians to the Hellespont, xii. 4; arrests Alcibiades (410), xii. 5. | Tlepolemus, general at Samos, i. 16. INDEX. 561 Torone, captured by Brasidas (424), viii. 7; recovered for Athens by Cleon (422), viii. 13. Trachinians, their country ravaged by the Oetaeans, vii. 1. Trade, effect of the Ionian revolt on, xiv. 22 ; of Athens, ibid. Tragia, battle of, i. 16. Tribute, diminution of, in 450-440, i. 2 ; of the allies in Caria, i. 15; collected in Lycia (430), v. 11; raising of the, by Athens in 425, vii. 16; see App. 1; of the Asiatic cities, reckoned as due to the Great King, xi. 2. Triremes, a hundred set apart at the beginning of the war, v. 5. Troezen, Athenians attack, in 430, v. 8. Tyrrhenians, in the Athenian army at Syracuse (413), x. 29. V Vase-painting, xiv. 17. w War, parties for and against, at Athens, ii. 9; causes of the Peloponnesian, Thucydides' views, iii 1; the Megarian decree, ibid.; the peculations of Phidias, ibid.; the Peloponnesian, due to the peculations of Pericles, ibid. ; the cost of, iv. 6; largely met by private expenditure, ibid.,; savage nature of the Peloponnesian, even in 430, v. 12. Warfare, mode of, among the Athenians and Spartans, contrasted, iv. 5 ; difficulties of, ibid. West, the, and Athens, i. 9; Athenian view of conquest in, x. 13. Women, their life at Athens, ii. 3; at Athens, xiv. 23. x Xanthippus, son of Pericles, ii. 3; carried off by the plague (430), v. 10. Xenocritus, takes part in the founding of Thurii, i. 10. Xcnophanes of Elea, xiv. 11. z Zacynthus, attack on (430), V. 11. Zeno, xiv. 11. Zeuxis, xiv. 17.