3. THE PLACE OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.

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There have been, in recent years, marked changes in the method of study in both the philosophical and scientific fields. The results of scientific research have enlarged the bounds of human understanding, and made philosophy something quite different from the ancient and mediæval conceptions. In the study of philosophy the natural, concrete, and human have, in a measure, taken the place once occupied by the supernatural, abstract, and superhuman. The study of social phenomena has received much attention. Social Ethics, Social Economics, and Sociology, have already a somewhat well-defined territory. Political and Economic Philosophy are fairly established. It has been claimed that there is a Social Logic and Social Metaphysics. Books upon Social Philosophy have from time to time appeared. The place of Social Philosophy in a scheme of education is more and more recognized.

There is a wide belief in a science of society, even though there may be difference of opinion as to its completeness. In his "Philosophy of History" Professor Flint has said, "No special science is excluded from having the closest connection with and interest in philosophy, so that such special subject may be naturally said to have its philosophy; the philosophy of a subject, as distinguished from its science, being the view or theory of the relations of the subject to other subjects, and to the known world in general, as distinguished from the view or theory of it as isolated or in itself." * If this view of the relation of the science and the philosophy of society be taken, then, as the science attempts to deal with social facts by reference to causes, the philosophy, dealing with the same material, would be, broadly speaking, "the view or theory of the relations of the subject to other subjects, and to the known world in general."

It is fortunate that much work has been done so well for Social Philosophy by such studies as Ethics, Economic Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Education, Philosophy of

History, and other studies. It was necessary that some of this work should be done before Social Philosophy could be possible. Thus far it has usually been necessary to introduce, in the presentation of Sociology, some subjects properly belonging to Social Philosophy. Sociology furnishes Social Philosophy generous data; for Social Philosophy can no more deal with pure abstractions than other philosophy can. Here, as elsewhere, "the science must be philosophic, and the philosophy scientific," that the best results may be forthcoming. The pure science view of society may be narrowing and dangerous, and may lead to conceptions wholly misleading. France has borne witness of this last. A single point of departure, a cogito, ergo sum, is not sufficient for Social Philosophy. It must view the whole social organization of relationships. The point of view changes often, as in a moving equilibrium, with continual readjustment of parts. Consideration must be given to the ever-changing achievements in other fields of knowledge. It is not to be hoped that Social Philosophy will become fixed, even so far as other philosophies. No ultimate Social Philosophy can be presumed. The old must lose its life for the new, as heretofore. Nor does Social Philosophy propose to be a philosophy of philosophies, as sometimes thought. It draws, nevertheless, from all possible sources, to gain new insight as to the significance of social phenomena, and to apprehend these in their relationships with view to an end or ideal. A philosophy of society would not be possible until society, in some measure, became conscious of itself, and set before itself an aim.

Social Philosophy is in accord with the modern tendency to discover relationships. Coherence is the watchword of many theories. For Social Philosophy this coherence must be in all the past, all the present, and the future. The various cosmologies and elaborate systems of synthesis of recent days are natural outcomes of the modern spirit. Social Philosophy will follow in part a common way with some of these systems, yet will not lose its identity.

Fundamental philosophical questions are often propounded by the special social sciences. The conclusions in these sciences will be strongly influenced by the philosophical attitude of the investigator. A failure to apprehend sociological data in their broad relationships may greatly impair the value of the conclusions. The social problem is to bring the social units into proper relations to one another, and to society as a whole. How to do this must be
left, in a measure, to the social sciences. The laws in accord with which it may be done Sociology enunciates. What this proper relationship is Social Philosophy must help to show. If, as Professor Eucken has said, the general good is higher than the individual good; if the individual will is conditioned by the general will; if the social end must be attained through enlightened and intelligent actors,—then there is need of a Social Philosophy to determine the general good, the general will, the social end, in order that action may be enlightened and intelligent.* The overemphasis of one form of social activity, which at times makes it impossible for society to advance as it should, might often be avoided if a proper understanding of social relations were had. The understanding of these relationships would have shown the unsoundness of certain economic doctrines which have only been set aside after a century of trial. Economists, as Cossa says, have been long learning that “in the progress of civilization wealth is simply a means to the attainment of the higher end of moral improvement.” The many theories of social reorganization, sometimes dangerous, sometimes absurd, even though utterly disregarded by science, cannot be so treated by Social Philosophy; for these theories often show the spirit of the times, and now, as in all times, the limitation of man’s thinking is, to some extent, in the age itself. Social Philosophy should often serve as a balance wheel amid conflicting social theories.

The concrete questions of crime, punishment, charity, race-influence, marriage and divorce, and many others, may receive much light from Social Philosophy. The mighty influence of material science and reverence for the material have led to a neglect of the philosophical way of viewing what are named minor phenomena. There is in progress a study of society which, if not coupled with Social Philosophy, may later need the recasting Economics is now receiving. The aim, the end, the ideal, the reason for the existence of society itself, the idea that welfare or somewhat else is the goal of social effort, are fitting subjects for consideration; and the conclusions upon these subjects will be of great significance. All these inquiries may be in part independent of the same inquiries in regard to the individual as such, the political organization, or any other organization or unity which may exist within the social structure. Some say that it is not determined beyond a doubt that

*See also Professor Peabody, “Philosophy of Social Questions,” Andover Review, vol. viii, p. 561.
a political organization is necessary. Such questions Social Philosophy may help to decide by considering the larger unity in its relations. The social sciences will afford much assistance in such considerations. Indeed, so far-reaching are the inquiries of Social Philosophy that, while fundamental, they must come after a fairly developed scheme of education. To most clearly understand the whole, the parts must be somewhat fully understood; and the significance of the parts must be seen through a knowledge of the aim of the whole.

Fragmentary social phenomena can be apprehended when brought into relation to the larger social unit which Social Philosophy cognizes.

With all its limitations, both from the character of the data and from the nature of the study, Social Philosophy is still of great service. Especially is it of great importance to Sociology in furnishing a scheme of a system in viewing society as a whole, and considering the ideal and end of social action. Frequently the conclusions of Sociology may be rendered more intelligible through reference to this philosophy; for the scientific explanation of social phenomena depends upon the method of man's thinking, and this in part depends upon his understanding of the principles and ideals of society which his Social Philosophy furnishes. There can be no hostility between Sociology and Social Philosophy, but the most vital harmony and widest mutual helpfulness.

Social Philosophy may come into close relationship to many departments of knowledge. Its relationship to the Philosophy of History, of whatever school, is close. These often go hand in hand along the same way, but Social Philosophy must sometimes see what the Philosophy of History passes without notice. The Philosophy of History asks: (1) how comes the historical development to take place; (2) what results and what significance has this historical development.* Thus the Philosophy of History, while purporting to handle only the data which history supplies, is of great assistance to Social Philosophy. Certainly, the Philosophy of History furnishes a most excellent preliminary training for the study of Social Philosophy, which must consider the past, present, and the future of society in their interrelations. If a forward look is to be taken, a masterly grasp of the past is necessary, and for a comprehensive understanding of the present a wide knowledge of the relations and significance of old civilizations

*Bernheim, Lehrbuch der historischen Methode, p. 485.
must be had; and this the Philosophy of History greatly facilitates. The Philosophy of History has shown that the "Golden Age" is not "shrouded in the clouds of the past"; has given a clearer insight into the past, oft-times doing work that Social Philosophy must otherwise do, though doing much which Social Philosophy need not do, and leaving undone much that Social Philosophy must do.

Social Philosophy in the scheme of education is occupied with another view of the same subjects which may engage the attention of other departments; also with certain material which other departments leave uninvestigated. It would view these subjects as related to associated man, past, present, and future. The social ideal of the present will be of vast importance to the future, as is the individual ideal of the past to the present. The present has been characterized as showing "much knowledge, yet little productivity, many interests, yet little force, much elasticity, yet little continuous following of independent lines of thought,—in short, much talent, yet little character." If the present shows such conditions, Social Philosophy may best interpret their significance.

Social Philosophy would try to explain the significance of the conclusions of Sociology with reference to an ideal, and to relate these conclusions to those of other sciences. Through Social Philosophy man may be brought to an apprehension of the wider meaning of collective relationships and possibilities. This will not be wholly without practical value; for, as that able scholar, the late Dr. Jowett, has said, "There is no absurdity in expecting that the mass of mankind, having the power in their own hands, and becoming enlightened about the higher possibilities of human life, when they come to see how much more is attainable for all than is at present the possession of a favored few, may pursue the common interest with an intelligence and persistency which the world has not yet seen." Though Social Philosophy does not aim to solve social problems,—for to bring the social units into proper relations to each other and to society is doubtless a hopeless task, and, were it done to-day, must be done again to-morrow,—yet this does not make its task a needless one, nor the labor of considering the wide relations, and thinking the significance of social phenomena, empty; for only thus can social life be understood, and only by right understanding can right use be made.
In making up its program for this morning, the Department of Education has shown itself awake to the importance of a new departure in the teaching of social science, which is attracting general attention, and which promises interesting developments in scientific theory and in educational practice.

For many years "social science" has appeared in the list of subjects taught by lecture, or now and then by instruction in systematic observation, in a few American universities. The courses offered under this title have resembled each other in nothing but name. Some of them have been statistical studies of population; others have dealt with the so-called labor question; others, with defectives and delinquents, charity, punishment, and reformation; and others still, with public health and sanitation. Indeed, they have collectively well-represented the broad inclusiveness of the term "social science" as it is used in the title of this Association. All that could be said with certainty of such university courses was that they were concerned with groups of social facts not otherwise covered by the courses in history, political economy, politics, and ethics.

Meanwhile, in European universities have appeared courses on "sociology." These have differed from the American courses as much in fact as in name. Essentially, they have been as much alike in subject-matter as the American courses in "social science" have been unlike. They have adhered strictly to the original and only defensible meaning of the word "sociology." Recently, with the growing popular interest in social questions of every sort, the words "sociology" and "sociological" have been used in American newspapers and on the platform for every conceivable idea of social conditions, and even to designate the conditions themselves. To Comte, who coined "sociology," the
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name meant always a philosophical explanation of society as a whole. To Spencer, who made it pass as coin current, it has always meant an explanation of society in terms of evolutional theory. To the European sociologists, such men as Schäffle of Stuttgart, De Grefe of Brussels, Gumplowicz of Graz, Westermarck of Helsingfors, Letourneau of Paris, and Simmel of Berlin, all of whom have written sociological treatises, as well as given sociological courses in their universities, the word stands invariably for the original conceptions of Comte and Spencer,—conceptions, namely, of society as a concrete whole, and of its scientific explanation in terms of natural causes. "Sociology," then, in the view of all these scholars, is the descriptive, historical, and explanatory science of society. It is not a study of some one special group of social facts: it examines the relations of all groups to each other and to the whole. It is not philanthropy: it is the scientific groundwork on which a true philanthropy must build.

For some time past it has been apparent to the discerning that this unified, coherent, philosophical "sociology" was destined to displace or to incorporate and co-ordinate the fragments of "social science" taught in American universities. The change has already begun. In fact, it is far advanced. The first true course in sociology in an American university was given by Professor Sumner at Yale, who introduced Spencer's "Study of Sociology" as a text-book in his classes, soon after its publication in 1873. For many years he stood alone. But since 1890, when President Small began a course of lectures on sociology to seniors at Colby University, and the present writer one to graduate students at Bryn Mawr, the word "sociology" has quietly taken its place with "biology" and "psychology" in college and university catalogues in every section of our country. This present year Columbia has created the first American university professorship of sociology to be officially designated by that name; and at Hartford, Conn., a School of Sociology in connection with the Theological Seminary is to be established this autumn, with an able corps of lecturers.

Such recognition of sociology as a true and coherent science, backed up by liberal provision for its teaching, must powerfully stimulate the scientific study of society; and we have a right to expect from it large results, of theoretical and practical value. But it brings with it new difficulties to be overcome. One of these, which I think is the initial difficulty, and upon the right or wrong
apprehension of which serious consequences will turn, is the subject of my paper this morning.

The classification of the sciences, which seemed to Comte to be of theoretical importance, and upon which Mr. Spencer, for theoretical reasons chiefly, has written at length, has all at once become a matter of immediate practical concern. The university cannot afford duplication of work. If a subject is already taught under one name, nothing is to be gained by creating a new department for no other purpose than to teach the same subject under a different name. Political Economy, various branches of law, and the theory of the State have long been subjects of university instruction. If sociology is the general science or explanation of society, does it not cover under one name the ground that more special social sciences collectively cover under various names? For practical purposes is not sociology too comprehensive? No one would propose to turn over to the chair of sociology the work of an entire faculty of political science. But, if we are to go on teaching political economy, law, and other branches as distinct subjects, what field remains for sociology?

These questions, as I have said, present a real difficulty. But it is a difficulty for which the sociologist has reason to be thankful. For in meeting it, and in framing answers to the questions just now raised, we are arriving at more perfect notions of our science. What was nebulous and vague is becoming clear and precise.

Reflection will show us that only two answers can be given to the question about the field, or the province, of sociology. For educational purposes, sociology is either a co-ordinating science, as Professor Small has been teaching his students at Chicago, or it is a fundamental science, as I have been teaching my students at Columbia. In other words, sociology either concerns itself with the study of the relations that various groups of social phenomena hold to each other and to society as a whole, leaving to particular social sciences the study of each group in minute detail, or it is a study of those elements and first principles of social life and organization out of which the great special groups of phenomena, such as the economic, the legal, and the political, are developed.

These two notions of sociology are different in form; and one’s methods in teaching will be affected somewhat, doubtless, by the choice one makes between them. But, in substance, they do not differ materially. Co-ordinating principles are fundamental or first principles, always. The most general facts examined by any
science are elementary facts. If we want to know what relations economic, legal, and political phenomena bear to each other and to the social whole, we must ask what fundamental conditions of life in society they grow out of.

If, now, guided by this thought, we inquire what very fundamental phenomena of human society are under our observation, we shall see many things in a new light. We shall expect, perhaps, that a sociology which restricts itself to elements and first principles will prove to be highly abstruse, and much too general to afford helpful guidance in practical affairs. This expectation will be curiously disappointed. As a matter of fact, it so happens that the elementary phenomena of society are precisely those that give rise to the pressing questions of practical policy and philanthropy. Nearly all the practical problems that confront society grow out of the alternate aggregation and dispersion of population; the migration and intermingling of races and nationalities; the unequal development of economic and of social instincts in different individuals; the consequent appearance in the community of different standards of living; the consequent segregation also of the population into the enterprising, the industrious, the criminal, the pauper, the unfortunate, and the degenerate; and, finally, out of that ceaseless interchange of thought and feeling whereby the members of a community come to feel the same desires and antagonisms, to cherish the same ideas, and to act in concert for common ends. That these things are the fruitful causes of unrest, of agitation, of interest in social questions, of philanthropy itself, has long been understood. What we have not perceived is that these things are in truth the very elements of social phenomena of every description. We have not realized that it is because of these things that there are in society different notions and estimations of utility, differing costs and varying supplies of commodity, fluctuating market values, and a division of labor; that there are also varying degrees of toleration and various regulations of individual liberties and forbearances; and that there are, finally, political combinations possessing the attribute of sovereignty. We have therefore felt no surprise that colleges and universities have not prepared their students for studies in political economy, law, and politics by systematic studies of the facts of population, including migration, assimilation, industriousness, pauperism, and criminality, and by careful analysis of the social mind, one phase of which is public opinion. We have not thought it peculiar that these
studies, when admitted into the curriculum at all, have been assigned to a minor rank, as if they were of quite secondary importance.

Here, then, is the opportunity for sociology. It must enter upon that thorough-going, systematic study of these phenomena which will demonstrate to everybody that they are the fundamental, the elementary things,—that they are, in fact, the germ-plasm of society,—and that the study of them, so far from being a mere supplement to older sciences, and without logical relation to other inquiries, is the true co-ordination of all social sciences, because it is the groundwork on which all must build.

Sociology so conceived will be descriptive, historical, and explanatory. As descriptive, it will analyze and classify the facts of population, of the characteristics and activities of the social mind, of the social composition, and of the social constitution. The social composition is the organization of the population into such groups as the family, the clan, the tribe, the town, the commonwealth, and the nation. The social constitution is the organization according to social function and a division of labor. It consists of the partnerships, associations, and corporations that men form for innumerable special purposes. The social composition and the social constitution are creations of the social mind.

As historical, sociology will examine the stages through which society has passed in its evolution. There have been four great stages, corresponding roughly to the four descriptive aspects named above. Society begins among animals, and most of the phenomena characteristic of population were engendered in a zoogenic stage of association. The evolution of the social mind marked the transition from animal to man: it was the anthropogenic stage. The social mind created the family (as something more and higher than a mere animal union), the tribe, and the nation,—the ethnos, in short; and this was the ethnogenic stage. Finally, through the evolution of the social constitution, with its functional division of labor, population has been enabled to multiply enormously, and the social mind has become democratic. We have arrived at the demogenic stage of social evolution.

As explanatory, sociology will not be satisfied to accept as a sufficient interpretation of the social process an account in terms of physical causation only, or an account in terms of volition only. Physical causation and human volition act and react upon each other. The aggregation of population and its rough differentiation
are accomplished by physical causes. Association multiplies the life chances, and increases the happiness of individuals, who endeavor, therefore, to perfect the social organization. They choose courses of conduct, and invent social arrangements. Some choices are wise, and some are unwise. Some arrangements are beneficial, and others are harmful. Natural selection sifts them as it sifts individuals. Some arrangements, some customs, laws, and institutions survive, others disappear. Sociology therefore must try to understand the interaction of physical and of volitional causation in social evolution. It must try to formulate the law of the physical process, the law of the volitional process, and the law of social survival.

This conception of sociology as the fundamental social science has been criticised, notably by Professor Patten, who argues that all subjective sociological explanations must be made in terms of the abstract theories of utility and of social forces, and that these, properly developed, constitute sciences logically antecedent to sociology. In meeting this criticism, I can best indicate my view of the relation of sociology to various sciences, not hitherto named, and so round out my discussion of the relation of sociology to other scientific studies.

The criticism arises, I think, out of the mistaken attempt to arrange all the sciences in a serial order. I think that we should accept the notion of Dilthey,—that the sciences fall into two distinct orders, the general, abstract, or hypothetical, and the historical, or concrete. Instead, then, of putting all the abstract sciences at the beginning of a series and all the concrete sciences at the end, after the manner of Comte and Spencer, we should better indicate their true relations by arranging the abstract sciences in order along a horizontal line and the concrete sciences in order along a vertical line. The lines of subdivision of the abstract sciences projected will then cross the projected lines subdividing the concrete sciences. Putting the critique of knowledge, logic, and mathematics in the angle, we should then arrange the abstract sciences along the horizontal line thus: (1) physic (the pure theory of physical forces), (2) abstract economics (the pure theory of utility), (3) abstract ethics (the pure theory of social forces). The concrete sciences would stand in order down the vertical line thus: chemistry, astronomy, geology, biology, psychology, sociology. Where the lines of the abstract cross the lines of the concrete, the concrete pass from mere description into ex-
planation. Chemistry, astronomy, and geology become explanatory only as crossed by the abstract theories of physics. Biology, psychology, and sociology become explanatory as well as descriptive and historical, when crossed by the abstract theories of physics, abstract economics, and abstract ethics.
5. PRACTICAL INSTRUCTION IN CIVICS.

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The instruction of the citizen in civics is attained chiefly through the practice of civic duties. It is not well to try to separate too far scientific from practical knowledge. We have known something about electricity for several generations. We have practised electricity only a part of one generation. Yet much of the progress of the science belongs to this brief period, and an eminent electrician has predicted that there will be new revelations of the power of that marvellous force when time has intervened for boys to become men who have thought and handled electricity from childhood. The attempt to separate the science of economics from applied economics is a hindrance both to accurate knowledge and to rational industrial conduct. That instruction in politics will in the end be seen to be most scientific which is most practical.

It would seem that men have been engaged in the business of governing long enough for both the science and the practice of government to have attained perfection. But, for the most part, the people have felt themselves to be the victims of government. The conscious and free exercise of governmental functions is yet an unattained dream. Both Robespierre and those whom he guillotined were victims. Both the despot and his people are subject to forces which neither can control. The Constitution of the United States was wrung from the despair of the most courageous of men. We pity our colored brethren of the South because, in the eyes of the law, they enjoy equal rights with their white neighbors, while their right to vote is made a mockery. The occasional black man of the South who does vote, and who does exert a conscious political influence, may look with pity upon the wealthy and educated classes in our Northern cities, who are apparently hopeless victims in the hands of an alien race. Neither in municipal, State, or national affairs do the people consciously rule. A member of the Irish race informs me that the reason the Irish govern our cities as they now do is because they are a humorous people.
They see a vast, intelligent, and money-making class offering themselves as victims; and they go in, and occupy the field from a feeling of irrepressible humor. The white man of the South represses the negro vote because he feels that he must. Both the ruler and the ruled are victims.

In the industrial world, also, men are victims of circumstances. The business corporation or the joint-stock company is, in law, an organization whereby all the stockholders may have an equal or a proportionate share in the management of an industrial enterprise. Yet, in practice, the business corporation follows the analogy of the municipal corporation. The conduct of the business drifts into the hands of the few. The ordinary stockholder has practically no voice in the business. Neither industrially nor politically are the people free.

It is not reasonable to expect that a government in which the few do the governing will succeed in creating business corporations in which the many shall enjoy their just rights. The newly awakened interest in civic education is closely connected with new industrial necessities. The modern city is a product of modern industries. Civic and industrial freedom are not likely to be separately attained.

It is of the highest consequence to right civic education that all activities which are in themselves parts of the civic, or governmental, life of the people should be so named and so regarded. An industrial monopoly is, in its very nature, a part of the government. Any man, or any company of men, who succeed in monopolizing a necessity or a convenience of the people, by that fact attains the power of exacting tribute from the people. This principle has always been recognized by the most enlightened statesmen; yet governments have failed to act consistently with this principle. A company organized to supply a city with water is an industrial monopoly. Such a company is just as really a part of the city government as is the corporation which furnishes the police. If the so-called city government takes no account of the city water company, and allows the people and the company to deal with each other as they please, then the people become at the same time subject to two independent, corporate governments. Such a water company may deal with the people in a just and fatherly way. There have been in history many despots who thus dealt with their people. But a water company which gets control of the only supply of pure water for a city, and is then
permitted to make such contracts as it pleases with the people, is not a democratic government. It is a despotic government. It may be just; it may be a good government. It cannot be a free or a democratic government. The only way such a government can be made democratic in its character is for all the people who compose the one municipal corporation to furnish themselves with water through their own chosen officers. What is true of the water supply is likewise true of the light supply and the street-car service. To subject the people to an independent government for each of these services tends to confusion in civic education. This confusion has apparently reached its climax in the minds of certain writers, who apply the term “paternalism” to that form of city government in which the people take direct charge of all their city monopolies, and administer them in a thoroughly democratic way. The term “paternalism” applied to any act of a real democratic government is the sheerest nonsense. A despotism assumes that the people are not capable of governing themselves. A truly generous and just water company is a real paternal government. It assumes that the people are not able to manage their own affairs, and it proceeds to manage for them. The only way that a people can rid themselves of such a paternal government is by supplying themselves with water by means of their own officers.

The city of Chicago learned lessons in civics with wonderful avidity last year when the city government began to distribute typhoid fever to the people through the water supply. If Chicago had been supplied through a company, there would have been confusion in the educational effect. The company would have employed “experts,” to throw doubt upon the origin of the disease. The people would not have thought of the company as a part of their government. There would at least have been a divided responsibility, and the people would have been more than ever impressed with a sense of helplessness. The same people of Chicago have had forty years of experience with a gas company, and they have been robbed of as many millions of dollars; while, so far as appears, not one needful lesson in civics has been learned. Civic education will proceed simply and naturally when everything which is of the nature of government is formally made a part of the government. If the water is poison, the people ought to know that it is their own officers who are poisoning them. If the lighting is bad, they should know that the fault is that of the city.
If the street-cars are dangerous, they should seek to reform their city government. To say that the people are not capable of managing such matters themselves is to plead that the people are not capable of attending to their simplest civic duties.

What is said of the city monopolies in their relation to the municipal corporation is equally true of telegraphs and railways in their relation to the general government. These are in their nature business monopolies. They are a part of the government to which the people, without any choice of their own, are obliged to submit. A railway company may deal fairly and justly with the people, just as an oligarchy may rule with justice and moderation; but such a government is not democratic. It has all the limitations of any other oligarchy or despotism. If it is no part of the business of a government to own and operate railroads, pray, what is a government for? We have heard that a government is to administer justice. Some men talk about administering justice, as though that was the one simple and easy thing that people can do in their corporate capacity as a government. It may possibly be true that, if the people could succeed in setting up governments which were capable of administering exact and adequate justice, little else would be required. Such a thing has never been done. The administration of justice is the most difficult thing that man has ever undertaken. It is generally conceded that in the management of corporate property, especially in the management of railway property, there has been a lamentable failure in the administration of justice. The courts of law have been conspicuous agents in the defrauding of stockholders and bondholders. Having, then, failed in what is claimed to be the primary function of government, it is certainly a fair question to consider whether it would not be best to undertake the simpler and easier business of owning and operating railways. Certainly, no one would have the temerity to predict that our failure in this business would be as signal as has been our failure in the administration of justice in the management of corporate property.

The claim is made that it is best to let railway companies manage the railway business, and expend the power of the government in the control of the companies. This is a great waste of the means of civic education. If the government could thoroughly control the companies, then the business would be in fact government business, while it would appear to be the business of a private company. The people would be dealing with their govern-
ment unawares. The full advantage of civic education can be obtained only when the people are fully aware that they are doing the business through their own chosen agents. It is no answer to this argument to say that companies can do the business more efficiently and more cheaply than can the government. A despotism often appears to be more effective and more economical than a democracy. But, if democracy is to survive, nothing will in the end be economical which tends to confuse the mind of the citizen. If the people do not attain the conscious power to manage that part of the government which is called railway business, they are likely in the end to lose all hope of ever mastering the more difficult business of the administration of justice. It is said that, if the people own city monopolies and operate telegraphs and railways, then they must engage in other business enterprises, and the complete socialistic state will ultimately be established. The only claim I have set forward is that the people should learn to administer through their own governmental agents the entire government to which they are in fact subject. The success of democracy demands this, and any other method is a hindrance to effective civic education. No one has any right to say that this policy has any tendency to produce the socialistic state. It may be the most effective way to forestall dangerous experiments in socialism. When an industry is monopolized, it becomes a part of the government, whether we will or not. I do not favor extending the government to industries which are not already a part of the government. I do not object to the use of the powers of government to restrain the growth of monopoly. My single claim is that, in the interest of practical civic education, every part of the government to which people are in fact subject should be made a direct and formal part of that which the people are accustomed to recognize as the government. My claim is that the people should cease to be humbugged.

This simplifying of the government could not fail to have a favorable effect upon the education of the citizen. It would greatly multiply the points of conscious contact with the government. There would be a perpetual sense of achievement or of failure, which could not fail to be educating, in the best sense. As the work of the citizen would be simplified, so the work of the schools would likewise be simplified. The first teacher of the child is usually a civil officer. The school is recognized as a part of the government. The child thus begins to learn of the
government as he learns of the family,—by contact and by observation. It is now customary for teachers to begin very early to call to the conscious attention of the child the grouping of neighbors into school districts, and the various doings of the school districts, road districts, townships, towns and cities, counties, States, and the United States. The child is early led to take a deep interest in the activities of these various governmental agencies. That which especially interests the child is the activities which he is able to observe for himself. If the city monopolies and the railways and telegraphs were a formal part of the government, they would furnish a rich field for the instruction of youth. The field of conscious civic life would be greatly enlarged. There would be an ampler accumulation of facts and observations to be used in the theoretic studies of the higher schools. But if these monopolies are not a formal part of the government, if they are in the hands of so-called private companies, it were folly to try to make any use of them in the formal civic education of youth. The child learns, in course of time, that his kindred are subject to the gas company; but he accepts this as a part of an unexplained, mysterious providence. It does not edify him to tell him that there is some occult relation between the gas company and the city government.

The uniting of all business which is governmental in its nature is here urged, not as a means of effecting specific reforms, but as a means of promoting practical instruction in civics. Right civic education is vitally related to all permanent reforms. But it is wide of the mark to contend that, unless a proposed policy cheapens a service, it ought not to be adopted. Thus far no cheap market for liberty has been found. The very term "civic education" assumes a democratic government. If the citizen is to live under a despotism, the only education which is useful and practical is that of obedience to rulers. Civic education, as we know the term, is education in the art of government. It is the gaining of that knowledge and experience whereby a people may rule themselves.

Some forty years ago a few young men in Birmingham, England, were wont to meet together to bemoan the desperate condition of their municipal government. They were subject to a corrupt water company and two gas companies. Their taxes were high, life was insecure, and it was a disgrace to be a member of the town council. These young men were seated in a small, dark room, when one of their number had a revelation. He leaped into
the air, and exclaimed, "The way to reform this town is to give it something worthy to do!" Acting upon this word, there was instituted a policy which has resulted in the municipalization of the water supply and the light supply, the purchase of a drainage farm, the purchase of the slums of the city and the transforming of them into New Street, the establishing of a system of city schools, and a library system which furnishes abundant free reading matter to the people. Gas and water became cheap and pure. Taxes were reduced, the police was rendered efficient, and the most honorable citizen accounts it an honor to be chosen to a place in the city government. In this particular instance a great reform coincided with a marked growth in civic education. But he who holds a rational belief in democracy must advocate the doing of these things on the part of the government, even though the business be not at first so well done. A generous and paternal monarchy is the most effective enemy to the growth of free government. People have usually learned lessons in freedom by the practice of costly experiments. It is sadly true that the transition from despotism to freedom has not usually appeared to be cheap and easy. The American ought not to insist that gas and water shall be furnished cheaply before he gives his approval to a policy of municipalization. All that is necessary is that he shall believe that in the long run a democracy is better than an oligarchy or a despotism. A rational believer in free government is willing to undertake its responsibilities, even when he is convinced that it will cost something to educate the people to do the work well. So long as the people confess their inability to manage their railroads and their city monoplies, they not only confess their inability to govern themselves, but they confess their inability and that of their children to learn to govern themselves. I know of no proposition more misleading than the statement that no sort of business should be undertaken by the government which can be done more economically and more effectively by private enterprise.

Whenever the comparison is made between private and public business, we are apt to fix, as a sort of standard, the best that individuals are accustomed to do, and compare this with what an inexperienced or a corrupt government would be likely to do. This is not fair to the claims of the government; and, if the so-called principle were carried to its logical conclusion, it would destroy all attempts at the experiment of free government.

The police business of New York has for generations been
chiefly a matter of private enterprise. According to competent authorities, it has, in the main, been cheap and effective. If the people of the city should take this business in hand, it would probably be a long time before the work could be done as effectively and as cheaply. Tammany Hall is a fairly good paternal government. Yet all believers in democracy must contend that it is better for the people of the city, at whatever cost, to seek to transfer this business from private to public hands. They must do this even if they could be assured in advance that it would take them a thousand years to learn to do the business as cheaply and efficiently as it is now done by Tammany Hall.

The jury system was never adopted, and is not now retained, because it is believed to be cheap and efficient. It was adopted because it seemed less barbarous than was trial by battle and by hot irons. It is retained, not so much because we believe in its efficiency as because we fear that greater evils attend a proposed substitute. It is universally conceded that judicial business ought not to be left to private enterprise: it ought to be in the hands of governmental agents. Yet we are afraid to have judges chosen by direct vote of the people. We are also afraid to place the selection of judges in the hands of the executive or in the hands of the legislature. No policy can be proposed which does not seem fraught with danger. The common citizen is advised to avoid the courts. It is better to endure a good deal of palpable injustice than to risk the chances of a suit at law. Everything about the business tends to impress the mind of the ordinary citizen with the conviction that he is a victim of government. So far as this business is concerned, its influence is against the attainment of practical civic education. Those who make law a profession often become more hopeless victims than the common citizen. They are taught to give the name of justice to that which is not just, but which is simply a crude and imperfect attempt at justice. Many are the lawyers who, in course of time, become victims of the notion that these crude attempts are in fact what they are called. There is often a doubt as to what is just. Such a business, at its best, cannot give to a people a lively sense of either achievement or failure.

Civic education has advanced because the people, in their capacity as a government, have done other things. They have owned land and other natural agents, and have attempted to distribute the uses of these. They have erected buildings, and taken care of
them. They have equipped armies and navies. They have gone forth as colonists to subdue the wilderness. Europeans farther advanced in civic education have practised governing the hordes of Asia. During the Middle Ages European towns practised all sorts of handicraft, and regulated the minutest details of trade and commerce. In more modern times civic education has been promoted by the postal system, government telegraphs, and, in some countries, by the government railways.

But progress in civic education in recent years is chiefly due to the fact that governments have assumed the task of educating all the people. Without any reference to what is taught in the schools, the mere fact that the masses of the people during the impressible years of childhood and youth are under the tutelage of officers of the government is a transcendental lesson in practical civics. It is not an accident that the creation of the public school, the unexampled growth of the spirit of democracy, and the widespread striving after conscious social achievement should occur at about the same time. These are related to each other as cause and effect. Learning is democratic in its tendency, because the son of the humble man is often seen to surpass the son of the great man. The spirit of democracy will not continue to subsist in an age of science and learning without desperate efforts to realize the fact of democracy. No sort of political or civic education is at all useful or practical in this age which does not tend to give to the people the consciousness of their power to do things through the one organization which includes them all; that is, through their government. Modern industry has determined that associated action shall displace isolated and individual action. If other organizations of men can do things too difficult for the people to learn to do through their government, then those other organizations are likely to become the government; and the spirit of democracy will be suppressed. A greater or more difficult organization than the government cannot continue to exist. It will itself become the government, controlling the action of legislatures and administrative and judicial officers.